

CLASS AND REGION IN ARGENTINA  
A STUDY OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGE, 1916-1966

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To the memory of

Charles D. Farris

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	xiv
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION: CLASS AND REGION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . .	1
II. THE RADICALS ARRIVE, 1916-1918 . . . . .	48
III. A RADICAL HOUSE DIVIDED, 1926-1928 . . . . .	115
IV. THE CONSERVATIVE RESTORATION, 1936-1938 . . . . .	169
V. THE PERON ERA OPENS, 1946-1948 . . . . .	204
VI. THE FAILURE OF "NATIONAL INTEGRATION," 1960- 1962 . . . . .	266
VII. A SHORT-LIVED ATTEMPT AT "NORMALCY," 1965- 1966 . . . . .	303
VIII. CONCLUSION: CLASS AND REGION, 1916-1966 . . . . .	350
APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY: ELECTION ANALYSIS . . . . .	377
APPENDIX B METHODOLOGY: ROLL CALL ANALYSIS . . . . .	419
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	536

# LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
11-1	CORRELATES OF 1916 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	71
11-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	78
11-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	78
11-4	SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE . . . . .	80
11-5	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES . . . . .	80
11-6A	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	82
11-6B	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	82
11-6C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	85
11-6D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	85
11-7A	FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE . . . . .	88
11-7B	FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE . . . . .	88
11-7C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	89
11-7D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	89
11-8A	SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE . . . . .	92
11-8B	SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE . . . . .	92
11-8C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	93
11-8D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	93
11-9A	RELIGION SCALE . . . . .	98
11-9B	RELIGION SCALE . . . . .	98
11-9C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	99
11-9D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	99
11-10A	INVESTIGATIONS SCALE . . . . .	101

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table		Page
II-10B	INVESTIGATIONS SCALE . . . . .	101
II-10C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	102
II-10D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	102
III-1	CORRELATES OF 1926 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	127
III-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	135
III-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	135
III-4	SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE . . . . .	137
III-5	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES . . . . .	138
III-6	RADICAL DEPUTIES BY REGION . . . . .	138
III-7A	PETROLEUM SCALE . . . . .	141
III-7B	PETROLEUM SCALE . . . . .	141
III-7C	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	142
III-7D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	142
III-8A	WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE . . . . .	145
III-8B	WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE . . . . .	145
III-8C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	146
III-8D	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	146
III-9A	FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE . . . . .	148
III-9B	FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE . . . . .	148
III-9C	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	149
III-9D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	149
III-10A	LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE . . . . .	151
III-10B	LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE . . . . .	151

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table		Page
III-10C	RADICAL BLOC . . . . .	152
III-10D	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	152
III-10E	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	153
III-11A	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	155
III-11B	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	155
III-12A	PENSIONS SCALE . . . . .	157
III-12B	PENSIONS SCALE . . . . .	157
III-13A	CREDENTIALS SCALE . . . . .	159
III-13B	CREDENTIALS SCALE . . . . .	159
III-13C	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	160
III-13D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	160
III-14A	BUDGET CONTROL SCALE . . . . .	162
III-14B	BUDGET CONTROL SCALE . . . . .	162
III-14C	ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC . . . . .	163
III-14D	CONSERVATIVE BLOC . . . . .	163
IV-1	CORRELATES OF 1936 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	179
IV-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	191
IV-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	191
IV-4A	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	195
IV-4B	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	195
IV-4C	CONCORDANCIA BLOC . . . . .	196
IV-4D	OPPOSITION BLOC . . . . .	196
IV-5	SCALE TYPE BY PARTY . . . . .	197
IV-6	MAJOR PARTIES . . . . .	199

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table		Page
V-1	CORRELATES OF 1946 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	216
V-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	231
V-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	231
V-4	SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE . . . . .	232
V-5	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES . . . . .	234
V-6A	LABOR SCALE #1 . . . . .	236
V-6B	LABOR SCALE #1 . . . . .	236
V-6C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	237
V-7A	LABOR SCALE #2 . . . . .	239
V-7B	LABOR SCALE #2 . . . . .	239
V-7C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	240
V-7D	OPPOSITION BLOC . . . . .	240
V-8A	UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE . . . . .	243
V-8B	UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE . . . . .	243
V-8C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	244
V-8D	OPPOSITION BLOC . . . . .	244
V-9A	EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE . . . . .	246
V-9B	EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE . . . . .	246
V-9C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	247
V-10A	RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE . . . . .	250
V-10B	RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE . . . . .	250
V-10C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	251
V-11A	FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE . . . . .	253

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table		Page
V-11B	FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE . . . . .	253
V-11C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	254
V-12A	ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE . . . . .	256
V-12B	ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE . . . . .	256
V-12C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	257
V-12D	OPPOSITION BLOC . . . . .	257
V-13A	SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE . . . . .	259
V-13B	SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE . . . . .	259
V-13C	PERONISTA BLOC . . . . .	260
VI-1	CORRELATES OF 1960 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	281
VI-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	296
VI-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	296
VII-1	CORRELATES OF 1965 DEPUTIES ELECTION . . . . .	318
VII-2	CONTESTED ROLL CALLS . . . . .	329
VII-3	ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	329
VII-4	SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE . . . . .	331
VII-5	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES . . . . .	331
VII-6A	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	333
VII-6B	PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE . . . . .	334
VII-7A	LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE . . . . .	338
VII-7B	LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE . . . . .	339
VII-8	TAX BREAK ROLL CALL, 1965-1966 . . . . .	341
VII-9	BUENOS AIRES POWER ROLL CALL, 1965-1966 . . . . .	343



# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table		Page
VIII-1	URBANISM AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965 . . . . .	352
VIII-2	PROSPEROUS FARMING AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965 . .	355
VIII-3	INDUSTRY AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965 . . . . .	358
VIII-4	RANCH-FARM RATIO AND PARTY VOTE, 1936-1965 . . .	362
VIII-5	CONTINUITY AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965 . . . . .	364
A-1	1914 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX . . . . .	380
A-2	CORRELATION MATRICES FOR 1914 FACTORS . . . . .	384
A-3	1947 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX . . . . .	391
A-4	CORRELATION MATRICES FOR 1947 FACTORS . . . . .	400
A-5	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTORS OF 1914 AND 1947 .	404
A-6	1960 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX . . . . .	408
A-7	CORRELATION MATRICES FOR 1960 FACTORS . . . . .	412
A-8	CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTORS OF 1947 AND 1960 CENSUSES . . . . .	415

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
B-1 . . . . .	435
B-2 . . . . .	437

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION: CLASS AND REGION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Cleavage, once considered a social and political aberration, has become a basic element of contemporary political theory. No longer is it assumed that all right-thinking men will agree on what is best for the whole, nor that faction is fatal to the body politic. Political parties, once defined as a group of men united in pursuit of the common interest,<sup>1</sup> more recently have been conceptualized as a means of aggregating diverse interests into units which, in most systems, confront one or more other composites of similarly diverse interests.<sup>2</sup> It is commonplace that legislatures are--and should be--composed not so much of Burkean "trustees" as of men representing diverse and often conflicting interests. While it is but one of his many roles, the executive's function as an arbiter between conflicting groups both within and without government has recently received increasing attention.<sup>3</sup> If politics is concerned with the "authoritative allocation of values,"<sup>4</sup> it is only reasonable that there will be differing opinions on the "proper" allocation and that at least some of these points of view will be translated into attempts to influence the allocation.

The existence of conflicting interests and attitudes is not taken merely as a neutral "given" in contemporary political analysis. It has come to be considered at least a potentially positive element in the operation of a political system. Lipset contends that in a stable democracy a measure of conflict or cleavage is needed "so that there

will be struggle over ruling positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in office."<sup>5</sup> He adds, of course, that this cleavage must be counterbalanced by a degree of underlying consensus. Easton, not limiting himself to democratic regimes, says neither social diversity nor political cleavage is a synonym for disunity and that both represent conditions which may help to integrate a political system or may have the opposite effect.<sup>6</sup> Cleavage would thus seem to be a factor basic to any political system, with its favorable or adverse effects on that system depending upon the nature and context of the cleavage.

The potential bases of cleavage in a political system are many: region, ethnicity, religion, social class, occupation, race, tradition, and leadership appeal, among others. The appearance, depth, and relative importance of diverse bases of cleavage vary from one society to another and from one time period to another. A recent study of three European nations has suggested, furthermore, that as one dimension of cleavage declines in importance it is often replaced by the rising significance of some new type of cleavage.<sup>7</sup>

The present study will attempt to analyze political cleavage in Argentina over a fifty-year period and relate it to the two dimensions which appear most relevant to that nation--region and socio-economic class. This is not intended to imply that these are the only significant dimensions of political cleavage in Argentina; tradition and leadership appeal--caudillismo as it is known in Latin America--are no doubt of considerable importance even though the nation has been relatively free of serious divisions along racial, cultural, or religious lines. Rather,

the selection of these two dimensions of cleavage was based on the belief that among possible bases of cleavage these two would prove to be of the greatest explanatory value and that a hypothesized shift from region to class as the major dimension of cleavage could be empirically tested.

An understanding of many facets of twentieth century Argentina must begin with a study of the nineteenth century. This is particularly important in the case of regionalism, only slightly less so in the case of socio-economic class. The bulk of the present chapter, therefore, will be devoted to an overview of the historical background of regionalism and socio-economic stratification. Although these two factors were often interrelated in Argentine history, they will be treated separately in an attempt at conceptual clarity. The same will be done with the important phenomena of immigration and internal migration, which relate to both regionalism and socio-economic class. The final section of the chapter will briefly outline the methodology and conceptual foundations of the analysis of the six sample time periods which compose the body of this study.<sup>8</sup>

Argentina has been free of the major causes of regional cleavage found in many nations. Her people have not been separated into isolated areas by mountain ranges or other geographic barriers. There have been no language or religious differences from one region to another, and while some regional ethnic differences were to develop as a result of heavy European immigration, this was not a factor during the nation's first half-century of independence and was of limited importance after that. Yet regional conflict, present even during colonial times,

dominated Argentine politics during much of the nineteenth century and will be seen to be of some significance well into the twentieth century. For in a very real sense "there are two Argentines, and the whole history of the nation is the story of their struggle."<sup>9</sup>

It was long customary to portray the regional conflicts of the first half of the nineteenth century in terms of cultural differences --"modern" Buenos Aires versus the "traditional" Interior--or as a struggle of "civilization"--again represented mainly by the city of Buenos Aires--against the "barbarism" of the Interior.<sup>10</sup> These themes dominated Argentine historiography during most of the nineteenth century and are often found in works by United States authors on Argentine history.<sup>11</sup> This image, however, has increasingly been challenged by well-documented economic interpretations of the basis of regional conflict in Argentina.<sup>12</sup> In this light, the regional struggles are seen as having their origins primarily in the Interior's efforts to defend its economic interests against detrimental economic policies of Buenos Aires, on the one hand, and in the efforts of Buenos Aires to economically and politically dominate the Interior, on the other. It has been common to speak of "two economies" in Argentina,<sup>13</sup> and even the more cautious who tend to avoid such a dichotomy note that regional economic differences were clearly marked in the nineteenth century.<sup>14</sup>

On the eve of independence, the Argentine Interior was the most populated and wealthiest part of the Viceroyalty of La Plata while the "Litoral" was the most backward and poorest. Only 130,000 persons lived in the Intendencia de Buenos Aires--which included the future provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes--

compared to 220,000 in the Interior intendencias of Córdoba and Salta.<sup>15</sup> The major cities of the Interior had been founded in the sixteenth century along trade routes radiating from Lima to the hinterlands of the then-Viceroyalty of Perú, and by the eighteenth century the region had developed a rather diversified and self-sufficient, if primitive, economy. Buenos Aires also was founded in the sixteenth century, but was long thwarted in the utilization of its major asset--its port--and lacked the economic diversification of the Interior.

Buenos Aires began seeking more freedom of commerce in the seventeenth century, and these pressures for direct trade with Europe increased as the city's hinterland developed.<sup>16</sup> Until the latter part of the eighteenth century, Lima's monopoly on the viceroyalty's foreign trade limited Buenos Aires port activity largely to contraband. So long as this situation held, the Interior cities not only were protected from competition from foreign imports but also had an advantageous position vis-à-vis Buenos Aires in being along the trade routes which merchandise imported legally through Lima had to follow to reach that city on the Río de la Plata.

In 1776 the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was created from sections of the Viceroyalty of Peru which now compose the nations of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. While this suddenly made Buenos Aires the center rather than the outer limit of the viceroyalty and led to increased trade through the city's port, it did not immediately bring to the surface the economic antagonism between Buenos Aires and the Interior. Eighteenth century Spain produced virtually no manufactured goods, but she did not allow such goods to be imported into

her colonies except by way of a complicated structure of taxation and transshipment which added greatly to the consumer price. Thus, while this mercantilist system now no longer favored distant Peru, it did have the effect of a protective tariff which helped the provinces of the Interior maintain their economies. The effect of this system became clear when, during the English invasions, free trade became temporarily possible and the price of various basic articles of clothing imported from England sold for half the price of those manufactured in the Interior.<sup>17</sup>

The independence movement originated in Buenos Aires with free trade--free from Spanish control but not necessarily free from revenue-producing tariffs--its most important economic postulate. Import-export activity through the port during even the worst moments of the independence struggle kept Buenos Aires flourishing while in the provinces of the Litoral and the north the industries were being ruined and the fields were being destroyed by warfare.<sup>18</sup> The Interior, whose economy had already been declining in the late eighteenth century, was thus suddenly exposed to the "devastating competition" of European goods in its former eastern markets at the same time that separatism deprived it of its former markets in Bolivia and Peru where European competition was least effective. Consequently, independence and free trade to the Interior meant "a considerable curtailment of production in some of its most important industries, the annihilation of its transandine commerce, and the contraction of its interprovincial trade."<sup>19</sup>

The Litoral provinces other than Buenos Aires had a different economic problem in the wake of the revolution. Their lack of an



industrial structure comparable to that of the Interior, combined with their outlet to the sea via large and navigable rivers, led them to be strong advocates of free trade. But for these provinces of Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes free trade meant free navigation of the rivers; for Buenos Aires it meant that city's monopoly of all import and export activity. Thus, while "under the colonial regime Buenos Aires had had to fight against the merchant-monopolists of the Interior and Lima, so likewise in independent Argentina the riparian provinces were rebelling against the stifling monopoly of Buenos Aires."<sup>20</sup>

The deep division on the issue of national organization became evident in the Congreso de Tucumán, which declared the country's independence from Spain in 1816. Dominated by the conservative elements of Buenos Aires and parts of the Interior, the congress first considered various monarchist plans and eventually--after moving to the city of Buenos Aires--drafted a strongly centralist republican constitution in 1819. Absent from the constituent congress were delegates from the Litoral provinces and representatives of the advocates of local autonomy in the Interior. Thus, the Constitution of 1819 combined the interests of Buenos Aires with those groups in the Interior who had a deep fear of the local caudillos and their bands. Of the three major currents of opinion which were developing on the question of national organization, the constitution represented but one--the unitarios.

The unitarios, whose major strength was in the city of Buenos Aires, wanted to organize the nation under the strong centralized leadership of that city. Both in Buenos Aires and in the provinces the party addressed itself primarily to the "small but highly articulate

group of wealthy merchants and intellectuals whose economic interests and cultural inclinations blended nicely with the liberal and progressive tendencies of the unitary ideology."<sup>21</sup> Contact between the unitarios of Buenos Aires and the Interior was facilitated by the fact that from their point of view specific provincial interests were minimal or non-existent; what was important was order and enlightened leadership rather than the chaos they saw in the local caudillos and the unlettered masses. A recent Argentine historian states that the most important element in understanding the unitarios is the fact that it was a porteño party, a Buenos Aires party which "represented the attempts by the ex-viceroyal capital to dominate all the territory of the former jurisdiction."<sup>22</sup> Economically, they were strong advocates of free trade.

Early Argentine political groups are often divided into unitarios and federales, but in fact there were two quite distinct types of federalists. The federales of Buenos Aires, like the unitarios, were strong supporters of a policy of free trade with Europe. But unlike the centralists, they were unconcerned with the remainder of the ex-viceroyalty. Representing primarily the rural and cattle interests of the province, the Buenos Aires federalists felt little need for the other provinces and were convinced that their own interests would be best served by a condition of autonomy accompanied by monopoly of the port. Thus, they did not differ with the unitarios on basic economic policy but rather on the nature of national organization.

To the federalists of the Interior, both national organization and economic protection were important. Unlike the large province of Buenos Aires, none of the Interior provinces could hope to survive

alone, and yet at the same time they saw nothing but economic ruin and political domination in the proposals of the unitarios. Thus, 'perhaps more than any other provinces (they) were anxious to finish with the task of political organization in a way that would guarantee their economic and political autonomy and at the same time stabilize inter-provincial relations.'<sup>23</sup> In short, the federalists of the Interior sought a measure of provincial autonomy, tariff protection against European competition, and a sharing of the Buenos Aires customs receipts among the various provinces. Federales of the Litoral were less concerned with tariffs, but were strongly opposed to political domination by Buenos Aires and to that city's monopolization of port activities.

As might have been expected from its failure to take into account two of the three main currents of political and economic opinion, the Constitution of 1819 was rejected by the provinces of the Interior and in early 1820 the centralist government of Buenos Aires collapsed following battles with caudillo-led armies of the Litoral. During most of the decade of the 1820's, the various provinces acted as independent states. In 1820 the provinces of Tucumán and Catamarca formed the "Republic of Tucumán," while the "Republic of Entre Ríos" was created following the failure of efforts to form a larger republic independent of Buenos Aires which would have included Uruguay, Entre Ríos, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Corrientes.<sup>24</sup>

In economic matters, the provinces set up local customs and transit duties to provide the tariff protection which they had not received from Buenos Aires. By thus taxing imported products as they crossed the frontier from Buenos Aires, the provinces were able to maintain an internal market for wines, liquors, textiles, and leather

products produced by the local industries. These import and transit duties also provided the bulk of the governmental revenue for the provinces during this period. The system of provincial tariffs was "largely a hit and miss affair" which frequently resulted in economic wars between provinces,<sup>25</sup> but it was still preferable to the free trade policies of Buenos Aires.

The goal of national organization remained alive, however, even if there was little consensus on the form. Representatives of the provinces met in another constitutional assembly in 1825-1826, elected Bernardino Rivadavia as president, and came out with another centralist constitution. Like the 1819 document, however, this proposed constitution was rejected by the majority of the provinces and this rejection led indirectly to Rivadavia's resignation. Meanwhile, the provinces continued to follow their independent courses.

The federalists came to power in the province of Buenos Aires in 1829, and for the next two years there was an interesting reversal --nominally, at least--of the parties representing the regional conflict. Shortly before federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas became governor of Buenos Aires, unitario general José M. Paz marched on Córdoba to overthrow the federalist government of that province "and carve out a nation of his own in the Interior."<sup>26</sup> After beating several Interior armies which had been sent against him, Paz soon was in control of the whole Interior and formed the Liga del Interior as a nominally unitario alliance of Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, San Juan, Salta, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, and Jujuy.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, in 1831 Entre Ríos and Santa Fe--later to be joined by Corrientes--entered into a "federal pact" with Buenos Aires whereby Rosas as governor of that province was authorized to represent them in foreign affairs. This pact, besides ranging a federalista Buenos Aires and Litoral against an unitario Interior, formed the first realistic, if limited, foundation upon which to build national unity. After a federalist army of the Litoral overthrew General Paz in 1831, the provisions of the federal pact were by "implication or extension" soon applied to the rest of the provinces. It was through the authority he derived from this pact that Rosas exercised his de facto control over the country for more than two decades.<sup>28</sup>

When Rosas returned to the governorship of Buenos Aires in 1835 with dictatorial powers--he was considered the only man capable of bringing the needed unity and demanded broad powers of the provincial legislature as his price for returning--his initial economic policies offered the Interior a welcome change from those of the unitarios. Late in 1835 he announced a new tariff act which provided the growing handicraft industry of Buenos Aires more protection than it had ever enjoyed before and did the same thing for the wine and liquor industries of the Cuyo region and Tucumán, the textile and food industries of Córdoba and Santiago del Estero, and the sheep-raising provinces of the Litoral. Although the act did not meet all the demands of the protectionists, it was the first "serious effort" to adapt a tariff policy to the economic needs of the various provinces and greatly increased Rosas' prestige in the Interior.<sup>29</sup>

Whether because Rosas was a cattleman and thus at heart a free-trader whose protectionism had been merely a political debt, or because the financial problems of his government left few other alternatives, the tariff act of 1835 was short-lived. The first reversal came in 1838 during the French blockade of the port of Buenos Aires, and in 1841 the protectionist plan was effectively undercut by allowing previously forbidden imports to enter the country paying a 17 per cent duty.<sup>30</sup> Transportation costs from the Interior to Buenos Aires were such that European goods could pay such a duty and still sell at a lower price in Buenos Aires than the products of the Interior provinces. Despite this loss of much of their coastal markets, however, the Interior provinces kept their internal systems of tariffs and transit duties throughout the Rosas period and thus were able to maintain their local markets.

It was, in fact, the other provinces of the Litoral which came to have the strongest complaint against the Rosas regime. As has been noted, the location and economies of these provinces inclined them toward a position of free trade; in this they were thwarted by the monopoly Buenos Aires maintained on imports and exports. Thus, for example, Corrientes and Santa Fe supported the French blockade of Buenos Aires in 1838 because the French admiral allowed ships to pass upstream to ports on the Uruguay and Paraná rivers which practiced free trade.<sup>31</sup> This and a later blockade of Buenos Aires by both French and British fleets were primarily reactions to Rosas' monopolistic trade policies,<sup>32</sup> and when England and France later recognized the right of Buenos Aires to close the rivers, the affected ones--Brazilians and Uruguayans as well as the Argentine provinces of the Litoral--rose up

against Rosas. The movement was led by General Justo José de Urquiza, a caudillo of Entre Ríos who had been one of Rosas' top lieutenants and had led the federal army against Paz in the Interior in 1831.<sup>33</sup> Urquiza's first act following his victory was to declare the rivers open.<sup>34</sup>

The porteños made little effort to support Rosas when he was challenged by Urquiza, but neither were they prepared to follow an "outsider." The Entre Ríos general used the federal pact of 1831 as a point of departure in his efforts at national organization; on that basis, Buenos Aires and the other three Litoral provinces concluded a protocol authorizing Urquiza to represent them in foreign affairs.<sup>35</sup> Despite this formal agreement, in Buenos Aires Urquiza was opposed by both federalists and centralists. The recent supporters of Rosas and the unitarios returning from exile "took possession of Buenos Aires as absolute owners and acted as if they alone had overthrown the tyranny [of Rosas]. They had no faith in the man who had just liberated them."<sup>36</sup>

In contrast to the ill-fated constitutions of 1819 and 1826, the new federalist constitution drafted in Santa Fe following Urquiza's victory represented a compromise of the economic and political interests of the Litoral and the Interior. This constitution--which with slight modifications has lasted more than a century--was designed to prevent future restrictions to free navigation of the rivers, to the opening of new ports, and to internal commerce. It nationalized external tariffs and abolished internal ones, while providing that provinces thus cut off from their former source of revenue would receive subsidies to cover their budgets. In its political provisions, the senate --representing provinces without regard to population--was designed to prevent legislation prejudicial to the Interior.

But now it was Buenos Aires' turn to reject the constitution. Facing the loss of its special port privileges, the province saw little advantage in remaining a part of an Interior-dominated confederation and chose instead to secede.<sup>37</sup>

The decade of the 1850's thus saw the Argentine territory divided into two sovereign states. The Argentine Confederation, composed of all provinces except Buenos Aires, adopted its constitution in 1853, established its capital in the Entre Ríos provincial capital of Paraná, and elected Urquiza president for a six-year term beginning in 1854. Buenos Aires, meanwhile, adopted its own constitution in 1854 and continued with its free-trade policies as before. Although during Buenos Aires' secession she failed to gain diplomatic recognition --England, France, Spain, Brazil, the United States, and the Papal States sent their representatives to Paraná--the province did not suffer economically during its independence.<sup>38</sup> The Confederation, on the other hand, was plagued by financial difficulties during early efforts to organize the government at Paraná. Urquiza's policies regarding the port of Rosario in Santa Fe laid the foundation for that city's future greatness as a grain port,<sup>39</sup> but Rosario was no match for Buenos Aires as a producer of customs revenue.

Urquiza's defeat of a Buenos Aires army at Cepeda in 1859 led to that province's decision to finally join the Confederation. Still the conflict persisted, however, and in 1861 the Cepeda outcome was reversed in the battle of Pavón. The porteño victory resulted in Buenos Aires' governor Bartolomé Mitre's establishment of a provisional national government with the city of Buenos Aires as capital. Mitre was



inaugurated as president in 1862. National political struggles for the next half-century were generally between centralists and federalists of the Buenos Aires type--the former as Liberales and later Nacionalistas, the latter as Autonomistas. But regardless of which group was momentarily in power, the gravitation of economic and political power to Buenos Aires and, to a lesser degree, to the other provinces of the Litoral and the resultant decline of the Interior continued at an increasing pace.

Argentine history has been said to be divided into two eras on the basis of the arrival of the railroad.<sup>40</sup> Before rail transportation, commercial traffic traveled by oxcart over the plains and by mule train in the mountain regions. Every ton carried in this way between Buenos Aires and Salta cost approximately the salary of one peon for a year,<sup>41</sup> and in 1834 the ton-per-mile cost of moving goods along this route was more than sixty-two times that of shipping between Buenos Aires and Europe. Even the water-borne transportation between Buenos Aires and Corrientes cost ten times as much per ton-mile as did the transatlantic shipping.<sup>42</sup> Because of these transportation costs, the wine producers of San Luis received less than half of what their product sold for in Buenos Aires, while producers in more distant Mendoza, San Juan, and Tucumán were even more seriously handicapped. But while provinces which depended upon outside markets suffered due to the cost of transportation, it provided a measure of protection for those whose economy was more diversified and self-sufficient.

An example of what the railroad meant to a "cash crop" province can be seen in the case of Tucumán. Although sugar cane had become

established agriculturally in the province some time before, sugar could not be shipped economically any farther than Córdoba under pre-railroad conditions and thus only some 2,000 hectares were planted in cane. Six years after completion in 1876 of the railroad between Tucumán and Buenos Aires the cane fields had doubled in area, iron machinery had been brought in to replace the former primitive processing methods, "and sugar was on its way to becoming a major Argentine industry."<sup>43</sup> By 1895 the area of sugar plantings in Tucumán had expanded to 61,273 hectares, with a further increase to 109,200 hectares in 1914.<sup>44</sup> A somewhat similar benefit accrued to the wine-producing provinces of Cuyo, which could now get their product to market cheaply enough to operate successfully under a reasonable degree of tariff protection.

But to many provinces of the Interior, the railroads--combined with the economic liberalism practiced by the national administration in Buenos Aires--had a quite different impact. In La Rioja the proportion of the economically active population employed in the textile industry dropped from 17.4 per cent in 1869 to 4.6 per cent in 1914, while in the neighboring province of Catamarca those employed in textiles declined from 17.9 to 9.4 per cent during the same period.<sup>45</sup> In large measure a result of the expanding railroads, by the end of the nineteenth century the local and regional structures of production and consumption had given way to a national structure, but the new structure was balanced neither geographically nor economically.

Had the integrating effect of the railroad been accompanied by national economic policies concerned with protecting and developing the economies of all parts of the nation, a different situation might

have resulted. A recent study has pointed out, for example, that Australia--like Argentina a primary producer of agricultural commodities for export--followed a protectionist policy since the turn of the century and as a result had already developed a steel industry by the 1920's and had a rather diversified economy when the economic crisis of 1930 arrived.<sup>46</sup> But in Argentina the economic policies, like the layout of the railroads,<sup>47</sup> were concerned with maintaining close ties with European markets. Governments viewed tariffs as a source of revenue rather than as a means of protecting and fostering economic development, and the few nineteenth century examples of protectionism--such as Rosas' tariff act of 1836 and some limited measures during the 1870's--were short-lived and usually nothing but brief variations in the prevailing theme of free trade.<sup>48</sup>

Like the concept of economic solidarity based on protection of the Interior industries, the political autonomy of the provinces which had been the foundation of the 1853 Constitution soon proved to be ephemeral. A constitutional provision authorizing the national government to "intervene" in a province to restore order and "guarantee a republican form of government" has frequently been used in Argentina and--along with increasing provincial dependence on federal money--has seriously undermined the political position of the provinces. While there may have been instances in which intervention was justified as the only means of restoring order to a strife-torn province, the measure was more often used as a political weapon and resorted to "in many instances [where] the provinces could very well have ironed out their difficulties without the benefit of intervention."<sup>49</sup> Thus, while

various aspects of the 1853 Constitution were designed to prevent a revival of Buenos Aires' dominance over the other provinces, the intervention clause seriously weakened the effectiveness of these safeguards.

As long as Buenos Aires served as both the national capital and the capital of the province of the same name, the governor of the province had power in many ways comparable to that of the president. While the situation existed, there could be little hope of curbing the power of the province over the rest of the nation. Understandably, therefore, the question of a national capital was of serious concern from the first days of national organization. There had been arguments for moving the national center of government inland to either Rosario or Córdoba, but the weight of Buenos Aires prevailed on this issue as it has done before and since on most issues. The federalists, now Autonomistas, of Buenos Aires province opposed the proposed nationalization of their capital, but eventually lost the argument in an election and a brief armed clash over the issue. The centralists in the capital favored turning it into a federal district and sought support of the Interior with the argument that such a move would greatly reduce the economic and political power of the province of Buenos Aires and thus lessen its historic dominance over the other provinces.<sup>50</sup> Although this solution gained general support--perhaps as the only likely solution to the capital question--it has been said that "the country was less afraid of the province than of the city of Buenos Aires."<sup>51</sup> The federalization of the capital in 1880 somewhat eased the regional conflict, but the concern over the growing power of the city itself would prove well founded.

A study of the background of twentieth century social stratification in Argentina might well begin with the pattern of land tenure which was established in the early post-independence period. The effect of that pattern was to create a small yet powerful group of families with vast holdings whose wealth and political influence has been a predominant factor in Argentine history ever since. It is land, not name or title, that is the foundation of the traditional upper class in Argentina.<sup>52</sup>

The distribution of large-scale tracts began in the 1820's, in part as a means of raising revenue. The initial system, established by the unitario government of Bernardino Rivadavia, was one of emphyteusis rather than outright sale. Ostensibly aimed at securing a compromise between preservation of public lands and the need for governmental revenue, the system provided for a life-time lease with the rent to be fixed every ten years. The law failed to limit the amount of land one man might possess, however, and the lands put up for lease were quickly taken up by speculators and sublet. During the 1820's 538 men obtained a total of about twenty million acres--an average of about 37,000 acres each, though some got as much as three-quarters of a million acres. By the end of the decade, therefore, "two of Argentina's perennial evils were born: the concentration of seigniorial tracts of land in the hands of a few families, and the subletting of land down through several hands to the poor man who actually worked it."<sup>53</sup>

Whatever the merits of the intentions behind it, the system of emphyteusis broke down early and was finally abandoned. Its fate has been called "a study in what happens when a piece of legislation is

outside a period's frame of ideas," for while tenure without ownership would not have seemed strange in medieval Europe, it was foreign to nineteenth century America. Thus, by the early 1830's the landlords were secure in their possessions, were letting the rent lapse, and were coming to consider themselves owners of the land. In 1838, furthermore, Rosas doubled the rent on land held in emphyteusis so as to force holders to buy the land outright.<sup>54</sup>

The 1830's also saw the growth of policies of both selling and giving away large areas of public lands. Rosas himself had been given some 430,000 acres of good grazing land in appreciation for his services in leading campaigns against the Indians in the early 1830's, and as governor of Buenos Aires he gave away vast tracts along the new frontier line in the southern part of the province. The recipients "were names that, added to the list from Rivadavia's time, went to make up the landed aristocracy of Argentina."<sup>55</sup> In 1836 Rosas decreed the first large-scale public sale of land, facilitating purchase of large tracts by allowing payment in kind and without interest.<sup>56</sup>

Following the final national campaigns against the Indians in the 1870's and 1880's, land was awarded to participants of all ranks. As the lands had not been surveyed, the awards were in the form of bonds good for a certain number of hectares wherever the holder wished to settle. Many of the Indian fighters sold their land bonds to speculators at 20 centavos a hectare, leading to a concentration in which 541 speculators presented claims to the government for a total of more than four and a half million hectares.<sup>57</sup> The policy of giving land to soldiers in the Indian wars was also followed in the province

of Córdoba, where many of the recipients sold them to businessmen in the area and to speculators in Buenos Aires who had never seen the land.<sup>58</sup>

When the availability of new lands slowed down with the end of the campaigns against the Indians, the large landowners who had benefited the most from the distribution policies were able to maintain their advantage through land prices so inflated relative to productivity that only those who already had land could afford to buy more.<sup>59</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century, it was "beyond the power" of the national government or those of the coastal provinces to create a land policy "suited to the needs of the immigrant or small farmer, for the governments no longer held land in agricultural zones and that in private hands was quite high-priced."<sup>60</sup> As a result, a much-publicized 1884 "homestead act" was largely a dead letter.

A series of factors thus lay behind the nineteenth century concentration of land in Argentina. From colonial times, there was the tradition that the suerte de estancia, consisting of some 4,500 acres, was the smallest unit of the pastoral economy.<sup>61</sup> Abundant lands combined with scarce capital in the early decades of independence caused the cattle industry of Buenos Aires and the Litoral to build on a foundation of large tracts with few employees and a minimum investment in improvements. For the government, the abundance of land provided a source of revenue, a way of rewarding those who had served the country, and a means of rallying and solidifying governmental support. Around 1870, for example, the national government was in many respects rather weak but it was quite powerful when it could count on the support of the landowning class.<sup>62</sup> And what better way to gain such support than to

follow a policy providing even more land to the members of this class?

Nor were governmental measures favorable to the large landowners limited to the distribution of public lands. Public credit, an item of particular importance in a society where capital is scarce, was controlled by the national government and during the latter half of the nineteenth century it went mostly to the same large propertyowners.<sup>63</sup> In contrast to the easy credit always available to the large landowners, particularly those with cattle, the industrialists and the merchants encountered a high degree of reticence on the part of the bankers and a considerable amount of the financing of these activities had to come from other sources.<sup>64</sup>

Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the other strata of Argentine society were a small commercial middle class, limited largely to the towns and cities, and the large urban and rural lower classes. In contrast to the ideology of a limited and elite-guided democracy held by the porteño leaders who tried to organize the country during the first years after independence, the lower class masses are said to have demonstrated a "democratic spirit" which sought expression in concrete and immediate ways and was manifested in support for local caudillos with the same psychological and social characteristics.<sup>65</sup> Out of this grew the numerous caudillo-led private armies which dominated nineteenth century Argentine history.

The porteño historians of the civilization vs. barbarism school long explained the popular support of the caudillo by citing the alleged base nature of the lower classes--particularly the gaucho--and



its exploitation by the caudillo. Recently, for example, an Argentine writer said that rather than joining the "course of freedom" following independence--meaning apparently the course of the unitarios--the lower classes supported the group of provincial caudillos who "praised their primitive passions and instincts without helping them economically or raising them culturally."<sup>66</sup> As Alvarez pointed out a half-century ago, however, the fact that men who would readily follow and fight for their caudillo showed a strong aversion toward serving in the national army would indicate that the nineteenth century civil wars were not merely the result of bellicose and violent men.<sup>67</sup>

A more likely explanation seems to lie in the existence of real dissatisfactions on the part of the masses which they were unable to articulate in any way other than through the caudillos. Germani, for example, states that the autocratic authority of the caudillos did not rest on traditional legitimacy as might be expected in what was essentially a traditional society, but rather upon their acceptance on the part of the lower class groups "who saw in them their own reflection and the exaltation of their own values."<sup>68</sup> In the same vein, Alvarez contends that support of a caudillo was the result, among other things, of the inability of the masses to alter the law or the state of things which caused their discontent. Therefore, he says, they followed a caudillo as they would follow a doctor's orders for curing an illness they did not know how to fight alone.<sup>69</sup> Thus, for example, the practice of exporting meat tax-free while taxing it at home was a source of discontent that made thousands of men ready to rally behind any caudillo who rose up against the government which had authored the new economic

formulas--and often with more enthusiasm than had been shown in the wars against Spain.<sup>70</sup>

The same factors applied in class relations at the local level. To the rural people, the caudillos represented their interests both against the city and the merchants and against unpopular rural land-owners.<sup>71</sup> Thus it was that the unitario General Paz, who as a would-be caudillo carved out a short-lived nation for himself in the Interior, was never able to gain the kind of popular support which went to such men as Guemes or Quiroga. As Paz himself described it years later, "the opposition against me . . . was, rather than personal, directed against the class they considered an enemy, and which they believed supported me. . . . The gauchos, the people without property, were our enemies."<sup>72</sup>

Between 1869 and 1914, the years of the first and third national censuses, the pattern of social stratification changed from one typical of a traditional society--a small upper class, virtually no middle class, and a large lower class--to one in which the middle classes had an important weight and function and in which the internal structure of the classes was that of a modern society.<sup>73</sup> The change was primarily the result of two related factors: immigration and changes in the economic structure. Already by 1895, the social structure had been considerably modified as a result of massive immigration, rapid expansion of agriculture, transformations in the style of ranching, a certain degree of industrial development, and a sharp increase in urbanization.<sup>74</sup>

Although as early as 1812 the government in Buenos Aires passed a decree offering aid and protection to immigrants,<sup>75</sup> it was a half-century before immigration began on a large scale. The rate of European immigration began to climb sharply in the 1860's, and by 1895 more than 25 per cent of the Argentine population was foreign-born. The proportion of immigrants ranged from 23.5 per cent to 29.9 per cent over the next three decades, after which it declined to 15.3 per cent in 1947 and 12.8 per cent in 1960.<sup>76</sup> The majority of the more than six million immigrants<sup>77</sup> were Spanish and Italian, with the remainder divided primarily among various other European nationalities.

By far the greatest number of immigrants remained in the provinces of the Litoral, primarily in the major cities. Thus for almost sixty years foreigners composed more than two-thirds of the population of Buenos Aires and around half of that of the nation's most populous and economically most important provinces. The social and economic impact of this immigration was considerably greater than even these figures would indicate, however, because the majority of the immigrants were males of working age and hence represented a considerably greater proportion of the economically active population than they did of the over-all population. Hence, while foreign-born represented 25.4 per cent of the total population in 1895 and 29.9 per cent in 1914, they composed 39 per cent and 46 per cent of the economically active population during those respective years.<sup>78</sup> In Buenos Aires, the proportion of foreign-born among males of 20 years or older averaged about 80 per cent between 1890 and 1920, while the figure for the entire Litoral during the same period ranged between 50 and 60 per cent.<sup>79</sup>

With the exception of Mendoza and some areas of Córdoba, few immigrants penetrated into the Interior provinces. In the northwestern provinces of Catamarca, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Salta, and Jujuy the foreign-born represented only 3.6 per cent of the population in 1895 and 8.4 per cent in 1914.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, the few immigrants who did go to the Interior had little effect on the area because the economic structure they encountered effectively shut them out of any integrated activity in that area.<sup>81</sup>

The expansion of farming<sup>82</sup> in the Litoral--particularly in Santa Fe--in the late nineteenth century was largely the work of Europeans who went into the rural areas in connection with colonization projects. Corrientes made the nation's first venture into agricultural colonies shortly after the fall of Rosas, and the example was followed soon afterward by the provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Ríos. Santa Fe was quick to take the lead in colonization, however, and in 1872 that province had 135 of a total of 153 square leagues then devoted to agricultural colonies in Argentina. The colonists that year were predominantly Swiss (5,857), followed by Italians (4,157), native Argentines, mostly descendents of immigrants (2,364), and small groups of other nationalities.<sup>83</sup> Frequently those recruited for the early colonization projects had no agricultural experience, coming primarily from among the poor of the European cities. Furthermore, official colonization in Argentina was from the start relegated to marginal zones, often of dubious agricultural value and at times exposed to Indian raids. Also, the provincial governments "invariably lacked the funds or the initiative to carry out their part of the bargain" in providing housing, tools,

and other types of assistance promised to the colonists to help them get started.<sup>84</sup>

Despite the fact that the national and provincial governments had proved to be rather inadequate administrators of colonization programs under their impetus the system was picked up by private colonization firms and landowners as a means of exploiting marginal pastoral lands and by 1870 agricultural colonization was firmly established in Argentina.<sup>85</sup> In Santa Fe, where most of the colonists located, landowners were often willing to sell part of their holdings in order to increase the value of the remainder by its then-proximity to cultivated areas.<sup>86</sup> Land was also cheaper in Santa Fe--about one-fourth what it cost in Buenos Aires province--and a colonist could gain ownership after a few good years. As Scobie describes it: "For a moment in the early days of the Santa Fe colonies it had appeared that an independent and prosperous farmer-owner would emerge to populate the desert and dilute the barbarism of rural Argentina."<sup>87</sup>

But the promise was short-lived. Colonization in Santa Fe began to decline sharply in the early 1890's, and by 1895 the tenant-farmer had replaced the colonist as the principal producer of wheat in Argentina. Among factors behind this shift in the pattern of tenure were (1) the advantage the railroad gave to the southern part of Santa Fe and northern Buenos Aires province over colonies in central Santa Fe, (2) a sharp increase in land prices in the 1890's, and (3) a crisis in the international wheat market.<sup>88</sup> There was a southward shift in the wheat-growing zone during these years, accompanied by a shift from colonization and small owner-farmers to larger rental units. At the

turn of the century only 39 per cent of Santa Fe's 11,500 wheat farms and the 8,000 in Buenos Aires province were owned by the cultivators; the pattern was for the tenant to grow wheat for two or three years and then return the land to the owner sown in alfalfa.<sup>89</sup> There were colonization projects begun after 1890, but they did not produce the same results as those of earlier years and were often little more than new ways for large landowners to expand their holdings at low cost.<sup>90</sup> Short-term tenancy had become the prevailing system of tenure in agricultural lands in Buenos Aires and the Litoral.

Numerous writers have commented on the negative social effects of the pattern of land tenure which had developed by the turn of the century.<sup>91</sup> As the estancieros who owned the land viewed grain farming as but a way of preparing it for pasturage and getting the first crop of alfalfa sown, they were not interested in long leases. Short-term leases had the additional advantage, of course, of permitting periodic increases in rents.<sup>92</sup> Faced with the prospect of having to move to new land every couple of years, the tenant had no incentive to make improvements on his holding and usually lived and worked in quite primitive conditions with the sole hope of having a good harvest or two in order to be able to leave with a profit. In what has been described as an "overwhelming drive toward extensive cultivation," even those who had enough capital to buy small farms often preferred to gamble with the larger tracts they could rent, while among owners "there were quite a few who continued to live in mud-and-straw ranchos, surrounded by nothing but fields of wheat."<sup>93</sup>

The cattle industry underwent a sharp transformation in the latter part of the nineteenth century, one manifestation of which was the need for improved pasture which in part led to the system of tenant farming. But immigrants never gained the entry into this economic area which they did in farming. Cattle activity continued to be largely under the control of the large landowners, and even where it wasn't they did not let go of the land itself. Thus, in 1914 only 44 per cent of the heads of ranching establishments were foreign-born, compared to 57 per cent of the heads of farming establishments.<sup>94</sup> And in the province of Buenos Aires, the cattle-raising area where the most immigrants went out onto the land, the grazing was done largely on rented land in contrast to the pattern of owner-operators in the other cattle provinces.<sup>95</sup>

Whether he stayed there upon arrival, came back with a stake made in a few good wheat harvests, or returned broke and discouraged after an unsuccessful try on the land, it was in the city--particularly Buenos Aires--that the immigrant found his future. In 1895, when they composed 39 per cent of the nation's economically active population, the foreign-born accounted for 81 per cent of the industrial proprietors, 74 per cent of the commercial proprietors, 60 per cent of the industrial employees, and 57 per cent of the commercial employees.<sup>96</sup> A great many of the immigrants had been peasants and laborers in their homelands, but among them were artisans, mechanics and industrial workers who for a time practically dominated certain industries. In the developing shoe industry, for example, Italians supplied a large part of the labor and virtually all proprietors, while the wearing apparel industry was developed principally by Spaniards.<sup>97</sup> Italians and Spaniards--and

immigrants of other nationalities--became the small shopkeepers, the printers, the bakers, the tailors, and the principal holders of many other occupations in the increasingly complex urban socio-economic structure.

It has been seen that in 1895 there was a greater proportion of foreign-born among proprietors in both industry and commerce than among employees in those same economic areas, a pattern which was essentially the same in 1914. When to this is added the fact that foreign-born represented only 30 per cent of the public employees and 53 per cent of those in the professions in 1895--dropping still further to 18 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively, in 1914--the pattern of occupations and mobility becomes clear. The immigrant was predominant in commercial and industrial activities, and it was as a self-employed member of these sectors that he was able to move upward into the middle class. The expansion of the professions and white collar workers, on the other hand, was primarily the result of the upward movement of native Argentines--most of them the sons of lower class immigrants--whose level of education seems to have been the key to mobility.<sup>98</sup>

The social structure of the Interior provinces around the turn of the century took various forms. Córdoba, a buffer of sorts between the Litoral and the Interior, received a considerable number of European immigrants, as did the western province of Mendoza. To the latter province as well as to neighboring San Juan, many immigrants brought a knowledge of the grape industry from Europe and found that the price of small holdings suitable for vineyards was much more within their economic reach than were the large cattle holdings of the



Litoral. Thus, while at the time of the 1914 census the provinces of the Cuyo region had large areas of latifundia--sixty holdings covered 58.3 per cent of the area of Mendoza, while twenty establishments took up 47.2 per cent of the surface of San Juan--there were also large areas of small landowners dedicated to grapegrowing, forming the foundation of a solid rural middle class. In Salta, on the other hand, the rural population which was not part of the large latifundia was involved in only marginal activities and hence their economic level was much lower.<sup>99</sup>

In Tucumán, once one of Argentina's most prosperous and diversified agricultural provinces, the rapid expansion of the sugar industry led both to the concentration of economic power in a few hands and to the deterioration of other facets of the provincial economy. The introduction of the more expensive but efficient iron processing equipment following the opening of the railroad had a sharp effect in concentrating the industry; in 1877 there were seventy-three sugar mills in Tucumán, while in 1881 there were only thirty-four.<sup>100</sup> Because of the industry's reliance on the Buenos Aires market and on protective tariffs--sometimes as high as 130 per cent--<sup>101</sup> as well as perhaps to avoid local pressures and questions of local taxes, the sugar interests were generally located in the national capital. It has recently been claimed that the economic policies of the sugar region are determined by some fifty or sixty families of Tucumán, Salta, and Jujuy who normally live in Buenos Aires.<sup>102</sup>

Rapid urbanization was well under way in Argentina by the end of the nineteenth century. Immigration was the major impetus for this, both directly through the flow of Europeans to the larger cities

--particularly Buenos Aires--and indirectly as a result of the movement of immigrants into agriculture and the resulting displacement of many natives who then moved to the urban centers.<sup>103</sup> Although the migration from the Interior to Buenos Aires has been most conspicuous since it began to increase rapidly in the 1930's, this population movement began in the nineteenth century when as early as 1887 almost 30 per cent of the residents of the capital were from the Interior. A considerable amount of interprovincial migration to other major urban centers was also evident by the end of the century, as was the intraprovincial movement toward the towns and cities. Thus in Catamarca, a province little affected by European immigration, the rural population declined by 7,822 persons between 1895 and 1914, while the urban population of natives of the province increased by 18,052.<sup>104</sup> For the nation as a whole, the proportion of the population living in urban areas was 28 per cent in 1869, 37 per cent in 1895, 53 per cent in 1914, and 62 per cent in 1947.

Immigration, urbanization, and the beginnings of industrialization gave rise to increasing activity in organized labor toward the end of the nineteenth century. Argentina's first labor union was formed in 1857 by typographers in Buenos Aires, but it was not until the late 1880's that widespread union activity began.<sup>105</sup> The first labor strikes were sporadic and somewhat exotic in an environment unaccustomed to them; there was one recorded in 1878, but not another one until 1887. After this the tempo increased steadily with several strikes each year. In 1895, when there were twenty-five labor unions in Argentina, there were nineteen strikes.<sup>106</sup>

Early labor organization was led by immigrants, had a predominantly immigrant membership, and reflected European political ideologies. There were socialist unions, anarchist unions, and syndicalist unions, while speeches at the meetings were often made in Italian, French, and German as well as in Spanish. There was a lengthy battle between the anarchists, who found their greatest following among the unskilled workers, and the socialists for control of the labor movement, a struggle which has been called a serious disruptive factor in the development of the movement.<sup>107</sup> Despite the ideological leadership of the unions and the extensive labor unrest during the 1890-1910 period, however, the complaints were most often over hours, wages, or working conditions and seldom had any political implications.<sup>108</sup> The unions in the early years also sought their ends through petitions to public officials as well as through strikes; consideration of labor legislation began in Congress in the early 1890's but it was the following decade before any meaningful measures began to appear.<sup>109</sup>

Although the growth of the labor movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected a significant expansion of the urban working class and thus a shift in the earlier class relationships, it did not at the outset represent a threat to the traditional political dominance of the large landowners of Buenos Aires and the Litoral. Labor protest in those early years was aimed exclusively at the industrial sector which was still quite marginal in the Argentine society; the unions seldom challenged the existing economic structure and even favored the policy of free trade over any kind of tariff protection for industry.<sup>110</sup>

Perhaps partly because of this acceptance of the existing economic system in an immigrant nation where there was a relatively high degree of vertical mobility, the rapidly changing pattern of socio-economic stratification was slow to be manifested politically. The high incidence with which immigrants failed to become citizens of Argentina and retained the citizenship of their homelands even after decades of residence in Argentina meant that great numbers of them were effectively outside of the political system. And until the electoral reform of 1912, the prevailing system of political control by the landed interests through limited suffrage, non-secret voting, and--where necessary--fraud, provided little opportunity or incentive for political participation even among native Argentines. Thus, in contrast to regionalism which was frequently the basis of large-scale political conflict from the earliest days of independence, the changing socio-economic class structure did not take on overtly political significance until after the turn of the twentieth century.

What, then, has been the nature of these two bases of political cleavage during the twentieth century? Although there continue to be polemics about the "hydrocephalic" nature of Buenos Aires and its damaging effects on the rest of the nation,<sup>111</sup> political regionalism in Argentina seems generally to be considered a phenomenon of the nineteenth century with little relevance to the present century. The solution in 1880 of the problem of a national capital, the development of a national system of production and consumption by the turn of the century, and the appearance at the same time of the first "national" political party--the Unión Cívica Radical--are but a few of the events

taken to indicate the decline of regionalism. As regionalism subsided, socio-economic class seems to have increased in political importance; the electoral victory of the Radicals in 1916 is viewed as marking the entry of the middle class into the political system, while the rise of Juan Perón in the 1940's represents the political debut of the working class.

But beyond such broad-brush generalizations which are at best inadequate and upon closer examination sometimes disclose varying degrees of inaccuracy,<sup>112</sup> little attention has been given to the bases of political cleavage in twentieth century Argentina.<sup>113</sup> Still unanswered are such questions as: Has regionalism actually disappeared, or has it taken new forms? What is the relationship between the political manifestations of class and region? Have the internal divisions of "national" political parties in the twentieth century been primarily personal and ideological, as commonly portrayed, or have they represented differences along class and regional lines? Have the lines of cleavage been overlapping or cross-cutting, have they changed over time, and what has been their effect on the larger political system? These are some of the questions which the present study will attempt to explore on the basis of available empirical evidence.

Political cleavage will be studied over a fifty-year period, taking sample time periods from 1919 to 1966, so as to minimize the distortion of short-term conflicts as well as to allow a search for indications of change over time. Indicators of cleavage will be studied at two points in the political process: elections and legislative behavior. Such a two-front--or two-stage--approach should

be able to provide a more complete and significant picture of the bases of cleavage, detecting as it would constituency differences which might be ignored by their representatives, on the one hand, or elite conflict which might be personal or circumstantial and not based on constituency factors, on the other.

The basic subject of study will be the elections of national deputies held in 1916, 1926, 1936, 1946, 1960, and 1965, and the two annual sessions of the national chamber of deputies immediately following each of these elections.<sup>114</sup> Election returns at the departamento (county) level will be studied through multiple regression analysis in an attempt to establish the regional and socio-economic bases of party support. Correlation of the voting returns with census-derived variables will be conducted at both the regional and national levels in each election so as to be able to detect regional differences in constituency characteristics. The study of the manifestations of cleavage within the national chamber of deputies will be based on Guttman scale analysis of roll call votes.<sup>115</sup>

In analyzing the two basic dimensions of cleavage with which the study is concerned, an indicator of class-based cleavage will be considered the degree to which:

- (1) Nationwide parties show similar socio-economic ecological correlates irrespective of region and have congressional representatives who take similar stands on roll calls.
- (2) Various provincial parties which show similar class-related ecological correlates have representatives who take similar issue stands.

Conversely, an indicator of regional cleavage would be the degree to which:

(1) Nationwide parties show dissimilar socio-economic bases of support by region.

(2) Nationwide parties show similar bases of support but their representatives in the Chamber of Deputies differ by region.

(3) Various provincial parties with similar socio-economic bases have representatives who differ by region.

Authors frequently differ in the way they divide Argentina into regions.<sup>116</sup> But despite the variety of classification schemes and the acknowledged fact that economic regions seldom follow political boundaries, the taxonomic differences are most often the result of different degrees of detail or are concerned with the placement of marginal provinces. Thus, for instance, one writer may divide the nation into Litoral and Interior while another will subdivide it into five or six regions, although with little if any cross-cutting of the Litoral-Interior boundary. Or the province of Córdoba, technically not in the Litoral but in some respects resembling it more than the Interior, may be classified in the former by one writer and in the latter by another. Such details notwithstanding, there is little disagreement over the broad bases of regional differences.

In view of both the historical development outlined earlier in this chapter and methodological considerations, it was decided for the purposes of this study to divide the nation into three regional groupings. These will be Buenos Aires (federal capital and province), the remaining three provinces of the Litoral (Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes),

and the Interior (Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis, La Rioja, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Tucumán, Salta, Córdoba, and Jujuy).<sup>117</sup> This three-way division would seem to represent the simplest typology which could be used without distorting the major lines of nineteenth century regional antagonisms. A more detailed classification of regions, on the other hand, might have disclosed more subtle political patterns but would have run into statistical difficulties--particularly in the roll call analysis--due to an inadequate number of cases in some categories.

Alford defines regions as "those territorial entities less than a nation which are potentially capable of becoming the focus of political struggle and loyalties--in a sense potentially capable of becoming nations themselves."<sup>118</sup> The three-way classification to be used in this study conforms with this definition; the province of Buenos Aires was in fact a separate state during the 1850's, while the Interior and Litoral could certainly be said to have been "potentially capable" of becoming such throughout most of the nineteenth century.

Also following Alford, the use of the term "class" in the present study does not necessarily imply any consciousness of membership in a social class or economic group. While the level of class consciousness and its effect on political behavior are no doubt important empirical questions, the concern here is limited to the degree of political divergence of objectively defined socio-economic groups.<sup>119</sup> Limitations of available census data make a clear-cut correlation between voting and social class difficult for some of the sample time periods under study, making all the more important a broad "group" interpretation of the term class. For some elections it will be possible to measure



"class" only by such gross indicators as degree of urbanization, nature and extent of agricultural activity, etc. For other years, available data include indexes of the urban and rural class pyramids, the proportion employed in different categories of economic activities, and other rather sophisticated measures. Although the analysis will thus have to vary somewhat from one time period to another, it is felt that over the fifty-year span it should be possible to discover with sufficient accuracy the major social and economic bases of the various political groups and to detect any significant changes over time.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Edmund Burke wrote in 1770 that "party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." See "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents," in The Works of Edmund Burke (Vol. I; London: George Bell & Sons, 1909), p. 375.

<sup>2</sup>For an early formulation of the concepts of interest aggregation and articulation, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of Developing Areas, Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64.

<sup>3</sup>On the modern presidency in the United States, see among others Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Signet Books, 1964); and Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

<sup>4</sup>David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 129-134.

<sup>5</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 230-243.

<sup>7</sup>Morris Janowitz and David R. Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," American Journal of Sociology, LXXII (May, 1967), 601-618.

<sup>8</sup>For a complete discussion of methodology, see Appendices A and B.

<sup>9</sup>Ysabel F(isk) Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. viii.

<sup>10</sup>The classic statement of this position is Domingo F. Sarmiento's Facundo; civilización y barbarie (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1940). Published originally in 1845 and available in various Spanish and English editions.

<sup>11</sup>For a good discussion of Argentine historiography, see Joseph R. Barager, "The Historiography of the Río de la Plata Area Since 1830," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIX (November, 1959), 588-642.

<sup>12</sup>One of the pioneers of this position was Juan Alvarez, Las guerras civiles argentinas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966), originally published in 1912. Perhaps the most thorough study is Miron Burgin, Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946).

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, Juan Lazarte, Federalismo y descentralización en la cultura argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Cátedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1957), p. 43.

<sup>14</sup>Roberto Cortés Conde and Ezequiel Gallo, La formación de la Argentina moderna (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1967), p. 19.

<sup>15</sup>Alvarez, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup>Cortés Conde and Gallo, pp. 15, 17.

<sup>17</sup>Alvarez, p. 27.

<sup>18</sup>Ernesto Palacio, Historia de la Argentina (4th ed.; Buenos Aires: A Peña Lillo Editor, 1965), I, 246.

<sup>19</sup>Burgin, p. 119.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>22</sup>Palacio, I, 307.

<sup>23</sup>Burgin, p. 121.

<sup>24</sup>Alvarez, pp. 44-45, 47.

<sup>25</sup>Burgin, pp. 126, 137.

<sup>26</sup>Rennie, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup>Burgin, p. 147n.

<sup>28</sup>James R. Scobie, "The Significance of the September Revolution," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLI (May, 1961), 240.

<sup>29</sup>Burgin, pp. 237, 242.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 244.

<sup>31</sup>Alvarez, p. 51.

<sup>32</sup>Rennie, p. 54.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>34</sup>Alvarez, p. 52.

<sup>35</sup>Scobie, p. 240.

<sup>36</sup>Miguel Angel Cárcano, Sáenz Peña; la revolución por los comicios (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1963), p. 44.

<sup>37</sup>Alvarez, pp. 52-53.

<sup>38</sup>Rennie, pp. 94, 102.

<sup>39</sup>Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 646. In the twenty years from 1879 to 1898, exports through the port of Rosario--almost entirely consisting of grain--rose steadily from 140,000 to 770,000 tons per year. Imports through that city rose from 120,000 tons in 1879 to 610,000 tons in 1889, but dropped to less than half that amount during the following decade as a result of Buenos Aires' growing "absorption" of imports. See José Panettieri, Los trabajadores en tiempos de la inmigración masiva en Argentina, 1870-1910 (La Plata, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1966), pp. 97-98.

<sup>40</sup>Alvarez, p. 32.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>42</sup>Calculated from figures in Burgin, p. 117.

<sup>43</sup>Rennie, p. 142.

<sup>44</sup>Panettieri, pp. 100-101.

<sup>45</sup>Sergio Bagú, Evolución histórica de la estratificación social en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Sociología, 1961), pp. 21-22.

<sup>46</sup>Juan Carlos Agulla, "Las decisiones económicas y el desarrollo del interior," in Federalismo y centralismo, Agulla (ed.) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Líbera, 1967), p. 113.

<sup>47</sup>The main lines of Argentina's railroad network extend out from Buenos Aires in the form of a fan, with few lines connecting one part of the Interior with another.

<sup>48</sup>The protectionist policies argued in Congress in 1875 by men who were later to become key members of free trade governments have been explained as being the result of a drop in world prices which led to the conviction in Argentina of the advantage of processing the nation's wool at home. Representing as it did but a stage in the development of the livestock industry, the protectionist sentiment disappeared when new techniques allowed improved participation in the international market. See Cortés Conde and Gallo, p. 88.

<sup>49</sup>R. A. Gómez, "Intervention in Argentina, 1860-1930," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 1 (December, 1947), 72.

<sup>50</sup> Perhaps the classic polemic in favor of the plan is J. B. Alberdi, La República Argentina consolidada en 1880 con la ciudad de Buenos Aires por capital (Buenos Aires: Librería La Publicidad, 1881).

<sup>51</sup> Burgin, p. 143.

<sup>52</sup> Probably the most thorough and best documented study of this facet of Argentine history is Jacinto Oddone, La burguesía terrateniente argentina (3rd ed.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Populares Argentinas, 1956). The work was originally published in 1930.

<sup>53</sup> Rennie, p. 33.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., pp. 70-71.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 139-140. According to this author, distribution of land following the Indian wars of the 1880's was: heirs of campaign leader Adolfo Alsina, 15,000 hectares; each jefe de frontera, 8,000 hectares; chiefs of battalions or regiments, 5,000 hectares; sergeant majors, 4,800 hectares; captains, 2,500 hectares; lieutenants, 2,000 hectares; and non-commissioned officers, 1,500 hectares.

<sup>58</sup> José Luis de Imaz, Estructura social de una ciudad pampeana (La Plata, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 1965), p. 69.

<sup>59</sup> Cortés Conde and Gallo, p. 60.

<sup>60</sup> James R. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas: A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), p. 118.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>62</sup> Cortés Conde and Gallo, p. 55.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>64</sup> Bagú, p. 16.

<sup>65</sup> Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición; de la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1966), p. 181.

<sup>66</sup> José S. Campobassi, "Historia de los partidos políticos argentinos, 1810-1943," in Los partidos políticos: estructura y vigencia en la Argentina, Campobassi et al. (Buenos Aires: Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1963), pp. 16-17.

<sup>67</sup>Alvarez, p. 65.

<sup>68</sup>Germani, p. 219.

<sup>69</sup>Alvarez, p. 19.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-78.

<sup>71</sup>Rennie, p. 40. The author notes that in the province of La Rioja the famous caudillo Facundo Quiroga would have landowners shot and then distribute their property among his soldiers.

<sup>72</sup>José M. Paz, Memorias, I, 166. Quoted in Rennie, p. 40.

<sup>73</sup>Germani, p. 196.

<sup>74</sup>Gino Germani, Estructura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), pp. 218-219.

<sup>75</sup>Gastón Gori, Inmigración y colonización en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1964), p. 25.

<sup>76</sup>Carter Goodrich, "Argentina as a New Country," Comparative Studies in Society and History, VII (October, 1964), 86. Although immigration in the United States was greater in absolute figures, the highest proportion of foreign-born recorded in the population at any one time was 14.7 per cent, in 1890 and again in 1910.

<sup>77</sup>When allowance is made for the many who returned, the net immigration has been estimated at 3.5 million. See Pfo Isaac Monteagudo, Migraciones internas en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Comisión Nacional de Homenaje a Lisandro de la Torre, 1956), p. 34.

<sup>78</sup>Germani, Estructura social . . . , p. 223.

<sup>79</sup>Gino Germani, "La movilidad social en la Argentina," Appendix II in Spanish edition of Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Movilidad social en la sociedad industrial (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1963), p. 320.

<sup>80</sup>Germani, Estructura social . . . , p. 88. The percentage of foreign-born was high in many of the national territories, but in most cases the total population was small. Also, much of the foreign-born population of some of the territories was from neighboring countries rather than of European origin.

<sup>81</sup>Panettieri, pp. 98-99.

<sup>82</sup>Throughout the present study, an attempt will be made to conform to the Argentine classification of agricultural establishments. The English "ranching" will be used for ganadería, which covers all types of livestock establishments, while "farming" will be the equivalent of the Spanish agricultura, referring to all forms of crop farming, orchards, vineyards, etc. "Agriculture" in English will be used generically to refer to both types of activities.

<sup>83</sup>Panettieri, pp. 18, 21-22.

<sup>84</sup>Scobie, Revolution . . . , p. 33.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-36.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 45. In Buenos Aires province, however, the landowner "had no desire to subdivide his property, at least not at the prices which the penniless new arrival could hope to amortize."

<sup>87</sup>James R. Scobie, "Implications of the Argentine Wheat Economy, 1870-1915," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XIV (Autumn, 1960), 12.

<sup>88</sup>Cortés Conde and Gallo, pp. 69-72.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 72-73; and Scobie, Revolution . . . , p. 49.

<sup>90</sup>Bagú, p. 3.

<sup>91</sup>See, for example, Alvarez, p. 79; Monteagudo, p. 27; Scobie, "Implications . . .," p. 18; and Dardo Cúneo, Juan B. Justo y las luchas sociales en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial ALPE, 1956), p. 343.

<sup>92</sup>At the time of the Grito de Alcorta, when tenant-farmers rebelled against contract conditions, rents were running 40 to 45 per cent of the harvest.

<sup>93</sup>Scobie, Revolution . . . , pp. 67-68.

<sup>94</sup>Germani, Estructura social . . . , p. 223.

<sup>95</sup>Bagú, p. 5.

<sup>96</sup>Germani, Política y sociedad . . . , p. 195.

<sup>97</sup>George Wythe, Industry in Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 90.

<sup>98</sup>Germani, Estructura social . . . , pp. 223-224.

<sup>99</sup>Bagú, p. 64.

<sup>100</sup>Rennie, p. 143.

<sup>101</sup> Alvarez, p. 95.

<sup>102</sup> Juan Carlos Agulla, "Los factores sociales e históricos," in Agulla (ed.), pp. 86-87.

<sup>103</sup> Gino Germani, "El proceso de urbanización en la Argentina," Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, II (1963), 309.

<sup>104</sup> Bagú, pp. 21-23.

<sup>105</sup> For a detailed history of the Argentine labor movement to 1920, see Sebastián Marotta, El movimiento sindical argentino: su génesis y desarrollo (2 vols.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Laico, 1960-61).

<sup>106</sup> Panettieri, p. 122.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., pp. 145-146.

<sup>108</sup> Cortés Conde and Gallo, pp. 96-97.

<sup>109</sup> Panettieri, p. 124. The author says that the Anarchists played an important if indirect part in breaking down governmental resistance, thus allowing the Socialists to make their parliamentary gains in labor legislation. He calls the Código Nacional de Trabajo, presented to Congress in 1904, the "first serious effort at labor legislation." Ibid., pp. 148, 166.

<sup>110</sup> Cortés Conde and Gallo, p. 99.

<sup>111</sup> See, for example, Lazarte; and Antonio Brión, Buenos Aires contra la Argentina ([Buenos Aires]: Editorial Tierra y Libertad, 1953). Proposals are still made to transfer the national capital to the Interior, usually to Rosario or the city of Córdoba. See Alcides Greca, Una nueva capital para la nación argentina (Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Ciencia, 1950).

<sup>112</sup> Recent empirical studies which have begun to test and at times dispel long-held assumptions about Argentine politics include Darío Cantón, El parlamento argentino en épocas de cambio: 1890, 1916 y 1946 (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1966); Ezequiel Gallo (h.) and Silvia Sigal, "La formación de los partidos políticos contemporáneos: la U.C.R., 1890-1916," in Argentina, sociedad de masas, Torcuato S. Di Tella et al. (eds.) (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966), pp. 124-176; Peter H. Smith, "Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," Desarrollo Económico, No. 25 (April-June, 1967), pp. 795-829; and Inés Izaguirre, "Imagen de clase en los partidos políticos argentinos: el caso del radicalismo," Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, III (July, 1967), 196-231.



<sup>113</sup>Among the few studies which have probed the bases of party support through the correlation of election data with census variables are Germani, Estructura social, pp. 247-263; and Gallo and Sigal, "La formación . . ."

<sup>114</sup>The goal of a sample period every ten years could not be completely followed due to the absence of elections between the overthrow of Perón in 1955 and the election of 1958. Due to distorting factors in this election which will be discussed in the appropriate chapter, it was decided to use the election of 1960 rather than that of 1958.

<sup>115</sup>See Appendices A and B for details on methodology.

<sup>116</sup>For some typologies, see Roberto Cortés Conde, "Problemas del crecimiento industrial, 1870-1914," in Di Tella et al., p. 84; Panettieri, p. 11; and Miguel Angel Cárcano, La sexta república (Buenos Aires: Editorial Araujo, 1958), p. 34.

<sup>117</sup>This was for elections through 1946, when there were fourteen provinces plus the federal district. Although six national territories attained provincial status during the Perón regime and thus participated in the elections of 1960 and 1965, the original boundaries were maintained for the analysis of these elections in order to allow comparability with the four earlier periods. The small proportion of the national population represented by these new provinces and the few deputies they had in the Chamber of Deputies minimize any "distortion" caused by this approach in 1960 and 1965.

<sup>118</sup>Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 35.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

## CHAPTER II

### THE RADICALS ARRIVE, 1916-1918

The 1916 election and the administration which followed have been widely hailed as a turning point in Argentine history. Whether the year marked the beginning or the end of respectable politics and responsible government can depend on one's political ideology and affiliation, but few would disagree that it brought a lasting change in cast and in style, if not always in program and in policy. Political fortunes--both of men and of groups--would vary greatly over the next fifty years, but underneath there could be seen patterns of partisanship and political culture which took form during this period.

An understanding of the era can perhaps best begin with a study of the political groups contending in the 1916 election. Dominant among these--at the moment and in lasting importance--was the Unión Cívica Radical and its long-time leader, Hipólito Yrigoyen.<sup>1</sup> Frequently described as the "most loved and most hated man in Argentine history,"<sup>2</sup> Yrigoyen was the major figure in the Radical movement from shortly after its birth in the late nineteenth century until his death in 1933. It is often difficult to separate the movement from the man; Yrigoyen liked to say that the UCR "is the nation itself,"<sup>3</sup> but with perhaps more justice he often could have said "le parti c'est moi."<sup>4</sup>

It is often difficult to pinpoint the birth of a political movement, but the party which was to carry Yrigoyen to the presidency in 1916 can probably best be dated from September 1, 1889. On that date,

a group of about 3,000 persons--mostly university students--met in Buenos Aires to form the Unión Cívica de la Juventud. According to its statement of principles, the group stood for civil liberties, free and fair suffrage, guaranteed autonomy of the provinces and municipalities, more honest administration, and an effort to raise public spirit in the performance of civic duties.<sup>5</sup> Numerous such clubs were soon in operation in the city, and on April 13, 1890, a specific political group--the Unión Cívica--was organized under the leadership of Leandro N. Alem, a former Autonomista.

Combining elements of the old Liberal elite and the newly politicized sons of European immigrants, the new political movement was born of mounting dissatisfaction over worsening economic conditions and lack of governmental responsiveness. The latter years of the 1880's had been marked by severe inflation which benefited the exporter and the land speculator while bringing economic hardship to the small merchant, the worker, and the immigrant farmer.<sup>6</sup> The governments of the period were tightly linked to the cattle export interests and worked on the apparent policy that what was good for those interests was good for the country. The "order and progress" administration of Julio A. Roca (1880-1886)--whose policies were largely followed by Juárez Celman (1886-1890)--has been likened to that of Mexico's Porfirio Díaz during the same period.<sup>7</sup> Like those of Díaz, the policies gave rise to revolt.

Three armed uprisings have a place of honor in the early history of Argentine Radicalism--1890, 1893, and 1905. The first of these--known as "La Noventa"--was the most important both in its demonstration of the depth of discontent and in its catalytic effect on the movement

which was to become the Unión Cívica Radical.<sup>8</sup> Its planning and leadership were political, but its intensity and breadth of participation were the result of factors beyond the influence of the newly organized political opposition. Protests among immigrant farmers for better conditions of tenure and for harvest payment in gold rather than the rapidly devaluing paper peso began in the 1880's, while the financial crisis of 1890 ruined many small and medium manufacturers and added them to the opponents of the Juárez Celman government.<sup>9</sup> The military had its own complaints against the administration, and even before the formation of the Unión Cívica de la Juventud the previous September a group of junior officers was considering a revolt against the government. When the newly formed Unión Cívica called for revolution in 1890, this dissident officer group--now considerably larger in number and including generals as well as men of junior grade--was quick to offer its services.<sup>10</sup>

The 1890 revolt was thus a composite of reaction to economic crisis and individual institutional grievances. But as was to happen repeatedly in the subsequent history of the Radical movement, these grievances were neither recognized nor remedied by the party's leaders and it was usually considered sufficient to announce sweeping generalizations about political ethics. Hence, while economic factors were basic behind the revolts of both 1890 and 1893, the men who drafted the revolutionary proclamations did not understand these factors and did not interpret them in those proclamations.<sup>11</sup> Regarding the 1893 revolt, one author notes that the Radicals successfully enlisted the support of agriculturalists "not because the farmers understood, or were even interested in, the political issues or personalities involved but

because they were outraged at the corruption of rural authorities" and at recent actions by Santa Fe's provincial government withdrawing the right of foreigners to vote in local elections and levying a provincial cereal tax.<sup>12</sup>

The insurgents of 1890 were unsuccessful in their attempt to overthrow the government, but the late-July affair was put down only after a promise of total amnesty to the participants and led to the resignation of President Juárez Celman, a major symbol of the target of the revolution. It was, in the words of one historian, "a body blow, but not a knockout, for the oligarchy."<sup>13</sup>

The Unión Cívica obtained its first electoral victory in March of the following year, when Alem and Aristóbulo del Valle were elected national senators from the federal district.<sup>14</sup> But the diversity of the group's membership was soon to cause the first of a series of splits and internal struggles which in greater or lesser degree have continued ever since. The schism came at a meeting of the Unión Cívica's national committee on June 26, 1891. A faction headed by Bartolomé Mitre adopted the name Unión Cívica Nacional and sought an accord with the governing groups, which on the eve of the 1892 election, "seemed to be repentant."<sup>15</sup> The remaining members, under the label of Unión Cívica Radical and the continuing leadership of Alem, called for "relentless struggle" against the governing oligarchy.<sup>16</sup> Addressing a mass meeting in December of 1891, Alem said: "They have called us intransigent radicals and we have accepted this name with pride; and with pride our program is intransigent."<sup>17</sup> This conflict between intransigence and compromise, between abstention and participation, has been one of the most basic

divisive elements in the Radical movement.

Nor was all well within the Unión Cívica Radical itself, where there was a growing hostility between Alem and his nephew Hipólito Yrigoyen. The latter, although already of considerable influence within the party, did not frequent the party headquarters and meetings during the early 1890's. Instead, he sent aides whom no one knew and who in fact were spies designed to obstruct the revolutionary plans of Alem.<sup>18</sup> The rivalry for leadership of the party broke into the open in 1893 when the two men led unrelated revolutionary plots--Yrigoyen in the province of Buenos Aires and Alem in Santa Fe. When both uprisings failed, the party entered a period of crisis in which the hostility between the two leaders divided the followers.<sup>19</sup> The Radicals were further weakened when Juan B. Justo took his leftist followers out of the party in 1894 and Lisandro de la Torre departed toward the center with his following in 1897. Alem's suicide in 1896 and the defection of these dissident groups left Yrigoyen with undisputed leadership of the party, although internal conflicts were to continue.

The UCR reiterated its "intransigence" and refusal to join in coalition with other parties on the eve of the 1898 election, and following Roca's election to a second term as president that year the party seemed almost to disappear for some years. During this time, however, Yrigoyen is said to have been methodically plotting the revolution of 1905 and devoting much effort to winning young military officers over to the cause of Radicalism.<sup>20</sup> The 1905 revolt, coming at a time of generally good economic conditions, did not draw the popular support which went to the two earlier uprisings in periods of economic crisis.<sup>21</sup>

Nonetheless, it caused the government to declare a state of siege in which police closed labor unions, confiscated their publications, arrested labor leaders and deported some of them.<sup>22</sup> It also may have caused some of the more reflective members of the governing elite to begin thinking more seriously of the need to adjust politics to the changing social structure of the nation.

What type of man was Hipólito Yrigoyen, this "man of mystery,"<sup>23</sup> who was for so long the personification of the Unión Cívica Radical? Although a former school teacher and life-long politician, he avoided public appearances--even before his own followers--and preferred to manipulate the party from behind closed doors. When he had to speak to a party meeting in the early days of his career, he would allude to throat difficulty and talk in a low voice, his words then repeated loudly by a friend. Later on, he did not speak or appear at meetings at all; he sent his agents, his friends, his political flunkies.<sup>24</sup> Despite his public reticence--or perhaps due to a mystique engendered by it--Yrigoyen developed a wide and servile following within the party.

To Yrigoyen, what was needed in Argentina was a regeneration in public morality. His slogans--national reparation, the cause, morality--often sounded more religious than political, and he once characterized Radicalism as a "civic religion."<sup>25</sup> As one author put it, "there has never been a character whose motivation was more obscure, or whose personality was more secretive. . . . Without

being intelligent, he was almost unfathomable."<sup>26</sup> Said a major biographer: "Introverted and fanatic, a man of very few ideas, he was convinced that the country needed only free elections to be completely transformed."<sup>27</sup>

Free elections, plus compliance with the constitution, were about the only thing in the way of a program which the UCR had during the years before 1916. Yet in what was perhaps one of the major ironies of the era, Yrigoyen was by nature, by preference, and by experience much more of a revolutionary than a constitutionalist. A writer quite sympathetic to Yrigoyen concedes that he "seems to have worked more on revolutionary plans that would place him in the presidency than for electoral reform that would enable the UCR to come to power peacefully," adding that this might explain the lack of any party program beyond vague talk about popular sovereignty and administrative morality.<sup>28</sup>

The intransigence which Yrigoyen imparted to the UCR was twofold --electoral abstention and refusal to participate in coalition governments. Ever since 1892, Yrigoyen had repeatedly refused offices and candidatures including national senator, national deputy, minister, and governor. Likewise, he was the major force behind the party's boycott of elections for many years on the grounds that the balloting was fraudulent. It did not matter how many years the Radicals had to remain in the political wilderness, for he contended that "when one places faith in the cause for which one struggles, one preserves above all else the power of principle, with the conviction that victory will



come in due time."<sup>29</sup>

But not all Radicals agreed with Yrigoyen that the party's only road to power was through revolution. In 1909 a prominent Radical leader in Córdoba, Pedro C. Molina, resigned from the UCR with the accusation that parties

living enclosed in their headquarters like monks in a convent, giving no more signs of life than occasional indications of a conspiracy in the forts, making people believe that apart from violent revolution there is no salvation--far from serving the ideals of justice, of liberty and law, deny them because the revolution of a party without ideas is just as brutal a violence as is a government without elections.<sup>30</sup>

A Radical revolution could triumph "tomorrow," he said, but the following day would "see enthroned violence, iniquity, favoritism, and the art of electoral fraud" beyond the control of the idealist leaders of the party.<sup>31</sup> Later the same year, a dissident Radical faction led by Leopoldo Melo issued a manifesto charging excessive "personalism" in the party's direction and criticizing the "erroneous obstinance" of the abstention and revolutionary tactics and the reliance on "enigmatic phrases" rather than on programs.<sup>32</sup>

This internal conflict between those who wanted the UCR to look and act like a political party and those who considered it a movement destined to reform the nation via revolution--the former were known as azules, the latter as rojos--was to grow in intensity during the next couple of years as electoral reform brightened the prospects at the polls. Several provincial Radical parties defied Yrigoyen and prepared to enter elections, and the party's national committee authorized limited political participation in 1912 against the leader's recommendation. Even after realizing he had lost to the eleccionista

elements of the party, Yrigoyen retained the idea and ideal of revolution, both in the belief that it was the only way to power and that it was necessary in order to accomplish the political regeneration he felt the nation needed.<sup>33</sup> Thus, on the eve of the election which was to take him and his party to national power, the man who had long expressed such faith in the reformatory powers of free elections seemingly would have preferred a military uprising to a contest at the polls.

Other major groups contending in the 1916 election included the Socialists, the Progressive Democrats of Lisandro de la Torre, and the rather heterogeneous grouping of provincial parties which can be classified as "conservative." A brief look at each of these groups is in order before going on to a discussion of the electoral reform which cleared the way for the peaceful overthrow of the Régimen--Yrigoyen's term for the governing conservative groups--by way of the ballot.

Socialism developed in Argentina during the latter half of the nineteenth century. French, Italian, and Spanish socialist groups existed in Buenos Aires, but they operated separately until the Partido Socialista was formed in 1896 under the leadership of Juan B. Justo. From the time he left the Unión Cívica Radical until he founded the new party, Justo was active in organizing immigrant labor.<sup>34</sup> Justo was a harsh critic of the so-called política criolla, the pattern of personalism and violence which had been typical of the nation's politics. To him the Radicals represented this malady as much as did the conservatives, and from the beginning the Socialists were to follow a course independent of both the Régimen and Yrigoyen's Causa in their effort to change both the style and the content of Argentine politics.<sup>35</sup>

Although the conservative governments had passed a limited amount of legislation favorable to the workers and the Radicals considered themselves representatives of the lower classes, it was the Socialists who were to give precedence to social and economic concerns. While the Régimen was directing "progress from above" in line with the interests of the growers and exporters and the Radicals were concerned with principles of formal democracy and civic regeneration, the Socialists dealt with matters of wages, hours, factory conditions, and unionization.<sup>36</sup>

Despite their concern for the social and economic over the political, the Socialists maintained a considerably better record in respect for the democratic process than did either the conservatives or the Radicals. While perhaps in part the result of never being in power, this no doubt also was partly the byproduct of the new "style" of politics represented by the Socialists. The party, evolutionist from the outset, rejected both fraud and violence as political means. Instead, the Socialists stressed organization, program, and education. Through centers, through libraries, through forums, the Socialists worked to raise the cultural and civic level of the worker as well as trying to improve his economic level.<sup>37</sup> It was, in short, democratic Socialism of the European style.

Alfredo Palacios, whose colorful political career was to span more than half a century, became the first Socialist deputy in America when he was elected to the national chamber in 1904. His election came during a brief experiment with single-member districts, and the 1905 return to at-large election within each province and the federal capital

prevented any further Socialist victories until the electoral reforms took effect in 1912. That year both Palacios and Justo won federal capital seats in the Chamber of Deputies, where they were joined the following year by Nicolás Repetto and Mario Bravo. In 1914, the Socialists in the capital won six deputy seats to the UCR's three.

Although the Radicals were also winning a number of elections during the 1912-1916 period, the victories of the Socialists in the capital brought harsh criticism from the UCR. Yrigoyen's party claimed the Socialist victories were the result of "sinister conspiracy" by the Régimen which realized it could not win here by the fraud and violence it allegedly utilized elsewhere and thus supported the Socialists as a means of blocking the Radicals. As to the Socialists themselves, the UCR said it was a group "composed mostly of foreigners who are systematic enemies of the common good."<sup>38</sup>

Within Congress, the growing blocs of Socialist and Radical deputies often engaged in more bitter controversy with each other than either did with the conservative majority. In 1912 a Radical senator, José Camilo Crotto, challenged the election of Justo on the grounds --among others--that he helped spread "antipatriotic ideas" around the country and that he was foreign-born.<sup>39</sup> Insults, threats, and an occasional file folder were hurled between the rival blocs throughout the 1912-16 period, and in 1915 the tension reached the point of a duel between Palacios and UCR deputy Horacio Oyhanarta.<sup>40</sup> An assassination attempt against Justo in downtown Buenos Aires also was alleged to have been the outgrowth of an incident within the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>41</sup>

Although at times they were to obtain an occasional deputy from the provinces, the strength of the Socialists from the beginning was limited to the federal capital. Thus while ostensibly a class-based party, the Socialists also were in effect a regional party. Similarly local in character was Lisandro de la Torre's party in the province of Santa Fe, first under the name of Liga del Sur and later that of Partido Demócrata Progresista.

Like Justo, a founder of the Unión Cívica Radical and a participant in the 1890 insurrection, De la Torre resigned from the UCR in 1896 with a sharp blast at Yrigoyen for what he called secretive and negative leadership of the party. "I am no longer disposed," he said, "to continue contributing my modest efforts to a party which, impotent to realize those objectives which the great majority hold and applaud, serves only to provide Hipólito Yrigoyen with the prestige of national connections for his narrow and personalistic activities."<sup>42</sup>

De la Torre spent the next ten years involved in Santa Fe politics and in international travel, emerging in 1908 as the leader of the newly formed Liga del Sur. The new group combined an ideology of political liberalism with interests specific to the immigrant agriculturalists of the southern part of the province of Santa Fe. At the national level, these interests stood primarily in opposition to those of the large cattlemen of Buenos Aires province; at the provincial level, they sought greater local autonomy from the more conservative capital in the north. De la Torre had been greatly impressed with the local self-government he had witnessed in the United States, and a major plank in the Liga's founding program was a call for municipal

autonomy and the right of rural districts to elect their own police, court, and school officials.<sup>43</sup>

For a time, De la Torre's movement spread to some other provinces of the Litoral and Interior--at least nominally--and seemed to represent a viable middle ground between the Radicals and the more reactionary of the conservative groups. In the long run, however, its political impact was primarily provincial rather than national in scope.

The conservatives, mostly components of the so-called Régimen which the Radicals liked to portray as a sinister machine working relentlessly against the will of the people, were far from a centralized and monolithic political party. They were, rather, a loose coalition of provincial parties which--while they no doubt gained a certain unity in the face of the Radical threat--continued to reflect a considerable diversity of interests and style. These parties were typically composed of the "traditional and powerful people"<sup>44</sup> of each province, had little in the way of formal organizational structure, and relied primarily on the personal prestige of leaders and on traditional political loyalties.

Although Yrigoyen did not discriminate in his opposition to them, there was a considerable variety among the parties of the Régimen. The Partido Conservador of Buenos Aires province probably came the closest--at least during some periods--to the UCR's stereotype of a narrow-based, rather oppressive political group which retained power through widespread fraud and coercion. In some of the Interior provinces, on the other hand, conservative groups have kept the polls honest, have governed well, and have produced some of the nation's most respected politicians and statesmen. There also has been a

difference in persistence or "staying power" among conservative provincial parties; in some provinces the traditional parties crumpled and sometimes disappeared in the face of the Radicals and later the Peronistas, while in others--particularly Corrientes, Córdoba, and Mendoza--conservatives have continued to be of considerable importance politically.

There was dissatisfaction among conservatives as well as in the opposition parties with the political pattern which had developed in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century. The formation in 1891 of the Partido Modernista by Roque Sáenz Peña was an effort by a group within the ruling "class" to extend the limits of political participation.<sup>45</sup> Twenty years later, this same man promoted from the presidency the electoral reform which was to bring defeat to his class. Although Sáenz Peña's long-term concern with electoral reform would indicate that his motivation was rather altruistic, there were those who saw electoral reform as the best way of coping with the Radical "threat." In the early years of the twentieth century, the idea was current among various members of the oligarchy that the best way to destroy the Radicals was to let them govern, that as opposition they were indestructible but that they lacked the ability to govern successfully.<sup>46</sup> Carlos Pellegrini, who as vice president had assumed the presidency following the 1890 resignation of Juárez Celman, called Radicalism a "temperament" rather than a party and said "it has to be allowed to govern so that it corrects itself, learns, or destroys itself."<sup>47</sup>

In campaign speeches preceding his 1910 election to the presidency, Sáenz Peña contended that electoral reform was the most pressing need of the nation. After his election, he held a series of conferences with

Yrigoyen--whom he had known since both participated in the Partido Republicano in the 1870's--<sup>48</sup> and with the Radical leader reached a compromise on provisions of the proposed reform bill. Yrigoyen reported on these meetings to his party's national committee on October 5, 1910, and while refusing the president's offer to participate in the government the Radicals agreed to end their electoral abstention if the proposed reforms were approved and enforced.<sup>49</sup>

The first phase of the reform, sent to Congress in the final days of 1910, abolished the existing system of voter registration and provided for the use of the military draft registration as the basis of voter registration. Another bill sent at the same time placed the conduct of elections under the federal judicial system. The final and most significant bill, sent to Congress August 11, 1911, fundamentally altered the existing electoral system. It was designed, in Sáenz Peña's words, "to assure the freedom of the elector, the conscientious casting of the ballot," and the honest canvassing of returns "which reflect the public will."<sup>50</sup>

In addition to providing broader suffrage and establishing the secret ballot, the new law guaranteed minority representation. Although Sáenz Peña is said to have favored a plurality system, he eventually compromised with Yrigoyen on the so-called "incomplete list" system under which each party could put up candidates for only two-thirds of the available seats in the national Chamber of Deputies and, in presidential elections, two-thirds of the province's allotted number of presidential electors. The practical effect of this system was to guarantee the second party in each district about one-half the



representation obtained by the winning party.<sup>51</sup> The public, press, and Congress generally reacted favorably to the proposed reforms,<sup>52</sup> but the novelty of the incomplete list system gave rise to extensive debate and some serious opposition in Congress.<sup>53</sup> In early 1912, however, the reform was approved and the stage was set for a new era in Argentine politics.<sup>54</sup>

The electoral law brought an intensification of political activity and, with the first national election in 1912, an indication of the change that awaited the nation's political life.<sup>55</sup> Despite UCR skepticism about the enforcement of the new law and the party's apparent belief that all elections under Régimen administrations were invariably fraudulent, the Radicals won the 1912 election for national deputies in the capital and in the province of Santa Fe and won minority representation in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Entre Ríos. These victories gave the UCR eleven deputies in the 1912-1913 chamber, while the Socialists won two minority seats in the capital and the Liga del Sur took the minority seat in Santa Fe. The Radical bloc in the Chamber of Deputies increased to twenty-eight in 1914 as a result of victories in Entre Ríos and Santa Fe and minority representation from the capital, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Corrientes, and Mendoza. Winning the capital boosted the Socialist bloc to nine deputies, while the Liga del Sur won two more minority seats from Santa Fe for a total of three deputies.<sup>56</sup>

But the presidential election of 1916 would be the big test of the new policy of "free elections." The death of President Sáenz Peña and the succession of the more conservative Victorino de la Plaza, Sáenz Peña's vice president, caused some fears of a return to earlier

election practices. The new president assured the nation, however, that the 1916 election would be fair and guaranteed under the new law--and kept the promise. The fact that both Sáenz Peña and De la Plaza were rather independent politically and untied to particular political groups may have influenced their willingness to allow a Radical victory.<sup>57</sup>

When the Unión Cívica Radical held its national convention, 140 of the 146 delegates supported the candidacy of Yrigoyen for president. The Radical caudillo was not at the convention, and when a committee was sent to inform him of the nomination he declined it. "My thought has never been to govern the country," he said in a reply note to the convention, "but rather about a plan of fundamental reparation for which, in my judgment, I must sacrifice the holding of any public office."<sup>58</sup> The convention renewed its appeal, and Yrigoyen finally accepted. While there was little contest for the presidential nomination, the two major factions within the UCR fought over the vice presidential position. Yrigoyen's faction won, with the rojo Pelagio B. Luna receiving eighty-one convention votes to fifty-nine votes for azul leader Vicente C. Gallo.<sup>59</sup>

Lisandro de la Torre, the ex-Radical who founded the Liga del Sur in Santa Fe, was nominated in late 1915 as the presidential candidate of the Partido Demócrata Progresista. Like Yrigoyen, he at first declined the nomination but accepted after further urging by the convention. It was the first of two presidential candidacies for De la Torre; both were to be unsuccessful.

The Partido Demócrata Progresista was founded in December, 1914, of various provincial parties facing the prospect of competing with a

nationally organized UCR in the 1916 presidential elections. Led by De la Torre, the new party incorporated eight governing provincial parties and two minority parties--including the Liga del Sur.<sup>60</sup> After the electoral defeat and break-up of the group, De la Torre said the party had been the outgrowth of sincere beliefs among leaders of the provincial parties that only a more democratic and responsive style of politics could stem the Radical advance. Also, he added, these provincial leaders had been willing to sacrifice personal ambition in order to have a prestigious slate which could draw support from non-conservatives as well as conservatives.<sup>61</sup>

Few governing conservative parties remained out of the Partido Demócrata Progresista, but among them was the one which counted most --the Partido Conservador of Buenos Aires. Marcelino Ugarte, the governor and conservative caudillo of that powerful province, had presidential aspirations himself and refused to back De la Torre's candidacy. He not only would not take his Partido Conservador into the Partido Demócrata Progresista, but is said to have provided money to fight De la Torre's group in several provinces and to have conspired with President de la Plaza to thwart it in several others through federal intervention.<sup>62</sup> In addition to these external attacks, the party had difficulties with internal conflicts from the outset as a result of the differing interests and approaches of the various provincial groups making up the Partido Demócrata Progresista.<sup>63</sup>

The third presidential slate in the 1916 election was that of the Partido Socialista. Founder Juan B. Justo was the party's nominee for president; Nicolás Repetto, elected national deputy in 1914, was

the vice presidential candidate.

The UCR received a larger popular vote in the April 2 election than all the other parties combined. The Radicals maintained or improved their positions in the capital, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, and Santa Fe, while obtaining first-time victories in Santiago del Estero and Tucumán. The election expanded the UCR bloc in the Chamber of Deputies to forty-four members, more than one-third of the chamber. The Socialists won only second place in the capital, leaving their deputies bloc at nine members.

Dissension among conservative parties had intensified as the election approached, leading to the disintegration of the Partido Demócrata Progresista between the time of the election and the meeting of the electoral college. The Partido Conservador of Buenos Aires and its allies in other provinces had presented unpledged slates of electors; these plus parties defecting from De la Torre's coalition promoted the candidacy of Angel D. Rojas in the electoral college. Despite the initial success of the Partido Demócrata Progresista in gaining support among conservative provincial parties, only Catamarca, San Luis, Santa Fe, and Tucumán remained faithful to its leader at the July 20 meeting of the electors. Thus, the Partido Demócrata Progresista's original slate drew only twenty-eight electoral votes compared to 104 votes for the substitute slate--forty of which were from the Buenos Aires conservatives.

In spite of Yrigoyen's large popular vote total, he did not have the 151 electoral votes needed to win the presidency. Holding the key to the election were the so-called Dissident Radicals of Santa Fe, who

had won in that province and whose nineteen electoral votes could give the victory to Yrigoyen. The dissidence of the Santa Fe Radicals was the outgrowth of a party fight six months earlier when the "great majority" of the province's UCR leaders opposed the national committee's choice of a gubernatorial candidate,<sup>64</sup> and their opposition to the national committee inclined these electors not to vote for Yrigoyen. There was great suspense and a considerable amount of maneuvering--one of the electors allegedly was offered a blank check in return for his promise not to vote for Yrigoyen--<sup>65</sup> but when the electoral college met July 20 the Santa Fe dissidents cast their nineteen votes for the UCR candidate. This gave Yrigoyen one more than the required 151 votes--and the presidency of Argentina.

### Election Analysis

The Radicals--especially Yrigoyen--liked to contend that Radicalism and argentinidad were essentially synonymous; any Argentine, properly informed and freed of coercion, could not help but be a Radical. Foreign observers have been in general agreement that the UCR was a party of the urban middle class, representing its interests against those of the landed oligarchy and, later, those of organized labor. But few empirical studies have been made of the demographic and socio-economic correlates of electoral support for the UCR or any other party in the Argentine political system.<sup>66</sup>

The present section and the corresponding parts of subsequent chapters will report the results of multiple regression analysis of election returns with census-derived variables in an effort to explore the bases of support for the different political parties. The unit of

analysis in all cases is the departamento, or county, and all election data represent votes for national deputies. Independent variables in the regression analysis are the major factors or dimensions obtained through an orthogonal factor analysis of census data as described in Appendix A. Each county's ranking on each factor is represented by a factor score; it is these scores which are correlated with each major party's proportion of the total vote cast in the county.

Because three censuses yielding differing numbers and types of variables are needed to span the fifty-year period under study, there will be some variation in the number and nature of factor variables used from one election to another. As can be seen in Appendix A, however, the types of census data which "load" heavily on each factor as well as an intercorrelation of factors from different censuses reflect a certain continuity of major factors over the half-century.<sup>67</sup> The first two elections studied--1916 and 1926--will be correlated with factors from data of the third national census taken in 1914.<sup>68</sup> The next two elections--1936 and 1946--will utilize factors mostly from the fourth national census of 1947, while the final two election periods, 1960 and 1965, will use factors derived from a combination of data from the fifth national census of 1960 plus some special censuses of the early 1950's.<sup>69</sup>

Correlations in this and subsequent chapters will be studied at the national and regional levels. As was noted in the previous chapter, of the various ways in which Argentina could be "regionalized," it seemed most relevant historically and conceptually to divide the nation into three regions: (1) the federal capital and the province of Buenos

Aires; (2) the three Litoral provinces of Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe; and (3) the remaining ten provinces of the Interior. For purposes of election analysis, the first region covers only the province of Buenos Aires because boundary problems made it impractical to include the capital election data. The absence of elections in some of the smaller Interior provinces on certain election years<sup>70</sup> as well as the failure of a particular party to run in some provinces will result in some variation in the composition of regional groupings for correlation analysis. The notes to the tables reporting regional correlations will in all cases specify the provinces and parties which are included.

Two party groupings are used in the 1916 regression analysis. All Radical parties including the Dissident Radicals of Santa Fe are grouped under the label "Radicals." Because of the complicated and shifting relationship among the various conservative parties, it was decided to consider them together rather than try to distinguish between the De la Torre group and the Ugarte-led group. Hence all parties whose presidential electors voted for a candidate other than Yrigoyen or the Socialists' Justo are placed in the category of "conservatives." The Socialist vote is not analyzed due to the party's limited significance outside of the federal capital.

At the national and regional levels, a step-wise multiple regression was carried out whereby the equation for each party eventually included all independent variables. For ease of interpretation--and because the factor analysis dealt with much of the intercorrelation among independent variables at an earlier stage of the analysis--the simple correlation coefficients of each party with each factor will be

shown in the tables, along with the multiple correlation coefficient for the party with all factors. The relative importance of the various factors in the multiple regression equations will be described in the text.

Table II-1 shows the correlation coefficients at the national and regional levels for the two major groups contending in the 1916 elections. It is readily apparent that--at the national level at least--the general dimension of ruralism-urbanism was the significant variable for both Radicals and conservatives. The UCR tended to get its support from areas marked by the various urban-type census characteristics, while the conservatives to a somewhat greater degree drew their support from areas lacking these characteristics. Although the correlation coefficients of .31 and -.37 "explain" only about 10 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, of the parties' total variation in vote, the high number of cases involved give the correlations a statistical significance of greater than .01. Thus, there is less than one chance in a hundred that these correlation coefficients would be this high if there were in fact no relationship between the "urbanism" factor and the 1916 vote. None of the other factors, in contrast, can explain as much as one per cent of the vote of either party and they produce correlations of no statistical significance.<sup>71</sup>

As would be expected from the extremely weak simple correlations, the remaining three independent variables together account for but 1.2 per cent more of the UCR variance after the urbanism factor enters the multiple regression equation and bring the total explained variance to 10.9 per cent. For the conservatives, even less is explained by the



TABLE 11-1  
CORRELATES OF 1916 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors				
	No. Cases	I Urban	II Ranch Scale	III Rural T'ncy	IV Farm Scale	Mult. R
NATION						
Radicals	266	.31*	.03	-.03	.09	.33
Conservatives	266	-.37*	.09	-.02	-.06	.38
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>						
Radicals	106	.15	-.05	-.08	.11	.22
Conservatives	106	-.29*	.01	.04	-.01	.30
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>						
Radicals	57	.38*	.12	.55*	.31**	.60
Conservatives	57	-.31**	-.23	-.51*	-.29**	.59
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>						
Radicals	103	.48*	.02	-.07	.08	.50
Conservatives	103	-.54*	-.06	.04	-.06	.54

\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\* Significant at .05 level.

<sup>a</sup>Radicals stands for the Unión Cívica Radical; Conservatives represents the Partido Conservador.

TABLE II-1 (Continued)

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<sup>b</sup>Radicals includes the Unión Cívica Radical in Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe plus the Unión Cívica Radical Disidente in Santa Fe. Conservatives represents the Partido Autonomista and the Partido Liberal in Corrientes, the Concentración Popular in Entre Ríos, and the Partido Demócrata in Santa Fe.

<sup>c</sup>Radicals includes the Unión Cívica Radical in Catamarca, Córdoba, Jujuy, La Rioja, Mendoza, San Luis, and Tucumán. Conservatives includes the Concentración in Catamarca, the Partido Demócrata in Córdoba, the Partido Provincialista in Jujuy and La Rioja, the Partido Conservador in Mendoza and Tucumán, and the Unión Popular and Partido Demócrata in San Luis.

other three factors as the negative correlation with urbanism accounts for 14 per cent of the variance and the final explained variance is but 14.7 per cent.

Moving to the regional level, it can be seen that the national pattern generally holds in Buenos Aires province and in the Interior, but that some striking variations appear in the Litoral. In Buenos Aires, the UCR tended to receive more votes in the urbanized areas but the correlation coefficient of .15 is too low to be of statistical significance. The rural base of the province's conservatives is somewhat stronger, however, with the coefficient of -.29 on the urbanism factor carrying a significance of greater than .01. Ruralism, therefore, was a better indicator of conservative strength than urbanism was of Radical strength. In multiple regression, all four factors explained but 4.6 per cent of the UCR variance in Buenos Aires. For the conservatives, ruralism accounts for 8.1 per cent of the variance while the addition of the other three factors to the equation increases the explained variance to only 9.1 per cent.

In the three provinces of the Litoral, the urbanism correlations hold at about the same level and in the same direction as at the national level. But unlike the rest of the country, in the Litoral there are also other significant correlations; the UCR correlates strongly with rural tenancy and moderately with large farming while the conservatives register negatively on these factors at about the same strength. When the factors are introduced into multiple regression equations, rural tenancy accounts for by far the greatest part of the explained variance for both parties. In the UCR equation, tenancy explains 30.5 per cent

of the variance while urbanism, farm scale, and ranch scale add 2.8, 1.9, and 1.1 per cent respectively. For the conservatives, the negative correlation with tenancy explains 26.4 per cent of the variance. To this the remaining factors each add between 2.0 and 3.5 per cent for a total explained variance of 34.3 per cent.

Urbanism was a stronger factor in the Interior than in any other region, and the only one of any significance. For the Radicals the correlation of .48 with this factor accounts for 23.5 per cent of the vote variance, while the remaining factors together explain only 1.2 per cent more. Similarly, the conservatives' strong negative correlation with urbanism accounts for 28.7 per cent of that party's variance, to which the other three factors add less than one per cent.

Summarizing the 1916 election analysis, it can be seen that of the four independent variables urbanism is by far the strongest in explaining differences in support for the two major political groups.<sup>72</sup> It is the only explanatory variable of significance at the national level and in the regions of Buenos Aires province and the Interior, while in the Litoral it is one of three significant factors. Of the three regions, the politics of Buenos Aires appears to be the least "structured"--or is structured along dimensions not tapped by the available census data. Thus, despite a significant association with ruralism, more than 90 per cent of the variance in Buenos Aires conservative vote remains unexplained by all four factors. For the UCR, the unexplained variance exceeds 95 per cent. In the Interior, by contrast, it seems quite clear that the UCR gained its support mostly in the urbanized areas while the rural areas voted conservative. This strong urban-rural dichotomy in

the Interior is somewhat similar to the nineteenth century era in which the city merchants were unitarios while the countryside was dominated by the federales. The situation is not without irony in view of the UCR's claim that it was the reincarnation of federalism.

The correlations in the Litoral deserve special attention. The significant correlations with urbanism, rural tenancy, and large farming indicate that the Radical strength in the Litoral was generally in the more prosperous regions of the agricultural colonies and large-scale farming--often by immigrants--on rented land, as well as in the cities and farm towns of the region. The negative correlations of the conservative vote with these same three factors indicate support from the poorer and more traditional areas, representing perhaps a considerable amount of subsistence farming on owned plots. The fact that the moderately strong coefficients for urbanism and large farming lost most of their strength after tenancy entered first in the regression equations is accounted for by intercorrelation among these three variables in the Litoral. The orthogonal method of factor analysis used on the census extracts variables with little or no intercorrelation, but when only a part of the distribution is used--as it was for each of the regions--various intercorrelations can appear within each region. Thus, in the Litoral, urbanism correlates at .41 with rural tenancy and .26 with farm scale, while the latter two factors intercorrelate at .27. In short, the "disappearance" of urbanism and farm scale in the multiple regression does not indicate that they are not important explanatory variables but rather that in the Litoral urbanism, land rental, and large farms were often found together.

### Roll Call Analysis

The 123 men<sup>73</sup> who served at some time during the 1916 and 1917 sessions<sup>74</sup> of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies were elected under nineteen different party labels. This proliferation of party names is the combined result of the variety of provincial parties operating under different names which fall into the general category of "conservative" and the fact that even the same party would often change its name from one election to another or go into and out of coalitions.

In order to rationalize somewhat this rather confusing pattern of parties, deputies will be grouped into three "blocs"--Radical, Socialist, and conservative. This follows the procedure used in the election analysis and, as will be seen, conforms to the voting structure of the chamber. Deputies elected in 1916 were assigned to a bloc in the same manner that the electoral parties were classified; they were labeled Radical, Socialist, or conservative on the basis of their party's choice of candidate in the electoral college. For the carry-over deputies elected in 1914, the linkage between parties winning deputy seats in each province in 1914 and those winning seats in 1916 was established through a comparison of majority and minority candidates, their party identification, and their vote totals in each of the two elections.

On the basis of all deputies who served during the two-year period, the conservative parties--including those backing De la Torre and those allied with Ugarte--composed the largest bloc with fifty-nine members. Only slightly behind this were the Radicals, who had fifty-five deputies during the period. As noted earlier, the Socialist bloc was composed of nine members.

A total of thirty-two contested<sup>75</sup> roll calls were held during the 1916-1918 period on questions other than the election of chamber officers. The difference between the majority and minority vote ranged from 1.3 per cent, representing a one-vote split, to 64.5 per cent in the most unevenly divided case. The distribution of the roll calls according to the magnitude of the division is shown in Table 11-2. The distribution of the roll calls on the basis of degree of participation can be seen in Table 11-3. The fact that more than half of the votes had less than 60 per cent participation and that less than 70 per cent of the deputies voted in twenty-eight of the thirty-two roll calls reflects both the high rate of absenteeism prevalent in Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the custom of abstaining from a vote by leaving the chamber temporarily.<sup>76</sup>

Of the three party blocs under study, only the Socialists maintained a consistently high level of cohesiveness during the session. In all but one of the roll calls, all Socialist deputies voting took the same stand. Once, on a budget allocation to fight hoof and mouth disease, they split 4-2.

The cumulative scaling technique which will be used to analyze the roll call votes of this and subsequent sessions of the Chamber of Deputies has two important benefits in this type of study. Known commonly as "Guttman scaling" after Louis Guttman, who developed it in the 1940's, the procedure (1) identifies the major issue areas or dimensions of conflict in a legislative session, and (2) ranks both the individual roll calls and each of the deputies of the dimensions.<sup>77</sup> The fact that all roll calls which fit a scale can be said to reflect the same attitude or issue dimension makes Guttman scaling an important tool in reducing

TABLE 11-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference						
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69
Number of Roll Calls	10	7	8	2	3	1	1

TABLE 11-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting				
	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99
Number of Roll Calls	17	11	2	0	2



the dimensionality of a legislative session's voting record.

Twenty-four of the thirty-two roll calls fit one or more of five scales constructed for the two-year period under study. The fact that a higher proportion did not scale was at least in part the result of rather rigid criteria for scalability--outlined in Appendix B--plus the fact that some issue areas had only one roll call. The largest of the scales contains twelve roll calls, while the other four range from two to five roll calls each.<sup>78</sup> Only one roll call was found to fit more than one scale.<sup>79</sup> The nature of the scales, the number of roll calls, and the number of deputies assigned a scale position on each one is shown in Table II-4.

It can be seen in Table II-4 that between half and three-fourths of the deputies are included in three of the scales, while the other two each contain only slightly more than one-third of the chamber's membership. This small size of the "religion" and "investigations" scales is the result of their being composed of only two roll calls each, thus allowing only members who responded on both votes to be scaled. Despite the effects of a generally high level of non-response combined with rather rigid criteria for scalability, however, all but seventeen of the 123 deputies who served at some time during the two-year period could be placed on one or more of the scales. Thus, a study of the individual scales and of the interrelation among them should yield important data on the voting structure of the chamber.

Table II-5 shows the rank-order correlations among each of the five scales.<sup>80</sup> The correlation coefficients, ranging from .00 to -.64, provide statistical evidence of the fact that there were several

TABLE II-4  
SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE

Scale Subject	"Positive" Vote	Number Roll Calls	Number Deputies
Partisan Issues	Pro-Administration	12	89
Sugar Protection	Pro-Sugar Industry	5	68
Religion	Pro-Church	2	41
Foreign Relations	Pro-Break with Germany	3	71
Investigations	Pro-Investigation	2	42

TABLE II-5  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES

Scale	Scale			
	Sugar Prot.	Religion	For. Rel.	Investi- gations
Partisan Issues	-.04	.28	-.64	-.05
Sugar Protection		.41	.16	-.49
Religion			-.07	-.33
Foreign Relations				.00

distinct dimensions of cleavage in the 1916-1918 chamber. What these dimensions were and their association with party and region will be studied in an analysis of the individual scales.

### Partisan Issues Scale

The Partisan Issues Scale was the outgrowth of an effort to scale several party votes at the beginning of the session dealing with the credentials of victorious conservative candidates for deputy. When it was seen that these roll calls not only were mutually scalar but that a number of votes on other issues also scaled with them, the scale was expanded one roll call at a time until a total of twelve was found to fit. The two major blocs were in general considerably more cohesive on the roll calls comprising this scale than their average for the whole session, while an examination of the content of the roll calls shows them to be items which might well be expected to elicit partisan responses. Three of the votes dealt with provincial elections in which conservative deputies had been elected, while four concerned the intervention of conservative-dominated Buenos Aires province. The remaining five roll calls in the scale dealt with reapportionment, tax and budget matters, the arrest of a conservative deputy, and the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany.<sup>81</sup> A "positive" vote in each case was the pro-administration position, as indicated by the vote of the majority of the Radical bloc. Each position on the scale is based on a "contrived" item; the two end items contain two roll calls each, item 2 has three, and item 3 is composed of five roll calls.

Table II-6A shows the distribution of scale types among the three party blocs, while Table II-6B shows their relation to geographic region.

TABLE 11-6A  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Radicals	0	0	0	9	27	19	55
Socialists	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
Conservatives	25	9	9	1	0	15	59
Total	25	18	9	10	27	34	123

TABLE 11-6B  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Region	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	18	9	0	2	11	8	48
Litoral	2	4	2	6	6	10	30
Interior	5	5	7	2	10	16	45
Total	25	18	9	10	27	34	123

The concentration of twenty-five conservatives and twenty-seven Radicals at opposite ends of the diagonal in the first table indicates the strong cleavage along party lines represented by this scale. The fact that thirty-seven deputies representing all three blocs fell into the intermediate scale types, however, shows that even on partisan issues there was a middle ground and that there apparently were a number of "brokers" who operated between the hard cores of "government" and "opposition" in the 1916-1918 session.<sup>82</sup> The identification of the deputies found in the intermediate scale positions and an analysis of their attributes compared with those of the twenty-seven Radicals and twenty-five conservatives at the extreme positions should provide insight into the partisan structure of the chamber.

The Type 3 scale position, those whose position was pro-administration on all roll calls except the approval of the 1916 election in which the conservatives won the majority of deputies in Buenos Aires province and the vote to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, is held by nine Radicals and one conservative. Four of these Radicals--three "dissidents" and one orthodox--are from Santa Fe, two are from Entre Ríos, and one each is from Córdoba, Buenos Aires province, and the capital. Thus, the break from party unity, though slight, appears to have come primarily from provinces of the Litoral. The lone conservative who fell in this position toward the pro-administration end of the scale was a member of the provincial Concentración Cívica of San Juan.

Of the nine conservatives who make up the population of Scale Type 2--the median position of the scale--seven are from the Interior and two from the Litoral. Dominant in this scale type are deputies

from the northwest, with two from Salta, two from Tucumán, and one each from Jujuy and Catamarca. The other Interior deputy is from Córdoba, while the two Litoral conservatives who place in this scale type are from Entre Ríos and Corrientes. Placing in this scale type indicates that a deputy supports the administration of five of the twelve roll calls on the scale but has taken an anti-administration stand on (1) the election of a conservative deputy from Jujuy, (2) amendment to alcohol and tobacco taxes, (3) two bills relating to the intervention of Buenos Aires,<sup>83</sup> and (4) the arrest of a conservative deputy in Tucumán, in addition to the roll calls on Germany and the Buenos Aires election which comprise Item 4.

The Type 1 scale position includes those who supported the administration on the refusal to approve the election of the runner-up for a deputy seat whose winner--of the same party--died between the time of the election and swearing in, and on a mild Senate substitution for the original deputies bill criticizing the president's intervention of Buenos Aires province. The nine-member Socialist bloc and nine conservatives fall into this scale type. The conservatives include two from Santiago del Estero, two from Corrientes, and one each from Catamarca, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, San Juan, and Santa Fe. The Type 0 scale position, the most anti-administration, is held by eighteen Buenos Aires conservatives, two from Corrientes, two from La Rioja, and one each from Córdoba, San Juan, and Tucumán.

Tables II-6C and II-6D summarize the regional distribution of scale types by party bloc. The greatest deviation from the pro-administration position among the Radicals came from deputies of the Litoral,

TABLE 11-6C  
RADICAL BLOC

Region	Partisan Issues Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	0	0	0	2	11	7	20
Litoral	0	0	0	6	6	6	18
Interior	0	0	0	1	10	6	17
Total	0	0	0	9	27	19	55

TABLE 11-6D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Partisan Issues Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	18	0	0	0	0	1	19
Litoral	2	4	2	0	0	4	12
Interior	5	5	7	1	0	10	28
Total	25	9	9	1	0	15	59

who divided evenly between Scale Types 3 and 4. Radicals of the Interior and Buenos Aires, on the other hand, showed a high concentration at the pro-administration end of the scale. Among conservatives, those of Buenos Aires can be seen to form the "anchor" of the anti-administration end of the scale. In contrast to the Radicals, it is the conservatives of the Interior who deviate the most from "their" end of the scale, although even the Litoral conservatives spread over three scale types and show more deviation than do the Radicals of that region.

#### Foreign Relations Scale

The partisan orientation of the Foreign Relations Scale, which deals exclusively with the question of neutrality in World War I, is suggested in Table 11-5 from the fact that this scale correlates rather strongly--a  $Tau_c$  coefficient of  $-.64$ --with the Partisan Issues Scale. But only one of the three roll calls which comprise this scale would fit into the larger Partisan Issues Scale; thus, while the question of breaking diplomatic relations with Germany was definitely a party-related issue it did have a dimension of its own. In contrast to the Partisan Issues Scale, it was the Radicals who deviated the most from their bloc position on the neutrality issue.

The shift in the cohesiveness of the two major blocs is reflected in the distribution of scale types in Table 11-7A. Only four of thirty-nine conservatives are found outside of the position most favorable to a break in relations with Germany, and two of these four are in the adjacent scale type. Among Radicals, seventeen deputies remained solidly behind President Yrigoyen's neutrality while six deviated to varying degrees from this position. The Socialists, as has been typical on the



party-related scales, are found in the intermediate scale types.<sup>84</sup> Tables 11-7B, 11-7C, and 11-7D do not disclose any significant regional patterns on the German question beyond the tendency of the Litoral Radicals to deviate the most from their party's position which was seen in the partisan issues scale.

This scale's failure to fit within the larger Partisan Issues Scale is perhaps due to the nature of one of the three roll calls dealing with the German question. The major substantive vote--the roll call on the proposal to break relations with Germany--does fit in the Partisan Issues Scale. Of the two which did not fit the larger scale, a proposal by a pro-administration Radical to take up the day's agenda and thus postpone action on the diplomatic issue came quite close to doing so and in this scale is collapsed with the substantive vote to form a contrived item (Item 1). The remaining roll call is a motion by another pro-administration Radical to postpone the Germany debate in order to take up some railroad matters. This roll call is Item 2 on the scale, separated from Item 1 by two scale types (a "negative" vote on Item 2 is Scale Type 1, a non-response on Item 2 is Scale Type 2). The failure of the Item 2 roll call to fit the Partisan Issues Scale could be the result of apparently personal factors which will be seen throughout this work to show up in procedural votes even when they relate to important substantive questions, or due to the introduction of the railroad issue. It is possible, of course, that both factors were at work.

TABLE 11-7A  
FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Radical	17	1	3	2	32	55
Socialist	0	7	2	0	0	9
Conservative	2	0	2	35	20	59
Total	19	8	7	37	52	123

TABLE 11-7B  
FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE

Region	Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Buenos Aires	9	7	5	16	11	48
Litoral	3	0	2	9	16	30
Interior	7	1	0	12	25	45
Total	19	8	7	37	52	123

TABLE 11-7C

## RADICAL BLOC

Region	Foreign Relations Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Buenos Aires	9	0	2	0	9	20
Litoral	3	0	1	2	12	18
Interior	5	1	0	0	11	17
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>55</u>

TABLE 11-7D

## CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Foreign Relations Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Buenos Aires	0	0	1	16	2	19
Litoral	0	0	1	7	4	12
Interior	2	0	0	12	14	28
Total	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>59</u>

### Sugar Protection Scale

The Sugar Protection Scale is composed of five roll calls taken on various facets of a bill revising import duties on sugar. The move came as a result of high domestic prices and attempted to reduce duties until domestic sugar prices dropped to an acceptable level. The "positive" vote in each case is the position most favorable to the sugar industry.

Item 1 on the scale, the item on which the greatest number of deputies took a pro-sugar industry position, is a contrived item composed of Article 2 of the proposed bill which set a gradually declining duty over a ten-year period, and Article 3 which, on the assumed approval of Article 2, canceled the existing sugar tariff law. A "positive" vote in both cases is nay. Item 2, on which aye is pro-sugar industry, is an alternate proposal providing that seventy days after the domestic sugar price drops below forty centavos per kilo the old duty scale would again take effect. Item 3 is a vote specifying that it would be the retail price which would be the key, while item 4 is on setting 40 centavos as the maximum price. The positive vote on both is nay.

Table II-5 shows that the Sugar Protection Scale correlates quite weakly with the previous two scales. It has a Tau<sub>c</sub> coefficient of -.04 with the Partisan Issues Scale, and .16 with the Foreign Relations Scale. Despite this independence from the party-oriented scales, it can be seen in Table II-8A that the conservatives do tend to cluster at the pro-sugar industry end of the scale while the Radicals are most

heavily represented at the anti-sugar end, although this diagonal is not nearly as strong as it was in the previous three scales. Table 11-8B shows a similar pattern--with a similar lack of strength--based on region, with the Interior being the most pro-sugar and Buenos Aires the most anti-sugar. But whereas in some of the previous scales the regional variations were clarified when the two major blocs were presented separately, in this case the patterns appear to be still weaker when considered by bloc. This seems to be due primarily to the fact that the nine-member Socialist bloc, heretofore found largely in intermediate scale types, is in Scale Type 0 on the sugar question. As all the Socialist deputies are from the capital, this places them in the upper left-hand cell in Table 11-8B, where they compose nine of the sixteen cases and form one end of a diagonal which disappears when the blocs are separated.

Table 11-8C shows this dispersed pattern of regional scale types among members of the Radical bloc. As might be expected from the specific nature of the scale content, however, the voting structure takes on more form if intraregional variations are analyzed. Thus, the five Interior Radicals in Scale Type 0--the extreme anti-sugar position--are from Córdoba, San Luis, and Santiago del Estero. The first two provinces are completely outside of the sugar-growing region, while Santiago del Estero is on the fringe of the sugar area. The Interior Radical at the opposite end of the scale is from Tucumán, heart of the sugar region, as is one of the two in Scale Type 3 (this case was a non-response on Item 4 and hence, although assigned to Scale Type 3 according to scaling criteria, does not represent an anti-sugar vote on any of the five roll calls). The other Interior Radical in Scale

TABLE 11-8A  
SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Radical	12	0	7	3	3	30	55
Socialist	9	0	0	0	0	0	9
Conservative	5	4	4	4	17	25	59
Total	26	4	11	7	20	55	123

TABLE 11-8B  
SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE

Region	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	16	4	6	1	4	17	48
Litoral	2	0	4	2	5	17	30
Interior	8	0	1	4	11	21	45
Total	26	4	11	7	20	55	123

TABLE 11-8C  
RADICAL BLOC

Region	Sugar Protection Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	5	0	5	1	0	9	20
Litoral	2	0	2	0	2	12	18
Interior	5	0	0	2	1	9	17
Total	12	0	7	3	3	30	55

TABLE 11-8D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Sugar Protection Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	2	4	1	0	4	8	19
Litoral	0	0	2	2	3	5	12
Interior	3	0	1	2	10	12	28
Total	5	4	4	4	17	25	59

Type 3, who voted anti-sugar only on the roll call setting the 40-centavo price, is from Santiago del Estero.

At the other end of the scale, four of the five Radicals from the Buenos Aires region who are in Scale Type 0 are from the capital, while those from the province fall predominantly in Scale Type 2. These capital Radicals, combined with the Socialists, thus form the base of the anti-sugar industry position. Litoral Radicals, three from Entre Ríos and three from Santa Fe, are spread rather evenly across the scale and appear to have taken their positions on the basis of personal factors or temporary coalitions.

Among conservative deputies, a marked concentration of Interior members can be seen in the most protectionist position. These include deputies from Tucumán, Salta, and Jujuy--all in the sugar zone--as well as Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, and Mendoza. Interior deputies at the opposite end of the scale include two from Córdoba and one from San Juan, while a third conservative from Córdoba, one from Catamarca, and one from San Luis take intermediate scale positions. Litoral conservatives are all concentrated toward the pro-sugar end of the scale; those from Santa Fe and one from Corrientes are at the end position while another two from Corrientes and the two from Entre Ríos fall into intermediate scale types. Conservative deputies from Buenos Aires are spread rather evenly across the scale, although falling slightly heavier on the protectionist end. It would be interesting to determine if a correlation could be found between the urban-rural orientation of the individual Buenos Aires conservatives and their position on the sugar issue, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present study.



In summary, then, it can be seen upon a more detailed analysis of the Sugar Protection Scale that party is an even less important factor than Table II-8A would indicate, while region is a stronger influence than Tables II-8B, II-8C, and II-8D show at first glance. The cleavage on this issue is not between the regions of Buenos Aires and the Interior or between Buenos Aires-Litoral and the Interior. Rather, it is between the sugar-growing regions of the northwest--generally supported by some neighboring provinces--and the consumer-oriented deputies of the capital. Deputies outside of the influence of either the sugar industry or the urban consumer fall at various positions from one end of the scale to the other. This was seen clearly in the case of the Litoral Radicals, while the enigmatic situation among the Buenos Aires conservatives has been noted. It is also possible that some of these Buenos Aires conservatives were anti-sugar not because they may have been urban but rather because--as may have been the case with conservatives and Radicals from Córdoba as well--they represented a competing agricultural region. Regardless of the reasons behind the voting positions of these and other deputies from "neutral" areas, the bases of the pole positions and the nature of the cleavage are clear. The apparent party correlation seen in Table II-8A is the result of the regional distribution of party strength; there are no conservative deputies from the capital nor Socialists from the Interior, while conservatives outnumber Radicals more than two to one among deputies of the Interior.

#### Religion Scale

The Religion Scale is composed of two roll calls: a 197,124 peso item in the proposed 1917 budget to provide scholarships for training

priests, and a Socialist deputy's motion to appoint a committee to study his proposed divorce law. Both major blocs showed rather low cohesion on this scale. As can be seen in Table 11-5, the Religion Scale correlates only weakly with the two party-related scales analyzed above, showing a  $Tau_c$  coefficient of .28 with the Partisan Issues Scale, and .16 with the scale dealing with Germany. It has a slightly stronger correlation with the Sugar Protection Scale--a  $Tau_c$  value of .41--but not enough to suggest any significant overlapping of cleavage dimensions.

The clustering of Socialists at the anti-church end of the scale would be expected on ideological grounds. Of the twelve deputies who took a position against the church on Item 1, the budget allocation for seminary scholarships, eight were Socialists. They were joined in that end of the scale by three conservatives and a Radical. The median scale type--deputies who supported the scholarship but took an anti-church position on the divorce question--was predominantly populated by conservatives; only two of ten deputies in this category were Radicals. The most pro-church position, Scale Type 2, represents a vote in favor of the scholarships and against consideration of a divorce law. Ten Radicals and nine conservatives are in this scale type.

The fact that Radicals appear to support the church with considerably more strength than do the conservatives might at first seem contrary to the conventional image of the Radicals as the modern secular movement pitted against the conservatives as defenders of traditional interests and values. There was, however, an element of nativism, of emphasis on "lo criollo," in the Radical movement while at the same time many of the conservatives were the ideological heirs of the nine-

teenth century liberals who, among other things, had secularized education in Argentina. It is perhaps these latter aspects which are reflected in the Religion Scale.

Analysis of the two major blocs in Tables 11-9C and 11-9D shows that the slight deviation among Radicals from the most pro-church position came primarily from deputies of the Litoral. Among conservatives, those from Buenos Aires and the Litoral were spread more or less evenly among the three scale types while those from the Interior fell more heavily into pro-church positions.

#### Investigations Scale

The Investigations Scale also is composed of two roll calls. The "easiest" item is a request to the executive for information on the annual number and amount of national bank loans to national or provincial officeholders since 1890, and the disposition of these loans. The second item, approval of which placed a deputy in the most pro-investigation position, was a motion to appoint a committee to investigate alleged irregularities in the management of retirement and pension funds. Unlike many legislative investigations, these apparently were not primarily partisan issues. This is reflected in Table 11-5, where the investigations scale is seen to have a  $Tau_c$  coefficient of only -.05 with the Partisan Issues Scale, and .00 with the Foreign Relations Scale.

Socialist deputies made both motions comprising this scale, and Table 11-10A shows that they were solidly supported by their bloc. The same table shows how members of the other two blocs were spread evenly across the scale, with only a slight concentration among Radicals

TABLE 11-9A  
RELIGION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	1	2	10	42	55
Socialist	8	0	0	1	9
Conservative	3	8	9	39	59
Total	12	10	19	82	123

TABLE 11-9B  
RELIGION SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	10	6	12	20	48
Litoral	2	2	1	25	30
Interior	0	2	6	37	45
Total	12	10	19	82	123

TABLE 11-9C

## RADICAL BLOC

Region	Religion Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	0	1	8	11	20
Litoral	1	1	0	16	18
Interior	0	0	2	15	17
Total	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>55</u>

TABLE 11-9D

## CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Religion Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	2	5	4	8	19
Litoral	1	1	1	9	12
Interior	0	2	4	22	28
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>59</u>

toward the pro-investigation end and an even weaker imbalance toward the other end among conservatives. Table II-10B, while not establishing a strong relationship, suggests some regional influence with more than half of the Type 2 cases coming from Buenos Aires (all but two of these from the capital) while two-thirds of the deputies in Scale Type 0 are from the Interior.

As happened with the Sugar Industry Scale, separation of the major blocs in Tables II-10C and II-10D and the resulting elimination of the Socialists tends to obscure rather than clarify the regional aspects of this scale. Now, however, it is among the conservatives rather than the Radicals where regional influence seems to disappear. Table II-10C shows Radicals from Buenos Aires and the Litoral tend to concentrate most heavily in Scale Type 2, followed by Type 1 and only one case in Scale Type 0. Interior Radicals, on the other hand, are divided almost evenly among the scale types. The conservatives from every region can be seen in Table II-10D to spread evenly across the scale.

Despite this somewhat similar pattern to that of the Sugar Protection Scale and the moderately strong  $Tau_c$  correlation of  $-.49$  between these two scales, the investigations scale does not seem to be explainable on specific regional or party bases. Thus, in Córdoba one Radical is in Scale Type 0, two in Type 1, and one in Type 2, while the two conservatives from that province are divided between extreme scale types. A La Rioja conservative is in Type 0, a Salta conservative and a San Luis Radical in Type 2, while a San Luis conservative is in the intermediate position. Santiago del Estero has a Radical each in Types 0 and 1 and a conservative in Types 0 and 2, while the lone Tucumán

TABLE 11-10A  
INVESTIGATIONS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	4	6	7	38	55
Socialist	0	0	9	0	9
Conservative	5	7	4	43	59
Total	9	13	20	81	123

TABLE 11-10B  
INVESTIGATIONS SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	3	6	12	27	48
Litoral	0	3	3	24	30
Interior	6	4	5	30	45
Total	9	13	20	81	123

TABLE 11-10C

## RADICAL BLOC

Region	Investigations Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	1	1	2	16	20
Litoral	0	2	3	13	18
Interior	3	3	2	9	17
Total	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>55</u>

TABLE 11-10D

## CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Investigations Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	2	5	1	11	19
Litoral	0	1	0	11	12
Interior	3	1	3	21	28
Total	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>59</u>



deputy recorded on the scale--a Radical--falls into Type 0. Buenos Aires deputies show the same tendency as those of the Interior: three Radicals each fall into a different scale type while among conservatives two are in Type 0, five in Type 1, and one in Type 2.

In short, it would appear that except for the Socialists the factors behind a deputy's position on the investigations scale lay primarily in the realm of individual ideology or interests--or in some other area equally beyond the scope of the present study.

### Conclusion

The five Guttman scales which have been analyzed in this section include twenty-four of the thirty-two contested roll calls held during the 1916-1918 session of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. One hundred six of the 123 deputies who served at some time during the two-year period are ranked on at least one of the scales, and all but seven of these have a place on two or more of the scales. Thus, among them the scales provide a reliable indication of the voting structure of the session despite the high rate of non-response typically found on any one roll call.

The first two years of the Chamber of Deputies under the new Radical administration of Hipólito Yrigoyen were a period of flexibility, with various lines of cleavage and a number of "brokers" or middle-ground deputies along each of those lines. Two of the scales--Partisan Issues and Foreign Relations--reflect the same basic dimension: support of or opposition to the policies of the president. It was seen that the Radicals of the capital and Buenos Aires, backed up by those

of the Interior, formed the core of the president's support while the conservatives of Buenos Aires were the center of opposition.<sup>85</sup> Radicals from the Litoral and conservatives from the Litoral and the Interior populated the intermediate scale types and served as "brokers" on these scales--as did the Socialists. The fact that deputies are found at various intermediate positions on scales which are clearly partisan in character raises a serious question as to the validity of the common portrayal of the Yrigoyen congress as one sharply divided between the Radicals and an obstructionist "opposition" bloc of conservatives and Socialists.<sup>86</sup>

The other three scales all intercorrelate more strongly than any of them correlate with either of the previous two, indicating that they also to some extent reflect related dimensions. This dimension would seem to be that of geographic region. The fact that these intercorrelations range only between  $Tau_c$  values of .33 and .49, however, shows that while the dimensions may be related they are not the same. Regionalism, although on a basis other than the original categories of regions, was most clearly seen in the Sugar Protection Scale. A probable combination of ideological and political factors entered into the religion scale, while factors likewise beyond the scope of this study were found to play an even greater part in the Investigations Scale. Thus, aside from the specific economic question involved in the Sugar Scale, regionalism does not emerge as an overriding explanation behind these scales.

Political differences among the various regions of Argentina emerge with considerable more clarity when the two major blocs are

considered individually. It will be recalled that with occasional exceptions Radicals and the Litoral veered the most from the voting position of the Buenos Aires and Interior Radicals, while Interior conservatives regularly deviated the most from those of Buenos Aires. The cases where this did not occur did not represent reversals of the pattern, but rather cases--such as the conservatives on the Investigations Scale--where no pattern was discernible or where no significant deviation occurred. These patterns within each bloc were found in the "political" scales related to support of Yrigoyen as well as in the other three scales.

It is premature to attempt to explain these regional patterns within the blocs, but a few speculative observations seem in order. Among the conservatives, the division would appear to reflect but a continuation of the historic conflict between the Interior and Buenos Aires, with the other provinces of the Litoral falling in the middle. Although the scales show no great differences between deputies elected under the Partido Demócrata Progresista and those connected with other conservative parties, that 1916 conflict within the conservative coalition might perhaps have been partly a result of those regional differences and, in turn, may have contributed to parliamentary factionalism among conservatives. This division between deputies of the Interior and Buenos Aires would likely be found in the chamber in earlier years were sufficient roll calls available to allow analysis, and may well have been the major dimension of cleavage before the Radicals made their appearance in the chamber and brought new dimensions of polarization.

The pattern within the Radical bloc would appear to reflect a somewhat similar situation although modified by factors stemming from the party's recent rise as a political force and the control over the party exercised by Buenos Aires caudillo Hipólito Yrigoyen. It will be recalled that the first Radical electoral victories came in 1912 in the capital and in Santa Fe, and that while two years later the UCR in the capital was defeated by the Socialists, it won once again in Santa Fe and also in Entre Ríos. Thus, the Radicals of the Litoral understandably could feel politically strong enough to challenge Yrigoyen's attempts to forge a "national" party subject to his will. Radicals of the Interior, on the other hand, had not shown this type of electoral strength and were operating in a more politically hostile environment. As a result, it is possible that Interior Radicals saw a close relationship with the "national" party as the only means of assuring political survival at home.

Finally, the "independence" of the Litoral Radicals may in part be the result of their particular constituency characteristics. As was shown in Table 11-1, the UCR was essentially an urban party in Buenos Aires and quite strongly so in the Interior. In the Litoral, the 1916 Radical vote showed a solid correlation with urbanism--the strength of association being about mid-way between that in Buenos Aires and in the Interior--but also showed significant correlations with the agricultural factors of rural tenancy and farm scale. The possible influence of these particular constituency characteristics of the Litoral Radicals will be explored further in later chapters.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>The bibliography of Argentine Radicalism is extensive, although analytic studies are greatly outnumbered by polemical works. The most thorough--though partisan--history of the movement is Gabriel del Mazo's El radicalismo (3 vols.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1957-1959). An extensive collection of articles and documents related to the early decades of UCR history can be found in Hipólito Yrigoyen; pueblo y gobierno (12 vols.; Editorial Raigal, 1951-1953). Among studies of Radicalism which focus on its long-time leader and first president, the best are Félix Luna's Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1964) and Manuel Gálvez's Vida de Hipólito Yrigoyen; el hombre del misterio (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1939.) Brief overviews of the UCR's history can be found in Peter Snow's Argentine Radicalism: The History and Doctrine of the Radical Civic Union (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965) and Gabriel del Mazo's Breve historia del radicalismo (Buenos Aires: COEPLA, 1963). For examples of anti-Radical interpretations, one can consult Mariano G. Bosch, Historia del Partido Radical; la U.C.R., 1891-1930 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1931), or Carlos Sánchez Viamonte, El último caudillo (Córdoba: El País, 1930). Some recent scholars have begun to take a more empirical and analytic look at this facet of Argentine history which has traditionally been viewed only through partisan or opposition eyes. Representative of this long-overdue effort to go below the myths and rhetoric of the era are Ezequiel Gallo (h) and Silvia Sigal, "La formación de los partidos políticos contemporáneos: la U.C.R., 1890-1916," in Torcuato S. Di Tella et al. (ed.) Argentina, sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966), pp. 124-176; Peter H. Smith, "Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," Desarrollo Económico, No. 25 (April-June, 1967), pp. 795-829; and work currently under way by Argentine sociologist Darío Canton and his associates.

<sup>2</sup>See, among others, Luna, p. 199; and Gálvez, p. 333.

<sup>3</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 128.

<sup>4</sup>It may perhaps be said that there is not a single party leader who fails to think and to act (as if), and who, if he has a lively temperament and a frank character, fails to speak . . . and to say *Le Parti c'est moi*." Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 227.

<sup>5</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 58. The last principle illustrates the type of vague ethical statements which will be seen to complement --and often substitute for--concrete programs in the platforms of Radicalism.

<sup>6</sup>Indicative of the severity of the inflation and the rapid decline in value of the paper peso is the fact that the salary in gold or gold equivalent for a skilled worker in Buenos Aires dropped from an average of 1.95 pesos in 1885 to 81 centavos in 1891. José Panettieri, Los trabajadores en tiempos de la inmigración masiva en Argentina, 1870-1910 (La Plata, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1966), p. 58.

<sup>7</sup>Mario Monteforte Toledo, Partidos políticos de Iberoamérica (Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1961), p. 51.

<sup>8</sup>On the revolution of 1890, see Roberto Etchepareborda, La revolución argentina del 90 (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966); Luis V. Sommi, La revolución del 90 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pueblos de América, 1957); and O. del Pino Montes de Oca (ed.), La revolución del 90 (Buenos Aires: Editorial La República, 1956). A number of relevant articles and documents can also be found in the first number of Revista de Historia (Buenos Aires, 1957), which is devoted to the incident.

<sup>9</sup>Rodolfo Puiggrós, El Yrigoyenismo (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1965), pp. 12, 158.

<sup>10</sup>Ysabel F(isk) Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 185.

<sup>11</sup>Sergio Bagú, in preface to Juan Alvarez, Las guerras civiles argentinas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966), p. 10.

<sup>12</sup>James R. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas; A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), p. 154.

<sup>13</sup>Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 660.

<sup>14</sup>Carlos J. Rodríguez, Irigoyen; su revolución política y social (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Facultad, 1943), p. 90.

<sup>15</sup>José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, trans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 212.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 212-213.

<sup>17</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 78-79.

<sup>18</sup>Gálvez, p. 111.

<sup>19</sup>Romero, p. 216.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 218; and Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Historia política del ejército argentino (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1959), p. 56.

<sup>21</sup>Alvarez, p. 106.

<sup>22</sup>Panettieri, p. 156. In response to mounting labor conflicts, congress in 1902 passed the so-called "Ley de Residencia" authorizing the expulsion of foreigners deemed "dangerous" to public order. For a fifty-year history of this controversial law, see Carlos Sánchez Viamonte, Biografía de una ley antiargentina; la ley 4144 (Buenos Aires: Nuevas Ediciones Argentinas, 1956).

<sup>23</sup>This is the subtitle of Gálvez biography of Yrigoyen.

<sup>24</sup>Dardo Cúneo, Juan B. Justo y las luchas sociales en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial ALPE, 1956), p. 374.

<sup>25</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 21.

<sup>26</sup>Rennie, p. 190.

<sup>27</sup>Gálvez, p. 241.

<sup>28</sup>Snow, p. 24.

<sup>29</sup>The 1897 declaration of intransigence, quoted in Romero, p. 213.

<sup>30</sup>Quoted in Leopoldo Velasco, Pedro C. Molina; caballero de la democracia (Córdoba: n.p., 1947), p. 185.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>32</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 127. The charge of "personalism" was to become a major rallying cry among the Radicals who opposed Yrigoyen's leadership of the party.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>34</sup>Luis Pan, "Partidos y movimientos a través de la historia argentina," in José S. Campobassi et al., Los partidos políticos; estructura y vigencia en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1963), p. 97.

<sup>35</sup>Alfredo Galletti, La política y los partidos (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), p. 51.

<sup>36</sup>For the early activities of Justo and the Socialists in the labor movement, see, among others, Cúneo, pp. 171-329.

<sup>37</sup>Galletti, p. 65.

<sup>38</sup>Cúneo, p. 339.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 339-340.

<sup>40</sup>As dueling was against the principles of the Socialist Party, the incident led to Palacios' expulsion from the party and, following a brief effort at forming another socialist group under his own leadership, to a number of years of relative inactivity in politics before he reentered the party in the early 1930's.

<sup>41</sup>Cúneo, p. 382.

<sup>42</sup>Lisandro de la Torre, "Renuncia al Radicalismo," in Obras de Lisandro de la Torre (6 vols.; 3rd ed.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Hemisferio, 1957), I, 14-16.

<sup>43</sup>Raúl Larra, Lisandro de la Torre; vida y drama del solitario de Pinas (3rd ed.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Futuro, 1948), p. 119.

<sup>44</sup>Ramón J. Cárcano, Mis primeros ochenta años (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pampa y Cielo, 1965), p. 319, referring to the conservative Concentración Popular of Córdoba in 1912.

<sup>45</sup>Roberto Cortés Conde and Ezequiel Gallo, La formación de la Argentina moderna (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1967), p. 90.

<sup>46</sup>Puiggrós, p. 35.

<sup>47</sup>Quoted in Cárcano, p. 312.

<sup>48</sup>Del Mazo, Breve . . ., p. 47.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>50</sup>Miguel Angel Cárcano, Sáenz Peña; la revolución por los comicios (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1963), pp. 189-190.

<sup>51</sup>Yrigoyen's insistence on this provision may have reflected an underassessment of his party's electoral prospects. As it turned out, in many elections the UCR would have won more offices under a plurality system.

<sup>52</sup>The degree of popular dissatisfaction over the existing plurality system with multi-member, province-wide districts was indicated in a 1911 public opinion poll in which only five per cent of 1,580 respondents said they favored the system. Among Socialists or Socialist sympathizers, who composed one-third of the sample, 77 per cent favored some system of guaranteeing minority representation while 21 per cent favored single-member districts. The other respondents were about equally divided between these two alternatives (48 per cent to 45 per cent),



although within that group those whom the author said seemed most likely to be Radical supporters (party affiliation as such was not included in the questionnaire) favored guaranteed minority representation over a plurality single-member district system by 55 per cent to 41 per cent. Darío Cantón, La primera encuesta política en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Documento de Trabajo No. 38, 1967), p. 23.

<sup>53</sup>For the various bills and other documents involved in the reform as well as an extensive amount of the congressional debate, see Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, Las fuerzas armadas restituyen el imperio de la soberanía popular; las elecciones generales de 1946 (2 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 1-324.

<sup>54</sup>While widely acclaimed, the electoral reform has not been without its critics. See, for example, Benjamín Villafañe, La ley suicida (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1936); and Carlos D. Verzura, La comedia electoral (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1958).

<sup>55</sup>One immediate effect of the reform was the "mobilization" of more modern and urbanized sections of the population. Before 1912 it was the rural and "traditional" areas which showed the highest voter turnout; after that year voter interest and participation increased sharply in the urban areas while declining somewhat in rural areas. See Darío Cantón, Universal Suffrage as an Agent of Mobilization (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Documento de Trabajo No. 19, 1966).

<sup>56</sup>Deputies are elected for four-year terms, with half of the chamber being replaced every two years.

<sup>57</sup>This political detachment of the president and vice president is said to have aided the UCR's image as a national party in the years between 1910 and 1916. See Velasco, p. 59.

<sup>58</sup>The text of the message, in which Yrigoyen did observe that he thought his government would be "exemplary" were he to accept the nomination, is printed in Hipólito Yrigoyen: pueblo y gobierno, I, Part 2, 413-414.

<sup>59</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 155.

<sup>60</sup>Larra, p. 145.

<sup>61</sup>Letter to Martín Aldao, August 10, 1916, in Obras . . . , V, 55.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., pp. 56-57.

<sup>63</sup>Larra, p. 146.

<sup>64</sup>Luna, p. 193.

<sup>65</sup>Snow, p. 29.

<sup>66</sup>As was noted in the previous chapter, two important exceptions to this generalization are Gallo and Sigal, who report the results of a regression analysis of the 1916 election returns, with census indicators of "modernization," and Gino Germani's correlation of the elections of 1940, 1942, 1946 and 1948 in the federal capital with indicators of social class. The latter study is reported in Germani's Estructura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), pp. 247-263. Argentine sociologist Darío Canton currently has an extensive study under way which will deal with elections at various periods since 1912.

<sup>67</sup>For a discussion of the "power" of factor analysis to extract underlying dimensions despite considerable variations in the original operational variables, see L. L. Thurstone, Multiple Factor Analysis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 66-67.

<sup>68</sup>The previous two national censuses were in 1869 and 1895.

<sup>69</sup>The 1960 census contains less relevant data at the departamento level than either of the previous two censuses. In addition to the shortage of variables, publication of the census volumes had not been completed for all provinces at the time the present analysis was carried out.

<sup>70</sup>A province with only one or two deputies usually would elect only every four years.

<sup>71</sup>Throughout this study, correlations will not be considered of statistical significance unless  $p \leq .05$ .

<sup>72</sup>This conclusion is in general agreement with the findings of Gallo and Sigal, who found that Radical support in 1916 correlated with their "index of modernization," a composite of 1914 census data on urban residence, foreign-born, and literacy.

<sup>73</sup>The official size of the chamber during this period was 120 members, but actual membership was only 101 deputies at the time of the session's first roll call vote and ranged between 114 and 119 during the remainder of the session.

<sup>74</sup>The Argentine Chamber of Deputies technically holds a different session each year, but since membership is altered by election only every two years the present study will treat the two annual sessions following each sample election as a single session or "congress."

<sup>75</sup>A contested roll call is one in which at least five per cent of the deputies voting cast a vote against the position of the majority. The figure was set at five per cent rather than the conventional ten

per cent on the basis that the prevalence of small parties and factions might cause some roll calls to be thrown out with the conventional measure although they still reflect significant voting alignments.

<sup>76</sup>Chamber rules require a deputy to vote on a roll call if he is in the chamber and allow abstention per se only upon the approval of the membership for each case. Hence, announced abstention usually occurs only in cases where it is considered important for the record--such as when an item affects a particular deputy.

<sup>77</sup>For a complete discussion of the methodology of Guttman scaling, see Appendix B.

<sup>78</sup>The creation of scales with as few as two roll calls is known to vary from the conventions of Guttman scale analysis, but is justified in this work on the grounds that it is more informative than would be the only alternative of no scale at all in several issue areas. Among studies which have built scales with as few as two roll calls is Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," Journal of Politics, XX (May, 1958), 308-338.

<sup>79</sup>This was the major vote on severing diplomatic relations with Germany, which fit the Partisan Issues Scale as well as scaling with two other roll calls on the German question which did not fit the larger scale. There was an additional roll call dealing with an export tax which scales with a number of seemingly unrelated items, a fact which seems due to the voting pattern--Socialists against both of the large blocs--rather than the issues involved (this pattern would place it in any scale in which the Socialists took an end scale type position). Because of this, the roll call has been left out of the scales even though it could have fit several.

<sup>80</sup>The rank-order correlations in Table II-5 and comparable matrices in subsequent chapters are Kendall's  $\tau_{bc}$  coefficients. For a brief description of this measure of association, see Hubert M. Blalock Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 319-324.

<sup>81</sup>In the United States Congress as well as in state legislatures, "partisan issues" have been said to generally fall into one of three categories: (1) issues involving the prestige and basic programs of the administration; (2) social and economic proposals for welfare programs and the regulation of business and labor; and (3) issues involving the special interests of the parties or legislative organization and procedure. Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 430.

<sup>82</sup>On the concept of "brokers," see Dean L. Yarwood, "Legislative Persistence; A Comparison of the United States Senate in 1850 and 1860," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (May, 1967), 193-211.

<sup>83</sup>The intervention of Buenos Aires has been called Yrigoyen's "declaration of war" against the Régimen. The opposition, in turn, was annoyed not only by the action but also by the words of the decree, which claimed his was the only legitimate government and had a mandate to correct all the nation's existing "illegal" governments. Gálvez, p. 350.

<sup>84</sup>Argentine Socialists were opposed to intervention in the war or a break in relations with Germany at the war's outset, but later the majority tended to side with the Allies on the basis of the German threat to Argentine trade through the sinking of merchant ships. This split the party into the guerrillistas and the internacionalistas, the latter group opposing any intervention in the war and forming the base for the subsequent founding of the Communist Party in Argentina. Cúneo, pp. 363-368.

<sup>85</sup>This would tend to support Gálvez's contention that Yrigoyen's greatest adversary was the provincial government of Buenos Aires under the governorship of Marcelino Ugarte. Gálvez, p. 244.

<sup>86</sup>For the Radical interpretation of the Yrigoyen congress, see Del Mazo, El radicalismo, I, 171-233; and Roberto Etchepareborda, Yrigoyen y el Congreso (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1951).

## CHAPTER III

### A RADICAL HOUSE DIVIDED, 1926-1928

The first decade of Radical rule in Argentina witnessed a variety of changes both in the party and in the nation. The skeptical could no longer doubt that the Unión Cívica Radical was to be a permanent player in the Argentine political game, for it had steadily increased both the margin of its electoral victories and its strength in national and provincial governments. At the same time, there was no lessening of opposition either within or outside of the governing party. The irregular and arbitrary governing habits of Hipólito Yrigoyen had angered many Radicals and members of the opposition, while the Radical administration's drift toward the right in the 1920's under Yrigoyen's successor probably did less to placate the conservatives than it did to alienate labor. For Argentina the decade of the 1920's was a time of prosperity, of concentration on business rather than social issues. It was what might be called the end of the golden--or gilded--age, the twilight of the heady years of "centennial optimism" when Argentina's future as a great power was generally taken for granted. By 1930, there would be growing doubts as to whether God was in fact criollo.<sup>1</sup>

Politically, perhaps the most important single aspect of Yrigoyen's 1916-1922 administration was his governing style. The tactics which had brought him criticism within the party were magnified manyfold in the presidency. "It was in the Radicals' method of government that Yrigoyen's enemies found the most legitimate causes of complaint. . . . All that

conservative presidents stood for in the way of excessive centralization and illegal methods was represented in exaggerated form by the man who claimed to be the spokesman of democracy."<sup>2</sup>

The "personalism" about which Radicals such as Molina and Melo had complained in 1909 was to be the keynote of the new president, a man not in the habit of consulting others nor of delegating authority. He intervened in all spheres of the government, and in addition to personally making the appointments which were legally under his jurisdiction he ordered or requested various appointments in the supposedly autonomous governmental agencies. Espionage was a basic part of Yrigoyen's political and governmental system, and with this net of personally appointed and loyal informants in the various governmental offices and agencies he knew who made fun of him and who admired him. Employees reached the point where they did not trust one another, and all refrained from criticizing the president for fear he would hear about it and have them fired.<sup>3</sup>

Yrigoyen, who had been reluctant to give up conspiracy for campaigning, is said to have tried to run the country as he had run the Unión Cívica Radical for twenty-five years--as an "unquestioning, disciplined machine instantly responsive to his will."<sup>4</sup> The first governor elected under the new electoral reform, a conservative in Córdoba, noted that in the 1912 campaign against him the Radicals seldom mentioned their candidate for governor. "There exists one name and one name only: Yrigoyen."<sup>5</sup> In the presidency, it was still always Yrigoyen. All Radicals except those who had been friends of Alem and the intellectuals of the azul faction were said to have been "equally submissive" before the

president,<sup>6</sup> whose followers were sometimes known as genuflexos or knee-benders.<sup>7</sup>

It has become commonplace among Radical historians to lay the major blame on Congress for Yrigoyen's failure to carry out major economic and social reforms.<sup>8</sup> Luna, for example, speaks of a "war without quarter" against Yrigoyen which was evident in the Congress, resulting in the systematic obstruction of the president's governmental tasks.<sup>9</sup> According to Del Mazo, "Congress was constantly remiss in the requests of the first Yrigoyen government--even the most urgent."<sup>10</sup> As was noted in the previous chapter, it is also common to picture the Congress as divided into a Radical bloc struggling against a dominant and monolithic opposition bloc composed of conservatives and Socialists<sup>11</sup>--an assumption which was seen to be open to serious question when the Chamber of Deputies roll call votes for the period are analyzed.<sup>12</sup>

Whatever Yrigoyen's problems with Congress, they were at least in part of his own making. Lacking perhaps both the skill and the inclination for "congressional management," Yrigoyen increasingly alienated the members of Congress through both his tendency to slight it as an institution and his constant criticism of all past administrations. Awaiting a comprehensive statement of the new administration's program and goals in the president's first state of the union message in May, 1917, members of Congress instead received a four-paragraph statement delivered by the minister of the interior in which Yrigoyen said he had been too busy with the "arduous and complex problems" he had inherited to be able to prepare a message for Congress.<sup>13</sup> When the belated annual message did arrive a month and a half later, it was presented by an underling rather

than the president.<sup>14</sup> Nor did Yrigoyen show up for the opening of Congress in 1918, and when the same thing happened in 1919 the legislators were no longer willing to sit and listen to the annual message read by someone else. That year, as at the following three opening sessions before the end of Yrigoyen's term, Congress dispensed reading of the message and merely had it entered in the record, thus tending to "return the discourtesy."<sup>15</sup> Yrigoyen avoided Congress when his party was in control just as strongly as he did when it had an "opposition" majority, and in his eight years as president, 1916-1922 and 1928-1930, he entered the building but twice--to be inaugurated.<sup>16</sup>

Congress, particularly its non-Radical members, was further annoyed by the president's rather flagrant violation of the traditional separation of powers. One writer contends that "he did not understand that only Congress had the right to vote appropriations, and he spent money not authorized by the budget."<sup>17</sup> Nor did the fact that fifteen of the twenty federal interventions in the provinces during Yrigoyen's first administration came by presidential decree during congressional recess<sup>18</sup> endear him to the legislators, particularly in view of the overt political nature of some of these interventions.

While Yrigoyen refused to accept the concept of class interests, he was considered generally sympathetic to labor and the party sought the support of the urban working class as well as the middle class. His was a paternalistic concern, however, different from that of former administrations perhaps in degree but not in kind. It has even been said that on balance the UCR's record of labor legislation was no better than that of the preceding conservative administrations, although Radicals



would no doubt blame this on congressional opposition rather than on Yrigoyen.

The semana trágica in January, 1919, caused some to question the supposed labor sympathies of the Radical president--although here as on other facets of Yrigoyen's administration there are widely varying interpretations. The week of strikes and rioting which left hundreds dead--many of them uninvolved bystanders--began when police fired upon a group of striking metalworkers in what one author calls "a massacre."<sup>19</sup> Between the incident and the funeral of the victims the following day several other labor groups walked off their jobs and took to the street to protest the police action. When police the following day responded to fiery funeral orations with further gunfire, the battle was joined. Congress failed to cope with the outbreak of violence, for "they met in an atmosphere of short tempers, and instead of taking action, they threw their notebooks at each other and said things which had to be deleted from the Diario de Sesiones."<sup>20</sup> As to Yrigoyen's role, one historian contends the police violence throughout the week was contrary to the president's orders and in sharp contrast to the "prudence" he exercised during the incident.<sup>21</sup> Another concludes, however, that Yrigoyen "seems to have given the police orders to shoot to kill, because they fired indiscriminately on everyone in the streets."<sup>22</sup>

When it was over and the various sides took stock of the events, few were happy with the government's action. "The middle and upper classes felt that the police had added to the confusion instead of controlling it; and the workers were angry and resentful at the brutality with which their strike had been broken and their fellows senselessly murdered."<sup>23</sup> But as

the same author adds: "With a world in revolution it is not surprising that the echoes of great events penetrated even to the Río de la Plata; Yrigoyen, like most of Buenos Aires, merely mistook the echo for the terrible event itself."<sup>24</sup>

Yrigoyen's first administration has also come under fire for alleged corruption. Although the president himself is said to have been of unquestioned honesty--he even set the example of personal austerity by paying his own way when he took vacations and bringing the bottled water he drank at the office from his home--<sup>25</sup>those around him often were not so honest. While it has been argued that Radical corruption was petty and relatively insignificant compared to the larger private "deals" of the days of the Régimen,<sup>26</sup> that of the 1916-1922 period was considerably more conspicuous.

There were, of course, positive sides to the Yrigoyen administration. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the first Radical government was psychological; it made large sectors of the population--particularly the urban middle class--feel for the first time that they were a part of the political system. For all the presidential inscrutability, the *semana trágica*, or the administrative corruption, Yrigoyen was their man in a way that few previous presidents had been. The UCR's popular vote, its control of provincial governments, and the size of its bloc in the Chamber of Deputies increased steadily over the six-year period. It should be noted, however, that the 1918 or 1920 conversion of provinces to the Radical cause most often came during or just after one of Yrigoyen's interventions. Such was the case in the province of Buenos Aires, in Jujuy, and in La Rioja in 1918; it was the same in San Juan and San Luis in 1920.

By 1918 Radicals composed a majority of the 120-member Chamber of Deputies, although six of the sixty-five Radical members were Santa Fe "dissidents." Following the 1920 elections, the UCR bloc in the expanded 156-member chamber had grown to ninety deputies, while there were an additional ten dissident Radicals. The 1922 election brought another slight increase, resulting in a UCR bloc of 101 deputies plus two members of the new Unión Cívica Radical Bloquista of San Juan. Thus, when Yrigoyen turned over the government to his Radical successor the party had an almost two-thirds majority in the lower chamber.

Aside from the fact that both were long-time members of the UCR, there was little similarity between Yrigoyen and his chosen successor, Marcelo T. de Alvear. The new president was more scrupulous than Yrigoyen in his respect for formal democratic processes, while being less of an advocate of governmental intervention in society and in the economy. While Yrigoyen had been criticized for intervening too frequently in the provinces, Alvear--despite the seven interventions of his administration--was criticized for intervening too little.<sup>27</sup>

According to a biographer of both Radical presidents,<sup>28</sup> Yrigoyen had not had time to groom a successor of presidential stature who thought of the party and the nation as he did. Those who were closest to Yrigoyen's approach and ideology--men such as Diego Luis Molinari, Horacio Oyhanarte or Jorge Raúl Rodríguez--still needed years of maturity and experience. On the other hand, men like Melo, Gallo, Le Breton or Saguier who were of presidential stature had flaws--in Yrigoyen's eyes--in their connections or in their outlook. It would help bring back together the centrifugal elements of the party to nominate someone from the azul sector,

but it could not be someone who would challenge Yrigoyen's leadership of the party or undermine the regeneration he was bringing to Argentina. The only answer, it seemed, was Alvear--a man close enough to Yrigoyen so as to not put up too much of a fight during their inevitable confrontations, and of sufficient "nobility" as to not employ underhanded tactics. What was wanted was a "good sport," someone who would put up a good front and help hold the party together while Yrigoyen continued to run both the party and the nation from behind the scenes.

But Alvear, even before his inauguration, was to show more independence than the retiring president had anticipated. The first sign came when he insisted on naming his own cabinet, often running against Yrigoyen's recommendations. In keeping with his style of one-man government, Yrigoyen's ministers--with a few exceptions--lacked influence in the administration and were responsible for few acts of individual initiative since all was absorbed and done by the caudillo.<sup>29</sup> Alvear, on the other hand, believed that excessive presidential power was one of the political maladies of the country and that it had been made worse during Yrigoyen's administration. The new president favored a system in which the president provided the guidance and orientation but where the actual running of the government was largely in the hands of the cabinet, whose members should themselves be of presidential calibre. Instead of filling the ministries with old party faithfuls, he sought out qualified men prominent in social and university circles with little regard to the ardor of their Radicalism.<sup>30</sup>

Nor did Alvear's election bring about the anticipated harmony within the Unión Cívica Radical. In the Chamber of Deputies, long-standing

differences within the Radical bloc<sup>31</sup> crystallized into two formal groupings, one supporting President Alvear and one rallying behind the ex-president. Organizing as a separate party, the former group adopted the label of Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista. In 1926, voters in most provinces had slates of two--and sometimes more--versions of Radicalism from which to choose.

To the alvearistas the break represented a return to the principles on which the UCR had been founded, principles which had been corrupted by the leadership of Yrigoyen. "We do not consider ourselves infallible, nor do we feel imbued with the divine inspiration of some apostle," concluded a manifesto by a group of Antipersonalista senators in obvious reference to the ex-president.<sup>32</sup> To those faithful to Yrigoyen, the Antipersonalistas were nothing but conservatives in boinas blancas--the white berets which had become a popular symbol of the UCR. At best, they viewed the dissidents as dupes of the Régimen; at worst, the alvearistas were considered active conspirators against all that the UCR represented and had accomplished. To the faithful, the rapprochement between the Antipersonalistas and the conservatives was contubernio--concubinage--a term which gained a permanent place in the Argentine political lexicon.

### Election Analysis

The 1926 vote for national deputies is perhaps the most difficult to analyze of the six elections dealt with in this study. In 1916 there was a clear division between Radicals and conservatives regardless of what particular names each took in the individual provinces. In 1936 and thereafter, the increasing nationalization of politics resulted in little

confusion among major groupings despite some variations at the provincial level. But in 1926, the recent division of the UCR at the national level had resulted in two distinct national Radical parties whose affiliates at the provincial level could not always be clearly identified. Thus, for example, in Santiago del Estero there was the regular UCR plus the UCR Alem, UCR Unificada, and UCR Blanca. In Rucumán there were ballots for the UCR, the UCR Carranza, and the UCR Roja, while in San Juan there was the UCR Unificada and the UCR Bloquista. In other provinces, however, the parties ran under their national labels and caused no problem of identification.

In provinces where it was unclear which Radical groups were aligned with the Yrigoyen faction and which were with the Antipersonalistas, a comparison was made with the electoral college vote of 1928 in much the same way that the various conservative groups had been checked out in 1916. Since this technique serves only for the top two parties in each province, the minor splinter Radical groups in several provinces were not considered in the regional or national correlations because there was no way of determining with confidence which of the two major groups they belonged with--if either. The notes to Table III-1 list the provincial parties included in each political category.

An additional problem of analysis in the 1926 election is the fact that although there were three major national groupings--the UCR, the Antipersonalistas, and the conservatives--one or another of these did not run in eight of the thirteen provinces which elected deputies. Thus, at both the regional and national levels the correlations for each party at times had to be calculated with different provinces and differing

numbers of cases. Election returns for Socialists were available for eight provinces, but as the party failed to win any representation outside of the federal capital the vote was not analyzed at the regional and national levels. It might be noted, however, that simple correlations showed the Socialists to have a consistently strong correlation with the urbanism factor.

In 1926 and for every election analyzed thereafter, an indicator of "party organization" will be included as an independent variable in addition to the census-derived factors. The strength of a particular party's vote in a given district would be expected to depend somewhat upon the nature of the party's organization in that district as well as upon socio-economic characteristics of the constituency. Thus an indicator of party organization--the term is used here in a very broad sense which would include traditional forms of caudillismo as well as more formal party organization and activity--would perhaps explain a portion of a party's variance in support which could not be accounted for by the other variables. As an indicator of party organization--and admittedly a rather imperfect one--the present study will use the particular party's vote in the previous election analyzed. In addition to the weakness of having an intervening decade in which vote patterns may have varied in other elections, the use of this indicator presents problems because of the fact that parties at times are different from those analyzed in the previous time period. Nevertheless, it was felt useful to include this new type of variable; the "proof" should be in the results.

Table III-1 shows the simple correlation coefficients for the 1926 election at the national and regional levels. Nationally, it can be seen

that urbanism declined somewhat as an explanatory variable--although still important for two of the three party groupings--while other factors have gained in importance. For the orthodox UCR, the only independent variable significant at the national level is rural tenancy, registering a correlation of .48. The party shows virtually no correlation either with urbanism--which had been so important in 1916--or with the Radical vote in that election a decade before. The Antipersonalistas, on the other hand, appear to have taken the UCR's place as the "urban" party and--perhaps not coincidentally--show a correlation of .39 with the 1916 Radical vote.<sup>33</sup> An additional important variable for the Antipersonalistas is ranch scale. For the conservatives of 1926, both rural ownership--a correlation of -.37 with rural tenancy--and ruralism appear more important than the sector's 1916 strength, although all correlations are in the expected direction.

In multiple regression at the national level, rural tenancy accounts for 23.5 per cent of the total variance in the UCR vote, while the other four variables together explain but another 1.9 per cent. For the Antipersonalista vote, Radical strength in 1916 accounts for 15.3 per cent of the variance, ranch scale explains another 7.3 per cent, and farm scale adds 5.7 per cent for a total explained variance at this step of 28.3 per cent and a multiple correlation coefficient of .53. The remaining two variables, urbanism and rural tenancy, together account for but another 1.7 per cent of the variance and boost the multiple R to .55. In the case of the conservatives, the negative correlation with tenancy explains 13.4 per cent of the total variance while ruralism--the negative correlation with urbanism--accounts for another 8.5 per cent. The 1916



TABLE III-1  
CORRELATES OF 1926 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors						
	No. Cases	I Urban	II Ranch Scale	III Rural T'ncy	IV Farm Scale	UCR 1916	Con. 1916	Mult. R
NATION								
U.C.R.	243	.01	-.03	.48*	.10	.01	ni	.50
Antiper.	115	.25	.31*	.10	.18	.39*	ni	.55
Conserv.	195	-.28*	-.10	-.37*	-.05	ni	.17**	.50
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>								
U.C.R.	106	-.24**	.01	.08	.15	.21**	ni	.36
Conserv.	106	-.10	-.06	.06	-.01	ni	.25*	.26
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>								
U.C.R.	57	.52*	-.16	.49*	.39*	.70*	ni	.78
Antiper.	57	.41*	.16	.55*	.46*	.84*	ni	.88
Conserv.	38	-.52*	.28	-.27	-.43*	ni	.71*	.85
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>								
U.C.R.	80	-.20	.05	.46*	-.01	ni	.03	.49
Antiper.	58	.22	.38*	.06	.06	ni	.06	.57
Conserv.	51	-.47*	-.44*	-.03	.20	ni	-.01	.62

\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\* Significant at .05 level.

ni Not included in multiple regression equation.

TABLE III-1 (Continued)

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<sup>a</sup>U.C.R. is the Unión Cívica Radical; Conserv. is the Partido Conservador.

<sup>b</sup>U.C.R. includes the Unión Cívica Radical in Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe. Antiper. includes the Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista in Corrientes and Entre Ríos and the Unión Cívica Radical Unificada in Santa Fe. Conserv. includes the combined slate presented by the Partidos Liberal and Autonomista in Corrientes and that of the Concentración Popular in Entre Ríos.

<sup>c</sup>U.C.R. includes the Unión Cívica Radical in Catamarca, Córdoba, Jujuy, La Rioja, and Tucumán. Antiper. includes the Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista in Catamarca and La Rioja, the Unión Cívica Radical Leninista of Mendoza, and the Unión Cívica Radical Carranza of Tucumán. Conserv. includes the Partido Demócrata in Córdoba and the Partido Liberal in Mendoza and Tucumán.

conservative vote entered the equation third, explaining another 2.7 per cent for a total explained variance at this stage of 24.7 per cent. After these three variables, the factors dealing with ranch and farm scale together account for less than one per cent of the variance and increase the multiple R only from .49 to .50.

Examination of the regional sections of Table III-i discloses some rather sharp regional variations which are disguised at the national level. In Buenos Aires, it is the UCR which now seems to be the "rural" party, correlating at  $-.24$  with the urbanism factor compared to the conservatives' correlation of  $-.10$ . The only other significant correlation for either 1926 group in the province was with its respective party vote in 1916. The Antipersonalistas did not run a slate in Buenos Aires, Yrigoyen's home province. In the multiple regression analysis, the 1916 Radical vote and the negative association with urbanism explain 6.1 and 5.8 per cent of the UCR's variance, respectively, while the remaining three variables account for but another one per cent. In the conservatives' equation, 1916 conservative vote accounts for 6 per cent and all other independent variables increase the explained variance only to 6.9 per cent.

The Litoral, which provided the strongest correlations in 1916, repeats this pattern for all parties in 1926. Both the UCR and the Antipersonalistas show strong positive correlations with urbanism, tenancy, and farm scale just as the UCR did in 1916, and correlate at  $.70$  and  $.84$  respectively with the 1916 Radical vote. The Litoral conservatives also show a rather similar pattern to that of a decade earlier, although the negative correlations with urbanism and farm scale are somewhat

stronger while the association--also negative--with rural tenancy has weakened. The 1926 conservative vote correlates at .71 with that of a decade earlier.

Multiple regression for the Litoral shows that the 1916 Radical vote accounts for 48.6 per cent of the variance in the UCR vote in 1926, while urbanism explains another 7.5 per cent. Ranch scale, entering the equation third, accounts for 3.3 per cent of the variance while the remaining variables, tenancy and farm scale, together add but another 2 per cent to the explained variance despite their strong independent correlations. The 1916 Radical vote explains a considerably higher proportion of the variance in the Antipersonalista vote--71.1 per cent. The second variable to enter was farm scale, which accounted for another 4.6 per cent, while the remaining three added only 2.4 per cent combined. For the Litoral conservatives, 1916 conservative vote accounts for 50.8 per cent of the 1926 variance. The negative association with urbanism explains another 10.6 per cent, that with tenancy 5.4 per cent, and with farm scale 4.9 per cent. These four variables account for 71.8 per cent of the variance in conservative vote, while the fifth--ranch scale--adds but one-tenth of a per cent more.

As it was at the national level, in the Interior rural tenancy is the strongest and only significant variable correlating with the vote of the UCR. The Antipersonalista vote in the Interior correlates significantly only with large ranching, while the conservative parties register significant negative correlations with this factor and with urbanism. In multiple regression, 20.7 per cent of the UCR's variance is explained by rural tenancy, with another 2.5 per cent accounted for by the negative

correlation with urbanism. The remaining three variables together explain less than one per cent more of the variance. For the Antipersonalistas, ranch scale accounts for 14.2 per cent of the variance while farm scale and the 1916 conservative vote account for an additional 7.3 and 2.6 per cent, respectively. The partial correlation with urbanism jumped sharply after the "organization" variable entered the equation, causing it to enter fourth but account for 8.4 per cent more of the variance. Tenancy, the last variable to enter, adds virtually nothing to the explained variance. Both urbanism and ranch scale are significant in the regression equation for the conservative vote. The former, entering first, explains 22.2 per cent of the variance while the second accounts for another 13.8 per cent and boosts the multiple R from .47 to .60. The 1916 conservative vote explains 2 per cent more of the variance, while the last two variables--tenancy and farm scale--together add less than one per cent.

It will have been noted that in the Interior, the "party organization" indicator used with the UCR and the Antipersonalistas is the 1916 conservative vote rather than the Radical vote of that year. Both 1926 branches of the Radicals were found to correlate negatively--although at a rather low level--with the 1916 UCR vote, while registering very weak positive correlations of .03 and .06 with the 1916 conservative vote. While a negative correlation with previous elections might well be meaningful, it seems invalid as an indicator of organization and hence if strong would "artificially" inflate the multiple regression coefficients. Although the coefficients are below the level of statistical significance, the 1926 correlations for the Interior suggest that the UCR

and the governing Antipersonalistas were stronger in 1926 in areas which had been dominated in 1916 by the conservatives. The 1926 conservatives, on the other hand, show a correlation of  $-.01$  with the 1916 conservatives but correlate at  $.20$  with the UCR vote in 1916. This reversal of sorts which appears to have occurred between 1916 and 1926, it should be noted, seems not to affect the consistent associations which the UCR of 1916, the Antipersonalistas of 1926, and the conservatives of both periods register with the urbanism factor.

The fact that the conservatives were in power at the time of the 1916 election and the Antipersonalista government of Alvear was in when the 1926 election took place suggests the hypothesis that in the Interior --or in parts of it-- "organization" may relate more to incumbency than to specific parties. In other words, there may be areas which tend to support the "official" party from one administration to another. To test this hypothesis, the regression equations for the Interior will correlate the governing party with the one which was in power at the previous election analyzed--always checking first, of course, to make sure that it does not correlate "properly" with the previous vote for the same party. Since it seems less plausible that certain areas would voluntarily be consistently in the opposition despite turnovers in administration parties, positive correlations such as that between the 1926 conservatives and the 1916 Radicals will be considered to be mainly the complement of the administration-support phenomenon. That is, if some areas consistently support the administration, the "out" party, when two parties are being analyzed, would tend to be strongest in residual areas. In view of this, the opposition parties will be correlated with their own earlier vote,

if positive, or with no previous vote if this is negative.

Summarizing the 1926 analysis, it can be seen that there is a considerable continuity between that election and the election of 1916. This is most evident in the case of the conservatives, who continue to draw their strength from the less urbanized areas and--with the exception of the special case of the Interior which has already been discussed--correlate significantly with the conservative vote of a decade earlier. Of the two Radical groups, the Antipersonalistas appear to have "inherited" most of the 1916 UCR strength in the more urban areas; in Buenos Aires, where the Antipersonalistas did not run, the UCR "lost" the urban areas to the Socialists and correlate more strongly with ruralism than do the conservatives. Whether or not there was justification on the basis of policies for the Yrigoyenista accusation that the Antipersonalistas were nothing but disguised conservatives, it can be seen that the areas supporting Yrigoyen's challenge to the conservatives in 1916 were more inclined to vote for the Alvear than the Yrigoyen sector of the Radicals in 1926.

#### Roll Call Analysis

Deputies serving in the 1926-1928 session of the Chamber included the three basic categories of a decade earlier--Radicals, conservatives, and Socialists. While the latter two groups were classified into blocs as they had been in the 1916-1918 session, however, the Radicals presented a new problem in the 1926-1928 analysis. The party in 1924 had formally split into two groups--those who supported Yrigoyen and those who opposed the leadership of the long-time Radical caudillo from Buenos Aires

province. The former were often called "personalistas"; the latter "antipersonalistas."

Had the new Radical factions adopted and consistently used new names as they did years later after the 1957 split, there would have been little problem of classification. This was not the case in the 1920's, however. While the 1926-1928 chamber did have deputies who had been elected under the party label of Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista, it also contained Antipersonalistas who had been elected as members of the Unión Cívica Radical, the banner under which most of the pro-Yrigoyen Radicals were elected. Also, there were cases of variously named provincial parties--such as the Partido Radical Unificado of Santa Fe--whose deputies were found in both camps.

Various methods were used to discover in which bloc of the Radicals the individual deputies belonged. In addition to a comparison of the parties in the 1926 election with support for the various presidential candidates in 1928--a technique discussed above in the section on election analysis--information on a number of deputies was obtained from Radical histories of the period.<sup>34</sup> Through these various methods, it was eventually possible to establish the proper bloc identification of all Radical deputies serving in the session. The regional distribution of the membership of the two Radical blocs is shown in Table III-6.

There were fifty-six contested roll calls during the 1926-1928 session of the chamber. As in the earlier session, Table III-2 shows that the majority of the roll calls were fairly even divisions of the chamber; in thirty cases the difference between the majority and minority vote was less than 20 per cent. Unlike the 1916-1918 session, however,



TABLE III-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference									
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99
Number of Roll Calls	16	14	11	4	1	2	1	3	1	1

TABLE III-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting					
	0-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99
Number of Roll Calls	1	16	14	14	8	1

there were a few cases where the difference in voting reached above 70 per cent. A more striking difference between the two sessions is the participation in roll call voting. In 1916-1918, slightly more than half of the roll calls registered the vote of only between 50 and 59 per cent of the deputies, while only four of the session's thirty-two roll calls had a rate of participation of 70 per cent or higher. Table III-3 also shows the highest concentration of cases in the 50-59 per cent category, but there are also fourteen cases with participation in the 70-79 per cent range and eight roll calls in which between 80 and 89 per cent of the chamber participated. Partly as a result of this higher rate of participation, all but four of the session's 157 deputies are ranked on at least one of the 1926-1928 Guttman scales.

Table III-4 lists the Guttman scales which were constructed from the 1926-1928 roll calls, showing the subject, the meaning of a "positive" vote, the number of roll calls, and the number of deputies composing each scale. The size of the scales range from three scales containing only two roll calls each to the Partisan Issues Scale whose two contrived items contain a total of twenty-two roll calls. The number of deputies ranked by the scales ranges from sixty-eight to 139.

It can be seen in Table III-5 that there is a wide variety of intercorrelations among the eight scales for this session. The correlation coefficient of .90 between the Petroleum and Partisan Issues scales results from the fact that in both cases the Radical deputies were solidly at one end of the scale while the Socialist bloc was in both cases in the middle scale type. There were enough differences, however, to justify these as two separate scales. Correlations of -.01 between the Partisan

TABLE III-4  
SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE

Scale Subject	"Positive" Vote	Number Roll Calls	Number Deputies
Petroleum	Pro-nationalization	3	120
Women's Rights	Expanded rights	2	78
Foreign Affairs	Pro-Administration	2	73
Labor Laws	Pro-Labor	3	89
Partisan Issues	Pro-Administration	22	109
Pensions	Pro-Pensions	2	68
Credentials	Approval	3	139
Budget Control	Pro-Administration	3	100

TABLE III-5  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES

	Women's Rights	Foreign Affairs	Labor Laws	Partisan Issues	Pensions	Creden- tials	Budget Control
Petroleum	.12	.25	.05	.90	.52	.48	.51
Women's Rights		-.31	.31	-.01	-.21	-.18	.03
Foreign Affairs			-.62	.20	.77	.66	.48
Labor Laws				.10	-.64	-.24	-.28
Partisan Issues					.47	.54	.67
Pensions						.87	.75
Credentials							.61

TABLE III-6  
RADICAL DEPUTIES BY REGION

Radical Bloc	Region		
	Buenos Aires	Litoral	Interior
Yrigoyenista*	42	9	8
Antipersonalista	0	16	15

\* This "orthodox" branch of the UCR will generally be referred to simply as the "Radical" bloc, as distinguished from the "Antipersonalista" bloc.

Issues and Women's Rights scales and .03 between this latter scale and that dealing with budget control suggests that here the scales represent completely unrelated issue dimensions. Most of the coefficients show some degree of intercorrelation--an expected situation where at least some of the blocs tend to vote with a rather high level of cohesion--but are low enough to leave no doubt that the 1926-1928 session showed a multi-dimensional configuration of voting behavior. These dimensions are discussed below.

#### Petroleum Scale

This scale deals with the controversial question of nationalizing the petroleum resources of the nation. It contains both partisan and regional elements; nationalization was a major issue for the UCR, and the main oilfields were in several provinces of the Interior and the Litoral.

Item 1 of the scale, the "easiest" of the three questions for deputies to take a pro-nationalization position, is approval of the article of the petroleum bill declaring national ownership of all hydrocarbons. Item 2 is a proposal that the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons also be a national monopoly, while Item 3 is a motion to close debate on the exploration and exploitation question. A "positive" or pro-nationalization vote is an aye on each item.

Table III-7A shows the bloc distribution on the Petroleum Scale. Beginning at the pro-nationalization end of the scale, it can be seen that only members of the Radical bloc are found in Scale Type 4--a positive vote on all three items--and that all but three of the Radicals

are in this scale type. Scale Type 3, those who favored both national ownership and a national exploration-exploitation monopoly but opposed closing off debate, contains the remaining three Radicals, a majority of the Socialists, and two members each of the Antipersonalist and conservative blocs. The three Radicals did not vote against their bloc, however; they fall in this scale type because of a non-response on Item 3.

Scale Type 2, representing a vote in favor of nationalization of hydrocarbon resources but opposition to a national monopoly on exploration and exploitation, is populated by the remaining Socialists, nine conservatives, and four Antipersonalists. Another eight conservatives and seven Antipersonalists are in Scale Type 1--a non-response on Item 1 and a negative vote on the remaining two items--while seven conservatives and eight Antipersonalists had a negative position on all items to rank at the anti-nationalization end of the scale. If the blocs are ranked from most pro-nationalization to most anti-nationalization, therefore, they would be in the order of Radical, Socialist, conservative, and Antipersonalist.

Table III-7B shows the regional distribution of the Petroleum Scale types. Although it is not as pronounced as the bloc distribution, a regional pattern can be seen on the scale. All but four of the deputies from Buenos Aires fall in Scale Type 2 or above, compared to only slightly more than half of those of the Litoral and less than half of those from the Interior. Moving to the regional distribution of the two blocs which ranged over several scale types, it can be seen in Tables III-7C and III-7D that among both Antipersonalist and conservative deputies those of the Interior tended to be more concentrated at the

TABLE III-7A  
PETROLEUM SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Radical	0	0	0	3	51	6	60
Antipersonalist	8	7	4	2	0	11	32
Conservative	7	8	9	2	0	20	46
Socialist	0	0	8	11	0	0	19
Total	15	15	21	18	51	37	157

TABLE III-7B  
PETROLEUM SCALE

Region	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	2	2	14	12	37	8	75
Litoral	4	6	3	3	8	10	34
Interior	9	7	4	3	6	19	48
Total	15	15	21	18	51	37	157

TABLE III-7C  
ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Petroleum Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Litoral	2	4	2	2	0	6	16
Interior	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	8	7	4	2	0	11	32

TABLE III-7D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Petroleum Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	2	2	6	2	0	4	16
Litoral	2	2	1	0	0	4	9
Interior	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>21</u>
Total	7	8	9	2	0	20	46



anti-nationalization end of the scale.<sup>35</sup>

In summary, then, the petroleum issue seems to have represented a partisan question for the Radicals and a regional issue for the Antipersonalists and conservatives. Radical deputies from the Litoral and the Interior overrode provincial loyalties in favor of the party--or did not vote--and favored complete national control. Socialists, in the only 1926-1928 scale in which they did not show high cohesion, split on the question of government vs. mixed systems of exploration and exploitation. Among conservatives, those from Buenos Aires were mostly in Scale Type 2 while those of the Litoral and--even more so--the Interior were at the anti-nationalization end of the scale. There were no Antipersonalist deputies from Buenos Aires, but those of the Interior were noticeably more opposed to nationalization than were those of the Litoral. It should be remembered throughout the discussion of the 1926-1928 scales, of course, that the regional nature of the division in the UCR in 1924, shown in Table III-6, will considerably reduce the intra-bloc regionalism of both Radical groups.

#### Women's Rights Scale

One of the scales composed of only two roll calls, the Women's Rights Scale is based on two clauses in a bill which would expand women's legal rights in handling property. The "easier" clause, composing Item 1, would give a woman the right to administer her own goods and property and any she may receive in the legal breakup of a household. Item 2 would give her the right to dispose of these same goods and property. A positive or pro-rights vote is an aye in each case.

Table III-8A shows that of the four blocs only the Socialists are all in the same scale type on this issue. A majority of the Radicals and Antipersonalists are also in Scale Type 2--an aye vote on both items--but some of their blocs also spread across the other two scale types. The conservatives are concentrated in Scale Type 1, with two members at the pro-rights end of the scale. Table III-8B indicates no pronounced regional pattern to the vote, but does show that a smaller proportion of Interior deputies than those from other regions are in Scale Type 0 and that those of Buenos Aires are predominantly in Scale Type 2 (of which nineteen, of course, are Socialists).

Checking the Radicals and Antipersonalists for intra-bloc regional variations, Table III-8C shows no significant pattern for the former and Table III-8D indicates only a slight pro-rights tendency among Antipersonalists of the Interior over those of the Litoral. The two conservatives who were in Scale Type 2 also were from the Interior--one from Mendoza and the other from Salta.

It would appear, in summary, that for the Socialists the question of extending women's legal rights was clearly a partisan issue--fitting the party's basic doctrines--while for members of the other blocs it was more a question of personal values or beliefs. One interesting aspect of the scale is that contrary to what might be expected on the basis of conventional wisdom about the "traditional" Interior vs. "modern" Buenos Aires, Interior deputies often tended to be more "modern" in their attitude toward women than did some of those from Buenos Aires and the Litoral.<sup>36</sup>

TABLE III-8A  
WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	8	1	20	31	60
Antipersonalist	2	3	7	20	32
Conservative	0	16	2	28	46
Socialist	0	0	19	0	19
Total	10	20	48	79	157

TABLE III-8B  
WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	6	4	32	33	75
Litoral	3	6	5	20	34
Interior	1	10	11	26	48
Total	10	20	48	79	157

TABLE III-8C

## RADICAL BLOC

Region	Women's Rights Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	6	1	16	20	43
Litoral	1	0	1	7	9
Interior	1	0	3	4	8
Total	8	1	20	31	60

TABLE III-8D

## ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Women's Rights Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Litoral	2	1	4	9	16
Interior	0	2	3	11	16
Total	2	3	7	20	32

### Foreign Affairs Scale

This is a scale which actually mixes elements of diplomacy, religion, and perhaps ethnicity; on the basis of its major theme, however, it will be called a Foreign Affairs Scale. Another two-item scale, this one is composed of a vote to take up the day's agenda so as to avoid a debate on the elevation of Argentina's representation in Italy to the rank of embassy (Item 1), and a vote to raise the nation's representation to the Vatican to the rank of embassy (Item 2). A positive vote is nay on Item 1 and aye on Item 2.

Table III-9A shows that the opposite ends of this scale are held up by the Radicals and the Socialists, with the other two blocs ranging over two or three scale types each. The Antipersonalists are almost evenly divided between Scale Types 1 and 2, while the conservatives range from Type 0 to Type 2 with a concentration in the latter. Table III-9B shows no significant regional pattern to the scale beyond the fact that there are no Litoral deputies in Scale Type 0 and Type 1 is composed mostly of deputies from the Litoral and the Interior. In regional analysis of individual blocs, it can be seen in Table III-9C that no pattern is evident for the Antipersonalist deputies but that conservative deputies --Table III-9D--from the Litoral and Interior tend more toward the lower end of the scale than do those of Buenos Aires. The Radical deputy in Scale Type 1 also is from the Litoral.

Once again the issue would seem to be one of partisan or doctrinal importance to the Socialists; this certainly would be the case with the Vatican vote and probably was so on the question of Italy in the early days of Mussolini. Dealing as it did with actions of the Foreign Ministry,

TABLE III-9A  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	0	1	24	35	60
Antipersonalist	0	6	5	21	32
Conservative	1	8	12	25	46
Socialist	16	0	0	3	19
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>157</u>

TABLE III-9B  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	13	2	26	34	75
Litoral	0	5	5	24	34
Interior	4	8	10	26	48
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>157</u>

TABLE III-9C  
ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Foreign Affairs Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Litoral	0	3	2	11	16
Interior	0	3	3	10	16
Total	0	6	5	21	32

TABLE III-9D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Foreign Affairs Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	0	2	6	8	16
Litoral	0	1	1	7	9
Interior	1	5	5	10	21
Total	1	8	12	25	46

this brought solid support for the administration. The other two blocs, for whom the issue was apparently less precise, showed considerably more variation on the scale.

#### Labor Legislation Scale

The Labor Legislation Scale is composed of three roll calls, one procedural and two dealing with specific matters of working hours. Item 1 of the scale is a motion to override a presidential veto on a bill requiring businesses to close at 8 p.m.; Item 2 is a Senate modification which makes a bill outlawing night work in bakeries apply only to the federal capital and national territories; and Item 3 is a motion to take up the day's agenda containing some labor matters. A positive vote is aye on the first and third items and nay on Item 2.

Table III-10A shows that only the Socialists have any measure of bloc cohesion on this scale, with all but two of them at the pro-labor end of the scale and those two in the final item. The Antipersonalists concentrate at the opposite end of the scale--but are also found in two other scale types--while the Radicals and conservatives are spread over almost all scale positions. Table III-10B indicates that the deputies from Buenos Aires are found more toward the upper end of the scale, those of the Interior spread somewhat evenly across the scale, and those from the Litoral show the heaviest concentration at the anti-labor end.<sup>37</sup> The lack of significant regional patterns in Tables III-10C, III-10D, or III-10E, however, suggests that this over-all regional bias is the result of regional distribution of the blocs--especially the Socialists and the Antipersonalists.



TABLE III-10A  
LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Radical	4	8	1	16	3	0	28	60
Antipersonalist	13	1	0	2	0	0	16	32
Conservative	9	1	4	2	0	6	24	46
Socialist	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	26	10	5	20	5	23	68	157

TABLE III-10B  
LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE

Region	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	5	7	3	13	4	15	28	75
Litoral	8	2	1	1	1	0	21	34
Interior	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	26	10	5	20	5	23	68	157

TABLE III-10C

## RADICAL BLOC

Region	Labor Legislation Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	3	7	1	13	2	0	17	43
Litoral	0	1	0	0	1	0	7	9
Interior	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>
Total	4	8	1	16	3	0	28	60

TABLE III-10D

## ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Labor Legislation Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Litoral	7	1	0	1	0	0	7	16
Interior	6	0	0	1	0	0	9	16
Total	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>32</u>

TABLE III-10E  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Labor Legislation Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	2	0	2	0	0	1	11	16
Litoral	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	9
Interior	6	1	1	2	0	5	6	21
Total	9	1	4	2	0	6	24	46

### Partisan Issues Scale

Although it contains twenty-two roll calls, the high levels of bloc cohesion in this scale allowed the roll calls to be condensed into two contrived items. Item 1 is composed of four roll calls; Item 2 is made up of the remaining eighteen. The "easier" item--which the Socialists supported to rank in the median scale type--consists of two motions dealing with approval of deputy elections in Buenos Aires province, a motion to begin consideration of the budget, and a reaffirmation of the chamber's sole authority to initiate budgets. More detail on these and the roll calls composing Item 2 can be found in Appendix B.

It can be seen in Table III-11A that there was almost complete party unity on the Partisan Issues Scale. The Radical bloc is entirely in Scale Type 2 while the Socialists, as indicated, are all in the median position of the scale. All but one Conservative and one Antipersonalist--who join the Socialist in Scale Type 1--are concentrated in the anti-Radical end of the scale. Table III-11B shows a regional pattern to the scale. This is of course the result of the regional distribution of the bloc membership--Radicals and Socialists concentrated in Buenos Aires and the Antipersonalists and Conservatives predominating in the Litoral and Interior--but that fact does not remove the basic element of regionalism which appears to underlie both electoral behavior and the 1924 split in the Unión Cívica Radical.

### Pensions Scale

This scale also shows a high level of bloc cohesion, although with a different distribution of blocs across the scale. Another two-roll

TABLE III-11A  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	0	0	47	13	60
Antipersonalist	20	1	0	11	32
Conservative	21	1	0	24	46
Socialist	0	19	0	0	19
Total	41	21	47	48	157

TABLE III-11B  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	8	16	35	16	75
Litoral	15	1	7	11	34
Interior	18	4	5	21	48
Total	41	21	47	48	157

call scale, this one is composed of a motion to consider requests for pensions from the daughter of a former general and the family of a deceased deputy (Item 1), and approval of the Senate's increase from 400 to 1,500 pesos per month the proposed pension for the sister of former Radical leader Leandro N. Alem (Item 2). A positive or pro-pensions vote is an aye on each item.

Table III-12A shows that on the Pension Scale the Radicals and Socialists hold the opposite ends. Voting with the Radicals in favor of both items are the only four Antipersonalist deputies ranked on the scale, while all but one of the Conservatives fall into the median scale type by supporting Item 1 but opposing the increased pension for Alem's sister. Unlike the Partisan Issues Scale, the Pensions Scale in Table III-12B shows no significant regional pattern.

#### Credentials Scale

Ranking more deputies than any other 1926-1928 scale, this one is composed of three roll calls taken early in the session which deal with the approval of credentials of newly elected members of the chamber. It was not unusual during this era of Argentine congressional history to devote the first several months of a new session to election challenges and extensive debates over alleged fraud and irregularities in the biennial balloting--especially in provinces where opposition members had been elected. On this scale the majority bloc--or Radical--position is considered the "positive" vote.

Item 1 of the scale is a motion to postpone consideration of the credentials of two Antipersonalist deputies from Mendoza; Item 2 is a

TABLE III-12A  
PENSIONS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Radical	0	0	29	31	60
Antipersonalist	0	0	4	28	32
Conservative	0	16	1	29	46
Socialist	18	0	0	1	19
Total	18	16	34	89	157

TABLE III-12B  
PENSIONS SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	15	7	21	32	75
Litoral	0	2	6	26	34
Interior	3	7	7	31	48
Total	18	16	34	89	157

motion to postpone consideration of the credentials and accompanying resignation of a Radical deputy; Item 3 is a motion to postpone consideration of the credentials of a Radical deputy from Córdoba. A positive vote is aye on the first two items and nay on Item 3.

As in the previous scale, the Radicals and Socialists hold down opposite ends of this scale. Table III-13A shows fifty-two Radicals in Scale Type 6 and another three in the adjacent Scale Type 5, which represents a non-response on Item 3. All Socialists on the scale are in Scale Type 0. The conservatives spread over four scale types in the lower half of the scale, while Antipersonalist deputies can be found in every scale type. Table III-13B suggests no significant regional pattern to the credentials scale, while Table III-13C shows the same to be the case for the Antipersonalist bloc. A slight tendency of Buenos Aires conservatives to be more toward the end of the scale than those from the Interior can be seen in Table III-13D.

It is interesting that in a scale which dealt primarily with Radical attempts to give preferential consideration to deputies-elect of that party over Antipersonalists and conservatives, it was not the latter groups but the Socialists who most strongly opposed the Radicals on this dimension. Several explanations are possible--including interprovincial rivalry among Antipersonalists and conservatives--but perhaps the most likely explanation is that time-consuming and overtly partisan election challenges were contrary to the Socialist ideal of rational parliamentary politics.

#### Budget Control Scale

This scale is composed of three budget questions which all reflect



TABLE III-13A  
CREDENTIALS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Radical	0	0	0	0	0	3	52	5	60
Antipersonalist	2	1	6	7	6	3	5	2	32
Conservative	6	8	16	5	0	0	0	11	46
Socialist	<u>19</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	27	9	22	12	6	6	57		157

TABLE III-13B  
CREDENTIALS SCALE

Region	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	20	2	5	1	0	2	39	6	75
Litoral	3	3	6	4	5	2	7	4	34
Interior	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	27	9	22	12	6	6	57	18	157

TABLE III-13C  
ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Credentials Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Litoral	1	1	4	2	5	2	0	1	16
Interior	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	2	1	6	7	6	3	5	2	32

TABLE III-13D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Credentials Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	4	2	5	1	0	0	0	4	16
Litoral	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	9
Interior	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>21</u>
Total	6	8	16	5	0	0	0	11	46

an attempt by the majority Radical bloc--and through it the administration--to retain control of budget and spending matters. Item 1 is a proposal to allow the Senate to spend 300,000 pesos of its budget surplus on building repairs and other costs; Item 2 is a motion to remain in permanent session with a quorum until the annual budget is approved; and Item 3 is a vote on a committee report which would specify how surplus profits from the governmental oil operations could be used. A positive or pro-administration vote is nay on Items 1 and 3 and aye on Item 2.

Except for the fact that the Socialists all show a non-reponse on Item 1 and thus do not fall in the end scale type, Table III-14A shows a bloc pattern rather similar to the configuration of the previous scale. All but five of the Radicals are in the extreme Scale Type 6, and those five might be were if not for a non-response on Item 3. The Antipersonalists are spread rather evenly over all but the lowest scale type, while the conservatives cover the lower five of seven scale positions but concentrate in Scale Type 0.

No clear regional pattern emerges from Table III-14B and the same is true for both the Antipersonalist and conservative blocs individually in Tables III-14C and III-14D. As in several earlier scales, therefore, in this case the issue seems to have been a partisan question for the Radicals and the Socialists but to have depended on factors beyond the scope of the present analysis--such as perhaps personal ideology or friendship--in the case of many conservative and Antipersonalist deputies.

TABLE III-14A  
BUDGET CONTROL SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Radical	0	0	0	0	0	5	45	10	60
Antipersonalist	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	21	32
Conservative	10	3	5	3	4	0	0	21	46
Socialist	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	10	18	7	5	6	7	47	57	157

TABLE III-14B  
BUDGET CONTROL SCALE

Region	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	5	14	3	1	0	2	34	16	75
Litoral	1	0	1	1	2	4	6	19	34
Interior	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	10	18	7	5	6	7	47	57	157

TABLE III-14C  
ANTIPERSONALIST BLOC

Region	Budget Control Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Litoral	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	13	16
Interior	0	1	2	1	2	0	2	8	16
Total	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	21	32

TABLE III-14D  
CONSERVATIVE BLOC

Region	Budget Control Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	5	2	3	1	0	0	0	5	16
Litoral	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	5	9
Interior	4	1	1	2	2	0	0	11	21
Total	10	3	5	3	4	0	0	21	46

### Conclusion

The 1926-1928 session of the Chamber of Deputies contained a number of issue dimensions which brought out differing voting configurations within and among the four major blocs. As in the 1916-1918 session, it was a flexible chamber with shifting lines of cleavage and a number of "brokers" in the middle ground along any one particular dimension. The 1924 division of the Radicals took much of the internal diversity out of that bloc, however; in contrast to 1916-1918, the Radical bloc in this session was concentrated at one end in six of the eight scales. The Antipersonalist branch of the UCR continued to show a considerable amount of internal diversity, as did the conservatives. The Socialists, as in 1916-1918, seldom voted on opposite sides of any question.

Although the tables analyzing the regional voting patterns within blocs show less variation by region than they did in the earlier session, there is no indication that regionalism as such had declined. What had happened, it seems, is that the split in the UCR and perhaps general Radical gains over the decade had resulted in a situation where what was clearly regional voting in 1916-1918 had now come to coincide more with bloc voting and thus might seem to be lower. As was clear in the Partisan Issues Scale, however, when the Radicals and Socialists voted toward one end of a scale and the conservatives and Antipersonalists toward the opposite end, the scale would show a clear regional pattern.

Finally, it is interesting to note that despite the 1924 division of the UCR and the general identification of President Alvear with the Antipersonalist faction, it appears that it was the pro-Yrigoyen Radicals who still composed the "government" bloc in 1926-1928. On matters which

would be of most interest to the executive--matters such as foreign affairs and budgets--it was the Radical rather than the Antipersonalist bloc which consistently took the pro-administration position.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>To this Argentine saying could be added many other examples of a proverbial sense of national superiority. In the words of Marcelo T. de Alvear, president of Argentina from 1922 to 1928: "As a general rule, it is hard to tell the truth to our people . . . theirs is the greatest city in the world, their mountains are the highest, their pampas the broadest, theirs the most beautiful lakes, the best cattle, the richest vineyards, the most abundant crops, and the loveliest women. They admit no qualification, nor accept the idea that some other country might surpass theirs in any way." Quoted in Samuel Guy Inman, "Argentina," in What South Americans Think of Us (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1945), p. 326.

<sup>2</sup>Ysabel F(isk) Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 213.

<sup>3</sup>Manuel Gálvez, Vida de Hipólito Yrigoyen; el hombre del misterio (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1939), pp. 256-258.

<sup>4</sup>John W. White, Argentina: The Life Story of a Nation (New York: Viking Press, 1942), p. 139.

<sup>5</sup>Ramón J. Cárcano, Mis primeros ochenta años (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pampa y Cielo, 1965), p. 319.

<sup>6</sup>Gálvez, p. 253.

<sup>7</sup>John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York: Harper & Bros, 1941), p. 287.

<sup>8</sup>For a brief Radical interpretation of Yrigoyen's relations with Congress along with a listing of some of his more important bills, see Roberto Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen y el Congreso," in Hipólito Yrigoyen; pueblo y gobierno (12 vols.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1951), II, 45-83. The article also was published separately by the same publisher under its original title.

<sup>9</sup>Félix Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1964), pp. 200-201.

<sup>10</sup>Gabriel del Mazo, El radicalismo (3 vols.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1957), I, 177.

<sup>11</sup>In the opinion of a writer whose sympathies are strongly with the UCR and Yrigoyen, the Socialist deputies became "the most implacable and intelligent adversaries of the Radicals, serving the interests of the Régimen magnificently." Luna, p. 269.



<sup>12</sup>While there is general agreement that the Senate was a stronger "holdout" against the rise of the Radicals than was the Chamber of Deputies, opinions differ as to the extent to which it was a stronghold of the Régimen. Thus Peter Snow, in Argentine Radicalism: The History and Doctrine of the Radical Civic Union (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965), p. 33, contends that Yrigoyen was never able to obtain a "working majority" in the Senate while Socialist deputy Enrique Dickmann commented in the chamber on September 20, 1921, that Yrigoyen "governs with the Senate." Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Diario de Sesiones, 1921, IV, 166.

<sup>13</sup>Hipólito Yrigoyen, "Mensaje de 1917," in Hipólito Yrigoyen: pueblo y gobierno, II, 85.

<sup>14</sup>Gálvez, p. 350, says that Yrigoyen was the first president in the history of Argentina not to attend the opening session of Congress.

<sup>15</sup>Ramón Columba, El Congreso que yo he visto, 1914-1933 (3 vols.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Ramón Columba, 1949), p. 67.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>17</sup>Rennie, p. 213.

<sup>18</sup>R. A. Gómez, "Intervention in Argentina, 1860-1930," Inter-American Economic Affairs, I (December, 1947), 67, 69.

<sup>19</sup>Sebastián Marotta, El movimiento sindical argentino; su génesis y desarrollo (2 vols.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Lacio, 1961), II, 241.

<sup>20</sup>Rennie, p. 216.

<sup>21</sup>Nicolás Babini, "La semana trágica; pesadilla de una siesta de verano," Todo es Historia, Año I, No. 5 (September, 1967), p. 18.

<sup>22</sup>Rennie, p. 216.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>25</sup>Gálvez, p. 257.

<sup>26</sup>Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Historia política del ejército argentino (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1959), pp. 57-58.

<sup>27</sup>Alvear's refusal to intervene in Buenos Aires province toward the end of his administration led to the protest resignation of Interior Minister Vicente Gallo, one of the leaders of the original Antipersonalista movement. Ricardo Rojas, El radicalismo de mañana (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso Editor, 1932), p. 153.

<sup>28</sup>Félix Luna, Alvear (Buenos Aires: Libros Argentinos, 1958), pp. 55-56.

<sup>29</sup>Gálvez, p. 251.

<sup>30</sup>Luna, Alvear, pp. 57-58.

<sup>31</sup>Del Mazo, El radicalismo, II, 36, says that during Yrigoyen's administration there was a group of about twenty UCR deputies who "consistently and openly" voted against the party bloc. Although the lines may have hardened later in the administration, it was seen in the previous chapter that there was a considerable fluidity within both the Radical and conservative blocs during the first two years and that alignments varied with issue area.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>33</sup>This would appear to contradict the common image of the UCR under Yrigoyen as a national modernizing force whose efforts were continually thwarted by the conservatives and Socialists and, after the 1924 party division, the Antipersonalists.

<sup>34</sup>Especially useful in tracing these affiliations were the works of Del Mazo and Luna.

<sup>35</sup>From the extensive debate over the petroleum question, it is clear that while the Radical spokesmen argued that complete nationalization was necessary in order to keep "the economic future of the nation [from falling into] foreign hands," Interior deputies often saw it as the "unwarranted expropriation" of the petroleum resources of the provinces. See, for example, Diario de Sesiones, 1927, III, 184-185, and ibid., 1927, IV, 362.

<sup>36</sup>One opponent to these measures maintained that their approval would allow women to be victimized by opportunistic men who would take their property and leave their children in the street. Diario de Sesiones, 1926, IV, 430.

<sup>37</sup>Several deputies maintained that the setting of a nation-wide closing time for businesses would be an infringement of the rights of the provinces, which had the power and authority to regulate such matters. Diario de Sesiones, 1926, III, 568-569.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### THE CONSERVATIVE RESTORATION, 1936-1938

Radical failure, military intervention, and a return of the conservatives to power highlighted the eight years separating the end of the session of the Chamber of Deputies studied in the previous chapter and the national election of 1936. Yrigoyen was elected in 1928 to another term as president on a tidal wave of electoral support, yet two years later he was overthrown by a civilian-military golpe which also enjoyed general support among the public. For the first time since the nation was organized in 1860, the constitutional pattern of governmental succession was interrupted by the armed forces. Proscribed by the conservative-military groups which gained power in 1930, the Radicals returned to their pre-1916 pattern of electoral abstention mixed with revolutionary plotting. Marcelo T. de Alvear, who as president had become the bête noire of the orthodox Radicals, returned from Europe in 1931 to lead the reorganization of the party and after the 1933 death of Yrigoyen served as its standard bearer. In 1936, the UCR lifted its abstention and--as in the election two decades before--met a well-entrenched oficialismo at the polls.<sup>1</sup>

President Alvear had virtually assured the 1928 return to power of the yrigoyenistas by refusing--the previous year--to heed the pleas of many of his closest associates for federal intervention in Buenos Aires province. Buenos Aires was the stronghold of the aging UCR caudillo, just as it had been of the conservatives in 1916. It would have been

difficult for the Antipersonalista-conservative coalition of 1928 to win without the capital, which also was strongly yrigoyenista; without either the capital or the province, it would be impossible. Nor, of course, was Yrigoyen's strength limited to these two important districts. He beat the slate of the so-called Frente Unico--a coalition between Antipersonalistas and conservatives--in all of the provinces except San Juan, where the UCR boycotted the elections. His nationwide popular vote was 838,583 compared to 414,026 for the Frente Unico slate of Leopoldo Melo and Vicente Gallo, while Socialist candidate Mario Bravo polled 64,985 votes.<sup>2</sup> In 1916 Yrigoyen had edged through the electoral college with one vote to spare; in 1928 he received 245 of the 319 electoral votes cast.<sup>3</sup>

Such a victory would be heady for even the most unassuming of men, and easy to interpret as a mandate. For Yrigoyen, it could be nothing but proof of the rightness of everything he had done for and represented to the nation--proof that in fact "Radicalism was the nation." But the mandate to continue with the reparación begun in 1916 was to prove ephemeral; without his ever really realizing it, the support of 1928 began to erode practically from the day after the election.

In evaluating the 1928-1930 period, even a strong defender of Yrigoyen concludes that perhaps the UCR leader's "gravest error" was deciding to seek the presidency for a second time in 1928.<sup>4</sup> He was seventy-eight years old at the time, and is said by many to have already become rather senile. In any case, there is little question that he was not up to coping with the problems of the day. It will be recalled that in his first term Yrigoyen found it difficult--or did not try--to shift his outlook and tactics from those of a revolutionary to those of a

constitutionally elected president whose party's only platform was institutional integrity. In 1928, the question of respect for the constitution was no longer an issue; but while between 1928 and 1930 a variety of social, political, and economic problems called for solutions, Yrigoyen seemed oblivious to them.

Yrigoyen's detachment from the realities of the day was augmented by his staff and advisers. Whether through habitual subservience and a desire to protect their chief from unpleasant realities, or through a self-serving plan to isolate the president so as to give themselves more freedom of action, those around Yrigoyen shielded him from his environment and told him what he wanted to hear. In the words of one writer, "for two years, as the old man got feebler in mind and body, the government passed into the hands of the worst element in the Radical Party, and the nation was treated to a spectacle of plunder and inefficiency such as it had never seen."<sup>5</sup>

To the extent that Yrigoyen did make political moves--or moves that were assumed to have originated with him--he continued to alienate erstwhile party faithfuls as he had done during his first administration. The first message to Congress during his second term was filled with only lightly veiled criticism of the Alvear administration and spoke of the arduous task of putting the governmental house in order in much the same way as his 1917 message.<sup>6</sup> Politically inspired interventions in the provinces also became more frequent--and this time they were most often against the other wing of the Radicals instead of against the conservatives as in the 1916-1922 administration. The interventions of San Juan and Mendoza--approved by Congress just before Yrigoyen's inauguration

but after the yrigoyenista deputies elected with him had been incorporated into the chamber--is said to have done more to erode support of the UCR administration than any other single act of the 1928-1930 period.<sup>7</sup> The Cantoni family in San Juan and the Lencinas family in Mendoza were in firm control of provincial parties which had long gone under the Radical label but which moved into the Antipersonalista camp when the party split at the national level.<sup>8</sup> The yrigoyenista bloc successfully challenged the election of deputies from both provincial groups, and the 1929 assassination of Carlos W. Lencinas was believed by many to be the work of the president.

Nor was the opposition unready or unwilling to criticize--and perhaps often exaggerate--the questionable moves of the second Yrigoyen administration. The conservatives had revived and reorganized during the Alvear administration, and while as a national party the Antipersonalistas became somewhat disorganized after 1928, this wing of the Radicals still contained many able and articulate men whose long-standing criticism of Yrigoyen gained in intensity during the caudillo's second term. The Partido Socialista Independiente, which split from the Socialist Party in 1927, was more vehemently anti-Yrigoyen than the main party had ever been and--like the Antipersonalistas--it was staffed with men of energy and prominence. As the excesses and shortcomings became increasingly evident, particularly after the first shock waves of the world economic crisis began to be felt, these and other groups became increasingly convinced that something had to be done.

The economic crisis which began in Argentina in 1929 deepened the following year--one observer says 1930 was a year of "total crisis in all

of the nation's economic activities"--<sup>9</sup>but still the administration took no serious steps to cope with the problem. Even the sharp drop in support made obvious by the national deputies election of March, 1930, failed to shock the administration into meaningful action.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the government bloc in the Chamber of Deputies concentrated its energy on challenging the credentials of opposition members who had been elected in that election. The wrangle went on for months, leading to the so-called "Manifesto of the forty-four" of August 9 in which opposition deputies and senators urged the executive to comply with the constitution by opening the regular sessions on time rather than spending months on election challenges and called for "proper investment" of public monies and the "honest application" of basic laws. More importantly, the signers said they had agreed to coordinate their efforts in taking their anti-administration battle out of the chamber and into the street and the countryside.<sup>11</sup>

The August 9 manifesto was in effect the call to the barricades. Various leaders of the opposition had for some time been in contact with anti-Yrigoyen military men and gradually both the civilians and the officers became convinced of the necessity and desirability of a military overthrow of the UCR caudillo.<sup>12</sup> Toward the end of August and the early days of September there were increasing indications of an imminent golpe, but Yrigoyen refused to make a move to head off the conspiracy. The great majority of the military was still on his side, and his loyal minister of war, General Luis Dellepiane, urged the president to authorize him to move in and halt the planned uprising. But the authorization did not come; Yrigoyen, whose movement represented "the nation," could not

conceive of a revolution against him.<sup>13</sup> On September 3, the frustrated Dellepiane resigned his post. Three days later the government of Yrigoyen fell without resistance before a column led by a retired general and composed mostly of military cadets.<sup>14</sup>

September 6, 1930, marked the first time since the national organization three quarters of a century before that an administration had been overthrown by force. The day after General José F. Uriburu marched his column to the Casa Rosada, he was sworn in as provisional president, dissolved congress, and intervened in all but two of the provinces. There were a variety of political tendencies involved in the September 6 movement--aside from the administration, only Lisandro de la Torre's Demócratas Progresistas and the orthodox Socialist Party remained on the sidelines--<sup>15</sup> but they were in agreement in their opposition to the aged Radical leader and the need to begin anew.

Politically and ideologically, the leaders of the 1930 golpe can generally be divided into two groups. One, headed by Uriburu, had been impressed with the institutional innovations then in vogue in Europe--particularly the Italy of Mussolini and the Spain of Primo Rivera--and felt that the Radical experience had indicated a failure of institutions as well as of men. To this group, a simple reinstallation of the liberal state following new elections would not solve the problems. Instead, they favored some form of corporativism, probably with the Church in an important role. The other group, headed by General Agustín P. Justo, had less ambitious goals. They believed in the institutional system set out in the 1853 Constitution which had worked successfully for the better part of a century. The problem was not the institutions but the UCR--and



most specifically, Yrigoyen. The answer, therefore, was simply to dismantle the Radical administration, hold new elections, and return to constitutional government as soon as possible.<sup>16</sup>

The constitutionalists prevailed. Convinced that the UCR had collapsed and been adequately discredited following the September 6 movement, Uriburu called several provincial elections early in 1931, but when the Radicals won the first one--Buenos Aires province--he annulled the results and canceled the others. In May, the provisional government announced plans for general elections the following November. To guard against a repetition of the Buenos Aires election, various Radical leaders were deported and anyone connected with the deposed UCR administration was prohibited from seeking office in the 1931 election. In the face of these restrictions, the UCR resorted to its pre-1916 policy of abstention.

The major political groups which had been behind the 1930 golpe --conservatives, Antipersonalistas, and Independent Socialists--formed a political coalition under the name of the Concordancia. On November 8, 1931, Concordancia candidate Agustín P. Justo was elected president of the nation. Elected with this Antipersonalista--he had served as Alvear's minister of war--on the "official" slate was the conservative Julio A. Roca as vice president. With the UCR out of the election, the major opposition was a coalition of De la Torre's Partido Demócrata Progresista and the Partido Socialista, which won only in the federal capital and in the province of Santa Fe. When the national deputies elected November 8 held their first session the following January 20, it consisted of a "government bloc" of ninety-four members, an "opposition" bloc of fifty-seven deputies, and seven who were said to be uncommitted to either bloc.<sup>17</sup>

When General Uriburu turned the presidency over to Justo, the nation seemed to be safely in the hands of its more conservative interests. With the presidency, a good majority in both houses of Congress, and control of most of the provinces, the conservatives were once again in the position from which they had been displaced in 1916. It was, in short, the restoration. Policy, particularly economic policy, was made by and for the agricultural export interests. Perhaps the epitome of this orientation was the notorious "Roca-Runcimann" pact signed with Great Britain in 1933. In return for a guaranteed beef and grain market, the Argentine government agreed to stipulations which were later said to have sold the nation into economic bondage. Whether or not the Justo administration had much alternative in the world economic conditions of the early 1930's, the Roca-Runcimann pact became the symbol of the 1930-1943 period whose economic policies combined with frequent political fraud, led to the designation of "infamous decade."<sup>18</sup>

As they had done during the years before 1916, the Radicals once more combined electoral abstention with revolutionary plotting.<sup>19</sup> But under the leadership of Alvear in the early 1930's, there was no uprising similar to those of 1890, 1893, or even 1905. After sitting out the 1934 elections for national deputies--where the results were similar to those of 1931--the UCR lifted its abstention for the 1936 deputies renewal. It has been said that the Radicals' reentry into electoral politics merely meant that the government had to perfect and extend the fraud it had practiced in every election since the 1930 golpe.<sup>20</sup> The fact that the UCR won majority representation in the capital, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, and Tucumán, plus second place in various other

provinces, would indicate that perhaps fraud was not a decisive factor in the election.

The question of how much fraud there was in the 1936 election cannot be answered here; perhaps it cannot be answered at all. For the purposes of the present analysis, however, this question is only of marginal importance. The concern here is not with how many votes the respective parties received nor even with who won which provinces in a particular election. Rather, what is of importance to the study is the regional and socio-economic correlates of support for the various contending slates. Hypothesizing that there is a given amount of fraud in the election, it would not be a matter of serious concern here if either (1) the resulting distortion of results were spread more or less evenly throughout the nation, or (2) the fraud was mostly found in counties where the defrauding party was dominant anyway and merely increasing its margin. Only if the unlikely pattern occurred where fraud effectively reversed the "true" distribution of electoral support would this type of analysis be seriously undermined. A comparison of the 1936 correlations with those of earlier and later periods of "honest" elections should help answer this question.

#### Election Analysis

The 1947 factor scores are used in the multiple regression analysis of the 1936 election since they represent data which are closer in time than those represented by the 1914 factor scores. Party vote in the previous election will continue to be used as an indicator of "party organization" as it was in 1926. Because of the present study's particular

concern with the question of social class, a 1947 "urban class index"--a ratio of middle class to working class--which did not load significantly on any of the factors<sup>21</sup> will be used separately as an additional independent variable.

Table IV-1 shows the national and regional correlations for the 1936 election. As before, these are the simple correlation coefficients of the party groupings with each factor and special independent variable rather than the partial correlations obtained at different stages of the step-wise multiple regression analysis. It was thought that this would make the table more easily interpretable, while the outcomes of the regression equations will be discussed in the text.

At the national level, the 1936 Radical vote can be seen to correlate most highly with that party's vote a decade earlier. The party also shows relatively weak but statistically significant correlations with urbanism, rural middle class (a negative correlation on Factor II), small ranching, an absence of large industry, the factor tentatively labeled "paraurban," dairy farming, and urban middle class. With the exceptions of Factors I and VIII, these would all seem to suggest support among the middle class elements which had traditionally been the mainstay of the Unión Cívica Radical. Since 1916 it has been seen that the Radicals typically drew more support from the urban areas than did the conservatives, and while the significance of Factor VIII is not entirely clear it obviously involves a facet of urbanism.

The Concordancia at the national level correlates negatively with urbanism, with the rural middle class, with paraurbanism, and with dairy farming. With small ranching the Concordancia, like the UCR, shows a

TABLE IV-1  
CORRELATES OF 1936 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors					
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
	No. Cases	Urban	Rural Class	Agri. Size	Rich Farm	Small Ranch	Ind. Scale
NATION							
U.C.R.	238	.14**	-.18*	.01	.11	.17*	.21*
Concord.	238	-.13**	.13**	-.08	.03	.13**	.04
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>							
U.C.R.	104	-.02	.14	.01	-.18	.03	.02
Concord.	104	-.11	-.09	-.09	.13	-.04	.05
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>							
U.C.R.	57	.36*	.10	.08	.12	.56*	.26
Concord.	57	-.20	-.12	-.10	-.42*	-.27**	-.34*
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>							
U.C.R.	77	.19	-.51*	-.04	.23**	.13	.26**
Concord.	77	-.24**	.28**	-.12	-.17	.28**	.07

TABLE IV-1 (Extension)

VII	VIII	IX	X					
Out-Migr.	Para-Urban	Rural Trad.	Dairy Farm	Urban Class	UCR 1926	Anti. 1926	Cons. 1926	Mult. R
-.10	.15**	.06	.16**	.14**	.29*	ni	ni	.51
.18*	-.31*	-.09	-.14**	.11	ni	ni	ni	.45
-.15	.12	.03	.02	.09	-.06	ni	ni	.31
.14	-.19	-.02	.05	.02	ni	ni	.06	.32
-.33**	.09	.01	.21	.30**	.57*	.55*	ni	.79
.13	-.29**	-.09	-.19	-.51*	ni	-.65*	.72*	.78
-.03	.31*	.11	.33*	.06	.49*	ni	ni	.81
.14	-.34*	-.12	-.35*	.19	ni	.65*	ni	.85

\* Significant at .01 level

\*\* Significant at .05 level

ni Not included in multiple regression equation.

TABLE IV-1 (Continued)

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<sup>a</sup>U.C.R. is the Unión Cívica Radical; Concord. is the Partido Demócrata Nacional.

<sup>b</sup>U.C.R. is the Unión Cívica Radical in Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe. Concord. is the Partido Demócrata Nacional and U.C.R. Antipersonalista in Corrientes, the Partido Demócrata Nacional in Entre Ríos, and the Unión Cívica Radical de Santa Fe in that province.

<sup>c</sup>U.C.R. includes the Unión Cívica Radical in Córdoba, Mendoza, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán. Concord. includes the Partido Demócrata Nacional in Córdoba and Mendoza, the U.C.R. Unificada in Santiago del Estero, and the Concordancia in Tucumán.

positive if slightly lower correlation. The conservatives show no significant correlation with industry scale, but their vote does correlate at a significant level with areas rural stability--the reverse of "out-migration." Because of conflicting regional tendencies the 1926 vote showed rather meaningless correlations with the Concordancia-- $.08$  for the 1926 Antipersonalista vote and  $-.19$  with the 1926 conservative vote--and hence all 1926 categories were left out of the multiple regression equation.

In the multiple regression analysis, the party's 1926 vote explained 8 per cent of the 1936 UCR vote, while Factor II explained another 4.6 per cent and raised the multiple correlation coefficient from  $.29$  to  $.36$ . The next five variables entering the equation--out-migration, small ranching, paraurbanism, industry scale, and dairy farming--each explained about 2 per cent of the variance. With these seven variables in the equation the multiple R for the UCR was  $.49$ , accounting for 24 per cent of the total variance of that party's vote at the national level. The remaining five variables increased the multiple correlation coefficient to only  $.51$ . It is interesting to note that although the special urban class index variable had shown a significant if weak independent correlation of  $.14$ , its partial correlation dropped to  $.04$  after the first variable--the UCR's 1926 vote--was entered and never reached far above that level throughout the remaining steps of the analysis. This was the last variable to enter the equation, and by itself explained none of the variance in the vote.

For the Concordancia, Factor VIII's correlation of  $-.31$  explained 9.3 per cent of the variance while Factors VII and X explained another



3.1 and 2.5 per cent respectively, bringing the multiple R to .39. In contrast to the situation with the UCR, the urban class index was insignificant in its original correlation with the Concordancia but increased its importance with partial correlation and in the fourth step entered the regression equation to explain another 1.8 per cent of the total variance. Urbanism, small ranching, and "rural traditionalism" entered the equation at the next three steps, each explaining less than one per cent of the variance and together bringing the multiple correlation coefficient to .44. The last four variables increased the multiple R to only .45.

Moving to the regional section of Table IV-1, it can be seen that Buenos Aires failed to show a significant correlation for either party on any of the independent variables. In the case of the UCR, no variable explains more than 3.2 per cent of the variance and the multiple correlation of .31 when all variables are included represents a reduction of but 9.7 per cent in the unexplained variance. A similar situation exists for the Concordancia, where the strongest variable--Factor VIII--accounts for but 3.7 per cent of the total variance and the final multiple R of .32 explains only 10.1 per cent of the variance in the party's vote among the departamentos of the province.

The Litoral presents a sharp contrast to Buenos Aires. The independent correlations in Table IV-1 show coefficients of .50 or stronger for the UCR with small ranching, UCR 1926 vote, and Antipersonalista 1926 vote, and for the Concordancia with the urban class index, the Antipersonalista 1926 vote, and the conservative 1926 vote. Both parties also show additional correlations of significance, if somewhat less strength,

with various other independent variables. In addition to the strong evidence of party continuity or "organization," the UCR registers significant correlations with urbanism, small ranching, the urban middle class, and "out-migration." This would seem to present a composite of support similar to that seen in the earlier time periods, with the exception of the absence of any correlation with Factors III or IV which are most closely related to the 1914 rural tenancy factor which was seen to be so important in the Litoral in 1916 and 1926.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the party organization variables, the Concordancia's 1936 vote in the Litoral correlated negatively at significant levels with the urban middle class, prosperous farming, small ranching, and paraurbanism, while correlating positively with industry size. While it is below the level of statistical significance, there is also the expected negative correlation with urbanism. On the basis of these coefficients, the Concordancia's support in the Litoral would seem to have been heaviest in the less prosperous rural areas and in the urban areas with the lowest proportion of middle class.

Almost one-third of the total variance in the UCR vote in the three provinces of the Litoral in 1936 is explained by the party's vote a decade earlier. Another 14.4 per cent is explained by the small ranching variable, while urbanism enters the equation third to account for 8.5 per cent of the variance. These three variables produce a multiple R of .75 and explain 55.7 per cent of the total variance. The 1926 Antipersonalista vote enters the equation next to account for another 3 per cent of the variance, followed by "out-migration" and dairy farming at 1.6 and 1.0 per cent respectively. The remaining seven independent variables

increase the multiple R only from .78 to .79, and together account for less than another 2 per cent of the total variance.

For the Concordancia, the "party strength" indicator plays an even more important part. The correlation coefficient of .72 which the Concordancia registers with the 1926 conservative vote accounts for 52.8 per cent of the variance in that conservative coalition's 1936 vote in the Litoral. The next variable to enter the equation--industry size--explains but another 1.9 per cent of the variance, while the third--a negative correlation with prosperous farming--adds an additional 1.4 per cent. These three variables produce a multiple R of .75 accounting for 56 per cent of the total variance; the remaining ten variables increase the multiple coefficient only to .78 and together account for but 4.6 per cent more of the variance.

In the Interior, the strength of the more important simple correlations generally falls between those of Buenos Aires and the Litoral, although the multiple correlation coefficient for each party group is the highest of the three regions. For the UCR, the highest correlation is a -.51 with Factor II, indicating a rather strong association with the rural middle class. This is followed by a correlation of .49 with the UCR vote in 1926 and by somewhat lower but statistically significant associations with prosperous farming, absence of large industry, para-urbanism, and dairy farming. The correlation with urbanism is positive, as usual, but below the level of significance.

The Concordancia's highest association in the Interior was with the Antipersonalista vote in 1926, yielding a correlation coefficient of .65. This is followed by correlations of -.34 and -.35 with paraurbanism

and dairy farming, of .28 each with rural class and small ranching, and -.24 with urbanism. Thus, in the Interior the Concordancia would seem to be strongest in the rural areas--particularly those areas marked by latifundia or small ranching--while the UCR had its major strength in the urban areas and among the rural middle class. It will be noted, however, that the urban class index variable was not significant in the Interior in explaining the vote of either party.

The pattern suggested in the previous chapter whereby the "organization" variable in the Interior seemed to respond more to administration than to party is much more apparent in 1936. The governing Concordancia thus shows a correlation of .65 with the then-governing Antipersonalista vote of 1926, while correlating at -.76 with the 1926 conservative vote and -.40 with the UCR that year. The 1936 Radicals, on the other hand, do show a "proper" association of .49 with the UCR of a decade earlier but have an even higher correlation of .76 with the conservatives of 1926 and -.74 with the Antipersonalistas. Thus, in 1936 the Concordancia seemed to do best in areas where the Antipersonalistas had predominated in 1926, while the UCR benefited both from organization and from the "residual" areas. To avoid artificial escalation of the multiple regression coefficients, a party's previous vote was entered in the Interior regression equations only if the correlation was positive or if it was a correlation between a previous and present governing party.<sup>23</sup>

The UCR's association with the rural middle class explains 26 per cent of the party's variance in the Interior, while the correlation with the 1926 Radical vote adds another 27.1 per cent to the explained

variance.<sup>24</sup> After the first two variables, there is a sharp drop in explanatory power with urbanism adding 3.6 per cent, dairy farming 2.8 per cent, and industry scale 1.8 per cent. None of the remaining variables accounts for as much as one per cent of the variance, and together increase the multiple R only from .78 to .81 and the explained variance from 61.3 per cent to 64.9 per cent.

Explaining the greatest proportion of the variance in the Concordia vote in the Interior was the 1926 Antipersonalista vote, whose correlation of .65 accounts for 42.7 per cent of the variance. Small ranching adds another 22.7 per cent to the explained variance and increases the multiple correlation coefficient to .81. The entry of urbanism and rural class explains an additional 2.3 and 1.5 per cent respectively, bringing the multiple R to .83 and the explained variance to 69.2 per cent. The eight remaining variables, none of which accounts for as much as one per cent of the variance, together increase the multiple coefficient to .85 and the explained variance to 72.8 per cent.

In summary, it can be seen that basic similarities exist between 1936 and the two earlier voting patterns studied despite the introduction of a new set of independent variables and the alleged widespread practice of electoral fraud. Urbanism continued to be one of the most consistent variables in its positive association with the Radicals and even more so in its negative correlation with the conservative parties. In the Litoral the areas of prosperous farming--which have been seen to conform rather closely to the rural tenancy factor of 1914--continued to reject the conservatives, although this variable's positive association with the UCR was weaker than had been its 1914 counterpart in earlier analyses.

A somewhat similar--if less pronounced--pattern can also be seen in the Interior, just as it was in 1916 and 1926.

Contrary to what was expected on the basis of questionable empirical validity of Factors VII through X in the 1947 factor analysis,<sup>25</sup> the factors seemed to correlate significantly with the 1936 voting as frequently as did the first six strong factors. This is particularly true of Factors VIII (paraurbanism) and X (dairy farming). It will have been noted, however, that in both the Litoral and the Interior, areas where politics seemed to be the most structured, none of the "weak" factors entered the regression equations until the fourth step or after and thus accounted for but a small fraction of the total variance for each party. In the four equations involved, the great part of the variance was accounted for by the "organization" variables plus combinations of Factors I, II, IV, V, and VI. Factors VII and VIII did enter the regression equations early in Buenos Aires, but it will be recalled that none of the correlations for that province were of statistical significance. At the national level, these two plus Factor X also entered at early steps in at least one of the equations, and here they are of significance. It would thus seem that these "weak" factors cannot be summarily discarded at this stage of the study even though their meaning may not be entirely clear.

As predicted, the alleged electoral fraud of the 1930's seems not to have greatly distorted the previously existing voting patterns. The absence of significant correlations in Buenos Aires could be interpreted as an indication of manipulation of the polls,<sup>26</sup> but it will be recalled that in both 1916 and 1926 this province also showed correlations considerably lower than those of the Litoral and the Interior. Thus if

fraud was the cause of this phenomenon in 1936, it may also have been the case in 1916 and 1926. Other plausible explanations, of course, include (1) politics of the province are rather unstructured, or (2) political allegiances are structured along dimensions which are not tapped by any of the available independent variables. Regardless of the explanation, the continuity between the "honest" period of Radical government and the "fraudulent" 1930's under the Concordancia cannot be ignored.

The similarities between the 1936 correlations in the Litoral and that region's vote pattern during the previous two elections have already been noted. In the Interior, the unique relationship to the previous election which was suggested in 1926 becomes much more pronounced in 1936. Some correlation between the Concordancia and the 1926 Antipersonalista vote could of course be explained by the fact that the Concordancia contained certain Antipersonalista groups as well as conservatives. However, this would hardly seem to account for a correlation of .65 with the 1926 Antipersonalista vote combined with a correlation of -.76 with the conservative vote of that year. Rather, it seems that the areas which are most pro-administration in 1936 when the Concordancia was in control were also those which most strongly supported the Alvear administration in 1926 and--although there the relationship is much weaker--voted for the then-governing conservatives in 1916. Once again there are several possible explanations. It is possible that some sections of the Interior--particularly the less "developed" areas--are particularly susceptible to fraud by those in charge of elections. It is equally plausible, however, that this is more a case of "clientele politics"

than of fraud; there may be areas which are more dependent upon the national government and whose political leaders or caudillos "deliver" for the official party regardless of who may be in power at the moment.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, despite the strong correlation between the 1926 Antipersonalista vote and the 1936 support for the Concordancia in the Interior, the 1926 Antipersonalistas and the 1936 Radical both correlated positively with urbanism while the 1926 conservatives and the 1936 Concordancia showed even stronger negative correlations with this factor.

#### Roll Call Analysis

The 1936-1938 session of the Chamber of Deputies was divided into two blocs--Concordancia and Opposition. Of the 157 deputies who served at some time during the session, seventy-six are classified as members of the Concordancia bloc, seventy-four are in the Opposition bloc, and seven were formally members of neither bloc.<sup>28</sup> The major party in the Concordancia bloc was the Partido Demócrata Nacional, while the largest member of the Opposition was the Unión Cívica Radical.

The Chamber of Deputies held only twelve contested roll calls during the session under study. As in previous sessions, the majority of the votes were quite close and, due to high levels of non-response, seldom recorded more than two-thirds or three-fourths of the membership. Table IV-2 shows that the difference between majority and minority votes was less than 10 per cent in eight of the twelve roll calls, while on only one was there a difference of more than 25 per cent. Table IV-3 shows that the distribution of the roll calls ranked by the degree of participation in each vote.



TABLE IV-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference				
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-69	70-79
Number of Roll calls	8	1	2	0	1

TABLE IV-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting					
	0-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99
Number of Roll Calls	1	2	3	3	0	3

Eleven of the session's twelve roll calls fit into one Guttman scale, which on the content of the issues and the high party cohesion has been labeled a "partisan issues scale." In an effort to gain as much information as possible from this one scale, the policy of collapsing scale types with less than 5 per cent of the cases was not followed for this session. The extra discrimination which this approach allows can be seen in Table IV-5 and in the scale itself.<sup>29</sup>

The two extremes of the Partisan Issues Scale are each composed of a single roll call, while in each case the adjacent scale type represents a non-response on the end item. The three items in the center are contrived items composed of three roll calls each. The most extreme pro-administration vote on the scale--ranking a deputy in Scale Type 7--was a negative vote on a motion to override a presidential veto on a labor code amendment taking private chauffeurs out of the category of domestic servants and thereby guaranteeing them a weekly day off. Fourteen deputies are in this scale type. The next most pro-administration group is the thirteen deputies in Scale Type 6 who voted with the Type 7 deputies on the other four items but did not vote on the veto question.

The thirty-four deputies in Scale Type 5 are ones who voted to override the presidential veto but took a pro-administration stand on the other items. Their position on Item 4--the cutting point between them and Scale Type 4--represents a vote of nay on two roll calls dealing with a Socialist proposal to raise the minimum wage of government workers and on a proposed request that the executive furnish details on persons who had been deported since 1932. Six deputies are in Scale Type 4, representing a pro-administration position on Items 1 through 3. Item 3

is composed of two roll calls on procedural questions dealing with the approval of the 1936 election and a motion to discuss the intervention in Santa Fe province. A pro-administration vote in the latter case was "nay." Item 2, on which four deputies voted pro-administration who were anti-administration on all items to the right, represents two minor budget items and a Concordancia proposal favoring an increased effort by the executive to "preserve public education from Communist propaganda and that contrary to public order."<sup>30</sup>

Item 1 on the scale is a motion that the chamber president take whatever measures might be necessary to maintain a quorum. The vote itself lacked a quorum, coming at a time when a large majority of the Concordancia bloc was absent. The twenty-three deputies in Scale Type 2 are those who voted nay--pro-administration in the sense that the motion was aimed at solving a problem caused by the absence of the administration bloc--on this question but were anti-administration on all other items. Scale Type 1, with eleven deputies, represents a non-response on this vote and an anti-administration position on the other items, while Scale Type 0 signifies an anti-administration position on all five items. Thirty-nine deputies are in this most anti-administration scale type.

Distribution of scale types by bloc can be seen in Table IV-4A. There are no scale types in which members of both blocs are included, indicating a rather clear and constant division along partisan lines. On the other hand, the fact that Concordancia deputies are scattered in significant numbers among four scale types while the Opposition bloc is divided among three types shows that despite the clear division between

blocs there were varying degrees of administration support and opposition. Of the five "uncommitted" deputies included in the scale, three are in Scale Type 3 separating the Concordancia and Opposition ends of the scale.

Table IV-4B shows the regional distribution of the scale types. Aside from a predominance of capital and Buenos Aires deputies in the scale types at the Opposition end of the scale--due largely to the fact that forty-one of the seventy-four members of the Opposition bloc are from that region--the table discloses no apparent regional pattern. Analyzing Tables IV-4A and IV-4B together, the scale thus seems to represent cleavage along party lines with little independent regional effect.

As was the case in the earlier years, however, regional variations become apparent when the blocs are analyzed individually. Table IV-4C shows that once again among conservatives it is those of Buenos Aires who are the "most conservative" and--in this case--the most pro-administration. The Interior members of the bloc tend more toward the center of the scale, with the Litoral deputies falling between the other two regional groupings. When the administration bloc is divided into its component parties, other interesting variations appear. Table IV-5 shows that the various "Antipersonalista" members of the Concordancia--UCR Antipersonalista, UCR Unificada, UCR de Santa Fe, and UCR Federalista--are scattered toward the center of the scale while the Partido Demócrata Nacional holds up the end position. Deputies elected in 1934 under the label of Concordancia, including both former Independent Socialists of the capital and conservatives of the Interior, also are more "moderate" on the scale than the Partido Demócrata Nacional.

TABLE IV-4A  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type								Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Concordancia	0	0	0	1	6	34	13	14	8	76
Uncommitted	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	7
Opposition	37	11	23	0	0	0	0	0	3	74
Total	39	11	23	4	6	34	13	14	13	157

TABLE IV-4B  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Region	Scale Type								Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Buenos Aires	17	2	20	0	0	15	7	7	6	74
Litoral	13	6	1	0	5	2	1	5	1	34
Interior	9	3	2	4	1	17	5	2	6	49
Total	39	11	23	4	6	34	13	14	13	157

TABLE IV-4C  
CONCORDANCIA BLOC

Region	Partisan Issues Scale Type								Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Buenos Aires	0	0	0	0	0	15	7	7	4	33
Litoral	0	0	0	0	5	2	1	5	0	13
Interior	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>30</u>
Total	0	0	0	1	6	34	13	14	8	76

TABLE IV-4D  
OPPOSITION BLOC

Region	Partisan Issues Scale Type								Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Buenos Aires	17	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	2	41
Litoral	12	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
Interior	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	37	11	23	0	0	0	0	0	3	74

TABLE IV-5  
SCALE TYPE BY PARTY

Party*	Bloc**	Scale Type								
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
P. Demócrata Nacional	C	0	0	0	0	1	24	11	12	
P. Popular	C	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
Concordancia	C	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	1	
UCR Antipersonalista	C	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	
UCR Unificada	C	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	
UCR de Santa Fe	C	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	
UCR Federalista	C	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	
UCR de Tucumán	U	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	
UCR Bloquista	U	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
P. Liberal	U	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
P. Socialista	O	2	1	22	0	0	0	0	0	
P. Demócrata Prog.	O	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	
U. Cívica Radical	O	31	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	
UCR Tradicional	C	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

\* P = Partido; U = Unión.

\*\* C = Concordancia; O = Opposition; U = Uncommitted.

Looking at the regional distribution of the Partido Demócrata Nacional, Table IV-6 shows the familiar pattern of Buenos Aires being more "extreme" than the Interior; unlike previous conservative distributions, however, here it is the Litoral deputies who have the highest proportion in the end scale type. Summarizing the three tables, it can be seen that the Concordancia bloc was not monolithic but rather had an extreme end dominated by the Demócrata Nacional deputies of Buenos Aires and the Litoral, a middle which included many of this same group but represented a higher proportion of Interior members of the party, of capital Independent Socialists and Interior conservatives elected under the Concordancia label, and of members of various Antipersonalista parties, and a moderate or "centrist" end which was largely made up of Antipersonalistas.

In the Opposition bloc, Table IV-4D gives the impression that in contrast to earlier years and to the Concordancia bloc just analyzed, the more moderate or centrist faction is that of the capital and Buenos Aires. More than half of this group is in Scale Type 2, compared to less than 20 per cent of either of the other two regional groupings. Going on to Table IV-5, however, it can be seen that variation between the parties composing the bloc explains this apparent reversal of earlier patterns. Of the twenty-three Socialists ranked on the scale --and it will be recalled that all but two of the Socialists are from the capital or Buenos Aires province--twenty-two are in Scale Type 2. Thus, the Socialists compose the "centrist" side of the Opposition bloc while the Radicals, when viewed separately in Table IV-6, show a pattern similar to that of the UCR in earlier years. Although the latter table



TABLE IV-6  
MAJOR PARTIES

Region	Partisan Issues Scale Type					
	UCR		Partido Demócrata Nacional			
	0	1	4	5	6	7
Buenos Aires	15	1	0	12	7	6
Litoral	9	4	0	1	1	5
Interior	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	31	8	1	24	11	12

must be viewed with caution due to the fact that the difference involves only one roll call and the "deviant" scale type is based on non-response, the distribution tends to conform to that previously seen among Radical deputies. Fifteen of the sixteen Buenos Aires Radicals are in the extreme scale type, while less than two-thirds of those of the Litoral and Interior rank in this type.

Once again, therefore, it seems to be the Radicals and the conservatives of the capital and Buenos Aires province who form the opposing poles of the Argentine political spectrum. Their position relative to the administration is reversed from what it was in the first two time periods studied, but their position relative to each other is unchanged. And as in the earlier periods, it is the Socialists, the small provincial parties, and the Litoral and Interior sectors of the two major parties which tend most to populate the middle scale types and thus serve as "brokers" of the legislative system.

Compared with the sessions of 1916-1918 and 1926-1928, the voting patterns among deputies in this chamber were structured much more strongly along party and bloc lines. There were variations within each major bloc and in many of the party groups, but the Partisan Issues Scale showed that on eleven of the session's twelve roll calls there was no overlap between the two blocs. While there was thus evidence of a deepening cleavage along party lines, intraparty regional patterns remained generally similar to what they had been during the two previous sessions studied.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Probably the best single work on Argentine politics of the 1930's is Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina moderna, 1930-46 (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1964).

<sup>2</sup> Figures are from Roberto Etchepareborda, "Aspectos políticos de la crisis de 1930," Revista de Historia, No. 3 (1958), p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Ysabel Fisk (Rennie), "Argentina: The Thirteen-Year Crisis," Foreign Affairs, XXII (January, 1944), 257.

<sup>6</sup> Hipólito Yrigoyen, "Mensaje de 1929," in Hipólito Yrigoyen; pueblo y gobierno (12 vols.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1951), II, 331-340.

<sup>7</sup> Etchepareborda, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> On the Lencinas family of Mendoza, see Dardo Olgún, Lencinas; el caudillo radical (Mendoza: Ediciones Vendimiador, 1961); and José Hipólito Lencinas, Economía y política (Mendoza: n.p., 1963).

<sup>9</sup> Manuel Goldstraj, Años y errores; un cuarto de siglo de política argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sophos, 1957), p. 83.

<sup>10</sup> Nationwide, the UCR in 1928 had received 302,326 more votes than the combined total cast for opposition parties; in the 1930 election, its margin over the combined opposition vote dropped to 9,429 votes. Etchepareborda, p. 32.

<sup>11</sup> Gabriel del Mazo, El radicalismo (3 vols.; Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1959), II, 149. For the signers of this and a similar Anti-personalista document of August 20, see ibid., pp. 149n, 150n.

<sup>12</sup> Perhaps the best account of the civilian-military planning of the golpe is José María Sarobe, Memorias sobre la revolución del 6 de septiembre de 1930 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1957).

<sup>13</sup> Etchepareborda, p. 35.

<sup>14</sup> Militarily, the "revolution" of 1930 "was not much more than a military parade headed by General Uriburu." José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, trans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 226.

<sup>15</sup> Etchepareborda, p. 35.

<sup>16</sup>For an extensive discussion of these conflicting points of view, see Sarobe, p. 19ff.

<sup>17</sup>Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, Las fuerzas armadas restituyen el imperio de la soberanía popular: las elecciones generales de 1946 (2 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 473.

<sup>18</sup>On economic conditions in Argentina during the 1930's, see Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo económico argentino (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1967), pp. 380-455; and Leopoldo Portnoy, Análisis crítico de la economía, Vol. II: La realidad argentina en el siglo XX (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), pp. 144-179.

<sup>19</sup>On Radical conspiracies during the 1932-33 period, see Atilio E. Cattáneo, Plan 1932 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Proceso, 1959).

<sup>20</sup>Ernesto Palacio, Historia de la Argentina (2 vols.; 4th ed.; Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1965), II, 384.

<sup>21</sup>See Appendix A.

<sup>22</sup>Appendix A, Table A-5.

<sup>23</sup>Multiple correlations for Buenos Aires and the Litoral calculated before this criterion was decided upon were not refigured because of the low relative importance of the items which would have been eliminated from the equation. Thus in Buenos Aires the UCR's association with the party's 1926 vote was but -.06 and did not enter the regression equation until the sixth step, adding virtually nothing to the explained variance. In the Litoral the Concordancia's negative correlation with the 1926 Antipersonalista vote is quite high, but after the 1926 conservative vote enters the equation in the first step the Antipersonalista correlation practically disappears. The Antipersonalista vote does not enter the equation until the eighth step, explaining but one-fifth of one per cent of the variance.

<sup>24</sup>Although generally in a step-wise multiple regression each variable entered will have less explanatory power than any of those already in the equation, there are cases such as this one where the entry of one variable causes a sharp shift in the partial correlations of the remaining variables and results in a variable being "stronger" than the one which entered the equation ahead of it.

<sup>25</sup>See Appendix A.

<sup>26</sup>For an interesting discussion of a conservative political "machine" in Buenos Aires province during the 1930's, see Norberto Folino, Barceló, Ruggierito y el populismo olicárquico (Buenos Aires: Falbo Librero Editor, 1966).

<sup>27</sup>A somewhat similar type of "clientele politics" seems to operate in some of the less developed areas of Mexico. See José Luis Reyna, "Desarrollo económico, distribución del poder y participación política; el caso mexicano," Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, No. 50 (October-December, 1967), pp. 469-486.

<sup>28</sup>La Prensa (Buenos Aires), April 25, 1936, p. 9.

<sup>29</sup>The scale is in Appendix B.

<sup>30</sup>Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Diario de Sesiones, 1936, IV, 922.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PERON ERA OPENS, 1946-1948

Like the Concordancia administration of the 1930's, the government of the 1946-1948 period was constitutionally elected but was the direct outgrowth of the military overthrow of the former administration. The Concordancia--a coalition of conservatives, Antipersonalistas, and Independent Socialists--remained in power until June 4, 1943, when it was displaced by a military golpe. The military held control of the government for three years this time, and when elections were called in 1946, the winner--like Justo a decade and a half earlier--was a man who had risen through the revolt. The winner was Juan Domingo Perón, a man who could easily rival Hipólito Yrigoyen as the "most loved and most hated" of Argentines. He was to govern for less than a decade, but his influence would be decisive for at least a quarter of a century. Like 1916, the election of 1946 was a major watershed in Argentine political history.<sup>1</sup>

The first six years of Concordancia government ended with the close of the legislative session studied in the last chapter. The Concordancia's candidate for a successor to President Justo in the elections of September 5, 1937, was Roberto M. Ortiz, described as a "liberal Antipersonalista who was supposed to give just the right touch" to the governing coalition.<sup>2</sup> A corporation lawyer, Ortiz had been minister of public works in the 1922-1928 Alvear administration and minister of finance under Justo. Balancing this "liberal" on the official slate

was Ramón S. Castillo, dean of the Buenos Aires law school and "the most reactionary man" in that rather conservative institution.<sup>3</sup> The only major opposition slate was that of the Unión Cívica Radical with Marcelo T. de Alvear for president and Enrique Mosca for vice president.

The Concordancia slate received about 1,097,000 votes to the Radicals' 815,000. The UCR won in the federal capital, Córdoba, La Rioja, and Tucumán for a total of 127 electoral votes; Concordancia victories in the other eleven provinces provided that slate with 285 electors.<sup>4</sup> As with all elections of the decade, there was widespread accusation of fraud in the 1937 balloting although at least one critic admits it is hard to prove.<sup>5</sup>

Despite losing the election, Radicals are said to have been generally pleased with the Concordancia's choice of Ortiz for president. They were confident of the depth of his Radicalism, and the new president appeared to confirm this when he began denouncing the electoral fraud of the conservatives since 1930--including his own election--and intervened in Buenos Aires province following a questionable conservative election victory. By the end of the decade, therefore, the optimistic among the opposition could look forward to a return to honest elections and--perhaps--a return to power.

But Ortiz was an ill man. His health declined sharply in early 1940, and at mid-year he was forced to turn the government over to Castillo. The succession of this archconservative thwarted the hopes of the Radicals and reversed the liberalizing trend inaugurated by Ortiz. Castillo appointed a new and more conservative cabinet and soon began intervening in provinces to assure conservative victories.<sup>6</sup> A

fraudulent election in Buenos Aires in February, 1940, had led to Ortiz's intervention in that province; in December, 1941, it was repeated with immunity.<sup>7</sup>

If Argentine politics had lagged behind social change in earlier periods, the gap was small compared to the chasm between government and society in the 1930-1943 period. As was noted in the previous chapter, governments of the Concordancia were oriented toward the agricultural export interests and gave little attention to other groups or problems. But Argentina was not the same as it had been at the turn of the century, and policies which had served then were inadequate now.

Perhaps the most important change was the increasing industrialization. While the world depression had hurt the agricultural export interests, it had stimulated the growth of a consumer goods industry because of the reduction in imported goods. Industrial expansion further diversified the pattern of social and economic stratification, creating new sources of wealth and new groups of elites. Indicative of this change is the fact that among the 100 highest incomes reported in 1941 there were thirty-five manufacturers and industrialists compared to only ten estancieros and four cereal brokers.<sup>8</sup> In an era when the major concern was securing foreign markets for beef and wheat and maintaining the social and economic dominance of the agricultural interests at home, the rising industrial elites were frustrated both by governmental policy and by status inconsistency.<sup>9</sup>

There was also widespread discontent among other middle class groups, particularly the university educated. As one author described it in the early 1940's, the young people who came of age during the



decade of the 1930's "were a frustrated generation. . . . Graduate engineers, graduate chemists, graduate teachers found every avenue closed to them. Cynicism became the fashion."<sup>10</sup> Another writer has compared the situation in 1943 to that of 1890: "the prosperity of a few camouflaged a sea of discontented elements" including both middle sectors and labor groups as well as growing numbers of nationalists.<sup>11</sup>

On the basis of numbers, perhaps the most important discontent of the 1930-1943 period was that of the workers. Fifteen years after the adoption of a national law requiring that wages be paid in national currency, the use of script or tokens negotiable only at the "company store" was still common in the Interior.<sup>12</sup> In the northwestern provinces of Salta, Jujuy, and Tucumán--where provincial governments were dominated by the cash crop and agriculture-related industrial interests--all social legislation, worker rights, and even civil liberties were said to be "mere words."<sup>13</sup> Perhaps motivated by a combination of adverse conditions in these rural areas and the attraction of the growing urban industrial sector, urban migration began to climb sharply around the middle of the decade.<sup>14</sup>

For the migrant, it was often easier to break with the old environment than to adapt to the new. There was no longer the patrón or the family to provide social attachment and orientation, but voluntary associations--social, political, labor--were foreign to the experience of most migrants.<sup>15</sup> Thus when many found the urban reality considerably dimmer than had been the promise, the migrants contributed significantly to "a vast discontented and disorganized popular sector without a firm democratic tradition and without political or labor union experience"<sup>16</sup>

which was to be a major factor in Perón's rise to power. By the end of the decade "a profound and general resentment against the ruling groups, together with a deep political skepticism, developed among the masses, as well as an awakened consciousness of certain social and economic rights that they considered justly deserved."<sup>17</sup>

Argentina's foreign relations during the 1930's--particularly with Great Britain--gave rise to a growing nationalism among some sectors of the opposition. The issue of nationalism was basic behind the 1935 formation of F.O.R.J.A. (Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina), a group of Radicals dissatisfied both with the Concordancia administration and with the leadership and direction of the UCR.<sup>18</sup> For a decade the forjistas wrote and spoke in advocacy of neutrality in World War II, economic independence from Great Britain, and other current nationalist causes. The question of whether to remain within the UCR split the group around 1940 and led to the resignation of several Radicals such as Gabriel del Mazo and Luis Dellepiane, after which the movement went its independent way under the leadership of Arturo Jauretche.<sup>19</sup> When F.O.R.J.A. formally disbanded in 1945, many of its members joined the Peronista movement.

Nationalism also took a more pronounced form in the military during the latter part of the 1930-1943 period. The Argentine military had been trained by German military missions for decades, and as World War II increasingly divided the world the military's viewpoint diverged more and more from that of the British-oriented oligarchy.<sup>20</sup> The Axis-oriented military nationalism crystallized with the formation of the GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos), a secret "lodge" which was "perhaps

the only army faction that knew exactly what it wanted and was prepared to get it."<sup>21</sup> What it wanted was a unified continent under the leadership and control of an industrially and militarily powerful Argentina. This would require a military government, for "a civilian will never understand the greatness of our ideal."<sup>22</sup> The ideal would be attained through an "inflexible dictatorship" which would take the nation along the "heroic road" to greatness following the example of Hitler's Germany.

Argentina remained neutral during the early years of World War II, but those favoring this policy grew concerned on the eve of the 1943 presidential elections. Robustino Patrón Costas, a sugar magnate from Tucumán, was the presidential candidate of the Concordancia and was widely known to be pro-British. "He was hated by the left because of his unsavory record as a feudal landholder in the north. The Naziphiles and nationalists hated him worse because he was known to be strongly pro-British, and his foreign policy as president could not but lean toward the Allies."<sup>23</sup> This was hardly a pleasant prospect for those who dreamed of Argentine hegemony through blood and steel.

Unlike the military uprising of 1930, the revolt of June 4, 1943, occurred independent of civilian political forces. Perhaps because of this, it came rather unexpectedly. Nonetheless the upset represented within the military both pro-Axis elements opposed to Patrón Costas and pro-Allies who were opposed to the expected fraud in the coming elections,<sup>24</sup> and was greeted favorably by all political sectors except the conservatives and the Communists. Over the next three years the Radicals and Socialists were to pull further and further away from the

military government largely in reaction to its pattern of antidemocratic tendencies. At the same time, the intense nationalism which grew with the fortunes of Perón in the military government proved increasingly attractive to some civilian nationalists such as the forjistas.

Perón's name did not figure prominently among initial leaders of the June 4 movement, but it was not long before the colonel began to outmaneuver the generals and the admirals. He was aided considerably by the failure of efforts at a rapprochement with the United States by moderate members of the military government.<sup>25</sup> The intense nationalism of the GOU was only one of several orientations among the military leadership, but the influence of this sector of opinion and its leader, Perón, grew as the policies of the moderates were discredited.

The key factor in Perón's rise to power, however, was his perception of a powerful and largely untapped constituency--the working class. A few months after the golpe Perón was put in charge of the National Department of Labor. Many would have considered such a post lacking both the prestige and influence of even a sub-cabinet position, but to Perón it presented a unique opportunity to build a solid base of political support for himself and--to the extent that it followed his wishes--for the military government of which he was a part. His goal was a corporate union structure in which all labor would be hierarchically organized under government leadership and control. Existing unions which cooperated with the plan found favor with the government; those which did not were soon faced with a myriad of harassments while parallel "official" unions were formed to lure away the membership.<sup>26</sup> In a military government which lacked any solid basis of popular support

and faced increasing opposition from the political groups which had initially welcomed the overthrow of the Concordancia, this growing bloc of organized supporters was of crucial importance.

By mid-1944 Perón had added the ministry of war and the vice presidency to his labor post and was recognized as the true power behind the presidency of General Edelmiro Farrell.<sup>27</sup> But when World War II ended with the defeat of the Axis and more and more upper and middle class Argentines became alarmed by the sponsored militancy of the working class, there was increasing pressure for a return to civilian and democratic government. The major target of the attack was Perón, representing as he did both the pro-Axis foreign policy and the pro-worker domestic policy. He was imprisoned on October 9, 1945, by a group of fellow officers who--when they were thus free to remake the regime--fell to quarrelling among themselves over the succession.<sup>28</sup> Perón's supporters, however, acted more decisively. Under the leadership of Eva Duarte--soon to become Eva Perón--and union leader Cipriano Reyes, among others, thousands of workers converged on the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential palace and demanded Perón's release. When the demonstrators refused to disperse and the government was faced with the alternatives of yielding or of firing on the crowd and perhaps starting a civil war, a compromise was reached.<sup>29</sup> Perón was released, but was stripped of his offices in the military government.

Separation from the government had little effect in curbing the power of Perón. His two years in labor activities had assured him a solid constituency in this sector and he retained the support of much of the military. Referring to only one of Perón's labor measures, an

author notes that the extension of social security in 1944 and 1945 to cover all business and industrial labor had an "enormous emotional impact" in millions of Argentine homes. Freed for the first time from fears of economic disaster in illness and old age, these people "saw in Perón and in his movement the authentic leader and the authentic movement representing the human interests of the workers."<sup>30</sup> The so-called "statute of the peon," perhaps the first meaningful legislation dealing with rural working conditions, also had been adopted in 1944 and thereby presented Perón as the champion of this long-neglected sector of the working class. Perón's activities in organizing labor have already been cited; the union structure he forged during the 1943-1945 period remained loyal to him after he left the military government.<sup>31</sup>

A week after the October 17 showdown, the Partido Laborista was formed by a group of labor leaders with the avowed aim of supporting Perón for president in the elections the following year.<sup>32</sup> The party's statement of principles stressed the need for improved labor conditions and better representation of the worker within a democratic society and governmental structure. While unions were to provide the link between party and workers, the statement pledged that the party would "absolutely" respect the autonomy of the labor movement.<sup>33</sup>

In other sectors, Perón in 1945 is said to have represented the army's general desire for industrial expansion and for a more just distribution of the national wealth which would help insure working class support for the development of Argentine capitalism.<sup>34</sup> Governmental support of industrialization also was welcome to many of the newer industrialists who had been frustrated under the Concordancia

administrations' orientation toward the agricultural export sector of the economy. Perón also was supported by a sector of the Radicals under the general label of Unión Cívica Radical, Junta Renovadora. Like the founders of F.O.R.J.A., these Radicals--who in some provinces went under the name of UCR Yrigoyenista--were dissatisfied both with the Concordancia record and with the direction of the UCR in recent years.

In opposition to Perón's candidacy, the orthodox Radicals, the Socialists, the Partido Demócrata Progresista, and the Communists formed a coalition under the name of "Unión Democrática."<sup>35</sup> Like the Radicals of thirty years before, the coalition stressed political democracy, respect for the constitution, and individual liberties. Its platform did include planks calling for labor legislation, land reform, and expanded social security, but the vague proposals had little impact in the face of the accomplishments and rhetoric of Perón. On the issue of nationalism, one author has said that "against the dreams of autarchy and absolute statism bolstered by Perón, the opposition promoted a vague and confused liberalism."<sup>36</sup>

Many claim to see a direct link between Yrigoyen and Perón as **representatives** both of the dispossessed and as champions of Argentine nationalism. There is no question but that F.O.R.J.A. furnished a considerable amount of the ideological content of Peronismo<sup>37</sup> nor that the Junta Renovadora sector of the Radicals provided electoral support for Perón in the 1946 election. Both Yrigoyen and Perón had stronger personal followings than any other Argentine president of the period under study, and both were to come under sharp criticism for their governing techniques. But if in fact Perón was the political descendant

of Yrigoyen, there had been a considerable amount of evolution between them. As one author put it, Perón's "combination of ardent nationalism and aroused workers seeking greater social and economic justice, as distinguished from the political equality that the Radicals had offered, produced for the first time in Argentina a politically charged movement with strong indigenous roots."<sup>38</sup>

In summary, then, Perón was backed in the 1946 election by the government, by most of the military, by the Church, by most of organized labor, by some of the newer industrialists, and by a group of dissident Radicals. In addition to the four political parties composing the Unión Democrática, opposition candidate José P. Tamborini had the backing of the Unión Industrial, the Sociedad Rural, and the Bolsa de Comercio --together representing much of the nation's powerful industrial, agricultural, and financial interests--as well as student groups, professional groups, and most intellectuals.<sup>39</sup>

Although there was a flurry of charges and countercharges of campaign irregularities<sup>40</sup> and the government candidates had a monopoly on the state-run radio network, there is general agreement that the February 24 voting and counting of the ballots was basically honest.<sup>41</sup> Perón won the election with a nationwide total of some 1,480,000 votes to 1,211,000 for the opposition slate. Winning the majority in the capital and ten of the fourteen provinces gave Perón a much greater margin in the electoral college; 304 electors cast their vote for him compared to only 72 which the Tamborini slate received through victories in Córdoba, Corrientes, San Juan, and San Luis.<sup>42</sup>



When he was inaugurated on June 4, 1946--the third anniversary of the golpe which launched his rise to power--Perón is said to have enjoyed more political power than any other Argentine president before him.<sup>43</sup> It would not be long before that power was felt by opponents as well as supporters of the new government.

### Election Analysis

Parties composing the two presidential slate coalitions in the 1946 election ran their own lists of candidates for national deputy in most provinces. With the exception of the minority representation in Corrientes and San Luis, which was won by conservatives, all candidates winning Chamber of Deputies seats were Radicals or belonged to parties supporting Perón. These will be the three blocs which will be studied in the election analysis.

As in 1936, this election will be correlated with the 1947 factor scores plus a measure of "party organization" and the 1947 urban class index as separate independent variables. Table V-1 shows the national and regional correlations for the 1946 election. Following the procedure of earlier analyses, these are the simple correlation coefficients of the party groupings with each factor and special independent variable rather than the partial correlations obtained at different steps of the multiple regression analysis. The outcomes of the regression equations will be discussed in the text.

In contrast to what might be expected on the basis of its working class appeal, the Peronista vote registered the weakest correlations at the national level of the three party groupings. The only correlation

TABLE V-1  
CORRELATES OF 1946 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors					
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
	Cases	Urban	Rural Class	Agri. Scale	Rich Farm	Small Ranch	Ind. Scale
NATION							
Peronistas	264	.14**	-.07	.06	-.01	-.01	-.11
Radicals	264	-.08	.11	-.11	.12	.15**	.23*
Conserv.	226	-.24	-.05	-.02	-.51*	.15	-.03
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>							
Peronistas	108	.27*	.14	.37*	.25*	.32*	-.41*
Radicals	108	-.38*	-.02	-.39*	-.16	-.27*	.37*
Conserv.	108	-.24*	.09	-.12	-.35*	-.20**	.27*
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>							
Peronistas	57	.18	.01	-.03	-.06	.06	.06
Radicals	57	.09	.00	.01	-.13	.22	.05
Conserv.	57	-.21	-.08	.17	-.02	-.02	-.19
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>							
Peronistas	99	.15	-.20**	.08	.05	-.22**	-.24**
Radicals	99	-.15	.16	-.08	.05	.38*	.29*
Conserv.	61	-.29**	.20	-.18	-.38*	.66*	.09

TABLE V-1 (Extension)

VII	VIII	IX	X				
Out- Migr.	Para- Urban	Rural Trad.	Dairy Farm	Urban Class	UCR 1936	Cons. 1936	Mult. R
.05	.08	-.08	.00	-.07	ni	ni	.23
.12	-.09	-.12	.11	.29*	.30*	ni	.48
.02	-.01	.00	.04	-.23*	ni	-.04	.64
-.15	.23**	-.01	-.04	-.19**	-.09	ni	.66
.11	-.25*	-.14	.08	.24**	.12	ni	.60
.11	-.26*	.01	.26*	.14	ni	.16	.57
.20	.10	-.16	.08	.08	-.11	ni	.49
.05	-.05	-.24	.15	.08	.11	ni	.45
.31**	-.07	-.14	.05	.01	ni	.40*	.65
-.05	-.08	-.09	-.14	-.18	ni	.46*	.69
.11	.11	-.04	.03	.37*	.57*	ni	.73
.15	-.25	.10	.00	.03	ni	-.10	.88

TABLE V-1 (Continued)

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\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\* Significant at .05 level.

ni Not included in multiple regression equation.

<sup>a</sup>Peronistas represents the combined votes cast for the Partido Laborista and the Unión Cívica Radical - Junta Renovadora; Radicals is Unión Cívica Radical; Conserv. is the Partido Demócrata Nacional.

<sup>b</sup>Peronistas are the coalition slate of PL-RJR (Partido Laborista and UCR, Junta Renovadora); Radicals are the Unión Cívica Radical; Conserv. is the merged slate of the Partido Demócrata Nacional and UCR Antipersonalista in Corrientes, the Partido Demócrata Nacional in Entre Ríos, and the Partido Demócrata Progresista in Santa Fe.

<sup>c</sup>Peronistas include the PL-RJR in Córdoba and Mendoza, the Partido Laborista in Santiago del Estero and Tucumán, the UCR Junta Renovadora in San Luis, and the combined votes cast for the Partido Laborista and the UCR Yrigoyenista in Jujuy; Radicals represent the vote cast for the Unión Cívica Radical in Córdoba, Jujuy, Mendoza, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán; Conserv. is the Partido Demócrata Nacional in Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, and Jujuy.

of statistical significance is a rather weak .14 with urbanism, while all independent variables combined produce a multiple correlation coefficient of only .23. The Radical bloc registers its highest national correlation with that group's vote of a decade earlier, followed closely by a correlation of .29 with the urban middle class. Other Radical correlations of significance are a negative association with large industry and a weaker positive correlation with small ranching. The strongest correlation at the national level is -.51, registered by the conservatives on the prosperous farming factor. The conservative vote also correlates negatively at significant levels with urbanism and the urban class index.

Moving to multiple regression analysis at the national level, only 2 per cent of the variance in the Peronista vote is explained by the urbanism correlation. Another 1.2 per cent is accounted for by the Peronista vote's correlation with large industry, while the remaining nine independent variables together explain only 2.1 per cent more. Thus, as was suggested by the low multiple R, almost 95 per cent of the national variance in the Peronista vote remains unexplained by all of these independent variables.

In the national Radical vote, the party's 1936 vote accounts for 9.3 per cent of the variance and the positive correlation with the urban middle class, entering the equation second, adds another 4.7 per cent to the explained variance. Paraurbanism, whose partial correlation had increased to -.17 after the second step, entered the equation next to explain another 2.6 per cent of the variance. The next three variables to enter the equation--each explaining between 1.2 and 1.8

per cent of the variance--were Factors III, VII, and IX, while the remaining six variables together accounted for less than 2 per cent more. A total of 22.8 per cent of the variance in Radical vote at the national level is explained by all independent variables combined.

For the conservatives, the correlation of  $-.51$  with prosperous farming explains 25.6 per cent of the variance while the second variable to enter the equation--a negative correlation with urbanism--increases the explained variance to 33.5 per cent. Small ranching enters the equation third to account for an additional 4.4 per cent of the variance, followed by a negative association with the urban class index explaining 2.4 per cent more. These four variables bring the explained variance to 40.3 per cent with a multiple R of  $.64$ . The remaining eight variables together explain less than one per cent more of the variance in conservative vote.

Regional correlations in Table V-1 disclose a shift from the pattern of earlier elections. Buenos Aires, heretofore the region consistently registering the weakest correlations, contains a number of significant coefficients and an average multiple R of about  $.61$ . The Litoral, an area of strong correlations in each of the first three elections studied, now replaces Buenos Aires as a region of "unstructured" politics or of bases of political support no longer tapped by the available independent variables.

In Buenos Aires, each of the three party blocs shows significant correlations with the factors of urbanism, small ranching, industry scale, and paraurbanism, while two of the three correlate significantly with agriculture scale, prosperous farming, and the urban class index.

It is interesting to note that despite the fact that more than half of the coefficients in the Buenos Aires section of Table V-1 are of statistical significance, neither the Radicals nor the conservatives correlate significantly with their 1936 vote.

For the Peronistas of Buenos Aires, industry scale proved to be the strongest independent variable; the correlation of  $-.41$  with this "reverse polarity" variable represents a moderately strong connection between large industry and Peronista voting. Peronista support also is associated with urbanism and paraurbanism, small-scale agriculture, prosperous farming, small ranching, and the urban working class. Radical vote in Buenos Aires was primarily associated with ruralism (negative correlations with urbanism and paraurbanism), large-scale agriculture, the absence of large industry, and the urban middle class. The conservatives in this region demonstrate a pattern quite similar to that of the Radicals although registering a stronger negative correlation with prosperous farming, a significant correlation with dairy farming, and no significant association with the urban class index.

The Peronista association with large industry in Buenos Aires explains 16.4 per cent of the variance in that group's vote. Prosperous farming enters the multiple regression equation second to explain another 5.8 per cent of the variance, followed by agriculture scale and paraurbanism which account for 4.8 and 3.9 per cent respectively. Increases in partial correlations of several variables by this stage of the regression cause the association between Peronista vote and the rural working class to enter the equation fifth and account for 4.5 per cent of the variance, while another 3.1 per cent is accounted for by the

negative entry of "rural traditionalism" in the seventh step. Urbanism, whose correlation coefficient dropped sharply after the entry of industry scale in the first step, explained 2.6 per cent of the variance when it entered the equation at the sixth step. The remaining five variables account for slightly more than 2 per cent of the variance, giving a total explained variance of 43.6 per cent for all independent variables combined.

In multiple regression analysis for the Radicals in Buenos Aires, the correlation with large agriculture explains 15.2 per cent of the vote variance while negative associations with urbanism and prosperous farming add 6.8 and 4.7 per cent respectively. The negative correlation with paraurbanism enters the Radical equation fourth to account for another 4.5 per cent of the variance, while rural middle class, 1936 Radical vote, and dairy farming each add between 1.2 and 1.8 per cent to the explained variance. These seven variables bring the explained variance to 35.9 per cent; the remaining five increase this only to 36.4 per cent.

For the conservatives of Buenos Aires, the first three variables to enter the multiple regression equation--each representing a negative correlation--are prosperous farming, urbanism, and paraurbanism. These factors explain 12.3, 9.2, and 6.2 per cent, respectively, of the variance of the conservative vote in that region. The conservative vote in 1936 adds 1.9 per cent to the explained variance, followed by the negative association with large industry at 1.1 per cent. The last seven variables to enter the equation together explain only about 1.3 per cent of the remaining variance, reaching a total explained variance of 32.1 per cent.



It can be seen in Table V-1 that both the Peronistas and the Radicals lacked any significant correlations in the Litoral. The highest Peronista correlation is .20 with Factor VII, which explains only 3.9 per cent of the vote variance. As a result of changing values of partial correlations at different steps of the regression analysis, variables explaining the largest amount of the Peronista variance were Factor IX, entering second to account for 4.4 per cent, and a negative association with the 1936 Radical vote which entered at the sixth step and explained another 4.7 per cent of the variance.<sup>44</sup> All independent variables together accounted for 23.9 per cent of the variance in Peronista vote in the Litoral, but at no point in the regression did the equation attain statistical significance. The Radical regression equation accounted for 20.4 per cent of the variance in that party's vote, and, like the previous case, never attained statistical significance. The first three variables entering the Radical equation were Factors IX, V, and VII, which respectively explained 5.7, 4.0, and 3.9 per cent of the variance.

In contrast to the other two party groups, the conservatives of the Litoral correlate significantly with two independent variables--1936 conservative vote and the absence of "out-migration." Although it is below the level of statistical significance, there also is the expected negative correlation with urbanism. In the multiple regression equation, the "party organization" variable enters first to explain 15.9 per cent of the variance in conservative vote, followed by Factor VII which accounts for another 6.9 per cent of the variance. Prosperous farming and small ranching--each with a simple correlation of only -.02--gain

in importance with the partialling process and enter the equation at the third and fourth steps to account for 6.6 and 6.1 per cent of the variance, respectively. These four variables bring the explained variance to 35.5 per cent with a multiple R of .60. The remaining eight variables increase the multiple correlation coefficient only to .65 and together account for 6 per cent more of the variance.

As in 1936, the Interior registers the highest multiple correlation coefficients among the three regions. In what has been seen to be a pattern in the Interior, the Peronista vote in 1946 correlates at a solid .46 with the Concordancia vote of a decade earlier. The Concordancia, of course, was the governing party at the time of the 1936 election; in 1946, the fact that Perón was the choice of the military government meant that he was the *de facto* administration candidate. Thus the same areas which had tended to support the incumbent party in 1916, 1926, and 1936 continued to do so in 1946. The conservative vote in 1946, by contrast, correlates at -.10 with the Concordancia vote of the previous decade.

Peronista support in the Interior also correlates significantly, though not strongly, with large industry, the rural middle class, and large farming. The correlation with the 1936 Concordancia vote accounts for 20.8 per cent of the variance in the Peronista vote, while the association with large farming--a negative correlation with small ranching--explains another 10.4 per cent. Industry size enters the regression equation third to explain 5.4 per cent more of the variance, followed by urbanism accounting for 4.8 per cent. These four variables together account for 41.4 per cent of the total variance and bring the multiple

R to .64; the remaining eight variables together add less than 7 per cent to the explained variance and bring the multiple R to .69. The significant correlation of -.20 which the Peronistas registered with the rural class Factor in Table V-1 dropped after 1936 Concordancia vote entered the equation, causing this factor to not enter until the eighth step where it added only 1.1 per cent to the explained variance.

UCR vote in 1936 proved to be by far the most important single variable in accounting for variance in the Radical vote in the Interior. Additional Radical correlations of statistical significance are .37 with the urban middle class, .38 with small ranching, and .29 with the absence of large industry. The correlation of .57 with 1936 party vote accounts for 32.3 per cent of the variance in Radical vote, while small ranching enters the equation second to explain another 9.7 per cent. The next two variables to enter the Radical equation are negative associations with urbanism and large industry, each explaining 2.6 per cent of the variance. These first four variables in the equation bring the multiple R to .69 and account for 47.3 per cent of the total variance in Radical vote; the remaining eight variables increase the multiple R to .73 and the explained variance to 53.5 per cent. Despite its relatively strong independent correlation, the urban class index declined steadily in its partial correlations as the first few variables entered the Radical equation and was the last of the twelve independent variables to be included.

Moving on to the Interior conservatives, it can be seen that this group has both the highest single correlation and the highest multiple R of any party grouping in any region in Table V-1. The multiple R of

.88 means that less than one-fourth of the variance in conservative vote remains unexplained by the available independent variables. The single most important variable behind conservative support seems to be small ranching, where a correlation of .66 explains 43 per cent of the variance. Other significant conservative correlations are -.38 with prosperous farming and -.29 with urbanism. These factors are the next two to enter the regression equation after small ranching, accounting respectively for 10.9 and 12.6 per cent of the variance. Entering the equation in the fourth and fifth steps are a positive correlation with the rural working class, accounting for 4.3 per cent of the variance, and a negative association with paraurbanism which explains an additional 5 per cent. These five variables bring the multiple R to .87 and account for a total of 76 per cent of the variance. The other seven variables together add only 2 per cent to the explained variance.

In summarizing the 1946 election analysis, perhaps the most striking change from earlier election periods is the pattern of stronger correlations in Buenos Aires and a parallel weakening of correlations in the Litoral. In the case of Buenos Aires, it would appear that the 1946 election proved to be a catalyst for political opinion in a way that none of the earlier elections had been. It is also possible, of course, that a tradition of electoral fraud in the province had finally broken down and for the first time a "natural" structure of political support was able to emerge. In view of the generally unchallenged honesty of the 1946 election, the sudden lack of structure in the Litoral is more difficult to explain. If fraud is not the explanation, the absence of significant correlations for the Peronistas and Radicals with

any of the same factors which showed strong associations with the 1936 election would seem to indicate that in the Litoral the 1946 election caused a general "across-the-board" fracturing of political alignments, particularly among the Radicals.

Although at the national level only urbanism correlates significantly with Peronista support, a review of the regional sections of Table V-1 shows a general pattern of Peronista strength in areas marked by urbanism, large industry, and the urban working class. This pattern, of course, is consistent with the origins of the Peronista movement as well as the findings of both impressionistic and empirical studies of the election.<sup>45</sup> But the fact that Peronista voting correlated at significant levels with small agriculture, prosperous farming, and small ranching in Buenos Aires while showing significant negative correlations with the rural working class and with small ranching in the Interior indicates that the appeal of the Peronista movement was rural as well as urban and that it varied somewhat from one region to another. It is this interregional variation which at least in part accounts for the low correlations at the national level.

The general pattern of Radical support in 1946 shows that party's major strength associated with the urban middle class, with the absence of large industry, and to some extent with ruralism. Like the Peronistas, the Radicals varied considerably from one region to another in their association with some of the independent variables. Radical vote correlates with small ranching at  $-.27$  in Buenos Aires and  $.38$  in the Interior, for example, while only in the Interior is the "party organization" variable of any significance.

Conservatives show their usual association with ruralism in all regions in 1946, and except in the Litoral show a solid negative correlation with prosperous farming. At the national level the conservatives also register a significant negative correlation with the urban middle class, but all regional correlations with this variable are without significance. In general, then, the areas of conservative support have about the same characteristics as in previous elections.

The apparent tendency of some areas of the Interior to support the administration candidates regardless of which party is in power has been seen to be evident in the 1946 election. Thus although there would appear to be little connection between either the parties or the policies of the Concordancia in 1936 and the Peronistas in 1946, their electoral support in the Interior correlates at .46.

Finally, a brief evaluation of the 1947 factors used in the 1936 and 1946 election analyses is in order. Urbanism, prosperous farming, small ranching, and industry scale emerge from both elections as generally the most meaningful of the ten factors in explaining variance in the vote for various party groupings. Rural class and dairy farming are of more value in 1936 than 1946, while the reverse is true of agriculture scale. It is interesting to note that of the four "weak" factors which to varying degrees seemed to be artifacts of the factor analytic process,<sup>46</sup> Factor IX (rural traditionalism) registered no significant correlations in either of the elections while Factor VII (out-migration) correlated significantly with only one party in one region in each analysis. Factor X (dairy farming) proved significant in the Interior and nationally in 1936 and for the conservatives in

Buenos Aires in 1946, but still was weaker than most of the first six factors. The enigmatic Factor VIII (paraurbanism) seems to be the strongest of the four weak factors, but its obvious relationship to urbanism also makes it the most defensible of the four. It is also interesting to note that in neither Buenos Aires nor the Interior--the regions with the most "structured" politics in 1946--did Factors VII, IX, or X enter the regression equation of any party until after the fourth step. In short, the original assessment of these factors as being artifactual and probably of little explanatory value has generally been borne out by the election analysis.

#### Roll Call Analysis

Deputies serving in the 1946-1948 session of the Chamber of Deputies--like those of a decade before--can easily be divided into Government and Opposition blocs. The Government bloc, which will be referred to as the Peronista bloc in the following analysis, is composed of 110 of the 158 deputies who served during the session. Most were elected on the slate of the Partido Laborista, the dissident Unión Cívica Radical (Junta Renovadora), or a combined slate of the two groups. Also joining the Peronista bloc were deputies of San Juan's UCR Bloquista and several elected in the Interior under the banner of UCR Yrigoyenista. Forty-four members of the Opposition bloc represented the orthodox Unión Cívica Radical, while the remaining four were conservatives from the Litoral and the Interior.

The 275 contested roll calls during the 1946-1948 session far exceeded the total of any other two-year period during the history of

the Argentine Chamber of Deputies.<sup>47</sup> Because the great majority of these roll calls were sharp divisions on which both blocs voted with a high level of cohesion, only those issue areas in which at least one of the blocs showed a lack of unanimity were examined for scalability. In practice, this often meant an issue in which the Peronista bloc was divided while the Opposition bloc remained unanimous since the latter group maintained a higher level of cohesion throughout the session.

Table V-2 shows that while the majority of the 1946-1948 roll calls represented a division of between 10 and 29 per cent and forty-five were divided by less than 10 per cent of the vote, there also were more unevenly divided cases than in some of the earlier sessions. In sharper contrast to some of the earlier sessions is the rate of participation shown in Table V-3. While the largest single group--105 roll calls--registered the vote of only between 50 and 59 per cent of the deputies, there were also many roll calls in which the rate of participation was between 70 and 89 per cent and six cases in which more than 90 per cent of the deputies voted.

The issue area of the Guttman scales, along with the number of deputies and number of roll calls composing each one, is shown in Table V-4. The size of the scales range from three composed of two roll calls each to the Foreign Affairs Scale made up of six roll calls. More than two-thirds of the session's 158 deputies are recorded on five of the eight scales, while the smallest scale includes only slightly more than one-third of the deputies. As has been noted in previous chapters, building scales with only two roll calls reduces the number of scalable deputies because a non-response cannot be tolerated on any of the items.



TABLE V-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference								
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89
Number of Roll Calls	45	79	76	41	9	12	2	4	7

TABLE V-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting				
	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99
Number of Roll Calls	105	85	56	23	6

TABLE V-4  
SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE

Scale Subject	"Positive" Vote	Number Roll Calls	Number Deputies
Labor #1	Pro-Labor	3	81
Labor #2	Pro-Labor	2	69
University Law	Pro-Autonomy	4	107
Export Investigation	Pro-Investigation	4	118
Rights & Immunities	Support of Immunities	4	129
Foreign Affairs	Pro-Administration	6	110
Aboriginal Protection	Pro-Protection	2	117
San Juan Disaster	Pro-Action	2	54

In contrast to earlier chapters, there is no Partisan Issues Scale in 1946-1948. This of course is not because there were no partisan issues--virtually all issues drew a partisan response from the Radical deputies and the great majority did likewise from the Peronistas--but because the large number of roll calls and the fact that most of them were sharp partisan divisions led to the decision to ignore these in the search for scales. This procedure would not have been defensible had the goal of analysis been to map the issue areas of the session, for many issues on which there were a number of roll calls do not appear in any of the scales.<sup>48</sup> The goal of roll call analysis in this study, however, is to determine the dimensions of voting behavior in the chamber, making the issue content important only to the extent which it is relevant to these dimensions. From this perspective, validity of the analysis would seem to be little harmed by ignoring large numbers of partisan divisions.

Table V-5 shows the rank-order correlations among the eight scales of this session. This matrix leaves no doubt that each of the scales does in fact represent a distinct voting dimension. The strongest correlation between any two scales is a coefficient of .71 between the University Law Scale and the Rights and Immunities Scale, while there are a number of coefficients weaker than .25. The scales representing these different voting dimensions of the 1946-1948 session are discussed below.

#### Labor Scale #1

This scale is composed of three roll calls dealing with questions of workers' salaries. Two of the votes were on amendments liberalizing

TABLE V-5  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES

	Labor Scale #2	University Law Scale	Export Investigation	Rights and Immunities	Foreign Affairs. Protection	Aboriginal Reconstruction	San Juan
Labor Scale #1	-.42	.63	.64	.56	-.59	-.22	.48
Labor Scale #2		-.44	-.41	-.48	.52	.12	-.32
University Law Scale			.61	.71	-.68	-.16	.60
Export Investigation Scale				.59	-.49	-.17	.63
Rights and Immunities Scale					-.62	-.22	.55
Foreign Affairs Scale						.25	-.54
Aboriginal Protection Scale							-.15

the salary supplement law while the third would have required employers to pay regular salaries during "lock-outs." A "positive" vote on all questions is the one which would extend or increase the pay of the worker.

Item 1 was a motion to extend the salary supplement law to include domestic servants; Item 2 would likewise extend the law's coverage to all government employees earning less than 800 pesos per month. Item 3, dealing with a separate law, was a vote on a provision in the meat workers statute which would require all employers guilty of lock-outs to pay employees their regular salaries during the time they were kept away from the job.

Table V-6A shows that all but three Opposition deputies recorded on the scale are in Scale Type 4, representing a pro-labor vote on all three items, while only one member of the Peronista bloc is in this end scale type. The adjoining scale type, representing a positive vote on Items 1 and 2 and a non-response on Item 3, contains two of the remaining three Opposition deputies and nine members of the government bloc. The remaining three scale positions--Scale Type 2 representing a pro-labor vote on the first two items and a negative vote on the third, Scale Type 1 indicating support of the first item and opposition to all three questions--are populated exclusively by members of the Peronista bloc with the exception of a single Opposition deputy from Córdoba in Scale Type 0.

A slight regional trend in which deputies from Buenos Aires tend to be at the pro-labor end of the scale and those of the Interior at the opposite end can be seen in Table V-6B. This same tendency, although

TABLE V-6A  
LABOR SCALE #1

Bloc	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Peronist	17	13	11	9	1	59	110
Opposition	1	0	0	2	27	18	48
Total	18	13	11	11	28	77	158

TABLE V-6B  
LABOR SCALE #1

Region	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	7	1	4	3	15	44	74
Litoral	3	6	2	3	6	15	35
Interior	8	6	5	5	7	18	49
Total	18	13	11	11	28	77	158

TABLE V-6C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Labor #1 Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	7	1	4	2	1	35	50
Litoral	3	6	2	3	0	10	24
Interior	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	17	13	11	9	1	59	110

still weaker, can be seen within the Peronista bloc in Table V-6C. This Peronista table suggests, however, that despite the slight regional bias the position of most deputies in the majority bloc was based on factors beyond the scope of the present analysis.

### Labor Scale #2

Also dealing with labor matters but correlating with the former scale at only  $-.42$ , this scale is composed of two roll calls. Item 1 is a clause in a law governing private chauffeurs which would set 90 days as the minimum period of employment required to qualify for benefits. Item 2 concerned an amendment to the retirement and social security law which would make it applicable to government employees over the age of eighteen. As opposition in each case was based primarily on the contention that the proposals were too restrictive, a pro-labor vote on each item is nay.

In contrast to the former labor scale, it is the Peronista bloc which holds up the pro-labor end of this scale. Table V-7A shows government deputies about evenly divided between Scale Types 1 and 2, with two members in the most anti-labor scale type. The Opposition bloc contains fourteen deputies in the median scale type and nine at the anti-labor end of the scale. Again in contrast to the former scale, Table V-7B shows a regional tendency for Interior deputies to be more pro-labor on this scale than those of the Litoral or Buenos Aires.

Looking at regional vote patterns within the individual blocs, Table V-7C shows that it is the Peronista bloc which is responsible for the pattern seen in the previous table. More than twice as many Interior



TABLE V-7A  
LABOR SCALE #2

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Peronista	2	23	21	64	110
Opposition	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	11	37	21	89	158

TABLE V-7B  
LABOR SCALE #2

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	5	20	5	44	74
Litoral	3	7	1	24	35
Interior	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	11	37	21	89	158

TABLE V-7C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Labor #2 Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	1	12	5	32	50
Litoral	0	5	1	18	24
Interior	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	2	23	21	64	110

TABLE V-7D  
OPPOSITION BLOC

Region	Labor #2 Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	4	8	0	12	24
Litoral	3	2	0	6	11
Interior	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	9	14	0	25	48

Peronistas are in Scale Type 2 than in the other two scale positions combined, while those of the Litoral and Buenos Aires are concentrated in Scale Type 1. In the Opposition bloc, on the other hand, Buenos Aires and Interior deputies show identical distributions between Scale Types 0 and 1, with Litoral deputies tending to be a little more "anti-labor."

#### University Law Scale

This scale is composed of four roll calls--three substantive and one procedural--on various facets of a new law governing the national universities. It is somewhat difficult to label the positive end of this scale, combining as it seems to elements both of increased autonomy from governmental control and increased professional standards for the faculty. Items 1 and 2 represent votes on Senate amendments to the university law; the first would prohibit faculty members from simultaneously holding other public positions, the second would require all persons joining the faculty to hold degrees. Item 3 is a proposal that deputies who are also university professors either resign from their university positions or refrain from voting on the university law. Item 4 is a vote to approve the law "in general" prior to various amendments. A positive vote is aye on the first three items and nay on Item 4.

Table V-8A shows a rather pronounced partisan alignment on the university issue. More Peronistas are in Scale Type 0 than in all of the other four scale types combined, while all members of the Opposition bloc are in either scale types 3 or 4. Although Peronista deputies are

found in every scale type, their frequency steadily declines toward the upper end of the scale. As a further indication of partisan polarization on this issue, only one of the thirteen Opposition deputies in Scale Type 3 cast a negative vote on Item 4; the remainder are in that scale type because of a non-response on the final item. Likewise, five of the Peronistas in Scale Type 1 are there due to a non-response on Item 1; had they voted, they might have joined the thirty-eight Peronistas who populate Scale Type 0.

In contrast to the partisan alignment, Table V-8B discloses no regional pattern to the scale type distribution beyond a very slight tendency for Buenos Aires deputies to be toward the upper end of the scale and those from the Interior toward the opposite end. Litoral deputies are spread almost evenly among all scale types. This weak regional pattern seems to be based primarily upon the Peronista bloc; Table V-8C shows that Interior members are somewhat more concentrated at the lower end of the scale than are those from Buenos Aires. For the Opposition bloc, Table V-8D shows no important regional pattern. In summary, the university law would seem to have been a strictly partisan question for the Opposition and one involving both partisan and regional considerations for members of the Peronista bloc.

#### Export Investigation Scale

The Export Investigation Scale is composed of four roll calls on questions dealing with a congressional investigation into alleged irregularities in the government-controlled export of wheat. As it involved at least an implicit criticism of the administration, this is the type of issue which has often been found to fit into the heterogeneous

TABLE V-8A  
UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Peronista	38	11	9	5	1	46	110
Opposition	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	38	11	9	18	31	51	158

TABLE V-8B  
UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE

Region	Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	16	3	4	9	16	26	74
Litoral	5	4	4	5	5	12	35
Interior	<u>17</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	38	11	9	18	31	51	158

TABLE V-8C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	University Law Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	16	3	4	3	1	23	50
Litoral	5	4	4	1	0	10	24
Interior	<u>17</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	38	11	9	5	1	46	110

TABLE V-8D  
OPPOSITION BLOC

Region	University Law Scale Type					Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4		
Buenos Aires	0	0	0	6	15	3	24
Litoral	0	0	0	4	5	2	11
Interior	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	0	0	0	13	30	5	48

"partisan Issues" scales in the past. Here it correlates moderately well with several of the other scales but is clearly a dimension of its own.

Item 1 of the Export Investigation Scale is a motion to refer to committee the requested creation of a special committee to investigate alleged irregularities in the export of wheat to Uruguay. Item 2 is a request that the committee investigating the Uruguay issue be granted broader authority to check into all matters dealing with export licenses. Item 3 is a proposal that the investigating committee be given full use of the facilities of the Chamber of Deputies, while Item 4 is the proposed authorization for the committee to investigate back to June 4, 1943, rather than just to June 4, 1946. These extra three years would have covered the time the country was under military rule prior to the election of Perón. A positive or pro-investigation vote is nay on Item 1--which would likely have buried the matter--and aye on the remaining three items.

Table V-9A shows a high cohesion for the Opposition bloc on this scale, with thirty-four members in Scale Type 5--a positive vote on all four items--and another four in the adjacent scale type which represents a positive vote on the first three items and a non-response on Item 4. The Peronista bloc, in contrast, is quite spread out over the scale although concentrated in Scale Type 1 (a positive response on Item 1 and negative responses on the other three items). Table V-9B shows a slightly higher proportion of Buenos Aires than Interior deputies toward the upper end of the scale, but the absence of a regional pattern for the Peronistas in Table V-9C would suggest that this is largely the

TABLE V-9A  
EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Peronista	7	39	11	10	12	1	30	110
Opposition	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	7	39	11	10	16	35	40	158

TABLE V-9B  
EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE

Region	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	2	18	4	5	6	20	19	74
Litoral	3	8	2	1	2	7	12	35
Interior	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	7	39	11	10	16	35	40	158



TABLE V-9C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Export Investigation Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	2	18	4	5	5	1	15	50
Litoral	3	8	2	1	1	0	9	24
Interior	2	13	5	4	6	0	6	36
Total	7	39	11	10	12	1	30	110

result of the higher concentration of Buenos Aires deputies in the Opposition bloc.<sup>49</sup> Once again, then, it seems that the export investigation issue was a strongly partisan question for the Opposition while the stand of the individual Peronista deputies was often dependent upon factors beyond the scope of this analysis.

#### Rights and Immunities Scale

The scale which in the absence of a more specific label will be called "rights and immunities" is composed of four roll calls. Two deal with questions of the internal operation of the Chamber of Deputies; two are concerned with an assassination attempt against a member of the chamber. Since all seem to in one way or another touch upon the rights and immunities of members of the chamber, that common theme was chosen as the dimension represented by the scale.

Item 1 involves a motion--taken at a time when the Opposition bloc was absent--to take roll and send the list to the chamber business office so that the pay of deputies absent without permission could be withheld for that day. Item 2 was a motion to consider changes in the chamber's rules which would make the dismissal of chamber employees less of a discretionary matter in the hands of the chamber president and more subject to the chamber as a whole. Item 3 is a motion to set up a special committee to investigate an assassination attempt against deputy Cipriano Reyes, a leader of the Partido Laborista, while Item 4 involved a proposal to expand that investigation to include a general probe of recent attacks on public liberties. A positive vote is nay on Item 1 and aye on the remaining three items.

As in the previous two scales, this seems to have been a strong partisan issue for the Opposition bloc but much less so for the Peronistas. Table V-10A shows that all but one of the forty-eight Opposition deputies recorded on the scale are in Scale Type 6--a positive vote on all four items. Peronista deputies, on the other hand, are found in all scale types although they show their heaviest concentration in Scale Type 2 (a positive vote on Item 1 and negative votes on all other items). In contrast to some earlier scales with similar partisan patterns, however, Tables V-10B and V-10C show virtually no regional pattern either for the chamber as a whole or for the Peronista bloc. Once again, therefore, it appears that there are divisions within the government bloc which lie beyond the scope of the present analysis.

#### Foreign Affairs Scale

This scale is composed of six roll calls on matters dealing with Argentine foreign policy, including approval of the United Nations Charter. The positive position on each roll call is that which supports the position of the administration. As would be expected in an issue-area involving important executive policies, the scale shows a definite partisan pattern--especially in the Opposition bloc--but does not correlate any more highly than  $-.68$  with any of the other scales.

Item 1 of the Foreign Affairs Scale is a contrived item composed of three roll calls dealing with (1) a motion to consider approval of the United Nations Charter and the Act of Chapultepec, (2) approval of the United Nations Charter, and (3) a minority report recommending several reservations in approval of the Act of Chapultepec. A positive

TABLE V-10A  
RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Peronistas	13	8	32	12	8	6	2	29	110
Opposition	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	14	8	32	12	8	6	49	29	158

TABLE V-10B  
RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE

Region	Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	5	4	19	4	2	2	26	12	74
Litoral	5	2	4	2	3	1	10	8	35
Interior	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	14	8	32	12	8	6	49	29	158

TABLE V-10C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Rights and Immunities Scale Type							Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Buenos Aires	5	4	19	4	2	2	2	12	50
Litoral	4	2	4	2	3	1	0	8	24
Interior	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	13	8	32	12	8	6	2	29	110

vote is aye on the first two roll calls and nay on the third. Item 2 is a vote approving Argentina's adherence to the Act of Chapultepec; a positive vote is aye. Items 3 and 4 represent roll calls dealing with affairs in other Latin American nations; the first was a declaration of solidarity with the national congress of Guatemala in its claim of national rights over Belize (British Honduras), the second a declaration urging Bolivia to cease political executions. A positive vote is nay on Item 3 and aye on Item 4.

Table V-11A shows that while Peronista deputies are found in all scale types, their concentration is steadily heavier toward the upper end of the scale. All but three Opposition deputies are in the lowest scale type, and those three are not members of the Unión Cívica Radical. Scale Type 5, populated by thirty-four members of the Peronista bloc, represents a pro-administration position on all four items; the adjacent scale type, where another thirteen Peronistas are ranked, represents a pro-administration stand on the first three items and a non-response on Item 4. Scale Types 1, 2, and 3 indicate support of the "easier" one, two and three items, respectively, and opposition to the remaining items. Scale Type 0, the most anti-administration position, indicates a negative stand on all items (although all Opposition deputies in that scale type show a non-response on Item 2).

A slight regional bias of Buenos Aires deputies concentrating toward the lower end of the scale is seen in Table V-11B, but the absence of any regional pattern within the Peronista bloc in Table V-11C suggests that this apparent regionalism was the result of the distribution of the Opposition bloc. As in several past scales,

TABLE V-11A  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Peronista	1	5	5	13	13	34	39	110
Opposition	<u>36</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	37	5	7	14	13	34	48	158

TABLE V-11B  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE

Region	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	21	3	1	6	5	16	22	74
Litoral	7	1	3	4	5	5	10	35
Interior	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	37	5	7	14	13	34	48	158

TABLE V-11C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Foreign Affairs Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	1	3	1	6	5	16	18	50
Litoral	0	1	2	3	5	5	8	24
Interior	0	1	2	4	3	13	13	36
Total	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>110</u>



therefore, it appears that in the Foreign Affairs Scale considerations other than those analyzed in the present study lay behind the voting pattern of the Peronistas.

#### Aboriginal Protection Scale

Composed of two roll calls dealing with national territories and governmental protection of the nation's aboriginal peoples, this is the only 1946-1948 scale in which the Opposition bloc showed a level of cohesion lower than that of the Peronistas. Item 1 of the scale is a resolution dealing with protection of the aboriginals; Item 2 is a proposed allocation of 30,000 pesos to the Committee on National Territories for use in study trips. A positive vote is aye in each case.

Table V-12A shows that the majority of both blocs is in Scale Type 2, representing approval of both items, while declining numbers of each bloc are found in the two lower scale types (Scale Type 1 representing approval of Item 1 but rejection of Item 2, Scale Type 0 indicating opposition to both items). Although following the same pattern as the Peronistas, a greater proportion of Opposition deputies is found in each of the lower two scale types. No pronounced regional patterns are disclosed for the chamber as a whole in Table V-12B or for either of the individual blocs in Tables V-12C and V-12D.

#### San Juan Reconstruction Scale

This scale is composed of two roll calls dealing with governmental aid in the reconstruction of San Juan province following extensive earthquake damage. Item 1 is a proposal to add a representative of the propertyowners to a special committee which would administer the national

TABLE V-12A  
ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Peronista	2	4	71	33	110
Opposition	4	11	25	8	48
Total	6	15	96	41	158

TABLE V-12B  
ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	3	9	38	24	74
Litoral	1	2	26	6	35
Interior	2	4	32	11	49
Total	6	15	96	41	158

TABLE V-12C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	Aboriginal Protection Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	2	2	27	19	50
Litoral	0	1	18	5	24
Interior	0	1	26	9	36
Total	2	4	71	33	110

TABLE V-12D  
OPPOSITION BLOC

Region	Aboriginal Protection Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	1	7	11	5	24
Litoral	1	1	8	1	11
Interior	2	3	6	2	13
Total	4	11	25	8	48

funds allocated for the reconstruction. Item 2 is a motion to set a date to consider the question of San Juan reconstruction with or without a committee report. On both items a positive vote is aye.

Table V-13A shows that all ranked members of the Opposition bloc are in Scale Type 2--representing approval of both items--while Peronista deputies are found in all scale types but are concentrated in Type 1. Scale Type 1 indicates approval of Item 1 and opposition to Item 2; Scale Type 0 represents rejection of both items.

The slight concentration of Buenos Aires deputies in Scale Type 2 in Table V-13B once again seems to be due to the regional distribution of members of the Opposition bloc. As can be seen in Table V-13C, the only regional pattern within the Peronista bloc is a tendency for deputies from Buenos Aires and the Interior to concentrate in the median scale type while those from the Litoral are found more toward the upper end of the scale.

### Conclusion

Despite the high frequency of sharp partisan divisions in the 1946-1948 session of the Chamber of Deputies, it has been seen that there were some issue areas in which the cohesion of one or the other bloc--or occasionally both--declined and thus allowed construction of cumulative scales. In contrast to the 1936-1938 session where all but one of the votes ranged along a single dimension, at least eight different dimensions were found among the 1946-1948 roll calls. The intercorrelations among these eight scales varied from .12 to .71.

Although the Opposition was found to have dropped its usual

TABLE V-13A  
SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Peronista	4	18	8	80	110
Opposition	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>48</u>
Total	4	18	32	104	158

TABLE V-13B  
SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE

Region	Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	2	9	16	47	74
Litoral	0	3	8	24	35
Interior	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	4	18	32	104	158

TABLE V-13C  
PERONISTA BLOC

Region	San Juan Scale Type			Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2		
Buenos Aires	2	9	2	37	50
Litoral	0	3	4	17	24
Interior	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	4	18	8	80	110

high level of cohesion on some scales, the gradations on most issue dimensions during the 1946-1948 session were the results of differing voting patterns among members of the Peronista bloc. Unlike many similar cases in previous sessions, however, this intrabloc variation in 1946-1948 seldom seemed to be based upon regionalism. Although the present study does not include indicators to measure these facets, it seems likely that this non-regional variation within the Peronista bloc might be explained at least in part by the heterogeneous class and group backing which Perón had in 1946. But what is evident--and important to the thesis of the study--is that regionalism seemed considerably less important in the 1946-1948 chamber than in any of the previous three sessions analyzed.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Much has been written about the Perón period both by Argentine and foreign authors. Like the historiography of the Yrigoyen period, however, heated polemics far outnumber analytic works and nothing approaching a definitive history of the period has yet appeared. An overview of the literature appearing up until about 1958 can be found in Fritz L. Hoffman's two-part bibliographical essay, "Perón and After," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVI (November, 1956), 510-528, and XXXIX (May, 1959), 212-233. Perhaps the best work in English dealing with the rise of Perón and the first few years of his administration is George I. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). Other accounts in English include Robert J. Alexander, The Perón Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); and Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentine Upheaval (New York: Praeger, 1956). A recent brief study which includes a critique of these and other earlier writers on the theme is Alberto Ciria, Peronismo--Mythology or Ideology? (Riverside: University of California, Latin American Research Program, 1967). Sociological interpretations of the Peronista movement include Gino Germani, Integración política de las masas y el totalitarismo (Buenos Aires: Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores, 1956); and Torcuato S. Di Tella, El sistema político argentino y la clase obrera (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1964). Among the better recent studies is Carlos S. Fayt, "Naturaleza del peronismo," Aportes, No. 1 (July, 1966), pp. 5-120. Current research includes a study by Argentine sociologist Miguel Murmis of the mobilization of the working class in Greater Buenos Aires during the 1940-1945 period.

<sup>2</sup> Austin F. Macdonald, Government of the Argentine Republic (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942), p. 101.

<sup>3</sup> Ysabel F(isk) Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 262.

<sup>4</sup> Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, Las fuerzas armadas restituyen el imperio de la soberanía popular: las elecciones generales de 1946 (2 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 950. The electoral law had been changed to give the winning party all electors in a district.

<sup>5</sup> Ernesto Palacio, Historia de la Argentina (2 vols.; 4th ed.; Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1965), II, 391.

<sup>6</sup> Rennie, p. 288.

<sup>7</sup> In a 1967 interview with the author, a prominent conservative who had been a young party worker at the time said the only thing which kept the 1941 election in Buenos Aires from being a national scandal was the fact that it was held on December 7 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor buried the news of fraud in Buenos Aires.



<sup>8</sup>Rennie, p. 317.

<sup>9</sup>The literature on the concept of status inconsistency is extensive. Among recent studies of the relationship between status inconsistency and politics in the United States are Gary B. Rush, "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," American Sociological Review, XXXII (February, 1967), 86-92, and David R. Segal, "Status Inconsistency, Cross Pressures, and American Political Behavior," American Sociological Review, XXXIV (June, 1969), 352-359. For a recent theoretical discussion of the subject, see James C. Kimberly, "Status Inconsistency: A Reformulation of a Theoretical Problem," Human Relations, XX (May, 1967), 171-179.

<sup>10</sup>Ysabel Fisk (Rennie), "Argentina: The Thirteen-Year Crisis," Foreign Affairs, XXII (January, 1944), 263.

<sup>11</sup>John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America; The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 111-112.

<sup>12</sup>Juan Antonio Solari, Parias argentinos; explotación y miseria de los trabajadores en el norte del país (Buenos Aires: Librería La Vanguardia, 1940), p. 7.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>14</sup>Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición; de la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1966), p. 230.

<sup>15</sup>For a study of migrant participation in voluntary associations, see Gino Germani, "Inquiry into Social Effects of Urbanization in a Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in Urbanization in Latin America, Philip M. Hauser (ed.) (Paris: UNESCO, 1961), pp. 206-233.

<sup>16</sup>Enrique Naya (pseud.), "La crisis argentina: peronismo y anti-peronismo," Cuadernos (Paris), No. 43 (July-August, 1960), p. 46.

<sup>17</sup>José Luis Romero, "Trends of the Masses in Argentina," Social Science, XXVI (October, 1951), 219.

<sup>18</sup>For a review of the movement by a founder and long-time leader, see Arturo Jauretche, F.O.R.J.A. y la década infame (Buenos Aires: Editorial Coyoacán, 1962). For an example of an early polemic of the movement, see Manuel Ortiz Pereyra, El S.O.S. de mi pueblo; causas y remedios de la crisis económica argentina (n.p.: Colección F.O.R.J.A., n.d.).

<sup>19</sup>J. J. Hernández Arregui, La formación de la conciencia nacional, 1930-1960 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Hachea, 1960), p. 305n.

<sup>20</sup>For a brief discussion of military-oligarchy relations in the twentieth century, see Darío Cantón, Military Interventions in Argentina, 1900-1966 (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Documento de Trabajo No. 39, 1967).

<sup>21</sup>Rennie, p. 345.

<sup>22</sup>"Proclama hecha circular entre los oficiales del ejército antes del 4 de junio de 1943," printed in Juan V. Orona, La logia militar que derrocó a Castillo (Buenos Aires: By the author, 1966), pp. 110-111.

<sup>23</sup>Rennie, p. 344.

<sup>24</sup>Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina moderna, 1930-46 (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1964), pp. 98-99.

<sup>25</sup>For a discussion of Argentina's policies and U.S. reaction during this period, see Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, Política exterior argentina, 1930-1962 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huemul, 1964), pp. 123-161.

<sup>26</sup>On labor relations during this period, see Alexander, pp. 20-32.

<sup>27</sup>Joseph R. Barager, "Argentina: A Country Divided," in Political Systems of Latin America, Martin C. Needler (ed.) (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964), pp. 403-444.

<sup>28</sup>Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentina (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum, 1964), p. 118.

<sup>29</sup>For a participant's account of the incident, see Angel Perelman, Como hicimos el 17 de octubre (Buenos Aires: Editorial Coyoacán, 1961).

<sup>30</sup>Agustín Rodríguez Araya, Revolución inconclusa (Buenos Aires: Editorial Proceso, 1964), pp. 43-44.

<sup>31</sup>Perón's activities and appeals during that early period are reflected in several collections of his speeches. See especially Juan Perón, El pueblo quiere saber de qué se trata (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1944), and, in English, Perón Speaks ([Buenos Aires]: n.p., 1949).

<sup>32</sup>The party's charter and platform are printed in Fayt, pp. 67-76.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-67.

<sup>34</sup>Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Historia política del ejército argentino (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, 1959), p. 68.

<sup>35</sup>The Unión Democrática's program is printed in Ciria, Partidos y poder . . ., pp. 161-163.

<sup>36</sup>Naya, p. 50.

<sup>37</sup>See, for example, Ciria, Peronismo . . ., p. 7. Several Peronistas who had been national deputies during the 1963-1966 period mentioned this alleged connection with Yrigoyen during interviews with the author in 1967.

<sup>38</sup>Johnson, p. 113.

<sup>39</sup>Fayt, p. 91.

<sup>40</sup>Many complaints and other pre-election documents can be found in Argentina, Las fuerzas armadas . . ., II, 9-318.

<sup>41</sup>Alexander, pp. 51-52.

<sup>42</sup>Argentina, Las fuerzas armadas . . ., II, 602.

<sup>43</sup>Ciria, Partidos y poder . . ., p. 131.

<sup>44</sup>The 1936 Radical vote in Buenos Aires and the Litoral was included in the Peronista equations because of the fact that some Radical sectors joined the Peronista movement. In both cases, however, the correlations proved to be insignificant and negative.

<sup>45</sup>For one of the few empirical studies dealing with this election, see Gino Germani, Estructura social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), pp. 247-263.

<sup>46</sup>See Appendix A.

<sup>47</sup>For a tentative explanation of differences in the frequency of roll calls, see Appendix B.

<sup>48</sup>There were, for example, numerous roll calls on attempts by the Opposition bloc to abrogate the controversial "Ley de Residencia" authorizing the deportation of aliens on political grounds. For an extensive discussion of this law, adopted in 1902 and apparently useful to subsequent administrations if not to opposition parties, see Carlos Sánchez Viamonte, Biografía de una ley antiargentina: la ley 4144 (Buenos Aires: Nuevas Ediciones Argentinas, 1956).

<sup>49</sup>Under the Sáenz Peña electoral system minority parties would often be somewhat underrepresented in the smaller provinces due to the inability of following the 2-1 ratio. For example, in a province with two deputies both seats would be won by the majority party, in one with four deputies they would be divided 3-1, and in one with five seats they would be divided 4-1 (assuming in each case that all are up for election at the same time).

CHAPTER VI  
THE FAILURE OF "NATIONAL INTEGRATION"  
1960-1962

The two-year time period<sup>1</sup> dealt with in this chapter is characterized by two major features: the return to power of the Radicals and the continued influence of Perón. The champion of the descamisados had been reelected in 1952, but his support began to erode during the following years and in September, 1955, he was overthrown by the military. As it had after the 1943 golpe, the military retained power for almost three years before holding elections and returning the government to civilian control. The electoral contest this time was between two Radical factions--the Unión Cívica Radical had formally split into two parties in 1957--which were to develop a rivalry as bitter and uncompromising as that between Radicals and conservatives or Radicals and Peronistas in earlier times. Arturo Frondizi, elected by an unprecedented majority in 1958, headed the first Radical government since 1930. But in many respects Perón--although in exile--continued to be the dominant figure in Argentine politics.<sup>2</sup>

Perón had steadily consolidated his control over Argentina during the late 1940's and early 1950's. This was accomplished largely in informal ways--policies of higher wages and lower prices which were popular with labor, the growing influence of Eva Perón and her vast welfare operations, constant harassment of opposition politicians and the opposition press. More formal measures included a new constitution in 1949 which institutionalized the social welfare orientation of the

administration as well as strengthening the executive and allowing the president to be reelected.<sup>3</sup> Also of undoubtable aid in broadening Perón's base of support was his action on two items which had been long debated but long postponed--woman suffrage and the raising of national territories to the status of provinces.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps the loudest source of opposition to Perón was in the national Chamber of Deputies, but even here criticism became increasingly difficult. Ricardo Balbín, leader of the Radical bloc in the chamber, was arrested in 1948 under the law of desacato--authorizing the arrest of a person who showed "disrespect" in word or action toward any government official--and later sentenced to a total of five years in prison on twelve counts. Arturo Frondizi succeeded Balbín in leadership of the Radical bloc which, already greatly outnumbered in 1946, lost a few more deputies in the 1948 election and voluntarily cut its size in half in 1950. The 1949 Constitution extended all congressional terms until 1952, when along with the presidential election the entire chamber would be up for renewal on the basis of six-year terms. The UCR had opposed the new constitution, and rather than compromise its position on the issue the party voted to withdraw those deputies who had been elected to four-year terms in 1946 on the date in early 1950 when their normal "constitutional" terms would have expired. This left only the eighteen Radical deputies who had been elected in 1948.

The popularity of Eva Perón and her husband's constant efforts to strengthen his position of power led to her consideration as his vice presidential candidate in the elections of November 11, 1951.

But this was too much even for some solid Perón supporters, and she declined the candidacy which was then given to incumbent vice president J. Horacio Quijano. On the opposition side, the UCR nominated Balbín --who had been freed early that year--and Frondizi as its presidential and vice presidential candidates. As in 1946, the election itself was considered to be quite honest, although the opposition had to campaign under severe handicaps and harassment. Perón won by a two-to-one margin.

The intensity of the UCR opposition and the severity of the government's repressive measures increased after the 1951 election. Police continued to arrest outspoken Radicals under the desacato law and broke up numerous party meetings; in one case, six UCR members were arrested for criticizing the government during debates at a party convention.<sup>5</sup>

Perón's troubles also increased during the early years of his second administration. The death of Eva in 1952 was a blow to his government, for in some ways she was the more popular of the pair and --perhaps--the better politician. Popular economic policies which were possible in the early years due to large surpluses of foreign exchange had to be increasingly replaced with austerity measures in the early 1950's. Perón also began to have increasing conflicts with the Church and sectors of the military, which along with the workers had provided the foundation of his support. By early 1955 Perón's position had weakened to the point where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a truce with the Radicals. In September of that year he was overthrown by the military.

The fall of Perón left the UCR as the only political group in Argentina with organization and programs of a national scope. It also

had young leadership and the record of having been the voice of "democracy" during many difficult years since 1930. But when opposition to Perón no longer served as a unifying force, the factionalism which had already been evident among the Radicals rapidly intensified.

The UCR was divided into four factions, and in August, 1956, Balbín resigned from the national committee after that group issued a directive calling for party members to support Frondizi as presidential candidate in the next national elections. Frondizi officially announced his candidacy in late September and resigned as head of the party's national committee. At the party's national convention, Frondizi won the nomination with 136 out of 204 votes while his opponents accused him of "steamroller" tactics and quickly solidified into an Opposition bloc. Thus Frondizi's nomination led to the fourth major split--the others were in 1891, 1897, and 1924--in the Radical party. In 1957 a coalition of four groups--Intransigencia y Renovación (Buenos Aires), Intransigencia Nacional (Córdoba), Intransigencia Popular (capital), and "Unionismo"--left the party and formed the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP).<sup>6</sup> The portion of the party which followed Frondizi was thereafter called Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI).

Frondizi immediately began campaigning for the election which the military provisional government had promised to call by the end of 1957. His approach appeared to be aimed at the working class rather than the middle class which had traditionally been the mainstay of the UCR, a tactic which brought accusations of demagoguery and alienated large segments of the Radicals as well as powerful sectors within the provisional government of General Aramburu and the armed forces.<sup>7</sup>

The two factions of Radicals faced their first national test of electoral strength when the provisional government called a constitutional convention election for July 28, 1957. When the government disclosed the plan the previous summer, Frondizi took an immediate stand against the proposal on the grounds that no changes in the constitution --the 1853 Constitution to which the government had returned following the overthrow of Perón--or electoral system should be made until the country was returned to a civilian government. Instead of a constitutional election, Frondizi urged that a date be set for general elections.<sup>8</sup> As the constitutional election approached, the UCR! took a position at the head of a list of parties opposed to the changes proposed by the Aramburu government--changes which would weaken the power of the president, strengthen that of the legislature and judiciary, and give more autonomy to the provinces. The anti-Frondizi UCRP led the groups favoring the reforms.

The UCRP proved to be the strongest of the two Radical groups in the election of the constitutional convention, polling 2,105,000 votes to the UCR!'s 1,848,000. The Peronistas were banned from participating as a party, but their strength was shown by the 2,147,000 blank votes cast after the exiled leader instructed his supporters to register their protest in this way.

Frondizi's party had promised to disband the convention if it won a majority; as it did not, it did the next "best" thing and had its seventy-seven delegates walk out before the first formal session. There was additional conflict over leadership within the UCRP bloc and among some of the minor parties represented at the convention, making the



coalition of 104 votes needed to approve any proposed reform increasingly remote. As one faction after another walked out of the meeting, the convention eventually was reduced below the point of a quorum and Frondizi's UCRI thus won the issue by default.

The UCRP nominated Balbín as its presidential candidate in December, 1957. Thus the men who had been partners in opposition to Perón and had been on the same slate in the 1951 election were pitted against each other for the presidency of Argentina. Both the UCRI and the UCRP claimed to be the true representative of the Radical tradition,<sup>9</sup> and to some extent they were both right. On the eve of the February election, a journalist termed the choice largely one of personalities rather than ideas or programs since the UCRI and the UCRP agreed on most key issues and the split between Frondizi and Balbín had come largely from rivalry over control of the UCR.<sup>10</sup>

But there were differences. The UCRP drew the support of the more conservative elements of the Radical movement and as the election drew near there was widespread criticism in the Argentine press of the alleged fact that Balbín was the "official" candidate of the military government. While the provisional Aramburu government was officially neutral, its sympathies for Balbín were evident. Frondizi and a number of other UCRI members, in turn, were viewed with a lack of confidence by those who had deposed Perón in 1955; this group advocated, in the eyes of the military, little more or less than what Perón had realized in part.<sup>11</sup>

In his campaign Frondizi openly appealed to--and received--the support of the Peronistas, who were prohibited from running their own candidates. Rogelio Frigerio, one of Frondizi's closest advisors, made

a trip to the Dominican Republic to see Perón prior to the election and on February 3 the exiled ex-president is said to have told his supporters to vote for Frondizi.<sup>12</sup> The move caused widespread debate over what kind of a deal Frondizi may have made with Perón, but the UCRI leader himself said he had never signed a pact with the Peronistas and that the only promises were those made publicly during his campaign.<sup>13</sup>

The appeal to the Peronistas was a basic aspect of the "national integration" theme which grew out of the magazine Qué published by Frigerio for two years prior to the 1958 election. Qué was a world news weekly when he took it over, but Frigerio changed it to almost exclusive emphasis on national matters, opened it up to more contributors, and turned it into a forum for debate. Readers in growing numbers began a dialogue through letters to the editor, and it was through the pages of Qué that Frondizi's electoral front, the Movimiento Nacional, was born.<sup>14</sup> During the campaign Frondizi played down the economic crisis resulting from Perón's policies, saying that the economic difficulty was transitory and could be easily cured by his programs.<sup>15</sup> When he did dwell on economic difficulties, Frondizi was inclined to stress the inflation since 1955 and blame the provisional government rather than Perón for the nation's problems.

On February 23, 1958, Frondizi won the presidency by the largest margin in Argentine electoral history, receiving the support of the Peronistas, the Communists, and the small Independent Party in addition to that of the UCRI.<sup>16</sup> Victory in all the nation's election districts assured him of the maximum 319 seats (two-thirds) in the electoral college and control of the national Chamber of Deputies. Of the minority

third of the Chamber seats, fifty-two went to the UCRP and two were won by the local Liberal Party which had placed second in Corrientes. UCRI victories in the provinces assured unanimous control of the national Senate.<sup>17</sup> The president-elect thus had a formidable mandate and no apparent obstacles in other branches of government, but the diversity of his support combined with the hostile watchfulness of the military were soon to lead to a maze of political crosspressures.

Two days after the election, the Peronistas--who had given Frondizi an estimated 1,500,000 votes--demanded full legality for the movement and participation in government.<sup>18</sup> This demand for compliance with their version of the alleged deal with Perón included the return of the Confederación General de Trabajo to the control of Peronista union leaders, legalization of the Peronista movement, freedom of its leaders who were under arrest and police vigilance, and the eventual return of Perón.<sup>19</sup> To meet these demands would have meant immediate opposition from both the military and various anti-Peronista sectors of the civilian population, probably resulting in the cancellation of the election. Instead, Frondizi began what was to be a four-year balancing act between pressures of the military on one side and the Peronistas on the other.

Some of the major--and most controversial--programs of the new administration were outlined in Frondizi's opening address to Congress on May 1, 1958. Noting that the nation's reserves of foreign exchange were practically exhausted while the cost of living had risen 13 per cent in 1956 and 25 per cent in 1957, the new president said a program of austerity and rationing would be needed for economic recovery. On the touchy question of petroleum, Frondizi said the nation must stop

paying large amounts of its limited foreign exchange for oil imports while known reserves sufficient to keep Argentina self-sufficient for the next quarter-century were inadequately exploited. In short, economic development was to be the chief aim of the administration--a goal Frondizi said would require a climate of tranquility, security, and stability.<sup>20</sup>

Some early measures of the Frondizi administration appeared to contradict the austerity theme. One of the new president's first acts was to announce plans for a 60 per cent wage increase, and as the announcement came at the same time that all price controls were abolished it led to an immediate markup in prices.<sup>21</sup> During the first three months of Frondizi's term, living costs rose 13 per cent and the price of some items--including beef and bread--spiraled far above the average. When the retail price ceiling on meat was lifted in late July as a means of freeing more for export, the price doubled during one week and brought widespread protests. By August, the new president began to find labor peace and his economic recovery plans threatened by the deterioration of the peso and the growing public criticism.

Perhaps even more threatening politically was Frondizi's announcement in late July, 1958, of a billion-dollar oil agreement with United States and European firms to help the state oil monopoly, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), triple the domestic production of petroleum. The move accomplished the purpose of increasing production--output went from 5.1 million tons in 1958 to 12.1 million tons in 1961 and about 14 million tons the following year--<sup>22</sup>but success did not ease the political difficulties.

Argentina's basic problem in petroleum had long been that in the interests of nationalism she had wanted to keep foreign firms from exploiting the fields but the nation had not had the financial resources to exploit them adequately alone. These conflicting factors had led to a chronic economic-political problem which began soon after the first oil was discovered in 1907. Frondizi, as opposition leader under Perón and later as presidential candidate, had been an outspoken advocate of fully nationalized petroleum on the contention that the fiscal problem could be solved by foreign loans to finance state operations. Explaining his deviation from this position which he had taken both in his 1954 book, Petróleo y política, and in his 1958 presidential campaign, Frondizi said his original proposal had been sincere and idealistic but when he arrived at the presidency he found the state did not have the necessary resources and that the need to cut down on petroleum imports was too pressing to allow the time needed for the government to raise the necessary financial and technical resources. The choice, Frondizi said, was whether to save the intellectual prestige of the author of Petróleo y política or to save the nation.<sup>23</sup>

The opening of oil development to foreign firms plus the austerity program announced the following December were praised by financial and business groups but appeared so contrary to Frondizi's nationalistic tradition and campaign pledges that they shocked many backers, including the Peronistas. The oil contracts led to a strike by the nationalistic oilfield workers, and Frondizi's subsequent declaration of a state of siege gave a new coloration to the administration and led to charges of "strongman" rule.<sup>24</sup> The Communists, who had supported Frondizi in

the February election, broke with him over the oil contracts<sup>25</sup> and the controversy was the first major step in the alienation of the Peronistas.

The oilfield strike also precipitated the first major internal crisis of the Frondizi administration. Vice President Alejandro Gómez resigned under pressure after he was accused of plotting to overthrow Frondizi. Gómez denied the allegations, contending that he was the victim of an intrigue by Rogelio Frigerio's "national integration" faction of the electoral coalition. Military pressure caused Frigerio to resign his own post as presidential secretary for economic and social affairs. The crisis brought into the open a conflict within the administration between the UCRI and the national integration group, which was said at the time to be in the process of forming a new party with Peronista forces.<sup>26</sup>

On December 29, 1958, the president went to Congress with his program for economic stabilization and development, a nationwide "belt-tightening" which was to have far wider impact--and be even less popular--than his petroleum contracts. Outlining a variety of specific measures the program would involve, Frondizi said the national standard of living would decline during the next two years for the simple reason that Argentina could not go on consuming more than it was producing. He predicted, however, that the living standard would rise to new heights when the economy was stabilized and production had risen adequately. While saying that Argentina was suffering the consequences of many errors over many years, Frondizi stressed--in keeping with his efforts to pacify the Peronistas--that his administration was not interested in placing responsibility or attributing blame, but rather

in solving problems. The president announced that on the basis of the stabilization program his government had pledges of \$329,000,000 dollars in foreign credits--\$254,000,000 from the United States and \$75,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The new austerity program was immediately attacked by the Peronistas, the Socialists, and the UCRP. A Peronista statement said the plan "condemned the nation to the yoke of foreign capitalism" and was a betrayal of the program and promises which won Frondizi his Peronista support. A Socialist weekly said that despite his campaign promises Frondizi had satisfied only the conservatives since taking office and hence the people did not accept as sincere his "call to sacrifice."<sup>27</sup> The austerity program would mean sacrifices by industrial and white-collar workers while immediately benefiting industry; in the words of one author, "it was the Argentine version of what was good for General Motors being good for the country."<sup>28</sup>

But while Frondizi had lost most of his leftist following by the end of his first year, he continued to be the target of the conservative press and in jeopardy from the army. Never a favorite of the military, Frondizi's campaign is said to have won him the reputation of a demagogue in moderate circles and the "undying animosity" of influential army officers and leading conservatives. The harassment from the right only subsided--and then only to a degree--after U.S. President Eisenhower praised the stabilization program as an example for all of Latin America.<sup>29</sup>

The opposition from the workers increased during 1959, especially after the government announced that a million federal employees would be graded on efficiency, discipline, and attendance in preparation for an

anticipated cut of 80,000 workers from the government payroll. Up to two million workers participated in some of the brief nationwide walk-outs and several thousand employees were involved in the longer strikes by particular unions, but the government succeeded in preventing the strikes from seriously crippling the nation through a combination of meeting some demands and declaring other walkouts illegal.

Frondizi had to rely increasingly on the army to cope with strikes and intermittent terrorism--mostly bombings. This led to a steadily growing military influence in his administration, perhaps most clearly evident in a series of cabinet changes which throughout his period in office represented a gradual shift toward older and more conservative members. By mid-1959 his entire cabinet had been reshaped to military demands.

The unpopularity of the austerity program caused the government party to suffer some severe defeats in local elections in 1959 and early 1960, even though the Peronistas had not been legalized as promised and the Communist Party--largely suppressed since December, 1958, under the state of siege--was formally outlawed the following April after it showed four times its 1958 strength in the important Mendoza provincial elections. On the eve of the 1960 nationwide by-elections, Frondizi yielded to military pressure for an effective way of dealing with the wave of terrorist bombings which had killed twenty-six persons in nine months and injured many others. Reviving an old Perón law, the cabinet placed the nation on a footing of "internal war" which gave the armed forces control of police facilities throughout the country and provided the death penalty for sabotage, terrorism, and rebellion. Within ten



days after the measure was adopted, an estimated 500 persons had been arrested.<sup>30</sup>

The UCRI losses were heavy in the 1960 elections, including the populous province of Buenos Aires--with 40 per cent of the nation's 10,000,000 voters--as well as the federal capital, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, and other provinces. Whereas Frondizi had polled 44.8 per cent of the vote in 1958 compared to the 28.8 per cent for the UCRP slate, in the 1960 election of national deputies UCRP candidates received 23.2 per cent of the total vote while the UCRI slates obtained 20.4 per cent. Blank voting, representing less than 10 per cent of the total vote in 1958, exceeded both major parties in 1960 at 25.2 per cent.

#### Election Analysis

The two major parties contesting the 1960 elections appeared to be better organized nationally than had been the case in the elections analyzed in previous chapters. In contrast to earlier patterns of coalition among semi-autonomous provincial parties, both the UCRI and the UCRP ran slates in all national electoral districts.<sup>31</sup> This removes the problem--sometimes of considerable magnitude in former elections--of determining the proper national affiliation of provincial parties, particularly among the Radical factions. Blank voting, the traditional Argentine symbol of electoral protest, will be used as an indicator of Peronista strength in the 1960 election. This meaning of the 1960 blank vote is generally accepted in Argentina and is supported by empirical evidence. The fourth party group to be studied in the present section is the conservatives; as in the past, this group is composed of provincial parties frequently bearing different labels

The 1960 factor scores are used as the independent variables in multiple regression analysis in this and the following chapter. Using available data from the 1960 census plus some of the same data used in the 1947 analysis, the 1960 analysis yielded seven factors which largely paralleled those of the earlier period. These new factors, in the order in which they emerged, are: urbanism, prosperous farming, rural class, industry scale, farm-ranch ratio, dairy farming, and agriculture scale.<sup>32</sup> As in earlier time periods, the party vote in the previous election is used in multiple regression as an indicator of "party organization."

Table VI-1 shows the national and regional correlations for the 1960 election. As in earlier chapters, these are simple correlation coefficients of the party grouping with each factor and relevant previous party vote. Where they are considered significant the partial correlations obtained at different stages of the step-wise multiple regression analysis will be cited and discussed in the text.

At the national level, the highest correlation is between the conservative vote and that group's vote in 1946. This would indicate a strong continuity over the fourteen-year period in counties which are conservative "strongholds." The conservative vote nationally also showed significant correlations with ruralism, the rural middle class, subsistence farming, and the absence of large industry.

The second highest correlation at the national level is the coefficient of .44 registered by blank votes on the urbanism factor. Following urbanism, variables showing significant correlations with blank voting in 1960 were Peronista vote in 1946 and a high ratio of farming to ranching--each with a coefficient of .22--rural labor at .21, and large industry at .14.

TABLE VI-1  
CORRELATES OF 1960 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors			
		I	II	III	IV
	No. Cases	Urban	Rich Farm	Rural Class	Ind. Scale
NATION					
Blank	303	.44*	-.07	.21*	.14**
UCRP	303	-.02	-.11	.01	-.30*
UCRI	303	-.32*	.38*	-.13**	-.09
Conserv.	250	-.35*	.18*	-.14**	-.20*
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>					
Blank	107	.62*	.26*	.06	.48*
UCRP	107	-.44*	-.13	-.12	-.28*
UCRI	107	-.33*	-.35*	-.08	-.22**
Conserv.	107	-.46*	-.04	.19**	-.32*
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>					
Blank	57	.61*	-.55*	.08	-.27**
UCRP	57	.19	-.27**	.13	-.32**
UCRI	57	-.30**	.39*	.18	-.23
Conserv.	57	-.37*	.34*	-.18	.41*
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>					
Blank	139	.18**	-.16	.28*	.22*
UCRP	139	-.02	.04	-.02	-.25*
UCRI	139	-.15	.43*	-.23*	-.25*
Conserv.	86	-.02	.05	-.24*	-.11

TABLE VI-1 (Extension)

V	VI	VII				
Farm: Ranch	Dairy Farm	Agr. Scale	Peron 1946	UCR 1946	Cons. 1946	Mult. R
.22*	.01	.06	.22*	ni	ni	.156
-.07	.09	.00	ni	.40*	ni	.47
-.39*	-.15*	.08	ni	.02	ni	.65
.01	-.11	-.11	ni	ni	.51*	.62
-.04	.08	.27*	.44*	ni	ni	.70
-.05	-.10	-.32*	ni	.56*	ni	.65
-.14	-.12	-.17	ni	.18	ni	.49
-.09	.17	.08	ni	ni	.53*	.71
.00	.17	.35*	.12	ni	ni	.77
-.32**	.33**	.37*	ni	.15	ni	.69
.06	-.09	-.29**	ni	.15	ni	.61
.23	-.31**	-.37*	ni	ni	.33**	.79
.37*	-.10	-.06	.41*	ni	ni	.59
-.02	.06	.14	ni	.59*	ni	.60
-.59*	-.06	.13	ni	.19**	ni	.74
-.11	-.08	-.36*	ni	ni	.45*	.71

TABLE VI-1 (Continued)

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\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\* Significant at .05 level.

ni Not included in multiple regression equation.

<sup>a</sup> UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo; UCRL is the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente; Conserv. is the Unión Conservadora.

<sup>b</sup> UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo and UCRL is the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente in all three provinces of the Litoral. Conserv. represents the combined vote for the Partido Autonomista and Partido Liberal in Corrientes, the Partido Demócrata in Entre Ríos, and the Partido Demócrata Progresista in Santa Fe.

<sup>c</sup> UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo and UCRL is the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente in Catamarca, Córdoba, La Rioja, Mendoza, Salta, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán. Conserv. includes the Partido Demócrata Conservador in Catamarca, the Partido Demócrata in Córdoba and Mendoza, the Partido Demócrata Liberal in San Luis, the Partido Demócrata Unión Provincial in Salta, and the Defensa Provincial Bandera Blanca in Tucumán.

National level correlations in Table VI-1 offer some interesting comparisons in sources of strength of the two Radical parties. The "party organization" variable would indicate that regardless of their respective claims and polemics, it was the UCRP which in 1960 was the closest "descendant" of the old Unión Cívica Radical. The vote for opposition Radicals in 1960 shows a correlation of .40 with the 1946 UCR vote, while the UCRI vote correlates at only .02 with the earlier Radical strength. The only other significant correlation registered by the UCRP is a coefficient of -.30 with industry scale. The UCRI, on the other hand, shows significant correlations with five of the seven census-data factors: -.39 with farm-ranch ratio, .38 with (the absence of) prosperous farming, -.32 with urbanism, -.15 with dairy farming, and -.13 with rural class. Deprived as it was of the traditional areas of Radical strength and the Peronista support it had enjoyed in 1958, the UCRI in 1960 thus seemed closer to the conservatives in the nature of its support than it did either to the UCRP or to the blank (Peronista) vote.

In multiple regression analysis at the national level, urbanism explained 19 per cent of the variance in the blank vote. Factor V, entering the equation second, accounted for another 5.3 per cent of the variance while rural class entered third to bring the total explained variance to 27.4 per cent. After the first three variables were in the equation, 1946 Peronista vote entered to add another 2.4 per cent to the explained variance. The remaining four variables account for less than 2 per cent more of the variance in blank vote, bringing the final multiple R to .56 for a total explained variance of 31.7 per cent.

As suggested by the simple correlations in Table VI-1, the first two variables to enter the multiple regression equation for the UCRP

were the 1946 UCR vote and industry scale. These respectively explained 16.1 and 4.2 per cent of the UCRP vote variance. All remaining variables together add only about 1.5 per cent to the explained variance; the final multiple R of .47 accounts for 21.8 per cent of the variance in UCRP vote. For the UCRI, farm-ranch ratio entered first to explain 15.5 per cent of the variance. This was followed by Factors II and I, accounting for 11.4 and 11.0 per cent more of the UCRI vote variance. After these three factors explained a total of 37.8 per cent of the variance, the explanatory value of the remaining variables fell off sharply; Factors IV, VI, and VII each added about 1.3 to 1.5 per cent to the explained variance. After the final two variables entered the equation with very little effect, the multiple R reached .65 to explain a total of 42.5 per cent of the UCRI vote variance.

The correlation of .51 which the national conservative vote registered with that grouping's support in 1946 explains 26.4 per cent of the 1960 variance. The negative association with urbanism accounts for another 4.4 per cent of the variance in conservative vote, while the negative correlations with Factors IV and VII each added between 2.3 and 2.5 per cent to the explained variance. The next three variables to enter the regression equation were rural class--accounting for 1.3 per cent of the variance--and Factors III and VI, each adding less than one per cent to the explained variance. The prosperous farming factor declined in importance during the partialling process and entered the equation last to add very little explanatory power. The multiple R for all eight independent variables accounts for 38.6 per cent of the variance in 1960 conservative vote.

At the regional level, it can be seen at a glance in Table VI-1 that a considerable number of relatively strong and statistically significant correlations are found in each of the three analytic regions. Starting with the blank vote in Buenos Aires province, there is a solid correlation of .62 with urbanism followed by coefficients of .48 with large industry and .44 with 1946 Peronista strength. Weaker but still significant at the .01 level are correlations of .27 with small ranching and .26 with the absence of prosperous farming. As it was nationally, the strongest correlation with the UCRP vote in Buenos Aires was the Radical vote in 1946. After this coefficient of .56, there are correlations of -.44 with urbanism, -.34 with agriculture scale (representing a positive association with large agriculture), and -.28 with large industry.

The UCRI's strongest correlation in Buenos Aires is -.35 with prosperous farming (indicating strength in areas of prosperous farming), followed by -.33 with urbanism and -.22 with large industry. As at the national level, the UCRI's association with the 1946 UCR vote is not statistically significant. The conservatives' strongest independent variable in Buenos Aires was the 1946 conservative vote with a correlation of .53. Following this are correlations of -.46 with urbanism, -.32 with large industry, and .19 with rural class.

In multiple regression of the Buenos Aires vote, the correlation of .62 with urbanism explains 38.2 per cent of the variance in blank voting. Another 5.8 per cent is explained by the 1946 Peronista vote, which entered the equation second and raised the multiple R to .66. Industry size was the third variable to enter and accounted for 2.3 per



cent more of the variance, while the remaining five variables together increased the multiple R only from .59 to .70 and account for about 2 per cent of the variance for a total explained variance of 48.5 per cent.

For the UCRP in Buenos Aires, the 1946 Radical vote accounts for 31.4 per cent of the 1960 variance while the negative association with urbanism adds another 4.8 per cent. Entering the equation at the third and fourth steps were Factors VII and V, explaining 2.0 and 1.5 per cent of the variance. The final four variables together account for less than 3 per cent more of the variance for a final multiple R of .65 with a total explained variance of 42.6 per cent. In the regression equation for the UCRI, the correlation with prosperous farming explains 12.2 per cent of the Buenos Aires variance. This is followed in the next three steps by Factor V at 4.3 per cent, Factor I at 3.6 per cent, and Factor VII at 2.1 per cent. At this stage the multiple R is .47 for an explained variance of 22.1 per cent; the next four variables raise the former figure to .49 and the latter to 24.1.

Conservative vote in 1946 accounts for 27.8 per cent of the variation in that group's 1960 vote in Buenos Aires. The negative correlation with urbanism enters the equation second to explain another 9.5 per cent of the variance, followed by Factors VII and V at 5.0 and 3.5 per cent respectively. The first four variables thus explain a total of 45.9 per cent of the variance with a multiple R of .68, while the remaining four raise the multiple coefficient to .71 and the explained variance to 50.1 per cent.

As it has frequently in earlier elections, the Litoral in 1960 showed voting patterns different from those of Buenos Aires and the

Interior. Among the differences is the fact that in the Litoral only the conservatives show a significant correlation with the "party organization" variable--and in this case it is weaker than either of the two other regions. Conservative vote in the Litoral correlates at .41 with Factor IV--a reversal of that group's usual negative association with industry--followed by correlations of -.37 each with urbanism and small agriculture, .34 with the absence of prosperous farming, and -.31 with dairy farming.

Blank voting in the three provinces of the Litoral correlates at a strong .61 with the urbanism factor. Other significant correlates of the blank vote are prosperous farming at -.55, small agriculture at .35, and large industry at -.27. The latter correlation represents a reversal of the usual pattern on the industry factor similar to that seen in the case of the conservatives. UCRP support in the Litoral appears to be most closely associated with small ranching and dairy farming, correlating at .37 and .33 on these factors. Other significant UCRP correlations are Factors IV and V at -.32 each and prosperous farming at -.27. The UCRI's strongest independent variable in the Litoral is (the absence of) prosperous farming with a correlation coefficient of .39. The government party also had correlations of -.30 on the urbanism factor and -.29 on the factor dealing with agriculture scale (a negative correlation indicating large farming). In this region both Radical parties seemed to be equally associated with--or unassociated with--the areas of UCR support in 1946.

In multiple regression, urbanism accounts for 37.9 per cent of the blank vote variation in the Litoral while the association with prosperous farming explains another 13.2 per cent. Variables entering the blank

vote equation after this fall off sharply in explanatory power: dairy farming at 3.4 per cent, industry scale at 1.3 per cent, agriculture scale at 1.6 per cent, and farm-ranch ratio at 1.3 per cent. In contrast to Buenos Aires, 1946 Peronista vote is of very little value as an explanatory variable for blank vote in the Litoral. All eight variables raise the multiple R to .77 and account for 58.8 per cent of the total variance.

Factor VII accounts for 14.0 per cent of the variance in UCRP vote in the Litoral. In one of those rather unusual cases where the partialling process causes a subsequent variable to explain more than a preceding one, Factor V enters the UCRP equation second to bring the total explained variance to 33.1 per cent at this stage. This is followed by industry scale at 9.7 per cent, dairy farming at 2.7 per cent, and urbanism at 2.0 per cent. The remaining three variables together add less than 0.5 per cent to the explained variance, bringing the total variance explained by the eight variables to 48.0 per cent. For the UCRI in the Litoral, prosperous farming entered the regression equation first to account for 14.9 per cent of the variance. This was followed by industry scale at 8.6 per cent, urbanism at 4.6 per cent, farm-ranch ratio at 2.5 per cent, and the rural class factor at 2.7 per cent. The last three variables added between 1.2 and 1.9 per cent each, bringing the total explained variance to 37.8 per cent.

Factors dealing with the scale of industry and agriculture were of about equal explanatory value for conservative vote in the Litoral; the former entered the regression equation first to account for 16.9 per cent of the variance, followed by the second which added 15.6 per

cent to the explained variance. Unlike the other Litoral groups, earlier party vote was of value in accounting for variation in conservative vote in 1960. The 1946 conservative vote entered the equation third to account for an additional 10.3 per cent of the variance. Farm-ranch ratio, urbanism, and dairy farming were the next three variables to enter, accounting for 7.4, 6.3, and 5.2 per cent of the variance in conservative vote. After the remaining two variables together account for less than a quarter of a per cent more, the multiple R of .79 means that the eight independent variables combined explain 61.9 per cent of the variance in conservative vote.

Moving on to a regional analysis of the Interior, Table VI-1 shows that once more the "party organization" variable assumes a considerable degree of importance. Except for the UCRI, the 1946 vote in each case showed a higher correlation than did any of the seven census-derived variables. And for the first time in the 1960 analysis, the UCRI votes show a significant--if relatively weak--correlation with the earlier Radical vote.

After the correlation of .41 with 1946 Peronista strength, the more substantial correlates of blank voting in the Interior are Factor V at .37, rural (laboring) class at .28, and large industry at .22. While the correlation of .18 with urbanism is of statistical significance, it is much weaker than the other two regions. Only two variables correlate significantly with UCRP vote in the Interior: 1946 Radical vote at .59 and large industry at -.25.

The strongest correlates of UCRI strength in the Interior are farm-ranch ratio at -.59 (indicating strength in cattle areas) and prosperous

farming at .43 (support in areas lacking prosperous farming). Others of weaker but significant levels are large industry at -.25, rural class at -.23 (or support in areas with a large rural middle class), and 1946 UCR vote at .19. Significant independent variables for the Interior conservatives are the 1946 conservative vote with a correlation of .45, agriculture scale at -.36 (support in areas of large farms), and large industry at -.24.

In the step-wise multiple regression, the 16.5 per cent of the variance in blank vote in the Interior explained by the 1946 Peronista vote was increased to 25.5 per cent with the entry of Factor V and on to 31.2 per cent when rural class entered in the third step. The next two variables, industry scale and urbanism, added 1.4 and 1.1 per cent respectively to the explained variance, while the last three combined increased this by only about one per cent more. All eight variables account for 34.7 per cent of the variance in blank vote.

For the UCRP, the 1946 Radical vote is the overwhelmingly significant variable in the Interior. This single correlation of .59 explains 34.9 per cent of the variance, while the remaining seven variables increase the multiple R only to .60 and the total explained variance to 36.2. In the case of the UCRI, the first two factors to enter the regression equation--farm-ranch ratio and prosperous farming--explain Factors IV and VII at 3.2 and 3.7 per cent, respectively, while the remaining four variables together add only 1.1 per cent more to the explained variance. For the eight variables, the multiple R of .71 accounts for a total of 54.8 per cent of the variance in UCRI vote.

Conservative vote in 1946 explains 20.5 per cent of the variation in that group's 1960 vote in the Interior. Agriculture scale adds another 18.0 per cent to the explained variance, while rural class enters the equation third to account for another 7.8 per cent. Factors V and I add 2.9 and 1.4 per cent respectively to the explained variance, while the last three factors are of virtually no explanatory value. The final multiple R of .71 explains a total of 50.8 per cent of the variance.

Summarizing the 1960 election analysis, several important aspects of Table VI-1 should be reemphasized. The multiple correlations are generally somewhat higher than in earlier periods, and for the first time both the Litoral and Buenos Aires register relatively strong multiple coefficients. Except for the UCRI, the "party organization" variable shows stronger correlations than in past elections despite the longer time interval between 1946 and 1960. The combination of higher correlations with census-derived variables and with earlier party support would seem to indicate that in 1960 Argentine politics was somewhat more structured--or perhaps more inflexible--than in earlier elections studied.

Blank voting in 1960 was consistent with general impressions about the source of continuing Peronista strength--with a partial exception in the Litoral. Nationally, blank voting tended to be highest in those counties which were urban, had large industry, had a high proportion of rural workers relative to rural middle class, tended to have more farms than ranches, and had voted Peronista in 1946. These same variables --in slightly different degrees of relative importance--were also the significant correlates of blank voting in the Interior. In Buenos Aires province, blank voting was strongest in the urban, industrialized areas

which had voted Peronista in 1946 but also showed significant correlations with subsistence farming and small agriculture. In the Litoral blank voting was also strong in areas of urbanization and small-scale farming, but there was a strong correlation with prosperous farming and a somewhat weaker but significant negative association with large industry.

The only significant correlates of UCRP vote nationally were 1946 Radical vote and a negative association with industrialization. The situation was the same in the Interior, while in Buenos Aires these indicators of UCRP strength were joined by ruralism and large agriculture. In the Litoral the UCRP retained its negative association with large industry, but was also associated with large agriculture, dairy farming, ranching, and prosperous farming.

The governing UCRI in 1960 showed sources of strength markedly different from those of its erstwhile allies, the Peronistas. Nationally, the UCRI vote was associated with ruralism, the absence of prosperous farming, ranching, and the rural middle class. In Buenos Aires, the correlation with ruralism remained but there was a correlation with prosperous farming and a negative association with large industry. The UCRI in the Litoral gained its support mostly from areas of ruralism, non-prosperous farming, and large agriculture, while in the Interior the party was associated with non-prosperous farming, rural middle class, the absence of large industry, and a predominance of ranching over farming. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Interior is the only region in which the UCRI shows a significant correlation with 1946 Radical vote--an association which is weak at best and loses its explanatory

value in multiple regression. There seems little question, therefore, that the UCRP more closely approached being the "true" Radical party in 1960 than did the UCRI.<sup>33</sup>

Conservative vote in 1960 followed the usual pattern of that political sector. Nationally, it was associated with ruralism, non-prosperous farming, the rural middle class, the absence of large industry, and conservative strength in 1946. The Buenos Aires conservatives were associated with ruralism, the absence of industry, earlier conservative voting, and the rural working class. In the Interior, conservative support was correlated with large agriculture, rural middle class, and 1946 conservative voting. Litoral conservatives drew their support predominantly from areas of ruralism, non-prosperous and large-scale farming, 1946 conservative voting, and large-scale industry. The seeming contradiction of the last variable represents the reverse of the situation noted above with blank voting in the Litoral and is consistent with the 1946 pattern of conservative voting in that region. The explanation, at least in part, probably can be found in the fact that much of the "large industry" in the Litoral is related to agriculture rather than manufacturing.

Finally, it should be noted that the pattern of "clientele areas" in the Interior which in earlier elections consistently supported the incumbent party is not evident in 1960. That region's correlation between the incumbent UCRI and the 1946 Peronista vote is  $-.17$ , compared to equivalent correlations between incumbent parties of  $.46$  in 1946,  $.65$  in 1936, and  $.06$  in 1926. Thus it would appear that by 1960 the Interior had fully joined the rest of the nation in voting on the basis of party



rather than of incumbency.

### Roll Call Analysis

The gradual trend toward tighter party discipline in roll call voting which had been apparent in earlier sessions reached an extreme degree in 1960-1962. The twenty-eight contested roll calls during the session covered a wide range of subjects--teachers' pay, drug and contraband investigations, police brutality, telephone rates, electoral reform, among others--but the two major party blocs were in constant and virtually unanimous opposition on all of them. The nature of the divisions will be discussed briefly in the following pages, but the rigidity of voting during the session would make Guttman scale analysis meaningless.

In order that the voting behavior in the 1960-1962 session can be compared with other time periods despite the lack of scaling, Tables VI-2 and VI-3 present the usual data on the vote difference and degree of participation. All but ten of the roll calls were divided by less than 10 per cent of the vote, while another six showed less than a 20 per cent spread between ayes and nays. Participation was somewhat higher than in many past sessions--perhaps due to a combination of (1) the discipline of the large blocs, (2) the close division of the chamber, and (3) the intensity of the opposition. More than half the roll calls recorded the vote of between 60 and 69 per cent of the deputies, while six were in the 70-79 per cent range compared to five in the 50-59 per cent category.

All but thirteen of the 172 deputies who represented the capital and original fourteen provinces in the 1960-1962 Chamber of Deputies

TABLE VI-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference				
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49
Number of Roll Calls	18	6	2	1	1

TABLE VI-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting			
	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89
Number of Roll Calls	5	16	6	1

belonged to one of the two major Radical groups.<sup>34</sup> The UCRI had the largest bloc with eighty-five deputies, followed by the UCRP with seventy-four. Of the remaining thirteen, eight went under the label of Radical Nacional y Popular--a group which split with the UCRI and joined the opposition--and one was listed as belonging to the UCRI Disidente. This left only four deputies who represented parties other than Radical factions. There were three members of the conservative Federación de Partidos del Centro--one representing the Partido Liberal of Corrientes and two the Partido Demócrata of Mendoza--and one deputy elected by the Defensa Provincial Bandera Blanca of Tucumán.

The UCRP provided a virtually "perfect" opposition during the 1960-1962 session. Of the twenty-eight roll calls, the party was unanimous in its opposition to the UCRI position in government bloc. The UCRI was not quite so consistent in its voting, but still represented considerably more "discipline" than the administration party in any of the earlier time periods studied. UCRI deputies were unanimous on twenty-two of the twenty-eight roll calls, had one dissenter on four of them, and three opposition votes on one issue. The one vote on which the UCRI was very divided--twenty-three to thirty-three--dealt with a procedural question concerning debate of an alleged conspiracy against the UCRI administration.

The group of Radicals under the label of Radical Nacional y Popular voted unanimously with the UCRI in the first eight roll calls of the session. From the ninth roll call onward, two RNyP deputies continued to vote with the official party--although both voted infrequently--while the rest began consistently voting with the opposition.

The other deputy of Radical extraction was a woman from the capital who had been elected as a UCRI candidate in 1958 but who in 1960 listed herself as "UCRI Disidente" and consistently voted with the opposition UCRP.<sup>35</sup> The Tucumán deputy elected in 1960 by the Defensa Provincial Bandera Blanca also voted with the UCRP bloc throughout the session.

The only deputies to even approach the function of "brokers"--flexible members who move in and out of administration support on the basis of issues or temporary alliances and thus mediate the government vs. opposition battle--were the three conservatives of the Federación Nacional de Partidos del Centro. Voting together throughout the session, the FNPC bloc supported the UCRI four times and voted with the UCRP on the remaining roll calls on which it was recorded.<sup>36</sup>

In summary, then, the 1960-1962 session of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies was a rigidly structured struggle between two groups uninterested in or incapable of even the slightest public compromise. In view of the wide range of issues which came before the chamber, it would appear that the position taken by the UCRI or the UCRP was much more important than the content of the roll calls in determining the other side's vote. It was, in short, Radical "intransigence" at its best--or worst.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>The pattern of taking a sample election and legislative period every ten years could not be followed in the post-Perón years. As the country was under military rule from 1955 to 1958, there was neither election nor congress in 1956. Because of the distorting effect of the shortlived Frondizi-Perón alliance on the 1958 election, it was decided that the 1960 election and the 1960-1962 legislative period would be the most suitable for analysis.

<sup>2</sup>The Frondizi administration is too recent--and controversial--to have yet been the subject for much dispassionate analysis with an adequate time perspective. There was, however, a great deal written during the period about the ideas, goals, and problems of the government--particularly by major participants. Among the more important works by Frondizi himself are Petróleo y política (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1954); Ni odio ni miedo: reconstruir el país (Buenos Aires: Servicio Editorial y Periodístico Argentino, 1956); Industria argentina y desarrollo nacional (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Qué, 1957); La política exterior argentina (Buenos Aires: Transición, 1962); Petróleo y nación (Buenos Aires: Transición, 1963); and Política económica nacional (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayú, 1963). Many of Frondizi's ideas can also be found in Félix Luna, Diálogos con Frondizi (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1963). Rogelio Frigerio, the controversial economic architect of the Frondizi administration, is also the author of numerous works dealing with the period. Among Frigerio's works are Los cuatro años, 1958-1962 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Concordia, 1962); El desarrollo argentino y la comunidad americana (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1959); El libro azul y blanco (3rd ed.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Concordia, 1962); Petróleo y desarrollo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Concordia, 1962); and Los trabajadores y el Frente Nacional (Buenos Aires: Movimiento de Integración Nacional, 1963). Other books dealing with the era include Néstor Grancelli Cha, De la crisis al desarrollo nacional: la UCRI y la realidad económica (Buenos Aires: Comité Nacional de la Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente, 1961); Mariano Montemayor, Claves para entender a un gobierno (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Concordia, 1963); Néstor Morales Loza, Frondizi y la verdad (Buenos Aires: Editorial Urania, 1957); Juan Ovidio Zavala, Desarrollo y racionalización (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayú, 1963); Francisco Hipólito Uzal, Frondizi y la oligarquía (Buenos Aires: Cía. Argentina de Editores, 1963); and Ismael Viñas, Orden y progreso: la era del Frondizismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Palestra, 1960).

<sup>3</sup>For the debates of the constitutional convention and text of the new document, see Argentina, Diario de Sesiones de la convención nacional constituyente: año 1949 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación, 1949).

<sup>4</sup>Both of these measures had been proposed and discussed from time to time in the Chamber of Deputies since the early years of the century, but neither was enacted until Perón.

- <sup>5</sup>New York Times, November 17, 1954, p. 15.
- <sup>6</sup>Gabriel del Mazo, Breve historia del radicalismo (Buenos Aires: COEPLA, 1963), p. 104.
- <sup>7</sup>Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 1957, p. 5.
- <sup>8</sup>Frondizi, Ni odio . . ., pp. 81-92.
- <sup>9</sup>Robert A. Potash, "Argentine Political Parties, 1957-1958," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 1 (October, 1959), 516.
- <sup>10</sup>Tad Szulc, New York Times, February 22, 1958, p. 2.
- <sup>11</sup>Marcos Merchensky, Las corrientes ideológicas en la historia argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Concordia, 1961), p. 240.
- <sup>12</sup>New York Times, February 23, 1958, p. 24.
- <sup>13</sup>Luna, p. 40. What purports to be the text of the pact, however, can be found in Américo Barrios, Con Perón en el exilio: lo que nadie sabía! (Buenos Aires: Editorial Treinta Días, 1964), pp. 42-43.
- <sup>14</sup>Merchensky, pp. 233-235.
- <sup>15</sup>"Mensaje para veinte millones de argentinos," in La América Latina de hoy, Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez and Harry Kantor (eds.) (New York: Ronald Press, 1961), pp. 200-210.
- <sup>16</sup>Mario Monteforte Toledo, Partidos políticos de Iberoamérica (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1961), p. 60.
- <sup>17</sup>New York Times, February 25, 1958, p. 16.
- <sup>18</sup>New York Times, February 26, 1958, p. 1.
- <sup>19</sup>Medardo Rodríguez, "Frondizi, the Army and the Peronistas," The Reporter, XXVI (April 12, 1962), 24.
- <sup>20</sup>Frondizi, Política económica . . ., pp. 53-69.
- <sup>21</sup>Orlando Martínez, "Plight of Argentina," Contemporary Review, CXC VII (June, 1960), 300.
- <sup>22</sup>United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963 (New York, 1964), p. 172.
- <sup>23</sup>Frondizi, Petróleo y nación, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup>John J. Kennedy, "Accountable Government in Argentina," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1959), 454.

<sup>25</sup>New York Times, August 4, 1958, p. 39.

<sup>26</sup>New York Times, November 14, 1958, p. 11; and November 19, 1958, p. 23. The alleged plans for a new party apparently were either non-existent or unsuccessful, although the factionalism may have played a part in the division of the UCRI five years later.

<sup>27</sup>New York Times, January 8, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup>Henry Raymont, "Why Frondizi Lost," New Republic, CXLVI (April 9, 1962), 15.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-16.

<sup>30</sup>New York Times, March 25, 1960, p. 10.

<sup>31</sup>The elevation of all national territories except Tierra del Fuego to provincial status between 1946 and 1960 added eight new provinces to the original fourteen. In order to maintain the continuity of regional classification and the highest possible level of comparability between time periods, the 1960 and 1965 analyses--both electoral and roll call--have been limited to the same provinces and capital district used in the earlier chapters. Although the new provinces cover an extensive area, the population distribution in the nation minimizes any distortion which might result from eliminating them from the analysis. In the 1960 election, for example, less than 6 per cent of the national total of 9,129,000 votes was cast in the eight new provinces. The constitutional provision giving each province a minimum of two national deputies led to a degree of overrepresentation for some of the new provinces, but the eight provinces together accounted for only twenty of the 192 deputies in the 1960-1962 session.

<sup>32</sup>For a more complete discussion of the methodology and census data used in the election analysis, see Appendix A.

<sup>33</sup>Since the UCRP was the major opposition in 1960 as the UCR had been in 1946, it is possible that this might reflect areas of consistent "opposition support" rather than party continuity (in other words, the reverse of the phenomenon discussed in earlier chapters where some areas of the Interior seemed to consistently support the administration party). More evidence would be needed before such an interpretation could be given serious consideration, however.

<sup>34</sup>The chamber was composed of 192 deputies, but the twenty representing the eight new provinces are excluded from the analysis (see Note 31). Of those dropped from consideration here, fifteen represented the UCRI, three the UCRP, one the Radical Nacional y Popular bloc, and one the UCRI Disidente.

<sup>35</sup>Another "dissident" of the UCRI, not included in the analysis because he was from the new province of Rio Negro, also voted with the UCRP on the few roll calls on which he was recorded.

<sup>36</sup>There were two roll calls on which none of the FNPC deputies voted and another six on which only one of the three is recorded.



## CHAPTER VII

### A SHORT-LIVED ATTEMPT AT "NORMALCY," 1965-1966

As with all sample time periods except 1916 and 1926, the administration analyzed in this and the previous chapter are separated by a military intervention and a change in governing parties. Frondizi was overthrown by the army in early 1962, and when elections were held fifteen months later the UCRI and the UCRP reversed their roles of government and opposition. The 1965 election was the first and last national by-election of the UCRP administration, while the following session of the Chamber of Deputies lasted until the military once again took control of the government in June, 1966.

It would have seemed that the political problems of the Frondizi administration might have eased somewhat during its third year. Despite serious losses in the 1960 congressional elections the UCRI had retained control of both chambers. The cost of living index which had risen 50 per cent in 1958 and climbed at the average rate of 10 per cent per month during the first half of 1959--while the government held down wage increases to curb inflation--leveled off in late 1959.<sup>1</sup> During 1960, the cost of living rose less than 10 per cent while wages increased by 20 per cent to represent a real rise in income and purchasing power.<sup>2</sup> Argentina's foreign reserves had risen from \$34 million dollars in mid-1959 to \$230 million dollars in November of that year,<sup>3</sup> and a year after receiving the initial \$329 million dollars from the United States and

the International Monetary Fund the nation was extended another \$300 million dollars in assistance.<sup>4</sup>

But while Frondizi's economic policies were praised abroad, they were widely criticized at home. Despite the success of the petroleum concessions in increasing domestic production--output climbed from 5.1 million tons in 1958 to 12.1 million tons in 1961--<sup>5</sup>they as well as the loans from the United States and the IMF came under chronic attack by the opposition as threats to nationalism. Also, the administration's program continued to be accused of benefiting the businessman far more than the worker--a charge easy for the worker to believe when railroad fares doubled, gasoline prices rose 200 per cent, the cost of food and clothing soared, and during the first year of the austerity plan 80,000 national government employees were fired or retired.<sup>6</sup>

The basic conflict between the Peronistas and the military continued unabated following the 1960 elections, and Frondizi remained caught in the middle. In economic matters, for instance, the Peronista labor unions were demanding the resignation of Economy Minister Alvaro Alsogaray for allegedly being anti-labor while a group of army officers wanted him replaced by someone who would make even fewer concessions to labor.<sup>7</sup> The UCRI thus continued to lose elections, including the 1961 balloting for a senator in the federal capital which both the government and opposition parties turned into a virtual referendum on Frondizi's economic program. Despite disqualification by the government of the Peronista candidate the day before the election, the UCRI ran third behind the Socialists and the UCRP and only slightly ahead of

the blank-vote total representing mostly Peronistas.

Frondizi also ran into domestic political trouble in the field of foreign relations. From the beginning of his term the UCRI president had set out to establish an active and independent--though not anti-U.S.--foreign policy for Argentina. Between his election and inauguration in 1958 he had toured Latin American capitals making a series of speeches on the theme of Latin American unity.<sup>8</sup> Frondizi helped set up the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and was a strong supporter of the Alliance for Progress. He was the first Argentine president to visit the United States,<sup>9</sup> and traveled to Europe and Asia as well during his administration. The rapprochement with the United States--and to an extent some of his other foreign policies--brought charges from the opposition that he was selling out the nation's interests to the imperialists. Few charges can be as damaging to an Argentine politician as that of vendepatria.

Although revolution or guerrilla warfare of the Cuban variety was not considered very likely in Argentina, there was during the early 1960's a considerable sympathy in that nation for the changes Fidel Castro was bringing to Cuba and--perhaps--the trouble he was causing Washington. This sympathy understandably did not extend to the armed forces, who saw in Castroism a threat of the same variety as internal Peronism and communism. A showdown between Frondizi and the military over Argentina's stand on Cuba at the Punta del Este foreign ministers conference in early 1962 was the first of a rapid series of events which led to the fall of the UCRI administration that spring.

Frondizi set out his position on the upcoming conference in a

January 2, 1962, letter to U.S. President John F. Kennedy. In essence, he said that the preoccupation with Cuba was causing a lack of attention to more important problems in the hemisphere, which included, on the one hand, the possible rupture of the hemispheric system and, on the other, the fracture of political order and institutional stability within the Latin American nations. Cuba would remain effectively isolated as long as it failed to participate properly in the hemispheric organization, Frondizi said, and there was no need to nominally isolate it. The problem of Castro would be solved by time and the Cuban people.<sup>10</sup>

But when Argentina abstained at Punta del Este on January 31 in a vote to evict Cuba from the Organization of American States the military demanded a break with Castro and called for the immediate resignation of Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Cárcano. Frondizi, who had been forced by the military to go on the radio to reaffirm the government's opposition to communism after he had met briefly with Cuban Minister of Industry, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the previous August,<sup>11</sup> once again bowed to the army and on February 2 agreed to go along with the Punta del Este resolution on Cuba. The UCRI also appeared to be starting the process of a diplomatic break with Castro.<sup>12</sup>

The government party, after many months of election losses, began to do better at the polls in local elections in the latter part of 1961 and won important contests in several provinces. In October, the government announced that the ban on the Peronistas would be lifted for the following March's important national elections "providing the party adjusts itself to the laws of the country and the Constitution."<sup>13</sup> As the March 18 election neared, the old Peronista Party was still outlawed but

the Justicialista Party--a neo-Peronista group--was told it could seek and win office if it adhered to democratic principles. It was a calculated risk for the government; recent successes suggested that the UCRI could win the election, while lifting the ban on the Peronistas should go far in easing the domestic conflict.

Frondizi lost his gamble. In an election in which thousands of voters were said to have switched to Peronista candidates in anger over the president's yielding to the military on the break with Cuba,<sup>14</sup> the Peronistas won ten of fourteen governorships including that of Buenos Aires province, and forty-four seats in the national Chamber of Deputies. In districts they did not win, the Peronistas came in second. The UCRI was the winner in most of the districts not won by the Peronistas, while the UCRP trailed in third place.

Reaction to the Peronista sweep came quickly. The day after the election, the national government took control of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Tucumán, Río Negro, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, and Neuquén and canceled the election results. The armed forces were divided between a large group of younger officers demanding Frondizi's resignation and a group of senior officers who wanted him to stay if a satisfactory coalition government could be set up. But the leaders of the other major parties rejected Frondizi's offer to come into the government--Balbín of the UCRP accused him of trying to save his own government with "false talk" about national unity and preserving democratic institutions--and agreement spread that the only way out was Frondizi's resignation. General Pedro Aramburu, who had served as provisional president following the fall of Perón and whom Frondizi had

appointed to mediate the crisis resulting from the 1962 Peronista victories, also announced he had "painfully" come to the conclusion that the president must resign.<sup>15</sup>

Frondizi refused to resign, and on March 29 he was arrested by the military and taken to the prison on Martín García island. Senate President José María Guido, the next in line of succession since the 1958 resignation of vice President Gómez, withdrew from the UCRI and assumed the position of president under close control of the military.

Guido's acceptance of the presidency brought mixed reactions within the UCRI. Some party members said it was the only alternative to outright military rule, but others were critical of the move and demanded Frondizi's return. Both the UCRI and the UCRP blocs in Congress--in agreement for perhaps the first time in two years--insisted that the legislators, not the president, should determine who was to be seated in that body; Guido, nonetheless, was forced by the military to cancel the election of the forty-four Peronistas to the Chamber of Deputies. The move brought increased opposition from the party blocs, leading Guido to first recess and then dissolve Congress.

Among the first major acts of the Guido interim administration were two measures aimed at preventing a recurrence of the 1962 electoral crisis. A new decree governing political parties outlawed the Peronista Party as well as the Communist Party and "other totalitarian parties." Peronistas, labor leaders, and military men less than two years out of uniform could not be candidates on any election slate. The government also ordered the parties to open their ranks to new members, to renew their leadership, and to reregister with the electoral tribunals.

Of greater impact was the new electoral law which replaced the 50-year-old Sáenz Peña law's 2-1 formula with the D'Hondt method of proportional representation. Although they usually represented less than one-third of the total vote, the Peronistas in 1962 had won two-thirds of the seats in many districts by obtaining more votes than any other single party; under the new system the number of seats won would have been roughly proportionate to their percentage of the total vote cast in the district.<sup>16</sup>

The first few months following the fall of Frondizi were little more than a military government behind a civilian façade, but the victory of the insurgent azul military faction over the colorados in the battle for Buenos Aires in late September assured the plan for national elections in 1963.<sup>17</sup> The rigidly anti-Peronista colorados were headed by General Toranzo Montero, who was said to favor a "democratic military dictatorship" for at least five years and claimed that his plan was supported by 85 per cent of the army.<sup>18</sup> The more moderate azules favored the reincorporation of the Peronistas into the political system although remaining strongly opposed to the return of Perón or a recurrence of his form of government. The new ruling faction, led by general Juan Carlos Onganía, set the tone for the new policy with a decree calling for an election plan "which will not leave out of the political solution truly Argentine sectors which, erroneously and tendentiously led in the past, can today be incorporated honestly into the constitutional life."<sup>19</sup>

The UCRI was left disorganized and fragmented following the overthrow of Frondizi. Oscar Alende, the former governor of Buenos Aires province, rose rapidly in influence and as early as June, 1962, was

being mentioned as a possible presidential candidate. He was identified with a faction of the UCRI which was trying to unify the divided party under new leadership.<sup>20</sup> Alende's opponents, mainly led by former Interior Minister Alfredo R. Vitolo, accused him of trying to take control of the party away from Frondizi while the ex-president was in prison.

The UCRI platform for the 1963 election remained basically unchanged, calling for more equitable distribution of income, increased efforts at Latin American economic integration, reorganization of Argentine state enterprises to cut out waste, aid to development of the nation's interior regions, and specific support of the principle of "social justice." The latter term was associated mainly with the Peronistas, who now claimed their movement was fully democratic. The Peronista party, the Unión Popular, was allowed to campaign as long as it avoided all contact with Perón, did not use his name, and agreed not to nominate candidates for president and other top offices. In May, 1963, a formal coalition between the UCRI and the Unión Popular was announced.

The coalition, called the Frente Nacional y Popular (FNP), agreed to present candidates only for president, vice president, and governorships while the member parties would offer their own slates for other offices. Several other minor parties also joined the electoral front. A poll by a government intelligence agency in mid-June showed 31 per cent of the public favoring the FNP, while one political commentator predicted the coalition would take 45 to 50 per cent of the vote in the July 8 elections in which every elective office in the country was at stake.<sup>21</sup>



But the FNP was not solid on either side. Alende had already filed as a presidential candidate and the largest sector of the UCRI followed him when, upon Perón's orders from exile, Dr. Vicente Solano Lima was named the candidate of the front.<sup>22</sup> Nor were the Peronistas entirely happy, for while Solano Lima had followed a Peronista line for a number of years he was still a conservative.<sup>23</sup> Frondizi, who in March had been moved from Martín García island to a ranch near San Carlos Bariloche where he was given more freedom although still under technical arrest, broke a fourteen-month silence in late May to issue a long statement backing the FNP as the only way out of the current political crisis.

The UCRI was so divided over the issue that it was unable to call its national convention to order for two days when it met in early June. The national committee eventually followed the factions led by Vitolo and Dr. Héctor Gómez Machado--former leader of the UCRI bloc in the Chamber of Deputies--to support the FNP while Alende resigned his position as head of the committee but continued as a candidate. Rogelio Frigerio, in exile in Montevideo, played a key role once more in cementing a front between Radicals and Peronistas.<sup>24</sup>

As the July 7 election neared, the Guido administration placed increasing restrictions on the FNP on the basis of its affiliation with Perón. A June 20 decree in effect disqualified the front's slate for president, vice president, governors, and senators from the federal district. The front's leaders accused the government of organizing a fraudulent election and said the repeated harassment was a violation of the pledge by the armed forces to allow voting in which all sectors

of Argentine society would be represented. After the government issued a decree disqualifying FNP presidential electors in eleven of the nation's provinces, the front announced July 3 that it would boycott the election.

The UCRP, with 25 per cent of the popular vote, swept the July 7 election at both the national and provincial levels. Presidential candidate Arturo Illia, whose campaign was mainly an attack on Frondizi's petroleum contracts, polled 2,441,000 votes to second-place Oscar Alende's 1,593,000. General Aramburu, backed by the Unión del Pueblo Argentino and the Partido Demócrata Progresista, was in third place with 1,348,133 votes. Provincial victories gave the UCRP thirteen of twenty-two governorships and the assurance of twenty-five seats in the national Senate and seventy-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The UCRI won forty seats in the chamber, giving it the second largest bloc.<sup>25</sup> The fact that there were less than 2,000,000 blank ballots --some of which no doubt represented the Communists--was interpreted as reflecting a decline in the influence of Perón in Argentine politics. Instead of the predicted 33 per cent, the blank vote represented only about 16 per cent of the total.<sup>26</sup>

The UCRI's national committee agreed to cast the party's 109 electoral votes for Illia--which added to his own 169 votes gave the UCRP candidate more than the 239 votes required in the electoral college--but said it would serve as "constructive opposition" rather than join in coalition with the UCRP. Internal factionalism, however, soon tended to reduce the strength of the UCRI as opposition.

Frondizi was released from military custody upon the electoral college's selection of Illia as president, and the former president's

return to political activity deepened the division which had developed within the UCRI during the period he was in custody. The judiciary had in several cases recognized the legal authority of the party's national committee headed by Alende, leaving Frondizi the alternatives of trying to regain control of the UCRI party structure from Alende or of starting a new party. Frondizi traveled extensively in Argentina during late 1963 and early 1964 defending the policies and actions of his government and rallying support for a political comeback. Alende, meanwhile, declined a government offer of the ambassadorship to London so he could remain at home and defend his control of the UCRI. By April, while the Frondizi group in some provinces continued to fight for control of the UCRI, in others it was applying for legal recognition of a new party under the name of Movimiento de Intransigencia Radical (MIR). The UCRI bloc in the Chamber of Deputies had earlier divided about evenly into Alende and Frondizi factions.

The MIR was officially formed April 18, 1964, at a meeting in Córdoba. Joining Frondizi in the leadership of the new party was Rogelio Frigerio, who had returned from exile in late 1963. The MIR, which claimed to be a revival of the "popular current" which brought victory to the UCRI in 1958,<sup>27</sup> quickly became the most vocal critic of the UCRP administration. In addition to the new Frondizi party, opposition blocs in the Chamber of Deputies in the latter part of 1964 included the UCRI, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, and Aramburu's UDELPA.

Frondizi's party changed its name to Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (MID) in late 1964 after the national electoral tribunal refused to recognize its original name on the basis of alleged confusion

which would be caused by its use of the term "Radical." In its decision, the electoral body supported MIR opponents who contended that the group did not have any connection with traditional Radicalism.<sup>28</sup> Any decision as to which among the many groups that over the years had branched off from the UCR trunk had sufficient connection with "traditional Radicalism" to carry the label is of course political and subject to challenge. Frondizi had been active as a Radical since the 1930's, but it is true that in the MIR he tried--with little success--to forge the Radical-Peronista coalition he had briefly had in 1958. In any case, the forced change of name had little effect on the new party.

In campaigning for the 1965 by-elections, the government party centered its platform on two basic achievements of the previous twenty months--domestic peace and political democracy. Since the election of Illia there had been an absence of military intervention, states of siege, or serious general strikes, while the authorization of general Peronista participation in the election was cited as evidence of democratic progress. The MID took a strong developmental position in the campaign, citing the need to bring in and encourage heavy industry and to set up economic conditions which would attract foreign governmental and private capital. The UCRI in 1965 based its campaign on political rather than economic foundations, claiming it was the party best able to unite classes and heal party wounds.<sup>29</sup>

The Unión Popular--representing the so-called "hard line" of the Peronista movement which had been prevented from participating in the 1963 elections--was permitted to run candidates in the 1965 by-elections.

The party campaigned on several issues concerning labor and nationalization of public services, criticized the political and economic conditions under the UCRP administration, and demanded a universal amnesty for all former Peronista leaders and all those who had been politically exiled during the period from the fall of Perón to the inauguration of Illia.<sup>30</sup>

Results of the March 14 election demonstrated two clear trends in Argentine politics. Most evident and of greatest importance, of course, was the fact that ten years after the fall of their leader and despite years of official harassment and repeated attempts to incorporate them into other parties, the Peronistas were as strong as--if not stronger than--ever as a political group. Secondly, the election showed that despite the adoption of proportional representation in 1962 and the continuing proliferation of minor parties, there continued to be a strong tendency toward a system of two major parties.

The Unión Popular received the highest number of votes among the parties competing in the congressional election, edging the UCRP total 2,828,000 to 2,676,000. The 31 per cent of the total vote received by the Unión Popular was the strongest Peronista showing--either in party support or in blank voting--since the fall of Perón. When to this is added the 620,000 votes received by the various neo-Peronista parties in the provinces, total Peronista support in 1965 reaches 38 per cent. It was no longer possible to predict--as some did after the relatively low blank vote in 1963--that the Peronistas were losing strength or losing unity, although it was probable that the movement was slowly gaining more and more independence from Perón himself.

Although there were more than 100 nominally different parties running slates in the 1965 elections and candidates bearing almost two dozen different party labels won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the election and the subsequent session of the chamber were dominated by the UCRP and the Unión Popular. These two parties together received 61 per cent of the total vote and seventy of the ninety-nine contested chamber seats. As had occurred in the past between Radicals and conservatives, between Yrigoyenistas and Antipersonalistas, and between Peronistas and Radicals, the 1965 election apparently was seen by many as a clear-cut "either-or" choice despite the ostensible variety of parties from which to choose. Both major parties contributed to the image of the election as one in which the major issue was to vote against the government or against the Peronistas, and the decline of minor party strength from 1963 would seem to support the contention that many voters were reluctant to "waste" their vote on minor parties.<sup>31</sup> Placing third in the election was Frondizi's MID with 589,000 votes, followed by the conservative Federación de Partidos del Centro with 489,000 and the UCRI with 407,000.

#### Election Analysis

The adoption of the d'Hondt system of proportional representation in 1962 and the further fragmentation of both the Radical and the Peronista groups make the 1965 election analysis somewhat more complicated than those of earlier chapters. In addition to the many provincial parties--usually of conservative or neo-Peronista orientation--there were a number of "national" parties which ran candidates in most or all provinces but drew only a small fraction of the vote,

frequently less than 5 per cent in any given province. Because inter-county variation under such circumstances could easily be caused by the political vagaries of local notables or a particularly active party organization which might be absent in the neighboring county, ecological correlation for these parties would be somewhat less reliable than for major parties receiving a sizable vote in virtually all electoral districts.

Because of this issue of reliability, combined with the relatively small importance of many of the other party groups during the 1965-1966 period, only the UCRP and the Peronistas are analyzed nationally and at each of the three regional levels. Due to its unusually strong support in the three provinces of the Litoral (18.9 per cent in Corrientes, 15.1 per cent in Entre Ríos, and 7.3 per cent in Santa Fe), the MID vote is analyzed for that region. And although they were not included in the multiple regression analysis, the simple correlation coefficients for the UCRI, MID, and conservatives have been included in Table VII-1.

As indicated in the notes to Table VII-1, the various neo-Peronista parties in the provinces were merged with the Unión Popular to obtain a "Peronista vote" for the correlation analysis. While there are certain important differences between the "hardliners" and the neo-Peronistas--in some provinces the Unión Popular ran against a neo-Peronista party--they all maintained a measure of ideological unity and, more importantly, worked together in the same bloc during the 1965-1966 session of the Chamber of Deputies. The situation is thus somewhat similar to that of earlier elections when "national" and provincial

TABLE VII-1  
CORRELATES OF 1965 DEPUTIES ELECTION

		Factors				
		I	II	III	IV	V
	No. Cases	Urban	Rich Farm	Rural Class	Ind. Scale	Farm: Ranch
NATION						
UCRP	256	-.01	-.14*	.05	-.27*	-.22*
Peronista	256	.30*	.21*	-.01	.10	-.24*
BUENOS AIRES <sup>a</sup>						
UCRP	110	-.34*	-.04	-.07	-.29*	-.14
Peronista	110	.55*	.18	.04	.43*	.03
UCRI	110	-.28*	-.16	.09	-.23**	-.14
MID	110	.07	-.17	-.20**	.07	-.06
Conserv.	110	-.34*	-.08	.09	-.17	-.03
LITORAL <sup>b</sup>						
UCRP	57	.22	-.33**	.17	-.37*	-.33**
Peronista	57	.18	-.17	-.17	-.17	-.11
MID	57	-.21	.30**	.00	-.10	.09
INTERIOR <sup>c</sup>						
UCRP	89	-.07	.00	-.05	-.19	-.25**
Peronista	89	-.17	.28*	-.22**	.19	-.48*



TABLE VII-1 (Extension)

VI	VII					
Dairy Farm	Agr. Scale	Blank 1960	UCRP 1960	UCRI 1960	Cons. 1960	Mult. R
.10	-.05	ni	.91*	ni	ni	.93
-.04	.27*	.42*	ni	ni	ni	.59
-.07	-.28*	ni	.89*	ni	ni	.90
.08	.38*	.61*	ni	ni	ni	.71
-.05	-.12	ni	ni	.78*	ni	na
-.14	-.20**	ni	ni	.21**	ni	na
.16	.00	ni	ni	ni	.65*	na
.35*	.37*	ni	.96*	ni	ni	.97
.00	.31**	.49*	ni	ni	ni	.64
-.08	-.22	ni	ni	.68*	ni	.69
.04	.03	ni	.85*	ni	ni	.88
-.17	.43*	.08	ni	ni	ni	.71

TABLE VII-1 (Continued)

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- \* Significant at the .01 level.
  - \*\* Significant at the .05 level.
  - ni Not included in multiple regression equation.

<sup>a</sup>UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo; Peronista is the Unión Popular; UCRI is the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente; MID is the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo; Conserv. is the Unión Conservadora.

<sup>b</sup>UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo; Peronista is the Unión Popular in Corrientes and Santa Fe and the Partido Tres Banderas in Entre Ríos; MID is the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo.

<sup>c</sup>UCRP is the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo in Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán; Peronista includes the Unión Popular in Córdoba, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán, plus the Movimiento Popular Mendocino in Mendoza, Acción Popular Sanluiseña in San Luis, Acción Provincial in Tucumán, and Tres Banderas in Santiago del Estero.

Radical parties had to be combined for purposes of analysis, or when provincial parties had to be merged into a somewhat fictitious national "party." There was no problem of this type for the UCRP vote in 1965, as the party ran under its national banner in all provinces.

The following analysis uses the 1960 factor scores which were described and used in the previous chapter. As before, the party vote in the previous election is used in multiple regression as an indicator of "party organization." Following the pattern of earlier chapters, the figures in Table VII-1 are simple correlation coefficients of the party groupings with each factor and relevant "party organization" variable. Where they are considered important, the partial correlations obtained at different stages of the step-wise multiple regression analysis will be cited and discussed in the text.

Support for the UCRP at the national level shows a strong correlation of .91 with that party's vote in 1960 indicating a considerable stability in the source of party strength. Far below this but still of statistical significance are correlations of -.27 with large industry, -.22 with farm-ranch ratio, and -.14 with Factor II (indicating a positive association with areas of prosperous farming). Although it is considerably below the UCRP figure, the correlation of .42 between national Peronista vote and the blank vote in 1960 is an indication of moderately strong party "organization" or stability and exceeds any other correlate of 1965 Peronista strength. Also of statistical significance are the Peronista vote's correlation of .30 with urbanism, .27 with small ranching, -.24 with farm-ranch ratio (strength in areas devoted predominantly to cattle rather than crops),

and .21 with Factor II (a negative association with areas of prosperous farming).

In multiple regression analysis at the national level, the correlation of .91 with the "party organization" variable entered the equation first to account for 83.6 per cent of the total variance in UCRP vote. The next two variables to enter the equation--rural class and farm-ranch ratio--together explain another 1.5 per cent of the remaining variance, while the remaining five variables combined add but one-half of one per cent more for a total explained variance of 85.6 per cent. For the Peronistas, correlation with the 1960 blank vote accounts for 17.9 per cent of the 1965 vote variance, while Factor V enters the equation second to add another 8.1 per cent to the explained variance. Agriculture scale and prosperous farming are the next two factors to enter the regression equation, bringing the total explained variance at this point to 34.0 per cent. The last four variables to come into the equation add a total of 1.2 per cent more for a final explained variance of 35.2 per cent.

As at the national level, the regional analysis for Buenos Aires province shows the 1960 UCRP to be by far the strongest correlate of that party's 1965 strength. In addition to that correlation of .89, other variables correlating at significant levels with the UCRP vote are urbanism at -.34, industry scale at -.29, and Factor VII at -.28 (a positive association with areas of large agricultural establishments). The Unión Popular shows a stronger correlation with the 1960 blank vote in Buenos Aires province than it did at the national level, followed by correlations of .55 with urbanism, .43 with large industry, and .38

with small agriculture. The strong coefficients which the two parties register in opposite directions on these three factors show clearly the 1965 voting structure in Buenos Aires; Peronista support was concentrated in areas marked by urbanization, large industry, and small agriculture, while the UCRP strength was concentrated more in the rural areas characterized by large farms and little or no large industry.

Turning to the multiple regression equations for the two major parties in Buenos Aires province, the UCRP's correlation of .89 with the "organization" variable accounts for 79.1 per cent of the total variance in that party's vote. Once this has entered the equation, no remaining variable accounts for as much as one per cent more of the variance and the entry of all variables only raises the explained variance to 81 per cent. In the equation for the Unión Popular, entry of the 1960 blank vote accounts for the first 37.5 per cent of the variance, while Factors I and VII each add an additional 4.7 per cent to the explained variance. These three variables bring the total explained variance to 46.9 per cent; the last five to enter the equation increase this to 49.9 per cent.

Correlations in Table VII-1 for the UCRI and the MID in Buenos Aires suggest that at least in this province the Alende party was more of a direct descendant of the 1960 UCRI than was Frondizi's MID; the former correlates at .78 with the 1960 governing party's vote, while the MID shows a correlation of only .21 with that variable. Buenos Aires conservatives also show a rather strong consistency in areas of strength over the five-year period, as evidenced by a correlation of

.65 between that group's vote in 1960 and 1965. Like the UCRP, the conservatives registered a correlation of  $-.34$  on the urbanism factor while the UCRI was a little less "rural" with a coefficient of  $-.28$  on this variable. The MID shows no significant correlation with urbanism in Buenos Aires and a relatively weak but significant  $-.20$  with both the rural class and agricultural scale factors.

The respective party's 1960 vote in the Litoral once again proves to be by far the most meaningful variable in accounting for 1965 party strength. The UCRP in this region registers a correlation of  $.96$  with its vote five years earlier, while the Unión Popular correlates at  $.49$  with the 1960 blank vote. In contrast to the rather weak correlation in Buenos Aires, the MID in the Litoral registers a correlation of  $.68$  with UCRI vote in the region in 1960. The Unión Popular and the MID each have only one additional variable which correlates at a significant level--a coefficient of  $.31$  with small agriculture for the former and  $.30$  on prosperous farming (indicating support in areas lacking prosperous farming) for the latter. The UCRP, by contrast, correlates at significant levels with five of the seven factors in the Litoral analysis. These are coefficient of  $.37$  on agriculture scale,  $-.37$  on industry scale,  $.35$  on dairy farming, and  $-.33$  on both prosperous farming (support in areas of prosperous farming) and farm-ranch ratio. The latter two coefficients would suggest UCRP strength in the Litoral areas of prosperous grain farming.

Multiple regression analysis for the UCRP in the Litoral shows that despite the numerous significant correlations little variance is explained beyond that accounted for by the 1960 party vote. This

coefficient of .96 accounts for 92.6 per cent of the total variance in UCRP vote in the Litoral, while the subsequent entry of the other seven variables add only another 1.5 per cent to the explained variance. The 1960 blank vote explains 24.1 per cent of the variance in Unión Popular vote in the region. The next two factors to enter the Unión Popular equation are rural class and farm-ranch ratio, explaining 4.5 per cent and 3.3 per cent more of the variance, respectively. Except for urbanism, which enters last to explain only one-half of one per cent, the remaining variables entering the Unión Popular equation each account for between 1.9 and 2.3 per cent of the remaining variance, causing the total variance explained by all eight variables to reach 40.9 per cent. Multiple regression for the MID discloses a pattern more like that of the UCRP than the Unión Popular; after the 1960 UCRI vote accounts for 46.0 per cent of the variance and Factor III enters second to add 1.4 per cent to this, the remaining five variables together explain less than one per cent more of the variance. Total variance explained by the MID's multiple R of .69 is 48.3 per cent.

Moving on to the Interior, it can be seen in Table VII-1 that the 1960 vote continues to be an important variable for the UCRP but that it loses all explanatory value for the Peronista vote. For the government party, the only correlation of significance after that of .85 with 1960 UCRP vote is a moderately weak -.25 on Factor V. The strongest correlates of 1965 Peronista vote in the Interior were farm-ranch ratio at -.48 and agriculture scale at .43, together suggesting support in areas marked by small cattle establishments. Weaker but also of significance are correlations of .28 on Factor II (support in areas

lacking prosperous farming) and  $-.22$  on the rural class factor (a relatively high proportion of rural middle class).

The strong correlation with 1960 party vote accounts for 72.6 per cent of the variance in the UCRP vote in the Interior. The next two variables to enter the multiple regression equation--farm-ranch ratio and rural class--add 1.6 and 2.2 per cent respectively to the explained variance, while the remaining five factors together increase this by another 1.3 per cent for a total explained variance of 77.8 per cent. In the multiple regression equation for the Unión Popular, Factor V enters first to explain 23.5 per cent of the variance. This is followed by Factor VII for another 12.7 per cent, while the entry of 1960 blank vote in the third step--its value had been increased by the partialling process--adds 6.0 per cent more to the explained variance. Factors II and I account for 3.8 and 3.5 per cent more, respectively, while the remaining three together add less than one per cent for a total explained variance of 50.3 per cent.

Summarizing the 1965 election analysis, the most pronounced feature of the 1965 vote appears to be its consistency with that of five years before. Except for the Peronistas of the Interior, every party showed its strongest correlation with this "party organization" variable--in most cases much higher than the next strongest correlation. Interior Peronistas drew their support primarily from areas of impoverished rural middle class; in 1960 these areas tended to support the UCRI rather than vote blank.<sup>32</sup>



### Roll Call Analysis

Elected in 1963 and 1965 under the new system of proportional representation, the 1965-1966 session of the Chamber of Deputies had representatives of twenty-eight different parties. The problem this presents for roll call analysis was somewhat eased by the fact that the deputies of seventeen of these parties belonged to one of three formal multi-party blocs: Bloque Justicialista (Peronista), Federación Nacional de Partidos del Centro, and the Confederación de Partidos Provinciales. The remaining eleven parties each was its own formal parliamentary bloc, however, resulting in a chamber composed of fourteen voting groups.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the proliferation of parties and blocs in the 1965-1966 session, the chamber was dominated by the UCRP and the Peronistas. Of the 192 members, sixty-eight belonged to the UCRP and fifty-two were members of various Peronista and neo-Peronista parties composing the Justicialista bloc. The third bloc in membership size was the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo with sixteen deputies, followed by the UCRI with eleven, the FNPC with ten, and the Partido Demócrata Progresista with nine members. The Unión del Pueblo Argentino began the session with seven members, but the UDELPA bloc was reduced to five deputies after internal party conflict caused two deputies to resign from the bloc and remain in the chamber as independents. The remaining seven "blocs" had from one to four deputies each.<sup>34</sup>

From the opening of the session in May, 1965, until Congress was dissolved by the military in June of the following year, a total of twenty-five contested roll calls were held by the Chamber of Deputies

on questions other than the election of chamber officers. The difference between the majority and minority vote ranged from 0.9 per cent, representing a one-vote split, to 77.7 per cent in the most unevenly divided case. In sixteen of the roll calls the difference between the aye and the nay vote represented less than 10 per cent of those voting, and in only five of the twenty-five roll calls was the difference greater than 20 per cent. The distribution of the roll calls according to the magnitude of the division is shown in Table VII-2. The distribution of roll calls on the basis of degree of participation can be seen in Table VII-3. Although in this session the average rate of participation was somewhat higher than in some of the earlier periods, there were still only seven roll calls in which 70 per cent or more of the deputies participated and only two in which 80 per cent or more took part.

The 1965-1966 session yielded two Guttman scales, one composed of fifteen roll calls and the other made up of four roll calls. The subject, size, and "direction" of these scales are shown in Table VII-4. The larger of the two falls into the multi-issue "partisan" pattern found in previous sessions and has been labeled accordingly. Four additional roll calls would have fit into this scale, but as they would have substantially increased the proportion of "error" without adding significantly to the meaningfulness of the scale, they were discarded. The "error" on these votes appears to have been of the type previously seen on roll calls which include both procedural and substantive aspects. The second scale is composed of four roll calls dealing with labor legislation. In addition to the two scales, this analysis will

TABLE VII-2  
CONTESTED ROLL CALLS

	Per cent vote difference					
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	70-79
Number of Roll Calls	16	4	1	1	1	2

TABLE VII-3  
ROLL CALL PARTICIPATION

	Per cent of Deputies voting				
	0-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89
Number of Roll Calls	1	8	9	5	2

include two individual roll calls which fit neither of the scales but whose content would seem to justify attention. These are votes on (1) a proposal to end tax exemptions for the Jockey Club and some sports clubs, and (2) a proposal to include fourteen counties in Buenos Aires province in the priority area for the Chocon-Cerros Colorado electric power complex. As in 1960, the roll call analysis deals only with the deputies from the federal capital and the original fourteen provinces.

Table VII-5 shows the rank-order correlation between the scales and the two independent roll calls. The correlation of  $-.60$  between the Partisan Issues Scale and the Labor Legislation Scale indicates that there is some relationship between them but that there is no question but that they represent different issue dimensions. The larger scale correlates rather strongly at  $.74$  with the roll call on the Buenos Aires electricity issue, much weaker at  $-.41$  with the tax break vote. The tax vote correlates at  $.15$  with the Labor Legislation Scale and  $.03$  with the electricity question, showing virtually no association with either issue. A moderate negative association of  $-.54$  is registered between the Labor Legislation Scale and the Buenos Aires power question. Thus there were at least four voting dimensions--with varying degrees of interrelationship--in the 1965-1966 session; what these dimensions were and their association with party and region will be analyzed below.

#### Partisan Issues Scale

The Partisan Issues Scale is composed of fifteen roll calls covering a variety of subjects. Seven of the votes dealt with direct

TABLE VII-4  
SCALE CONTENT AND SIZE

Scale Subject	"Positive" Vote	Number Roll Calls	Number Deputies
Partisan Issues	Pro-Administration	15	134
Labor Legislation	Pro-Labor	4	116

TABLE VII-5  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES

Scale	Scale		
	Labor Legislation	Tax Break Vote	BA Power Vote
Partisan Issues	-.60	-.41	.74
Labor Legislation		.15	-.54
Tax Break Vote			.03

or indirect criticism of the executive, three of them in matters of foreign relations. Three votes were directly or indirectly related to the Peronista issue; others dealt with such matters as political parties, taxes, a rent control law, and Buenos Aires street repairs. A "positive" vote in each case was the pro-administration position, as indicated by the vote of the majority of the UCRP bloc. Each position on the scale is based on a "contrived" item; the two end items contain two roll calls each, Item 2 has three, and Item 3 is composed of eight roll calls.

Table VII-6A shows the distribution of scale types according to party blocs, while Table VII-6B shows the distribution on the basis of geographic region. The concentration of forty-nine UCRP deputies in Scale Type 5 and thirty-six members of the Justicialista bloc at the other extreme clearly suggests that the main dimension of cleavage on these roll calls was government vs. opposition. There were, nonetheless, a number of deputies in the intermediate scale types; as in earlier sessions, these "brokers" tended to represent minor parties operating between the chamber's two major blocs. It will be noted, however, that the deputies of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and the MID were solidly in the opposition on all items of the scale.

A comparison of Tables VII-6A and VII-6B shows that it was clearly party rather than region which was the major influence on voting patterns of this scale. Deputies from the Litoral were more likely to be in the middle scale types than were those of Buenos Aires or the Interior, but representatives of the latter two areas were almost identically distributed at each end of the scale.

TABLE VII-6A  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
UCRP	0	0	0	2	5	49	7	63
FNPC	0	0	1	4	0	0	5	10
Autonomista	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
UDELPA	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	5
Dem. Progresista	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
Socialista Democrático	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
UCRI	0	3	0	0	0	0	8	11
Partidos Provinciales	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
Socialista Argentino	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	4
Justicialista	36	2	0	0	0	0	6	44
Demócrata Cristiano	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
MID	8	0	0	0	0	0	4	12
Bloc subtotal	49	8	14	7	5	49	40	170
Independents	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Total	49	8	14	7	6	50	40	172

TABLE VII-6B  
PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE

Region	Scale Type						Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
Buenos Aires	26	7	8	4	3	26	12	85
Litoral	9	0	6	2	1	7	10	35
Interior	15	1	0	1	2	17	16	52
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	49	8	14	7	6	50	38	172



Because of the low level of "deviation" of either major bloc on the Partisan Issues Scale, there was little point in presenting tables of scale type distribution by region separately for the UCRP and the Peronistas. As Scale Types 1 and 4 represent non-responses, only two UCRP deputies--one from the capital and one from Córdoba--are actually recorded as opposing the administration position; in the Justicialista bloc, the scale records no deputy as taking a pro-administration position on any item.

In addition to forty-nine UCRP deputies, the only member of the chamber who supported the administration on all items of the scale was a UDELPA dissident who became an independent. Supporting the government position on Items 1 through 3 but registering a non-response on Item 4 were five more UCRP deputies--two from Buenos Aires, two from the Interior, and one from the Litoral--and another former member of UDELPA. The pro-administration position on Item 4 represented negative votes on proposals to ask the administration to explain why teacher pay was behind schedule and for tax relief for the growers of Entre Ríos and the southern part of Corrientes, plagued by drought.

Deputies who took an anti-administration position on Item 4 but supported the UCRP government on the three "easier" items are represented in Scale Type 3. In addition to the capital and Córdoba UCRP deputies mentioned above, these include three conservative FNPC deputies from Buenos Aires province and one from Entre Ríos, plus an Autonomista from Corrientes.

Scale Type 2, the most heavily populated of the middle scale positions, represents administration support on Items 1 and 2 but opposition

on the eight-roll call Item 3 as well as on Item 4. Nine of the fourteen deputies in this scale type are members of the Partido Demócrata Progresista--three from the capital, one from Buenos Aires province, and five from Santa Fe. Other deputies who supported the administration on the first two items and opposed it on the second two included two members of UDELPA and two Democratic Socialists--all from the capital or Buenos Aires province--and a member of the FNPC bloc (Partido Liberal) from Corrientes.

The eight deputies in Scale Type 1 may very well represent an artificial grouping little more than an artifact of the scaling procedure. The scale type seems "real" enough for the three UCRI deputies and the member of the Confederación de Partidos Provinciales; all are recorded as pro-administration on Item 1 and anti-administration on the rest, while neither bloc contains deputies in any other scale type. The two Justicialista deputies and the two members of the Partido Socialista Argentino, however, are in Scale Type 1 due to a non-response on Item 1 because there were insufficient cases of this pattern to form a separate scale type. Since deputies of both blocs are also found in Scale Type 0, it is thoroughly possible that the non-reponse represents nothing more than inadvertent absence when the roll calls of Item 1 were taken. With this warning, however, they are ranked in Scale Type 1 according to the criteria outlined in Appendix B.

Scale Type 0 represents an anti-administration position on all four items. In addition to the remaining members of the Justicialista and Socialista Argentino blocs, this anti-administration end of the scale contains the blocs of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and the MID.

### Labor Legislation Scale

The Labor Legislation Scale is composed of two contrived items, each made up of two roll calls. All four roll calls deal with aspects of changes in labor legislation which were considered during the session. A total of 115 deputies are ranked on this scale, which shows only a moderate correlation of  $-.60$  with the Partisan Issues Scale.

Table VII-7A shows the distribution of deputies on the Labor Legislation Scale according to parliamentary bloc. There is a strong concentration in Scale Type 3--the most pro-labor position--where fifty-eight deputies in this category include all scaled members of six blocs: Justicialista, MID, UCRI, Christian Democrats, and both Socialist groups. As in the Partisan Issues Scale, the Demócrata Progresista deputies take a center position on this scale and are all located in Scale Type 2. In contrast to its cohesion on the former scale, the UCRP bloc was spread over all scale types on the Labor Issue but showed the highest concentration in Scale Type 2. In addition to six UCRP deputies, the most anti-labor end of the scale is populated by all ranked members of UDELPA and the FNPC.

Analyzing the Labor Legislation Scale types by region, it can be seen in Table VII-7B that there is virtually no regional pattern to the distribution. Regionalism, therefore, seems to be no more important on this issue than it was in the Partisan Issues Scale. The search for a possible regional explanation behind the dispersion of UCRP deputies across all scale types yielded no significant results; there is no more of a regional pattern within this bloc than in the chamber as a whole.

TABLE VII-7A  
LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE

Bloc	Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Justicialista	0	0	0	35	9	44
MID	0	0	0	8	4	12
UCRI	0	0	0	6	5	11
Demócrata Cristiano	0	0	0	3	1	4
Socialista Argentino	0	0	0	3	1	4
Socialista Democrático	0	0	0	1	1	2
Demócrata Progresista	0	0	8	0	1	9
UCRP	6	7	30	1	19	63
UDELPA	1	0	0	0	4	5
FNPC	5	0	0	0	5	10
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bloc subtotal	12	7	38	57	50	164
Independents	1	0	0	1	0	2
Other blocs	0	0	0	0	6	6
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	13	7	38	58	56	172

TABLE VII-7B  
LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE

Region	Scale Type				Not Scaled	Total
	0	1	2	3		
Buenos Aires	8	3	18	32	24	85
Litoral	1	3	9	9	13	35
Interior	4	1	11	17	19	52
Total	13	7	38	58	56	172

A "positive" vote on Item 1 of the Labor Legislation Scale represents support of two motions to consider proposed changes in the labor code. Item 2 of the scale--considerably "harder" than was the question of considering changes--is composed of an amendment to the law which would give tenure to employees with ten years seniority and a vote to retain maritime workers among those covered by the labor law. A pro-labor or "positive" vote is aye on each issue.

### Individual Roll Calls

The first of the two individual roll calls which will be analyzed is one which would be expected to create strong cross-pressures for many deputies. It was a proposal to end the tax exemptions which had been enjoyed by the Jockey Club and various sports clubs.<sup>35</sup> The Jockey Club was perhaps the strongest symbol of the conservative economic elite of Argentina, while sports clubs were popular among the middle and lower classes and had received special privileges under the Perón administration. The proposed bill, which thus would affect the favorite clubs of both the rich and the poor, brought out some unusual voting patterns among the various blocs.

It can be seen in Table VII-8 that the bill was supported by all but one Justicialista voting as well as by all voting members of the conservative FNPC. The UCRP split on the issue, with sixteen members voting aye and twenty-four opposing the measure. Also in opposition were the UCRI, the MID, three of four members of UDELPA, and the Demócrata Progresista deputies. Thus on the "left" there were the Peronistas and the Socialista Argentino deputies supporting the bill and the UCRI and the MID opposing it; on the "right" the FNPC voted aye while

TABLE VII-8  
TAX BREAK ROLL CALL, 1965-1966

Vote	Region	Bloc*													Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
Aye	Buenos Aires	9	15	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	31
	Litoral	4	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	11
	Interior	3	7	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	16
Nay	Buenos Aires	12	0	6	2	0	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	26
	Litoral	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	9
	Interior	9	1	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
Total		40	26	8	5	7	4	1	2	9	3	1	1	1	108

\*1, UCRP; 2, Justicialista; 3, UCRI; 4, MID; 5, FNPC; 6, UDELPA; 7, Partidos Provinciales; 8, Demócrata Cristiano; 9, Demócrata Progresista; 10, Socialista Argentino; 11, Socialista Democrático; 12, Autonomista; 13, Independent.

most of UDELPA voted nay. Table VII-8, furthermore, indicates that there is no major regional pattern to the vote. Analyzing the UCRP vote by region, there also appears to be no strong regional tendency beyond a slightly heavier negative vote among Interior deputies. Whatever the determinants of voting positions on this issue, therefore, they seem to be beyond the scope of the present investigation.

The roll call on the proposal that a section of Buenos Aires province be included in the Chocon-Cerros Colorado power network<sup>36</sup> reveals a considerably different voting pattern, correlating as it does at only .03 with the previous roll call. It can be seen in Table VII-9 that the UCRP bloc was quite united on this roll call, with forty-seven of forty-nine favoring the question. The Justicialista bloc, on the other hand, tended to oppose the issue although its Buenos Aires members split about evenly. Blocs whose entire voting membership favored the question were the UCRI, FNPC, and both Socialist groups; interestingly, all participating deputies of these blocs were from Buenos Aires. Opposing the inclusion of the fourteen Buenos Aires departments in the power grid were the deputies of UDELPA, Confederación de Partidos Provinciales, Demócrata Progresista, Demócrata Cristiano, and all but one Buenos Aires member of MID.

As might be expected in an issue of specific regional interest, Table VII-9 reveals a stronger regional pattern than was seen in either of the scales or the roll call on tax exemption. While Interior deputies split about evenly on each side of the question and those from the Litoral were 3-2 against the proposal, forty-six Buenos Aires deputies voted aye compared to only fourteen from that region who were against the issue.



TABLE VII-9  
BUENOS AIRES POWER ROLL CALL, 1965-1966

Vote	Region	Bloc*												Total
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Aye	Buenos Aires	25	8	6	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	46
	Litoral	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
	Interior	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Nay	Buenos Aires	0	7	0	1	0	3	1	0	2	0	0	0	14
	Litoral	0	2	0	5	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	12
	Interior	2	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	15
Total		49	26	6	7	3	7	3	1	4	1	1	1	109

\*1, UCRP; 2, Justicialista; 3, UCRI; 4, MID; 5, FNPC; 6, Demócrata Progresista; 7, UDELPA; 8, Partidos Provinciales; 9, Demócrata Cristiano; 10, Socialista Argentino; 11, Socialista Democrático; 12, Independents.

### Conclusion

Analysis of the 1965-1966 session of the Chamber of Deputies has disclosed a voting pattern somewhat more rigid than that found in the pre-1930 period but more flexible than that of the 1960-1962 session. The proliferation of parliamentary blocs under proportional representation no doubt contributed to a "loosening up" of the voting rigidity which was seen in the 1960-1962 session, but aside from this there also was somewhat less cohesion in both major blocs than there had been when the UCRP and the UCR! opposed each other during the Frondizi administration.

Fifteen of the session's twenty-five roll calls were found to fit a scale which on the basis of bloc alignments and issue content was termed a "partisan issues" scale. Four other roll calls would have fit into this scale, but were omitted because they would have added little explanatory value while the "errors" common to procedural votes would have added a considerable number of errors to the scale. Only the UCRP and one independent ex-member of UDELPA were on the most pro-administration end of the scale, while the opposition end was populated by the Peronistas, the MID, and the Christian Democrats. The middle scale types contained the minor blocs such as FNPC, UDELPA, Demócrata Progresista, and Socialista Democrático, who served as "brokers" between the government and opposition.

The second scale, composed of four votes on labor legislation, appears to rank the deputies along a "liberal-conservative" or "left-right" dimension more so than does the Partisan Issues Scale. On the Labor Scale, the pro-labor end is dominated by the Justicialistas, the

MID, UCRI, Christian Democrats, and both Socialist groups; concentrated at the anti-labor end are deputies of the conservative FNPC and the only scaled member of UDELPA. The Progressive Democrats were in an intermediate scale type, while members of the UCRP were spread across all four positions on the scale. Analysis by region uncovered no pattern to the UCRP vote; the dispersal of the bloc's deputies across the scale apparently was the result of personal ideology or other factors beyond the scope of this study.

The two remaining roll calls which would fit neither of the scales were analyzed separately as they seemed to reflect additional voting dimensions which might have yielded scales had there been more roll calls in the session. The first of these, a proposal to end tax exemptions of a number of private clubs, apparently presented a considerable amount of cross-pressure which divided the UCRP bloc and arranged the minor blocs in alignments unique for the session (this was the only roll call, for example, where the MID opposed the Justicialista bloc). In contrast to the tax question, the other roll call concerned an issue of specific regional interest and yielded a clear regional bias in the vote. A proposal that fourteen counties in southern Buenos Aires province be included in a regional electric power grid, the question drew the support of Buenos Aires deputies 46-14 while those of the Interior were about evenly divided and those of the Litoral tended to oppose the issue.

In summary, then, four different dimensions were found in the voting behavior of the 1965-1966 session of the Chamber of Deputies, although two of these are substantiated by only one roll call each.

These dimensions, in the order discussed, would appear to be (1) partisanship, (2) ideology, (3) unclassifiable, and (4) regional interests.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup>The Economist, January 9, 1960, pp. 118-119.
- <sup>2</sup>U.S. House of Representatives, Special Study Mission to Latin America (87th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 70, 1961), p. 16.
- <sup>3</sup>The Economist, November 21, 1959, p. 762.
- <sup>4</sup>International Monetary Fund, \$100,000,000 dollars; European banks, \$75,000,000 dollars; U.S. banks, \$75,000,000 dollars; and U.S. Treasury, \$50,000,000 dollars. U.S. House of Representatives, p. 16.
- <sup>5</sup>United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963 (New York, 1964), p. 172.
- <sup>6</sup>Orlando Martínez, "Plight of Argentina," Contemporary Review, CXCVII (June, 1960), 301; and David Heulin, "Conflicting Forces in Argentina," The World Today, XVIII (April, 1962), 145.
- <sup>7</sup>The Economist, December 24, 1960, p. 1322.
- <sup>8</sup>The principal speeches of the tour, in English translation, are reprinted in Arturo Frondizi, Argentina and Latin America (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1959).
- <sup>9</sup>Gabriel del Mazo, Breve historia del radicalismo (Buenos Aires: COEPLA, 1963), p. 125.
- <sup>10</sup>Arturo Frondizi, La política exterior argentina (Buenos Aires: Transición, 1962), pp. 169-177.
- <sup>11</sup>The Economist, August 26, 1961, p. 778.
- <sup>12</sup>New York Times, February 2, 1962, p. 1.
- <sup>13</sup>New York Times, October 28, 1961, p. 6.
- <sup>14</sup>New York Times, March 21, 1962, p. 16.
- <sup>15</sup>New York Times, March 27, 1962, p. 1.
- <sup>16</sup>James W. Rowe, Argentina: An Election Retrospect (American Universities Field Staff, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XI, February, 1964), pp. 8-9.
- <sup>17</sup>The terms azules and colorados, which originated during army maneuvers, came to be generally applied to the two factions during the September crisis and continued in common use. Previously, the

colorados were known as the gorilas and the more moderate faction went under the label of legalistas. See James W. Rowe, Argentina's Restless Military: An Analysis of the Role of the Armed Services in Argentine Politics (American Universities Field Staff, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XI, May, 1964), p. 24.

<sup>18</sup>The Economist, August 18, 1962, p. 596.

<sup>19</sup>Rowe, Election Retrospect, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup>New York Times, June 11, 1962, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup>Cited in Rowe, Election Retrospect, pp. 2, 14.

<sup>22</sup>Hispano-Americano, XLIII (June 10, 1963), 30-31.

<sup>23</sup>New York Times, May 28, 1963, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>In a newspaper interview, Frigerio was quoted as saying "My role is apparent. I am a friend of Perón and I am a friend of Frondizi. I am trying to unify and coordinate the forces they represent. Perón undoubtedly represents the great mass of the labor movement. Frondizi represents many businessmen, middle-class people, and some labor." New York Times, June 14, 1963, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup>Rowe, Election Retrospect, pp. 3-4.

<sup>26</sup>New York Times, July 14, 1963, p. 14.

<sup>27</sup>Hispano-Americano, XLV (May 4, 1964), 39.

<sup>28</sup>La Nación (Edición Aérea Internacional), November 9, 1964, p. 3.

<sup>29</sup>Peter Ranis, "Background to the 1965 Argentine Elections," The World Today, XXI (May, 1965), 204-206.

<sup>30</sup>Peter Ranis, "Peronismo Without Perón: Ten Years After the Fall (1955-1965)," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VIII (January, 1966), 119-120.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>32</sup>For further analysis of regional differences in class support for Perón, see Torcuato S. Di Tella, La teoría del primer impacto del crecimiento económico (Rosario, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Instituto de Sociología, 1965), and Darío Cantón, "Party Alignments in Argentina Between 1912 and 1955" (Paper presented to the International Political Science Association meeting in Brussels, September 18-23, 1967).

<sup>33</sup>Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Cámara de Diputados de la nación; su composición y comisiones (2nd ed.; Buenos Aires, 1965).

<sup>34</sup>These small blocs were: Confederación de Partidos Provinciales, and Demócrata Cristiano, each with four deputies; Socialista Argentino, three deputies; Autonomista and Socialista Democrático, each with two deputies; and Alianza Misionera and Unidad Nacional with one deputy each. Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>35</sup>October 28, 1965. Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Diario de Sesiones, 1965, p. 4870.

<sup>36</sup>April 20, 1966. Ibid., p. 7488.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION: CLASS AND REGION, 1916-1966

Six national elections and six subsequent sessions of the Chamber of Deputies have been analyzed in an attempt to trace the relative influence of class and region in Argentine politics since 1916. Each of the chapters summarized the quantitative findings for that particular time period and to some degree related these findings to those of earlier chapters and to the guiding concepts of the study. What remains to be done in this concluding chapter, therefore, is to take a brief look at some of the major trends over the fifty-year period and to evaluate the hypotheses in the light of these trends.

Tables VIII-1 through VIII-5 bring together the correlation coefficients of party vote with the most significant independent variables over the period of the study. The first four tables deal with census-derived factors, while Table VIII-5 summarizes the association with party support in the previous election analyzed. The factors chosen for the tables were selected on the basis of two criteria: (1) degree of correlation between related factors from different censuses and (2) strength of correlation coefficients between party vote and the factors. This allowed the selection of two independent variables spanning all six elections (urbanism and prosperous farming) and another two covering the period between 1936 and 1965 (industry and ranch-farm ratio), each of which showed a number of significant correlations with party vote.



Urbanism, the first factor to emerge in each of the three census periods, is traced over a fifty-year period in Table VIII-1. A considerable degree of continuity in correlation with this factor can be seen to exist for each major party grouping. Beginning with the Radicals, it can be seen that although the UCR began as an urban-based party it soon ceased to show any meaningful association with urbanism and in the case of Buenos Aires came to have a rather strong rural base of support. The Antipersonalistas showed a considerably stronger association with urbanism (except in the Litoral) in 1926 than did the Yrigoyen branch of the UCR, but in 1960 the UCRI was more strongly "rural" than the UCRP. Throughout the fifty-year period the Radicals of the Litoral tend to be the most urban--although at a rather low level after 1936--while those of Buenos Aires are the most rural.

Conservatives do not register a single positive correlation with urbanism from 1916 through 1960. Except in the Interior, where there is a declining association with ruralism, the coefficients indicate that conservative strength was limited largely to rural areas during both the earliest and latest elections under study--when it was in the opposition--but had more diffuse support in 1936 during the era of Concordancia rule. For the three elections with Peronista correlations, the only negative correlation with urbanism is a low  $-.17$  in the Interior in 1965. There is a low but consistently positive association with urbanism in 1946, a strong association in all areas but the Interior in 1960, and a continuing strong correlation in Buenos Aires in 1965, although the coefficient in the Litoral dropped sharply.

TABLE VIII-1  
URBANISM<sup>a</sup> AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965

Political Party and Region	National Deputies Election					
	1916	1926	1936	1946	1960	1965
Radicals <sup>b</sup>						
Nation	.31	.01 (.25)	.14	-.08	-.02 (-.32)	-.01
Buenos Aires	.15	-.24	-.02	-.38	-.44 (-.33)	-.34
Litoral	.38	.52 (.41)	.36	.09	.19 (-.30)	.22
Interior	.48	-.20 (.22)	.19	-.15	-.02 (-.15)	-.07
Conservatives						
Nation	-.37	-.28	-.13	-.24	-.35	
Buenos Aires	-.29	-.10	-.11	-.24	-.46	
Litoral	-.31	-.52	-.20	-.21	-.37	
Interior	-.54	-.47	-.24	-.29	-.02	
Peronistas						
Nation				.14	.44	.30
Buenos Aires				.27	.62	.55
Litoral				.18	.61	.18
Interior				.15	.18	-.17

<sup>a</sup>All correlation coefficients are with Factor I of the closest census: 1914 for 1916 and 1926, 1947 for 1936 and 1946, and 1960 for 1960 and 1965. The urbanism factors of 1914 and 1947 intercorrelate at .45; those of 1947 and 1960 register a coefficient of .69.

TABLE VIII-1 (Continued)

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<sup>b</sup>Correlations are for the UCR through 1946 and for the UCRP in the last two elections. Coefficients in parentheses represent the Antipersonalistas in 1926 and the UCRI in 1960.

Summarizing the connection between urbanism and voting, the findings for the conservatives and the Peronistas both conform quite closely to widely held impressions of those two groups--the first as based upon the rural landowners, the second as representing the urban working class. The case of the Radicals, however, brings into question much of the conventional opinion about that political sector. While there have been a few recent reinterpretations of Radicalism,<sup>1</sup> much that has been written and is still being written in Argentina and abroad pictures the Radicals as an urban-based, middle-class, progressive and modernizing political movement. While this may have been the case in 1916, such a definition of the Radicals in recent decades does not seem to be substantiated by their sources of electoral support.

Table VIII-2, also covering all six elections, correlates party vote with the tenancy factor of 1916 and the prosperous farming factors of 1947 and 1960. The 1916 tenancy factor correlates at .57 with the 1947 prosperous farming factor, while the latter factor correlates with its 1960 equivalent at -.81 (the sign is reversed on the 1960 and 1965 coefficients in Table VIII-2). Thus, over the fifty-year period this table represents the correlation of prosperous farming--especially grain farming--with party support.

Despite stronger intercorrelations of the different census factors, the coefficients in Table VIII-2 show less consistency than did those in the previous table. In contrast to the correlations with urbanism, it is not uncommon for a party to jump from insignificant to strong association with prosperous farming or to oscillate between positive and negative correlations from one election to another. The

TABLE VIII-2  
PROSPEROUS FARMING<sup>a</sup> AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965

Political Group and Region	Election of National Deputies					
	1916	1926	1936	1946	1960	1965
Radicals <sup>b</sup>						
Nation	-.03	.48 (.10)	.11	.12	.11 (-.38)	.14
Buenos Aires	-.08	.08	-.18	-.16	.12 (.35)	.04
Litoral	.55	.49 (.55)	.12	-.13	.27 (-.39)	.33
Interior	-.07	.46 (.06)	.23	.05	-.04 (-.43)	.00
Conservatives						
Nation	-.02	-.37	.03	-.51	-.18	
Buenos Aires	.04	.06	.13	-.35	.04	
Litoral	-.51	-.27	-.42	-.02	-.34	
Interior	.04	-.03	-.17	-.38	-.05	
Peronistas						
Nation				-.01	.07	-.21
Buenos Aires				.25	-.26	-.18
Litoral				-.06	.55	.17
Interior				.05	.16	-.28

<sup>a</sup>Correlation coefficients for 1916 and 1926 are with 1914 Census Factor III, those 1936 and 1946 are with 1947 Census Factor IV, and those for 1960 and 1965 are with 1960 Census Factor II with the sign reversed.

TABLE VIII-2 (Continued)

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<sup>b</sup>Correlations are for the UCR through 1946 and for the UCRP in the last two elections. Coefficients in parentheses represent the Antipersonalistas in 1926 and the UCRI in 1960.

UCR, for example, showed a national coefficient of .48 in 1926, while ranging between -.03 and .14 during the other five time periods. Similarly, conservative coefficients in Buenos Aires for 1936, 1946, and 1960 were .13, -.35, and .04, while Peronista coefficients in the Litoral went from -.06 in 1946 to .55 in 1960 and back to .17 in 1965.

The variability in Table VIII-2 probably is at least in part due to less stability in voting patterns among different farm groups than was found along the more constant urban-rural dimension. Thus, particular policies of administrations or particular problems of farmers in any given election year may have had a considerable influence on voting behavior despite the general stability of the underlying urban-rural conflict. With such wide variation in Table VIII-2, about all that can be said regarding the over-all position of the different political groups is that the Radicals tended to gain more support from areas of prosperous farming than did the conservatives--especially in the Litoral--but that in the last two elections the Radicals had to share this sector of Litoral support with the Peronistas.

Table VIII-3 shows the correlations of party vote with large industry during the last four elections analyzed. The elections of 1916 and 1926 could not be included in this table as there was no comparable factor in the 1914 census analysis. Despite some variability, it can be seen at a glance that the continuity in this table is more like that of urbanism than like the previous table.

The Radicals--including both the UCRP and the UCRI in 1960--show consistent negative correlations with large industry throughout the four elections. Conservatives also register a consistent negative

TABLE VIII-3  
INDUSTRY<sup>a</sup> AND PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965

Political Group and Region	Election of National Deputies			
	1936	1946	1960	1965
Radicals <sup>b</sup>				
Nation	-.21	-.23	-.30 (-.09)	-.27
Buenos Aires	-.02	-.37	-.28 (-.22)	-.29
Litoral	-.26	-.05	-.32 (-.23)	-.37
Interior	-.26	-.29	-.25 (-.25)	-.19
Conservatives				
Nation	-.04	.03	-.20	
Buenos Aires	-.05	-.27	-.32	
Litoral	.34	.19	.41	
Interior	-.07	-.09	-.11	
Peronistas				
Nation		.11	.14	.10
Buenos Aires		.41	.48	.43
Litoral		-.06	-.27	-.17
Interior		.24	.22	.19

<sup>a</sup>Correlation coefficients for 1936 and 1946 are with 1947 Census Factor VI with the sign reversed; those for 1960 and 1965 are with 1960 Census Factor IV.



TABLE VIII-3 (Continued)

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<sup>b</sup>Correlation coefficients for 1936 and 1946 are for the UCR; those for 1960 and 1965 are for the UCRP. The 1960 coefficients in parentheses are for the UCRI.

association with large industry--although it is often quite weak--in Buenos Aires and the Interior, but show a reverse pattern in the Litoral. The opposite situation is found in the case of the Peronistas, who show a steady, strong correlation with large industry in Buenos Aires, a weaker but still consistently positive association with this factor in the Interior, and negative correlations in the Litoral.

This regional variation in the conservatives and Peronistas can probably be explained in terms of the composition of the industry factor and the regional differences in what "large industry" might represent. It can be seen in Appendix A that in both 1947 and 1960 the industry factor was basically a combination of industry size in terms of personnel and the proportion of cash crops in the total agricultural production. Thus the industry factor represents both urban-based manufacturing and the agricultural industries associated with such crops as sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, and green tea. In Buenos Aires, the factor would primarily refer to urban manufacturing but in the Litoral it would consist primarily of operations connected with various cash crops. (An additional consideration in the Litoral might be the continuing strength of the conservative Liberales and Autonomistas in Corrientes.) In the Interior, the industry factor includes both the urban manufacturing centered around the city of Córdoba and the agricultural-based industries, such as sugar, in the northwest. Thus, while there is some Peronista support in the cash crop areas, it would seem that the primary strength of the Peronistas is among the urban industrial workers. Rather than basic regional differences in source of party support, therefore, the seeming inconsistencies among

conservatives and Peronistas in Table VIII-3 would seem to reflect regional differences in what the factor means. Had the factor been limited to urban manufacturing, the "deviation" of the Litoral may have disappeared.

Table VIII-4 contains the correlations between party vote and the ratio of ranches to farms within the agricultural sector. Because areas devoted to ranching and those where farming predominates often differ in social and economic structure,<sup>2</sup> this was considered to be a potentially important variable in accounting for voting patterns. Like the table dealing with prosperous farming, Table VIII-4 shows a considerable amount of fluctuation between time periods and between regions. The strongest correlation with ranching in the Interior, for example, is held by the conservatives in 1946, the UCRI in 1960, and the Peronistas in 1965. Nationally, the Peronistas show a correlation of  $-.22$  with ranching in 1960 and  $.24$  with the same factor five years later. As an example of regional variation, 1946 Radical vote correlated at  $-.27$  in Buenos Aires and  $.38$  in the Interior. In short, about the only long-term pattern that can be derived from Table VIII-4 is that in the Litoral the Radical vote tends to correlate rather strongly with areas of ranching.

The correlations between party support in succeeding elections, previously identified as a rough indicator of "party organization," are shown in Table VIII-5. Use of this measure of consistency in party support is based on the dual assumption of the imperfection of census data in measuring all social characteristics and the fact that even if all social variables could be measured there would remain a uniquely

TABLE VIII-4  
RANCH-FARM RATIO<sup>a</sup> AND PARTY  
VOTE, 1936-1965

Political Group and Region	Election of National Deputies			
	1936	1946	1960	1965
Radicals <sup>b</sup>				
Nation	.17	.15	.07 (.39)	.22
Buenos Aires	.03	-.27	.05 (.14)	.14
Litoral	.56	.22	.32 (-.06)	.33
Interior	.13	.38	.02 (.59)	.25
Conservatives				
Nation	.13	.15	.01	
Buenos Aires	-.04	-.20	.09	
Litoral	-.27	-.02	-.23	
Interior	.28	.66	.11	
Peronistas				
Nation		-.01	-.22	.24
Buenos Aires		.32	.04	-.03
Litoral		.06	.00	.11
Interior		-.22	-.37	.48

<sup>a</sup>Correlation coefficients for 1936 and 1946 are with 1947 Census Factor V, those for 1960 and 1965 with 1960 Census Factor V with the sign reversed.

TABLE VIII-4 (Continued)

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<sup>b</sup>Correlations for 1936 and 1946 are for the UCR; those for 1960 and 1965 represent the UCRP. The 1960 coefficients in parentheses are those of the UCRI.

TABLE VIII-5  
 CONTINUITY IN PARTY VOTE, 1916-1965<sup>a</sup>

Political Group and Region	Election of National Deputies				
	1926	1936	1946	1960	1965
Radicals <sup>b</sup>					
Nation	.01 (.39)	.29	.30	.41	.91
Buenos Aires	.21	-.06	.12	.56	.89
Litoral	.70 (.84)	.57	.11	.15	.96
Interior	-.23 (-.07)	.49	.57	.59	.85
Conservatives					
Nation	.17	-.19	-.04	.51	
Buenos Aires	.25	.06	.16	.53	
Litoral	.71	.72	.40	.33	
Interior	-.01	-.76	-.28	.45	
Peronistas					
Nation				.22	.42
Buenos Aires				.44	.61
Litoral				.12	.49
Interior				.41	.08
Incumbent Party Support <sup>c</sup>					
Interior	.06	.65	.46	-.17	.11

TABLE VIII-5 (Continued)

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<sup>a</sup>Correlation coefficients for the Radicals, conservatives, and Peronistas represent the correlation between their vote in the cited election and in the previous election analyzed.

<sup>b</sup>Correlations are for the UCR through 1946 and the UCRP in the last two elections. Coefficients in parentheses represent the correlation between Antipersonalista vote in 1926 and UCR vote in 1916.

<sup>c</sup>These coefficients for the Interior represent the correlation in that region between the vote for the incumbent party in the cited election and that for the incumbent party in the previous election analyzed.

"political" aspect of politics. In other words, even after all the relevant social characteristics were accounted for there would remain a number of voters whose party choice would depend upon such factors as past voting habits, being contacted by campaign workers, subjection to party propaganda, etc. It is the effect of these political aspects that the coefficients in Table VIII-5 attempt to measure in a crude way.

Looking first at the Radicals, it can be seen that nationally there is a gradual increase in consistency of vote over the five elections, rising from a coefficient of .01 in 1926 to .91 in 1965. (It will be noted, however, that the Antipersonalistas in 1926 correlated at .39 with the 1916 UCR vote at the national level.) Regionally, this same steady increase is shown by the Radicals in the Interior, while in both Buenos Aires and the Litoral the coefficients drop to low points of -.06 in the former region and .11 in the latter before beginning a pattern of increasing continuity. By 1965, the Radicals (UCRP) in all three regions show extremely high correlations with their 1960 vote.

Conservatives show relatively strong correlations in all regions with their earlier vote by 1960, but only in the Litoral does this group register a consistently strong though declining association with earlier elections. Peronistas, for whom only two-time correlations are possible, correlate the strongest with their former areas of support in Buenos Aires, with coefficients of .44 in 1960 and .61 in 1965. All coefficients are positive for the Peronistas, but vary considerably in magnitude in the Litoral and the Interior.



The last line of coefficients in Table VIII-5 is the correlation between the vote for the incumbent party at the time of each election and the vote in the previously analyzed election for the party that was then incumbent. As was noted in the appropriate chapters, in the Interior through 1946 the incumbent party in each election correlated more strongly with the previous "administration vote" than with its own support in the previous election. Thus, the Antipersonalista vote in 1926 correlated at .06 with the 1916 conservative vote (this is an insignificantly low coefficient, but it will be noted higher in the table that both the Antipersonalistas and the UCR in 1926 correlated negatively with the 1916 UCR vote). The "administration support" coefficients jump sharply for the next two elections, yielding coefficients of .65 between the 1926 Antipersonalistas and the 1936 Concordancia and .46 between the latter vote and the 1946 Peronistas. This pattern appears to end sometime between the elections of 1946 and 1960; in the last two elections analyzed, the incumbent party correlates much more strongly with its own former vote in the Interior than with the former administration vote.

Summarizing Table VIII-5, it can be seen that electoral politics became considerably more "structured" in the last two decades. With a few exceptions, both Radicals and conservatives in 1960 showed more consistency with their 1946 vote than between earlier elections, despite the longer time gap. Also, although there is no earlier basis for comparison, the Peronistas--as indicated by blank voting--registered a consistent correlation in 1960 with their 1946 vote. As noted above, it was also during this fourteen-year interval that

the pattern of supporting the incumbent party in the Interior gave way to consistent support for the party regardless of whether it was in or out of office. Finally, with the sole exception of the Interior Peronistas, the 1965 coefficients in Table VIII-5 are stronger than their 1960 counterparts. Whether because of better party organization or because of increased polarization among the electorate, voting patterns were much more consistent in the 1960's than in the 1920's and 1930's.

Like the patterns of popular elections, the voting behavior within the Chamber of Deputies became increasingly more tightly structured over the years covered by this study. Roll call voting in the sessions of 1916-1918 and 1926-1928 represented various issue dimensions; each dimension, furthermore, contained a number of deputies in the middle scale types as well as at opposite ends of the issue. Neither the conservatives nor the Radicals showed a great deal of cohesion on many of the roll calls during those sessions, and intraparty variation in voting often appeared to be at least in part based upon region.

By 1936, the voting lines within the chamber had become more sharply drawn. All but one of the roll calls of that session fit into a single Guttman scale despite a wide variety in issue content, indicating that the question of administration vs. opposition now took precedence over the particular content of a bill or motion. Despite this single voting dimension, however, the 1936-1938 chamber was not completely polarized; between the governing Concordancia bloc at one end of the scale and the opposition Radicals at the other were a number of deputies who supported the administration on some issues

and voted with the opposition on others.

The 1946-1948 session of the Chamber of Deputies yielded eight scales, as had the chamber of 1926-1928. These first two years under the presidency of Juan D. Perón represented a much more rigid alignment than had existed in the session two decades before, however. Whereas most of the fifty-six roll calls of the 1926-1928 session fit one of the scales, the great majority of the 275 roll calls in 1946-1948 were sharp party divisions between the Personalista bloc and the Radical minority and were of no value in scaling. Those few 1946-1948 votes which were useful in constructing scales represented cases where the Peronista bloc divided on an issue and some of its members voted with the opposition; rarely was there any voting deviation among the Radicals. And unlike earlier sessions, intra-bloc divisions seldom showed any regional pattern.

Of the six legislative sessions studied, that of 1960-1962 showed the most rigid voting structure. Both the UCRI and the UCRP, together holding all but fifteen of the chamber's 192 seats, maintained almost complete voting cohesion throughout the twenty-eight roll calls. There was a wide variety of questions which came up for roll call votes during the session, but to both the pro-administration UCRI bloc and the opposition UCRP the most important issue was clearly what position the other side was taking. Under such conditions where there was not only a single voting dimension but a virtual absence of any deputies in the role of "broker" between the opposite poles, there was little point in constructing a scale with the 1960-1962 votes.

Two scales were constructed from the roll calls of the 1965-1966

session, suggesting that the chamber had loosened up somewhat from the situation five years before. This renewed flexibility seems to be primarily the result of a change from the Sáenz Peña electoral system --which sometimes tended to create a de facto two-party system--to the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. Most of the party blocs in the 1965-1966 chamber continued to show a high level of voting cohesion, but the fact that there was a number of small blocs in addition to the two large groups--the administration's UCRP bloc and the Peronista bloc in opposition--allowed differing voting patterns based upon various alignments of the blocs.

The major hypothesis of this study has been that between 1916 and 1966 there was a discernible shift from geographic region to social class as the major dimension of political cleavage in Argentina. It is now time for a final evaluation of that hypothesis in the light of the analysis of elections and roll calls over the fifty-year period. Has regionalism in fact been replaced by social class as the major dimension of Argentine political cleavage?

It was noted early in the study that one of the major problems in testing the hypothesis would be the crude and perhaps inadequate indicators of "class" which were available. In addition to the limitations inherent in aggregate data analysis,<sup>3</sup> fundamental problems are presented by the absence of reliable class indicators in many Argentine censuses. Thus the use of the term "social class" in the present study must be understood to carry a very broad and general meaning. That is, rather than class in the sense of a specific pattern of stratification, the available indicators require that class

be defined in terms of group: urban vs. rural, prosperous farmers vs. subsistence farmers, etc. Interestingly, these group indicators represented by the factors derived from the three censuses often showed more significant correlations with voting patterns than did the specific 1947 class index which was used as a separate independent variable in the election analyses of 1936 and 1946.

The election analysis has shown that in many cases there was a significant association between such characteristics as urbanism, industrialization, or farming and support of a particular political party. There does not appear to be a general increase in the strength of such associations over the fifty-year period, as might be expected on the basis of the hypothesis.<sup>4</sup> However, the consistency of the correlations in many areas from one election to the next is rather convincing evidence of a socioeconomic or group basis to the vote throughout the period. Also, some interesting differences in correlation coefficients among the three analytic regions of Argentina lend support to the importance of regionalism in party support.

In terms of the indicators of class and region outlined in Chapter I, then, the elections throughout the fifty-year period show elements of both types of cleavage. There are cases--such as the conservative association with ruralism--where a party consistently shows similar sources of electoral strength in all three geographic regions. On the other hand, there are a number of examples of correlations varying considerably from one region to the next; the Radicals often appeared to be an urban party in the Litoral, a rural

party in Buenos Aires. Looking only at the election analysis, therefore, one would reasonably conclude that both region and "class" have been important bases of cleavage throughout the period under study but that there is no convincing evidence of a decided shift from one to the other. What is perhaps the most striking change over time is the sharp increase in the consistency of voting patterns after 1946.

But the indicators of class and region set out in Chapter I were based upon both electoral support and voting behavior in the Chamber of Deputies. In contrast to the findings in the election analysis, patterns of roll call voting show a definite decline in the manifestation of regionalism since 1916. As the parties became more national in scope and organization, there was an increasing degree of party cohesion within the chamber. In the early sessions there tended to be several issue dimensions, some of them clearly regional differences between the extreme and central scale types. In the latter sessions, in contrast, government vs. opposition was often the only meaningful dimension of cleavage and there was less of a regional basis to position on that dimension. If one were to look only at the roll call analysis, there would thus seem to be evidence of a considerable decline in regionalism since 1916.

Considering both forms of analysis together, however, a more complicated pattern seems to emerge. Since a steady decline in the manifestation of regional differences within the Chamber of Deputies has not been accompanied by a similar decline in regional differences in voting patterns, there would seem to have been a suppression rather than an elimination of regionalism. During the 1916-1930 Radical Era,

when even "national" parties such as the UCR were largely confederations of provincial parties and Buenos Aires had not yet achieved quite such an immense economic and demographic domination over the rest of the nation, regional political differences were dealt with openly and were often evident in the Chamber of Deputies as well as in election campaigns and voting results. With the increasing centralization of control over the major national political parties and the ever-increasing political power of Buenos Aires--disproportionate population growth manifested politically through reapportionment of the Chamber of Deputies--a different pattern developed. There continued to be regional differences in bases of party support, but these apparent indicators of regional interests were less frequently translated into roll call votes in the chamber. The party position was what mattered.

The foregoing comments are not intended to imply that all regional differences were unable to "surface" in the political system of the 1950's and 1960's. There continued to be some regional differences in party strength--such as the UCRP and the UCRI in 1960--which could be said to be regional representation in partisan guise.<sup>5</sup> Also, no doubt, many regional differences were worked out in party bloc caucus and compromises reached before an issue came to the chamber floor. Until an analysis such as this one is complemented with a detailed study of regional interest articulation and campaign strategies on the one hand and an examination of the decision-making process within legislative blocs on the other, the conclusion regarding

the "suppression" of regional differences can be no more than suggestive. Still, it does suggest a pattern of regional relations reaching back at least to the porteño constitutions of 1819 and 1827.



Notes

<sup>1</sup>See Chapter 2, Note 1.

<sup>2</sup>On rural conditions, see Carl C. Taylor, Rural Life in Argentina (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), and James R. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas: A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964).

<sup>3</sup>For a discussion of some problems of aggregate data analysis, see W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), 351-357.

<sup>4</sup>Although the correlations for any given party do not indicate a marked increase in class voting over the fifty-year period, there has been more class polarization since the emergence of the Peronistas than before. Prior to 1946, no party was able to claim such extensive and consistent support from the working class.

<sup>5</sup>As an indication that perhaps Argentine politicians themselves sometimes do not see the regional dimensions underlying some of their partisan and ideological conflicts, a Peronista who served as a deputy in the 1965-1966 session seemed surprised when the author in a 1967 interview pointed out that the split in the Peronista bloc in early 1966 was largely along Buenos Aires vs. Interior lines. The division --which did not break the bloc's voting cohesion--was over the recurring issue of loyalty to the exiled leader's orders for intransigence vs. a union-based "peronismo without Perón." After thinking about it for a moment, the ex-deputy agreed that it had been mostly the Interior members of the bloc who had formed the new hard-line faction, but said he had not thought about it in regional terms before.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A  
METHODOLOGY: ELECTION ANALYSIS

Due to the half-century of Argentine history which the present study spans, three sets of ecological variables were used in the analysis of voting data. By utilizing the last three national censuses --those of 1914, 1947, and 1960--it was possible to keep to a maximum of about thirteen years the distance in time between any particular election and the census from which variables were derived to use in that year's analysis. The number and nature of variables differed considerably from one census to the next, but, as will be seen below, certain major underlying dimensions could be extracted for all three census periods.

The variables from each census period were subjected to factor analysis in an attempt both to find the minimum number of "basic" variables reflected by the census data and to discover similar dimensions from one census to another which might underlie superficially different census indicators. The factor scores--the "loading" of each departamento or county on each of the factors--were used in the multiple regression analysis with the election data. The orthogonal method of factor analysis was utilized, with Varimax rotation. Variable communalities were set at unity in all cases, and the number of factors to be rotated was set at the lesser of (1) ten factors, or (2) all factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater. This procedure

resulted in four factors for the 1914 data, ten for the 1947 data, and seven for 1960. The original variables and the factors obtained for each of these time periods will be discussed in separate sections below.

### 1914 Census

The factor analysis of data from the third national census of 1914 involved fifteen variables. Five of these dealt with population characteristics and ten were related to agriculture and ranching. No data were available on urban economic activities or social characteristics. The fifteen variables utilized were:

1. Total population in 1914.
2. Population growth. (Average rate of population increase per year since the previous census in 1895.)
3. Population density. (Population per km<sup>2</sup>.)
4. Per cent urban. (Proportion of total population living in places containing 2,000 or more residents.)
5. Per cent foreign-born.
6. Farm tenure.<sup>1</sup> (Proportion of all farms which are owner-operated.)
7. Large farming. (Proportion of all farms which exceed 500 hectares in size.)
8. Ranch tenure. (Proportion of all livestock establishments which are owner-operated.)
9. Large ranching. (Proportion of all livestock establishments which exceed 5,000 hectares in size.)

10. Rural tenure. (Proportion of all agricultural establishments which are owner-operated.)

11. Farm-ranch ratio; establishments. (Per cent farms of all agricultural establishments.)

12. Farm-ranch ratio; area. (Proportion of total hectares devoted to agriculture which are in farms.)

13. Farm size. (Average size of farms in hectares.)

14. Ranch size. (Average size of ranches in hectares.)

15. All-agriculture size. (Average size of all agricultural establishments.)

The rotated factor matrix obtained from these variables is shown in Table A-1. The four factors which emerged with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 account for 70 per cent of the total variance of the fifteen variables, while the communalities ( $h^2$ ) show that only in the case of total population and population density did the four factors fail to account for at least half of the variance of each individual variable. This, plus the fact that each of the fifteen variables had a loading of at least .61 on one of the factors, would indicate that the four factors are an accurate representation of the basic dimensions underlying the original census indicators.

The composition and interpretation of the four factors or dimensions represented by the census indicators is as follows:

Factor 1. This was the strongest factor to emerge from the analysis, accounting for 30 per cent of the total variance of all variables. All five population variables load heavily on this factor,

TABLE A-1  
1914 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

Variable	Factor				$h^2$
	I	II	III	IV	
11 Farm-ranch ratio	<u>.81</u>	-.21	-.02	.04	.71
12 Farm-ranch ratio, area	<u>.77</u>	-.30	.03	.18	.73
5 Foreign-born	<u>.73</u>	-.04	<u>.47</u>	.19	.80
2 Population growth	<u>.72</u>	.16	.26	.28	.69
1 Total population	<u>.65</u>	-.08	.08	-.07	.45
4 Urban residential	<u>.64</u>	.01	.30	-.20	.54
3 Population density	<u>.61</u>	.04	-.04	.29	.45
9 Large ranching	-.03	<u>.94</u>	-.01	.11	.89
14 Ranch size	-.01	<u>.90</u>	-.05	.06	.82
15 All-agriculture size	-.28	<u>.87</u>	.05	.18	.88
10 Rural tenure	-.20	.07	<u>-.93</u>	-.10	.92
8 Ranch tenure	-.04	.00	<u>-.88</u>	.07	.78
6 Farm tenure	-.14	-.05	<u>-.79</u>	-.18	.67
13 Farm size	.01	.02	.11	<u>.77</u>	.60
7 Large farming	-.02	.30	.04	<u>.68</u>	.56
% of total variance	30.2	19.8	12.2	7.7	69.9

as do the two indicators of ratio of farms to livestock establishments. As these loadings are all positive, a high score on this factor would indicate (1) large population, (2) rapid population growth, (3) high population density, (4) a high proportion of the population living in urban areas, (5) a high proportion of foreign-born residents, and (6) a predominance of farming over agricultural activities dealing with livestock. When it is recalled that in 1914 one-fourth of the population of Argentina was foreign-born and that these immigrants were concentrated in the urban areas, the fifth item also seems clearly to be an indicator of urbanism. Agriculture of any sort might be expected to correlate negatively with urbanization, but to the extent that areas of an urban county are used for agricultural purposes it would seem most plausible that they would contain truck farming and other concentrated types of crop farming rather than pastureland. If this interpretation is accurate, these variables would thus also seem to be valid indicators of urbanization. Factor I, therefore, seems to reflect a broad urban-rural dimension and will be labeled "urbanism."

Factor II. The second strongest factor accounts for another 20 per cent of the total variance and has high loadings for three variables. The positive loadings of from .87 to .94 for average ranch size, average size of all agricultural establishments, and proportion of livestock establishments of more than 5,000 hectares mark this factor clearly as one dealing with the scale of livestock establishments. The fact that the variable combining the average size of all agricultural establishments loads heavily on this factor and not on Factor

IV which deals with farm size can be explained by the fact that live-stock establishments, due to their considerably larger size, influenced this variable much more than did the size of farms. Factor II will be called "ranch scale."

Factor III. This factor, accounting for 12 per cent of the total variance among census variables, also has high loadings for three variables. The highest loading of  $-.93$  is with rural tenure, followed with slightly lower loadings of  $-.88$  for ranch tenure and  $-.79$  for farm tenure. These strong negative loadings of variables dealing with ownership identify this factor as a dimension of rural tenancy. The higher the score on this factor, the lower will be the proportion of agricultural establishments--both farms and ranches--which are operated by the owners. Although in some cases the non-owner operator is a hired manager and in some isolated departamentos non-ownership is accounted for by utilization of government lands, the census indicates that the great majority of agricultural establishments which are not owned by the operator are on rented land. It will also be noted that variable No. 5, per cent foreign-born, has a moderately high loading of  $.47$  on this factor. This conforms to the historical pattern discussed in Chapter I in which the immigrants who did leave the cities and go into agricultural activities did so primarily on rented land--particularly in the grain-growing areas of the Litoral. (It will be seen below that this factor correlates relatively strongly with a 1947 factor more specifically identifiable with the immigrant farms of Buenos Aires and the Litoral.) It seems clear, then, that Factor III warrants the name of "rural tenancy."



Factor IV. The last factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 deals with farm size. Accounting for 8 per cent of the total variance, Factor IV has relatively high loadings for the variables dealing with average farm size and the proportion of farms which are larger than 500 hectares. This factor will be labeled "farm scale."

Although the author would disagree with those critics who discredit factor analytic techniques generally because of the alleged "artificiality" of the newly generated variables or factors, it is true that one can obtain factors which are more artifacts of the process than manifestations of strong intercorrelations among original variables. In order to judge the validity of a factor and to identify such artifactual factors, it is useful to examine a correlation matrix for all variables with high loadings on each of the factors. Table A-2 contains such matrices for the four 1914 factors.

The correlation matrix for Factor I indicates that it is without doubt a valid factor representing a "real" underlying dimension which is variously reflected by the census variables. At the same time, the broad range in correlation coefficients as well as the diverse nature of the variables included argues for a broad definition of the term "urbanism." The factor obviously represents more than simply the proportion of the population living in urban areas; while the term "urbanism" has been chosen here, the factor could perhaps as well have been labeled "development" or "modernization."<sup>2</sup>

In the case of Factor II, the correlation matrix in Table A-2 shows a strong intercorrelation among the three original variables and

TABLE A-2  
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR 1914 FACTORS

Factor I						
Variable	12	5	2	1	4	3
11	.76	.62	.52	.37	.39	.30
12		.60	.45	.41	.34	.41
5			.74	.39	.52	.27
2				.41	.42	.26
1					.48	.37
4						.42
Factor II						
Variable	14	15	Factor III			
9	.81	.83	Variable	8	6	5
14		.73	10	.79	.76	-.59
			8		.48	-.42
			6			-.44
Factor IV						
Variable	7					
13	.29					

leaves little doubt of the validity of the factor. The matrix for Factor III shows a moderate correlation of .48 between the discrete variables of farm tenure and ranch tenure, while each expectedly correlates more strongly with the composite variable of rural tenure. The foreign-born variable, in turn, shows a correlation of -.42 and -.44 with the two types of agricultural ownership and -.59 with the composite tenure variable. As the tenure variables all are based on the proportion of establishments which are owner-operated, the negative correlations of course reflect the high rate of tenancy among immigrants. The intercorrelation among these four variables strongly supports the validity of Factor III as a dimension dealing with rural tenancy.

On the basis of intercorrelation, Factor IV is by far the weakest of those emerging from the 1914 census data. The only two variables with moderately heavy loadings on this factor show an intercorrelation of only .29. This may in part be the result of the arbitrary selection of 500 hectares as the cutting point for "big farms"; the fact that the nationwide mean for this variable is 2.4 per cent compared to 4.4 per cent for the ranching counterpart would indicate that perhaps the definition of "large farms" should have been set lower. Had this been done, it is possible there would have been a closer association between large farms and average farm size. In any case, the conceptual similarity of these two variables would seem to minimize the problem of the low intercorrelation and allow Factor IV to safely be utilized as a dimension of "farm scale."

Finally, it will be recalled from the rotated factor matrix that the variables with the lowest communalities--.45 in each case--were

total population and population density. It will be seen below that in the 1947 analysis these are among the very few variables which show a moderately high loading on more than one factor; they load on a strong urbanism factor as they do here and then again on a more specific factor which--if it has any conceptual significance--would seem to perhaps reflect urban fringe areas or maybe a more "traditional" or "less modernized" type of urbanization. The unrotated factor matrix for 1914 indicates that a rather similar second factor involving these two variables might have emerged had the prescribed minimum eigenvalue not limited the rotated matrix to four factors. This has no bearing on the 1914 factors being used in the election analysis, but it is worth noting both as an explanation of the relatively low communalities and as an indication of the consistency of underlying dimensions from one time period to another.

#### 1947 Census

A considerably greater number and variety of census variables was available for the 1947 factor analysis than for either that of 1914 or 1960. This was due in part to the format of the published results of the 1947 census, but it was mostly made possible because a number of variables obtained by Argentine sociologist Torcuato S. Di Tella from unpublished census data, from special censuses, and from the data files of the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires, as well as from the 1947 census, were available to the author.<sup>3</sup> A total of thirty-four variables are used in the factor analysis--thirty from the Di Tella data and an additional four taken directly from the published volumes

of the 1947 census. These variables are:

1. Total population in 1947.
2. Population growth. (Average rate of population increase per year since the previous census in 1914.)
3. Per cent urban residential. (Proportion of total population living in places containing 2,000 or more residents.)
4. Per cent foreign-born.
5. Economically active population in 1947.
6. Total urban occupational. (Per cent of economically active population engaged in secondary, tertiary, and extractive activities.)
7. Secondary urban occupational. (Per cent of economically active population engaged in industrial activities.)
8. Tertiary urban occupational. (Per cent of economically active population engaged in business and services.)
9. Mining occupational. (Per cent of economically active population engaged in mining.)
10. Urban class index. (Urban middle class divided by urban laboring class.)
11. Urban middle class dependency. (Number of self-employed members of the urban middle class divided by the total members of the class.)
12. Business size. (Total number of business employees and self-employed divided by the total number of business firms.)
13. Industry size. (Total number of industrial employees and laborers divided by the total number of industrial firms.)

14. Rural occupational. (Per cent of economically active population engaged in agricultural and other primary activities with the exception of mining.)

15. Rural class index R2. (Rural middle class divided by rural laboring class.)

16. Rural class index R3. (While the previous index was limited strictly to agricultural personnel, this one includes persons whose occupation is mainly urban but who classify as rural middle class on the basis of ownership of rural property.)

17. All-agriculture size; area. (Average size of all agricultural establishments in hectares.)

18. All-agriculture size; personnel. (Active rural population divided by the number of agricultural establishments.)

19. Rural occupational instability. (Number of temporary rural workers divided by the number of permanent salaried rural workers.)

20. Rural tenure. (Number of self-employed landowners divided by the total number of agricultural supervisors.)

21. Production per capita. (Value of production per capita for 1953 in 1953 pesos.)

22. Population density. (Population per km<sup>2</sup>.)

23. Illiteracy. (Per cent of population over 14 years of age that is illiterate.)

24. Family size. (Average number of persons per family.)

25. Index of male population. (Male population over the age of 14 divided by total population over that age.)

26. Non-paying jobs. (Percentage of non-paying jobs from total active population over 14 years of age. Non-paying jobs include housekeepers and students, but not retired persons or the unemployed.)

27. Cereals and oils. (Percentage of the gross combined product of cereals and oils at cost value from the total agricultural product. The total agricultural product excludes fishing, mining, and timber.)

28. Cattle. (Percentage of the gross product of cattle at cost value from the total agricultural product.)

29. Sheep and wool. (Percentage of the gross product of sheep and wool at cost value from total agricultural product.)

30. Cash crops. (Percentage of the gross combined product of sugar cane, tobacco, indigo, tapioca, hemp, cotton, green tea, etc. at cost value from total agricultural product.)

31. Truck farming. (Percentage of the gross combined product of vegetables, fruits, vineyards, and flowers at cost value from the total agricultural product.)

32. Animal husbandry. (Percentage of the gross combined product of hogs, rabbits, and poultry at cost value from the total agricultural product.)

33. Dairy farming. (Percentage of the gross product of dairy farming at cost value from the total agricultural product.)

34. Mining production. (Percentage of gross value of mining at cost value from the total agricultural product. Since mining is not a component of the total agricultural product, this variable can exceed 100 per cent.)

While all population variables in the preceding list are for the year 1947, some of the economic variables are from the early 1950's. Thus, variables 16 through 20 are for the year 1952, variables 21 and 27 through 34 pertain to 1953, and variables 12 and 13 are for 1954. The remaining eighteen variables are for 1947.

The rotated factor matrix obtained from these variables is shown in Table A-3. The ten factors together account for 67.5 per cent of the total variance among all variables, although only the first factor explains more than 10 per cent of the total variance and the last six factors each explain less than 5 per cent. The introduction of a large number of diverse social and economic variables in the 1947 analysis thus appears to have resulted in a considerably more complex pattern of dimensions yielding factors more specific--and at times less clear--than those of the 1914 analysis.

The 1947 factors are:

Factor 1. As it did in 1914, urbanism clearly accounts for the first and strongest factor to emerge in 1947. Accounting for 21.1 per cent of the total variance--more than twice that explained by the next strongest factor--the urbanism factor has loadings of from .65 to .95 for seven variables and moderately high loadings of .45 to .49 for another four variables. Scoring highest on this factor are the complementary variables urban occupational and rural occupational with loadings of .95 and -.95 respectively. Following these are tertiary urban occupational, urban residential, urban middle class dependency, secondary urban occupational, and population density. Loading on the urbanism factor at between .45 and .49 are total population and



TABLE A-3  
1947 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

Variable	Factor		
	I	II	III
6 Urban occupational	<u>.95</u>	-.03	.07
14 Rural occupational	<u>-.95</u>	.03	-.05
8 Tertiary urban occupational	<u>.85</u>	.10	-.14
3 Urban residential	<u>.78</u>	.10	.06
11 Urban middle class dependency	<u>.75</u>	.06	-.10
7 Secondary urban occupational	<u>.67</u>	.09	.27
22 Population density	<u>.65</u>	.10	.38
9 Mining occupational	.02	<u>-.84</u>	.04
29 Sheep and wool	.00	<u>-.80</u>	-.15
34 Mining production	-.02	<u>-.68</u>	-.07
15 Rural class index R2	-.13	<u>-.67</u>	.10
17 All-agriculture size; area	-.11	-.09	<u>-.78</u>
27 Cereals and oils	.00	.09	.01
4 Foreign-born	<u>.45</u>	-.17	.19
21 Production per capita	.17	.09	.07
28 Cattle	-.11	.16	<u>-.49</u>
18 All-agriculture size; personnel	-.02	.17	-.12
16 Rural class index R3	-.14	-.34	.07
31 Truck farming	.12	.06	<u>.40</u>

TABLE A-3 (Extension)

IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	$h^2$
.06	.01	-.12	.03	.10	-.03	.03	.94
-.03	-.09	.10	-.02	-.08	.04	-.02	.93
-.03	.01	.23	.00	.13	-.01	.15	.85
.34	-.02	.05	.05	.26	-.02	.10	.82
-.05	-.23	.02	-.07	.01	.16	.06	.66
.16	.04	<u>-.45</u>	.08	.05	-.05	-.11	.77
.12	-.05	-.11	.08	.33	.04	-.08	.74
-.06	-.09	-.08	-.08	-.11	.03	-.02	.75
.07	.03	.07	.12	-.11	.01	-.11	.72
.01	.05	-.11	-.16	.03	.01	-.06	.51
-.20	.20	.09	.12	.08	.07	.12	.61
-.08	-.12	-.02	.01	-.06	-.02	-.13	.68
<u>.79</u>	.08	.17	-.15	.14	-.02	.02	.71
<u>.66</u>	-.15	.02	.05	.13	.03	-.05	.75
<u>.62</u>	-.34	.04	-.06	.00	.10	.21	.60
-.11	<u>.67</u>	.07	.01	-.17	.10	.05	.78
.08	<u>-.67</u>	-.24	-.11	.02	-.07	.08	.58
-.37	<u>.63</u>	.06	.09	.02	.01	-.10	.68
-.39	<u>-.63</u>	.20	.00	.08	-.09	-.34	.89

TABLE A-3 (Continued)

Variable	Factor		
	I	II	III
32 Animal husbandry	.04	.08	.23
13 Industry size	.19	-.13	-.04
30 Cash crops	-.12	.10	.04
25 Index of male population	-.01	-.01	-.11
1 Total population	<u>.47</u>	.06	.12
5 Active population	<u>.47</u>	.06	.12
20 Rural tenure	.05	.00	.02
23 Illiteracy	.03	-.10	.03
24 Family size	.11	-.02	.02
33 Dairy farming	.11	.06	.14
2 Population growth	<u>.49</u>	-.12	.17
10 Urban class index	-.32	.19	.13
19 Rural occupational instability	-.16	-.07	-.20
26 Non-paying jobs	.06	-.03	-.01
12 Business size	.25	.24	-.19
% of total variance	21.1	9.4	8.1

TABLE A-3 (Extension)

IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	$h^2$
-.02	<u>.58</u>	.03	-.22	.10	-.03	.09	.47
-.05	.03	<u>-.81</u>	-.04	.05	.00	-.07	.73
-.15	-.25	<u>-.74</u>	.09	.01	-.01	.02	.67
-.15	-.05	.02	<u>.76</u>	.25	-.07	.06	.69
.09	.02	-.05	.02	<u>.78</u>	.11	-.04	.88
.14	.01	-.04	.03	<u>.77</u>	.12	-.05	.87
.07	-.03	-.23	.04	.08	<u>-.64</u>	-.15	.51
.06	-.04	-.22	-.02	.26	<u>.59</u>	.02	.48
.07	.16	-.07	.12	.01	<u>.52</u>	-.38	.48
.14	.05	.04	.08	.01	.06	<u>.77</u>	.67
.06	-.14	-.13	-.05	.13	.03	-.32	.45
.32	.32	<u>.42</u>	.14	.22	-.18	.07	.64
.13	-.09	.07	<u>-.42</u>	.18	-.16	-.14	.36
<u>-.40</u>	.04	.03	<u>-.49</u>	.31	.02	.18	.53
.39	-.12	.10	.01	.39	-.14	.22	.56
6.1	4.7	4.4	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.2	67.5

economically active population, per cent foreign-born, and population growth rate. As before, this first factor will be labeled "urbanism."

Factor II. Although it could be interpreted as a "mining" or "sheep and wool" dimension, this factor seems to more plausibly be a measure of rural social class. Because the economic activities of mining and sheepraising are significant in only a small proportion of the 347 departamentos involved in the 1947 analysis,<sup>4</sup> variables 9, 29, and 34 are very low--often zero--for a great many of the cases. The class index represented by variable 15, on the other hand, is relevant regardless of the specific type of rural economic activity which predominates in an area. Because the rural class index thus has a much less "skewed" distribution than the other three variables loading heavily on this factor, it seems reasonable to interpret Factor II as a rural class dimension. The presence of mining and sheepraising on this factor simply indicates that in Argentina the latifundia are found on the plains and lowlands of Buenos Aires, the Litoral, and the eastern Interior--areas generally lacking both mining and sheep activities. Factor II therefore will be labeled "rural class."

Factor III. This factor shows a strong negative loading of  $-.78$  for all-agriculture size in hectares and moderate loadings of  $-.49$  for cattle and  $.40$  for truck farming. It would thus seem to represent a continuum running from small farms at the positive end to large cattle establishments at the negative extreme. The fact that the strong negative loading of the variable dealing with the area of agricultural establishments is not accompanied by a significant loading for that

dealing with agricultural personnel would indicate a rather concentrated, intensive cultivation at the positive end of the dimension. This factor will tentatively be called "truck farming," although it is understood that at its negative end it refers to large ranching.

Factor IV. The combined high positive loadings of cereals and oils, per cent foreign-born, and production per capita rather clearly identify this factor as one dealing primarily with the immigrant-dominated grain areas of northern Buenos Aires province and the Litoral. Following the same reasoning outlined in the case of Factor II, this factor will be labeled "prosperous farming" on the basis of the foreign-born and per capita production variables rather than basing the definition on the more narrow variable of grain and oils.

Factor V. This factor shows heavy positive loadings for cattle, the rural class index R3, and animal husbandry, plus negative loadings for all-agriculture size in personnel and for truck farming. In addition, it can be seen that the high loading on the R3 index is not accompanied by a significant loading on the R2 rural class index, and that production per capita loads at  $-.34$ . All of this would appear to identify Factor V as a dimension dealing with a combination of part-time and subsistence ranching. It will be called "small ranching," although at the negative end it would likely represent large farming.

Factor VI. Loadings of  $-.81$  for industry size and  $-.74$  for cash crops combined with loadings of  $-.45$  for secondary urban occupational and  $.42$  for the urban class index mark this factor as a measure of the scale of industry. Reversing the polarity of the loadings, the factor

represents a high average number of employees per industrial firm, a high proportion of the agricultural product coming from cash crops, a moderately high proportion of the urban labor force engaged in secondary activities, and a corresponding predominance of the urban laboring class over the urban middle class. The high loading of cash crops on what might be generally thought to be a strictly urban type of factor can be explained by the fact that this factor also appears to include the more "traditional" forms of industry such as sugar processing, cigar-making, etc., which are frequently located in the agricultural zones. Factor VI will be labeled "industry scale," and it must be remembered that because of the polarity of the loadings a negative factor score means large industry and vice versa.

Factor VII. This factor presents some difficulty in interpretation, showing a high loading only on the index of male population and moderately strong negative loadings on rural occupational instability and non-paying jobs. Reversing the polarity in an effort to aid interpretation, the factor would seem to perhaps reflect areas of unstable rural employment from which a considerable number of the men have migrated. With reference to the negative end of the dimension, therefore, this factor will be labeled "out-migration."

Factor VIII. At first glance, this factor would seem to be merely an indication of the size of the counties, conceptually a rather meaningless variable and often little more than a reflection of urbanization. Loadings of .25 for the index of male population and .26 for illiteracy--variables which load at -.01 and .03 on the urbanism factor--suggest that Factor VIII might in part be the reverse of the

previous factor, an indicator of in-migration to the fringes of the urban areas. On the other hand, a loading of only .13 for population growth--compared to that variable's loading of .49 on Factor I--would seem to argue against interpreting this factor as a measure of in-migration. As suggested earlier, it also might represent a more "traditional" type of urbanism, lacking the immigrants, the industry, and the growth rate of the "modern" urban areas. If in fact this factor represents nothing but population size, it should either show no significant correlation with voting patterns or should closely parallel the correlations of the urbanism factor; if it seems to correlate independently at a significant level, this would appear to indicate some additional meaning to the factor. Factor VIII will tentatively be called "paraurbanism," with a final evaluation of its validity postponed until further analysis.

Factor IX. This factor would seem to be a measure of rural "traditionalism" or perhaps rural poverty. On the basis of the original polarity, a high score on Factor IX appears to represent a high rate of tenancy, widespread illiteracy, and large families. This factor will be designated as "rural traditionalism."

Factor X. The last factor to emerge from the 1947 analysis appears to be a single-variable factor dealing with dairy farming. After a loading of .77 for the dairy farming variable, the next highest loadings on this factor are -.38 for family size, -.34 for truck farming, and -.32 for population growth. This factor will be called "dairy farming."



Following the procedure used in the 1914 analysis, the correlation matrices for the variables loading heavily on each of the factors will be examined as a means of checking the validity of the factors. These matrices are shown in Table A-4.

The matrix for Factor I once again leaves little doubt as to the strength and validity of the urbanism factor, showing a varied array of solid coefficients within the .40-.50 loading range as well as for those variables loading on the factor at .50 and above. Factor II also clearly represents a "real" intercorrelation among original variables, with only the association between rural class index R2 and the value of mining production falling below .40. Moving on to Factor III, however, it can be seen that while truck farming and cattle correlate well at -.61, each of these variables shows a relatively low correlation with size of agricultural establishments. When this is considered along with the fact that size loaded on this factor at -.78 while cattle and truck farming had loadings of only -.49 and .40 respectively, Factor III seems a better indicator of agriculture scale than of agriculture type. In view of this, the label "all-agriculture scale" will be substituted for the original name of "truck farming" given to the factor.

Although no two of the three variables loading the heaviest on Factor IV intercorrelate at more than .50, the matrix is solid enough to support the original designation of this factor as one dealing with prosperous farming. The fact that non-paying jobs loads on this factor at -.40 but does not correlate with any of the principal three variables with a coefficient of more than -.13 indicates that this variable is

TABLE A-4

Factor I										
Variable	14	8	3	11	7	22	4	1	5	2
6	-.98	.82	.76	.62	.77	.67	.47	.53	.52	.44
14		-.82	-.75	-.60	-.75	-.64	-.43	-.51	-.50	-.42
8			.70	.65	.33	.48	.29	.45	.43	.26
3				.56	.55	.67	.56	.58	.58	.36
11					.32	.44	.35	.35	.35	.32
7						.64	.45	.43	.44	.40
22							.49	.60	.61	.42
4								.36	.41	.40
1									.99	.35
5										.35

Factor II			Factor III			
Variable	29	34	15	Variable	28	31
9	.56	.53	.45	17	.23	-.10
29		.42	.48	28		-.61
34			.23			

TABLE A-4 (Continued)

Factor IV				Factor V			
Variable	4	21	26	Variable	18	16	31 32
27	.48	.38	-.13	28	-.34	.34	-.61 .13
4		.49	-.11	18		-.50	.22 -.25
21			-.08	16			-.20 .26
				31			-.23
Factor VI				Factor VII			
Variable	30	7	10	Variable	19	26	
13	.43	.42	-.36	25	-.09	-.09	
30		.17	-.32	19		.02	
7			-.22				
Factor VIII				Factor IX			
Variable	5	23	25	Variable	23	24	
1	.99	.17	.05	20	-.09	-.05	
5		.17	.05	23		.15	
23			.04				
Factor X							
Variable	24						
33	-.05						

of little conceptual significance to the factor. The matrix for Factor V contains a number of relatively weak correlations between variables which load strongly on the factor, but the fact that five variables which are conceptually related do load well on the factor seems sufficient "validation" when added to the correlation matrix. The original designation of this variable will therefore remain unchanged. In the case of Factor VI, the correlation matrix seems sufficient to support the validity and original interpretation of the dimension. The lowest correlation, .17 between secondary urban occupational and cash crops, is to be expected due to the "incompatibility" between urbanism and agriculture. Correlations of .42 and .43 between industry size on the one hand and urban secondary occupational and cash crops on the other support the original interpretation of this factor as covering both urban industry and the more "traditional" types of industry related to agriculture.

Factor VII, which was thought to be a measure of out-migration, seems seriously weakened by an examination of its correlation matrix. The index of male population correlates at only -.09 with both rural occupational instability and non-paying jobs, while the latter two variables intercorrelate at only .02. To the extent that a low ratio of males is an indicator of out-migration, the original interpretation of the factor may be accurate. However, the loadings of rural occupational instability and non-paying jobs on this factor seem to be largely an artifact of the factor analytic process and thus suggest caution in the use of Factor VII. A somewhat similar situation exists

in the case of Factor VIII. Here total population and total active population correlate almost perfectly at .99, but each correlates at only .17 with illiteracy and .05 with "maleness," while the latter two variables correlate with each other at only .04. As with the previous factor, this one will require great caution in its use as an explanatory variable for voting patterns. The correlation matrix for Factor X substantiates what has already been noted--that it is a single-variable factor. The dairy farming variable's highest correlation is -.22 with truck farming, followed by a correlation of -.05 with family size and -.04 with population growth rate.

In summary, a check of the correlation matrix for each 1947 factor has substantiated the validity and original interpretation of Factors I, II, IV, V, and VI. Factor III was found to be solid enough, but seemed better interpreted as a measure of the scale of agriculture than of the type of agriculture. Factors VII, VIII, IX, and X all turned out to be quite weak as anything other than single-variable factors and thus will be utilized and interpreted with considerable caution.

So as to further examine the consistency of underlying dimensions from one census to another, the factor scores from the 1914 census were correlated with those from the 1947 analysis. Table A-5 shows this correlation matrix. The table indicates that the urbanism factor in 1914 was somewhat more inclusive than its 1947 counterpart, correlating as it does not only with this at .45 but also with the "prosperous farming" factor at .39 and the "paraurbanism," or county-size factor at .49. The "ranch scale" factor of 1914 correlates at -.40 with the

TABLE A-5  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTORS OF  
1914 AND 1947

1914 Factors	1947 Factors									
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
I	<u>.45</u>	.18	.26	<u>.39</u>	-.19	.03	-.06	<u>.49</u>	.02	-.02
II	.01	.04	<u>-.40</u>	-.07	-.04	.06	-.01	-.01	-.07	-.24
III	.08	-.11	-.16	<u>.57</u>	-.04	.11	.16	.95	.03	.05
IV	-.18	.09	-.08	.25	-.03	-.14	.00	-.07	-.06	-.04

"all-agriculture scale" factor of 1947. It will be recalled that in 1914 the "all-agriculture size" variable loaded heavily on the ranch scale factor, while the negative sign of the 1914-1947 correlation is due to the reversed polarity of the 1947 factor. The highest correlation between a 1914 factor and a 1947 factor is .57, between 1914's rural tenancy and 1947's prosperous farming. It has been noted that both factors seemed to in large part reflect the immigrant-dominated grain farming of the northern pampa and the Litoral. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two factors is that in 1914 the predominant theme was tenancy while ownership loads at an insignificant .07 on the 1947 factor. Nor, apparently, is this simply the result of several narrow 1947 factors replacing a broader 1914 factor, for 1914 tenancy correlates at only .03 with the only 1947 factor on which ownership has a significant loading, Factor IX. Rather, it would appear to reflect a changed pattern of tenure in which owner-operators were considerably more common in 1947 than in 1914.<sup>5</sup>

#### 1960 Census

There is some overlap in the variables used for the 1947 factor analysis and those utilized for the third and last time period. Data available from the 1960 published census were more limited than either 1914 or 1947, due in part to the format of the published data and in part to the fact that at the time this research was conducted some census volumes had not yet been published. Because of this and the proximity in time of many of the economic variables from the Di Tella data, it was decided to use both sources of variables. Wherever there

was a choice, of course, the 1960 data were used.

Variables used in the 1960 factor analysis are:

1. Total population in 1960.
2. Population growth. (Average rate of population increase per year since the 1947 census.)
3. Population density. (Population per km<sup>2</sup>.)
4. Per cent foreign-born.
5. All-agriculture size; area. (Average size of all agricultural establishments in hectares.)
6. Rural tenure. (Proportion of all area devoted to agriculture which is owner-operated.)
7. All-agriculture proportion. (Proportion of total area which is devoted to all forms of agriculture.)
8. Urban class index. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
9. Business size. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
10. Industry size. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
11. Rural class index R2. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
12. Rural class index R3. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
13. All-agriculture size; personnel. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
14. Rural occupational instability. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
15. Production per capita. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
16. Cereals and oils. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
17. Cattle. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
18. Sheep and wool. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
19. Cash crops. (Same as 1947 analysis.)



20. Truck farming. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
21. Animal husbandry. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
22. Dairy farming. (Same as 1947 analysis.)
23. Mining production. (Same as 1947 analysis.)

As to the time periods of the various indicators, variables 1 through 7 pertain to 1960, variables 15 through 23 are for 1953, variables 9 and 10 pertain to 1954, variables 12, 13, and 14 are for 1952, and variables 8 and 11 are from the 1947 census. Thus, with the exception of the two latter variables, which were included because of the study's particular concern with the question of social class, all data used in the 1960 analysis fall within an eight-year time span.

The 1960 rotated factor matrix can be seen in Table A-6. The twenty-three variables produced seven factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater, which together accounted for 65.6 per cent of the total variance among all variables. All variables had a loading of at least .50 on one of the factors, and the communalities ( $h^2$ ) fell below .50 on only two of the variables.

The seven factors and their composition are:

Factor 1. Once again urbanism emerges as the dominant factor in the analysis. The first 1960 factor, accounting for 16.4 per cent of the total variance, has high loadings for such standard indicators of urbanism as population density, total population, per cent foreign-born, and rate of population growth. Data on the proportion of the population living in places of 2,000 or more were not available for 1960 due to the incomplete publication of the census volumes at the time of the present research, but on the basis of the 1914 and 1947

TABLE A-6  
1960 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

Variable	Factor							h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
3 Pop. density	<u>.87</u>	.05	.05	-.02	.06	.01	.12	.78
1 Total pop.	<u>.75</u>	-.13	.08	.08	.05	.03	.23	.66
4 Foreign-born	<u>.66</u>	-.39	.05	.12	.17	.19	-.21	.72
2 Pop. growth	<u>.65</u>	.13	.17	.23	.29	.24	-.08	.67
6 Rural tenure	<u>-.56</u>	.17	.37	.25	.28	.12	.07	.64
16 Cereals and oils	.13	<u>-.78</u>	.02	-.16	-.09	-.02	.11	.68
7 All-ag. propor.	-.37	<u>-.72</u>	.13	.02	-.13	.12	-.14	.71
15 Production	.22	<u>-.66</u>	.06	-.13	.19	.20	-.31	.68
9 Business size	.16	<u>-.61</u>	.25	.00	.05	.09	.13	.48
18 Sheep and wool	.00	-.02	<u>-.83</u>	-.03	-.03	-.10	-.20	.74
11 Index R2	-.08	.21	<u>-.74</u>	-.09	-.04	.03	.15	.62
12 Index R3	-.09	.30	<u>-.71</u>	-.06	-.20	.02	.14	.67
23 Mining	.00	.00	<u>-.62</u>	.09	.10	-.05	-.07	.41
19 Cash crops	-.13	.02	.08	<u>.83</u>	.10	-.17	.06	.76
10 Industry size	.28	.12	-.08	<u>.70</u>	-.19	-.14	.03	.65
13 Ag. size; pers.	.01	-.12	.16	<u>.62</u>	.19	.09	-.37	.60
8 Urban index	-.11	-.36	.08	<u>-.58</u>	-.17	-.22	.14	.58
17 Cattle	-.15	.24	.08	-.24	<u>-.83</u>	.08	-.06	.84
20 Truck farming	.15	.35	.19	-.09	<u>.81</u>	-.18	-.14	.89

TABLE A-6 (Continued)

Variable	Factor							$h^2$
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
14 Rural instab.	-.17	.04	-.03	.01	.15	-.77	.11	.65
22 Dairy farming	-.03	-.17	.08	-.09	-.01	.69	.21	.56
5 Ag. size, area	-.14	.01	-.04	.04	-.32	-.11	-.67	.59
21 Animal husbandry	.04	.01	.02	-.10	-.31	.01	.63	.51
% of total var.	16.4	13.2	11.2	8.0	6.8	5.2	4.8	65.6

analyses that variable would also be expected to load heavily on this factor. An interesting addition to the urbanism factor in 1960 is the variable on rural tenure, loading at  $-.56$ . Rather than representing a deviation in the meaning of the variable, this is most likely but a reflection of the higher land prices in the more urbanized departamentos. As in the earlier analyses, this factor will be called "urbanism."

Factor II. Loading most heavily on this factor are cereals and oils at  $-.78$ , proportion of total area devoted to agriculture at  $-.72$ , production per capita at  $-.66$ , and business size at  $-.61$ . In addition, the factor carries a loading of  $-.39$  for per cent foreign-born. Reversing the polarity of the loadings, Factor II seems to reflect a dimension of "prosperous farming" quite similar to Factor IV of the 1947 analysis. It will, therefore, carry that same label.

Factor III. Carrying heavy negative loadings for sheep and wool, rural class indexes R2 and R3, and mining production, this factor appears to be the 1960 equivalent of 1947's Factor II. As in 1947, it will be called "rural class."

Factor IV. This deals with the same dimension as did the sixth factor in the 1947 analysis--industry scale. As it did then, the factor has its heaviest loadings with industry size and cash crops. Urban secondary, which had a loading of  $-.45$  (original polarity) on the 1947 factor is not included in the 1960 variables, but the next two variables with the highest loadings then--urban class index and all-agriculture size in personnel--are also the next two highest in 1960. Thus, without the reversal of polarity of 1947, this factor once again will be called "industry scale."

Factor V. This is the first of three "two-variable" factors emerging at the weaker end of the 1960 rotated factor matrix. The only two variables with significant loadings on Factor V are cattle at  $-.83$  and truck farming at  $.81$ . These two variables have been seen to be somewhat complementary before, thus indicating that this factor is a measure of the ratio of farming to ranching. Following the designation of somewhat similar original variables used in the 1914 analysis, this factor will be called "farm-ranch ratio."

Factor VI. The meaning of the second two-variable factor is somewhat less clear than was the case above. The factor links dairy farming negatively with rural occupational instability, but requires a rather arbitrary choice on how to interpret and designate the dimension. In an effort at continuity with the previous time periods, the factor will be called "dairy farming."

Factor VII. This factor presents the same type of problem in interpretation as did the previous one. Should it be considered a general factor related to size of agricultural establishments or a more narrow factor dealing with animal husbandry? Opting once more for continuity, Factor VII will be labeled "agriculture scale" although the dual content suggests the need for caution in utilizing both this and the previous factor as explanatory variables.

Table A-7 shows the correlation matrices for the seven factors obtained from the 1960 analysis. The four variables loading most heavily on Factor I all correlate well with each other, with coefficients ranging from  $.41$  to  $.70$ . The variable dealing with rural tenure shows a markedly lower correlation with each of the other

TABLE A-7  
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR 1960 FACTORS

Factor I				
Variable	1	4	2	6
3	.70	.48	.52	-.35
1		.44	.41	-.25
4			.54	-.27
2				-.09
Factor II				
Variable	7	15	9	
16	.44	.43	.35	
7		.38	.31	
15			.39	
Factor III				
Variable	11	12	23	
18	.47	.47	.42	
11		.61	.22	
12			.29	
Factor IV				
Variable	10	13	8	
19	.43	.43	-.33	
10		.22	-.36	
13			-.31	
Factor V				
Variable	20			
17	-.62			
Factor VI				
Variable	14			
22	-.22			
Factor VII				
Variable	21			
5	-.12			

"urban" variables, ranging from a high of  $-.35$  with density down to  $-.09$  with population growth rate. Thus, the correlation matrix lends further support to the earlier interpretation that Factor I is a standard urbanism factor to which the rural tenure variable is an interesting but relatively unimportant addition.

The correlation matrices for Factor II, III, and IV all offer patterns of solid--if not excessively high--correlations among the variables loading heavily on each factor. Both the validity and the original interpretation of these three factors seem to be well substantiated by the matrices. The same is true of Factor V, whose only two heavy-loading variables intercorrelate at a substantial  $-.62$ . The difficulty of interpretation of the last two rotated factors is compounded by the correlation matrices; the two major variables on Factor VI intercorrelate at only  $-.22$ , while those on Factor VII are even less related at  $-.12$ . Factors VI and VII would therefore appear to be largely artifacts of the analytic process and will be utilized as explanatory variables only with considerable caution and qualification.

Summarizing the 1960 analysis, it can be seen that Factors I through IV are solid, multi-variable dimensions leaving little doubt as to either their validity or their interpretation. Factor V has heavy loadings for only two variables, but a correlation of  $-.62$  between these justifies its adoption as a strong and meaningful factor. Each of the last two factors, however, is composed of two largely unrelated variables and thus can be interpreted as little more than an imperfect manifestation of one or the other of the variables.

The similarity between the 1960 factors and some of those in the 1947 matrix has already been noted--and of course was to be expected in view of the fact that a number of the same variables were used in both analyses. Table A-8 shows the correlations between each of the 1960 factors and those of 1947. Each 1960 factor's strongest correlation with a 1947 factor has been underlined in the table. In two cases a 1960 factor correlated moderately well with a second 1947 factor; these secondary correlations are marked by a broken line.

Factor I of the 1960 group, composed entirely of "new" variables from the census of that year, shows a solid correlation of .69 with the urbanism factor of 1947. This indicates a strong continuity despite some variation in the types of indicators available for the two time periods. It is further interesting to note that while in Table A-5 the urbanism factor of 1914 correlated slightly higher with "paraurbanism" than with urbanism in 1947, that enigmatic 1947 factor shows a correlation of only .25 with the 1960 urbanism factor. A correlation of -.81 between the 1960 Factor II and Factor IV of 1947 supports the designation of these factors as essentially the same when allowance is made for opposite polarities. Equally clear is the association between Factor III in 1960 and Factor II in 1947 and between 1960's Factor IV and Factor VI in 1947--again with a reversal of polarity.

The two 1960 factors which show moderately strong correlations with more than one 1947 factor are Factors V and VII, designated as "farm-ranch ratio" and "agriculture scale." The 1947 factors with which both of these correlate are measures of "agriculture scale" (Factor III), originally designated as "truck farming," and of "small ranching"



TABLE A-8  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FACTORS OF  
1947 AND 1960 CENSUSES

1947 Factors	1960 Factors						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
I	<u>.69</u>	.04	.11	.08	.07	.20	.03
II	-.03	-.05	<u>.92</u>	-.03	-.12	-.02	.08
III	.20	.07	-.03	-.08	<u>.48</u>	-.03	<u>.47</u>
IV	.21	<u>-.81</u>	-.05	-.07	-.11	.08	-.09
V	.03	.09	-.13	-.21	<u>-.73</u>	-.04	<u>.43</u>
VI	-.10	-.06	.01	<u>-.89</u>	.19	.05	-.06
VII	.10	.05	-.08	-.05	-.01	.03	-.11
VIII	.25	-.27	-.02	-.01	.04	-.15	.27
IX	.10	.09	-.05	.03	-.08	.08	-.01
X	-.24	-.20	.00	.03	-.07	<u>.56</u>	.25

(Factor V). Thus farm-ranch ratio in 1960 correlates at .48 with 1947 agriculture scale--which had a reversed polarity--and at -.73 with small ranching, whose negative end would be large farming. In the case of the 1960 factor dealing with agriculture size--on which the reverse polarity also means that positive loadings represent small size--there is a correlation of .47 with the 1947 agriculture size factor and .43 with small ranching in that year. The dairy farming factors for both analyses, Factor VI in 1960 and Factor X in 1947, correlate at .56.

In summary, it can be seen in Table A-8 that a strong continuity exists between dimensions underlying the analyses of 1947 and 1960. In the case of many factors, of course, this is largely the result of utilizing the same variables for both time periods. Even where all new variables were used, however, this continuity continued to be evident. There was, for instance, a correlation of .69 between the urbanism factors of 1947 and 1960 compared to .45 between urbanism in 1914 and 1947--a difference which no doubt can be explained in part by an intercensal period of thirteen years, compared to thirty-three years. Another interesting aspect of Table A-8 is that the only 1947 factors which show no moderately strong correlations with 1960 factors are those that were the weakest and most ambiguous in the earlier analysis. This is in part the result of the absence of such variables as illiteracy, family size, and index of male population in the 1960 analysis. Other variables which loaded on these weak factors in 1947 are re-presented in 1960, but in that later analysis they load on more important factors; this was seen to be the case with both total population and rural tenure.

### Multiple Regression Analysis

The factors obtained in the three analyses described above provided the independent variables for the election analysis. The computer program used for the factor analysis produced "factor scores"--the loading of each county on each of the rotated factors--which were correlated with the election returns for major parties in each county. The 1914 factors were used with the elections of 1916 and 1926, the 1947 factors with the 1936 and 1946 elections, and the 1960 factors with elections of 1960 and 1965.

For the dependent variable the election analysis uses the percentage of all votes cast for national deputies in the departamento which the particular party receives. The correlation technique used is a step-wise multiple regression analysis yielding a product-moment correlation coefficient as the measure of strength of association between "continuous" variables. Independent variables are entered into the regression equation one at a time--always the one with the most "explanatory" ability at that particular stage--with the multiple correlation coefficient and the partial correlation coefficients of variables still outside the equation given at each step.<sup>6</sup>

In an effort at clarity of presentation, the tables dealing with the election correlations show a party's simple correlation with each of the independent variables rather than attempt to portray the coefficients of the partialling process. In addition, each table shows the final multiple correlation coefficient obtained when all independent variables are in the regression equation. Significant stages of the multiple regression analysis itself are described in the text.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>In Argentine census terminology, rural establishments are divided into two basic categories--ganadería and agricultura. The first classification includes all operations dealing with any type of livestock, while the second covers all crop farming, orchards, and other activities dealing with plants. The adjective agropecuaria is used to define the combined total of these two categories. In adapting this classification scheme to English, the present study will use "ranching" for ganadería, "farming" for agricultura, and "all-agriculture" for the inclusive agropecuaria. The term "dairy farming" found in the 1947 and 1960 analyses is an exception to this general rule.

<sup>2</sup>In a recent study involving factor analysis of Brazilian and Venezuelan census data, Glauco Ary Dillon Soares uses the label "economic development" for a factor which emerged first for each country and carried many variables similar to those loading heavily on the "urbanism" factors in the present study. See Dillon Soares, "Congruencias e incongruencias entre indicadores de desenvolvimento econômico," América Latina, VIII (January-March, 1965), 47-60. Similar variables also are used as indicators of economic development for modern Mexico in José Luis Reyna, "Desarrollo económico, distribución del poder y participación política; el caso mexicano," Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, No. 50 (October-December, 1967), pp. 469-486, and of modernization in Argentina of 1916 in Ezequiel Gallo (h.) and Silvia Sigal, "La formación de los partidos políticos contemporáneos: la U.C.R., 1890-1916," in Argentina, sociedad de masas, Torcuato S. Di Tella et al. (eds.) (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1966), pp. 124-176.

<sup>3</sup>The original analysis of the data was published as Torcuato S. Di Tella, La teoría del primer impacto del crecimiento económico (Rosario, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Instituto de Sociología, 1965), which also contains the data in tabular form in an appendix. Data used in the present study were obtained on IBM cards from the International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California at Berkeley.

<sup>4</sup>Most of the sheepraising and much of the petroleum--a major part of "mining"--is found in the southern provinces of Argentina which were national territories until after the 1947 census and which will be excluded even from the 1960 and 1965 election analyses so as to make these comparable with the first four election periods when the nation had only fourteen provinces.

<sup>5</sup>Di Tella, in La teoría, pp. 119-130, argues that farm tenancy is an important step in the development of modern capitalistic agriculture and a step which is both preceded and followed by periods of more widespread ownership.

<sup>6</sup>For further discussion of product-moment correlation and multiple regression, see, among others, Hubert M. Blalock Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 273-358.

## APPENDIX B

### METHODOLOGY: ROLL CALL ANALYSIS

The use of roll call votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies as an indicator of political cleavage makes this an exploratory study in several respects. Legislative roll call voting at the national and state levels has been the subject of much analysis in the United States for more than a decade,<sup>1</sup> while in recent years the techniques and concepts of this sub-field of political science have been used in the study of several foreign legislatures.<sup>2</sup> At the time the present research was carried out, however, the author was unable to find any published study which attempted to analyze voting data of a Latin American legislature. The absence of any background literature meant that the author had to begin with such basic projects as determining whether the Argentine Chamber of Deputies held and recorded roll call votes and, if so, whether they would lend themselves to the methodologies developed in roll call analysis in the United States. In the hope that others might not have to retrace all of these preliminary steps, the present appendix will deal at some length with the general issue of roll call voting in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and with certain particular methodological difficulties presented by the Argentine case.

The lack of interest in applying the methods of roll call analysis to Latin American data probably is the combined result of two major factors. The first deals with the orientation or "persuasion" of the "latinamericanists" in U.S. political science; the second concerns the

image of the Latin American legislatures themselves.

Many have commented on the "traditional" orientation of much of the work done on Latin American politics by U.S. scholars and how, as one author put it, "political research on Latin America, rather than flowing into the somewhat turbulent mainstream of modern political science, often appears to drift in an isolated channel of its own, with its sponsors perched along the banks of the more swiftly moving waters of the discipline."<sup>3</sup> There have been various signs of a change in recent years--the present study hopefully will make a modest contribution in that direction--but impressionistic accounts and broad generalizations still outnumber serious research pieces in the books and articles published on Latin American politics in the late 1960's. Thus one explanation for the lack of studies of roll call voting in Latin America is no doubt the fact that only a small percentage of those who specialize in that geographic area have either the inclination or the methodological background for this type of study.

Equally important, it would seem, has been the fact that traditionally the legislature in Latin America has been dismissed as an institution without power or importance. If the executive and the army--and sometimes the political party--are all that matter in the political equation, why bother to study congress? But while the legislative branch may be meaningless in some Latin American nations, in others it can be of political importance even in a system of executive dominance. It could be argued that in their proclivity to generalize about twenty diverse nations Latinamericanists have tended to miss the importance of some legislatures, but this is not the place

to make such a case nor is it required to defend the utility of roll call analysis. Even if one were to stipulate the powerlessness of the "typical" Latin American national congress, analysis of its voting patterns might still yield valuable insights into the national political structure. It is in this sense--where the question of the "importance" of the legislature is basically irrelevant--that roll call analysis is used in the present study.

This appendix will be divided into three basic sections. The first will be a descriptive account of the development and use of roll call voting in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, including some of the major characteristics of this voting and methodological problems presented in the analysis of the votes. The second section will specify the various criteria used in the selection of roll calls for analysis, in determining "scalability," and in coping with particular problems such as absenteeism. The final section will briefly describe and give the source<sup>4</sup> of each roll call used in the scale and reproduce the scales themselves showing the name, district, party, and ranking of each deputy on each scale.

#### Historical Background

The principle of roll call voting originated early in the history of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, but was rather slow to develop as a parliamentary practice. This section will trace the development of both the principle and the practice and suggest a few possible explanations behind their divergence.

The rules of procedure adopted in 1856--the third year of the new

chamber after "national organization"---established two basic principles which have continued to govern voting in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>5</sup> These were the stipulations that all elections would have to be by roll call vote (Art. 78) and that if a deputy was in the chamber he could not abstain from voting on an issue (Art. 81). There was no mention of a deputy requesting a roll call on some matter other than an election, and the results of the roll call votes for chamber officers were not printed in the Diario de Sesiones during those early years. On the question of obligatory voting, the 1856 rules provided that if a deputy felt constrained on some particular issue he could participate in the discussion and then leave the room when the vote was taken (Art. 83). As will be noted below, this practice of deputies "abstaining with their feet" presents some frustrating methodological problems.

A revised version of the rules of procedure which went into effect July 15, 1878, carried over the above provisions and for the first time introduced the principle of roll call voting on issues other than elections.<sup>6</sup> Article 154 of the 1878 Reglamento provided that a deputy could ask for a roll call vote on any question before the chamber and if his request was supported by one-fifth of the members present, the roll call would be taken and recorded in the Diario de Sesiones. This article expanding the use of the roll call was adopted by the chamber without challenge or question.<sup>7</sup>

Deputies soon began to experiment--albeit hesitantly--with the new use of roll call voting, but the clerks seemed somewhat slower to adopt the idea. Three weeks after the new rules were approved, a



roll call was held at the suggestion of the chamber president after a rectification reversed a 33-32 vote.<sup>8</sup> But even a year later, the fact that the president of the chamber felt it necessary to read Article 154 to the members after a deputy requested a roll call would indicate that this was still considered a rather novel procedure.<sup>9</sup> Despite the stipulation in Article 154, it was more than a year before the results of roll call votes began to appear in the Diario de Sesiones. The first roll call to be printed was held on August 20, 1879,<sup>10</sup> and despite several elections of chamber officers in the year following adoption of the new rules, the first such election to be printed was held May 15, 1880.<sup>11</sup>

The rules of roll call voting have remained basically unchanged since the adoption of the 1878 rules of procedure. Examination of subsequent issues of the Reglamento<sup>12</sup> and the Diario de Sesiones indicates that there has been consistent adherence to the principles of: (1) holding a roll call upon the request of one-fifth of the members present, (2) mandatory roll call votes on the election of chamber officers, and (3) obligatory voting on the part of deputies present in the chamber. Subsequent to the 1878 amendment a provision was incorporated in the rules to allow a deputy to formally abstain from voting if such abstention is approved in advance by the chamber. In practice, this method of abstention has usually been limited to those occasional votes when a deputy was directly involved in the issue at question and felt it necessary to go on record as abstaining to avoid implications of conflict of interest. The usual method of abstaining from a roll call vote has continued to be the tradition of leaving the chamber.

In 1938 the method of conducting a roll call by the clerk polling the deputies in alphabetical order was replaced by an elaborate new electro-mechanical voting machine. Said to be the first such device among the parliaments of the world,<sup>13</sup> each desk in the chamber was equipped with an aye-nay switch and with a keyhole, while each seat was wired with a pressure switch to record the presence or absence of a deputy. From the number of occupied seats in the chamber the machine would determine the existence of a quorum and calculate the number of votes composing one-fifth, one-half, and two-thirds of those present. The chief clerk would indicate on his master console the proportion necessary on a given issue, after which the device would determine the success or failure of the motion. Results of a vote were shown on the clerk's console and on two large panels on opposite walls of the chamber. On non-roll call votes, each deputy would simply move his aye-nay switch to the desired position while the "scoreboard" would register the number of deputies present, the number voting on each side of the question, the proportion of the vote needed for success, and whether the motion passed or failed.

But while the new equipment simplified the procedures of determining quorum and taking sign votes, its most elaborate and time-saving performance was in the calculation and recording of roll calls. Whereas in a chamber of 156 members the practice of having the clerk poll the deputies in alphabetical order took between 20 and 30 minutes, the voting machine could take, calculate, display, and record a roll call vote in a few minutes. Each deputy had a key which corresponded to a certain number on the light panels and on the printing device, allowing

him to vote on a roll call from any seat in the chamber by simply inserting his key in the keyhole of that desk before moving the vote switch to his desired response. If he voted aye his number on the panels would light up in green; if he voted nay, the number would show in red. As in the non-roll call votes, the panels would show the total number present, the number voting on each side, and whether the motion was successful. For the printers of the Diario de Sesiones and for the archives, a printing device at the clerk's desk would record the basic information about the roll call (date, totals aye and nay, results, etc.) and opposite each deputy's number indicate whether he voted aye, nay, or was not recorded as voting.<sup>14</sup> The clerk, then, was left only the task of relating the numbers to the deputies' names.

The first roll call conducted with the new system caused many deputies to accuse it of malfunctioning,<sup>15</sup> but the problem apparently was largely lack of familiarity with the equipment. The second attempt at an electro-mechanical roll call brought no protest,<sup>16</sup> and several years later one author on Argentine politics commented that only once had the device failed to function properly--"in that instance it showed an affirmative vote for a member who had died a few days previously."<sup>17</sup>

Although it had to be supplemented by a viva voce roll call after the size of the chamber was expanded to 192 in 1958--there were only 158 numbers on the panels--the electro-mechanical voting system remained in use until about 1961. But when the printing device broke down that year the uniqueness and the age of the system made repair or replacement difficult; as a result, roll calls from 1961 until the chamber was dissolved by the military in 1966 were again conducted by the clerk vocally polling the deputies.<sup>18</sup>

In summary, then, the principle of roll call voting on general issues has existed in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies since 1878 and for a quarter of a century the voting machine meant that this was a quick and efficient way to go on record on a question. Yet with the exception of the early years of the Peronista administration, roll call voting has been used rather sporadically and many important issues have passed through the chamber without a single roll call. From the perspective of the United States where senators and congressmen seem to be quite concerned with their voting records and with letting "the folks back home" know how they are voting, this orientation seems a bit strange. After a brief discussion of some of the major characteristics of roll call voting in the Argentine chamber, an attempt will be made to explain these differences.

An indication of the frequency of roll call voting in various periods can be seen in Table B-1. Although technically every year is a new session in the Chamber of Deputies, the present study considers each two-year period between elections to be a single "session."<sup>19</sup> To simplify the table, the roll calls have been added and averaged on the basis of major political "eras" since 1900.

Roll call voting was quite rare until Sáenz Peña's electoral reforms began to bring Socialists and Radicals to the chamber in 1912. The number of roll calls per two-year session ranged from one to five during the 1900-1912 period, increasing to sixteen in 1912-1914 and ten in 1914-1916. There were thirty-three roll calls during the session following the election of Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1916, with the number increasing to forty-seven in the 1918-1920 period. During the decade

of the 1920's, there were from fifty-four to sixty-five roll calls per session.

Although there were only twelve roll calls during the 1936-1938 period, the average for the decade of Concordancia administration was only slightly below that of the Radical period. There were thirty-seven roll calls during the first session following the return to constitutional government in 1932, while the 1938-1940 and 1940-1942 periods had seventy-seven and fifty roll calls, respectively. By far the greatest use of roll call voting in the chamber came during the early years after the 1946 election of Juan D. Perón. There were 275 contested roll calls during the first two-year session under Perón, while the 1948-1950 period registered 159. The frequency of roll calls declined considerably during the later Perón years as the combination of his party's popularity and the gerrymandering of election districts reduced the opposition to ineffectual size.<sup>20</sup>

With the return of the Radicals to power--the UCRI from 1958 to 1962 and the UCRP from 1963 to 1966--the frequency of roll calls in the chamber declined to an average lower than any period since 1916. The first session under the presidency of Arturo Frondizi had only eighteen roll calls, which increased to twenty-eight in the 1960-1962 session. Under the administration of Arturo Illia, there were twenty-one roll calls in 1963-1964 and twenty-five in the 1965-1966 session. While both of the latter sessions were slightly shorter than usual --the 1963 election was held in July instead of February and the last session was terminated by a military golpe de estado in June, 1966-- it seems unlikely that the average would have reached that of the UCR,

Concordancia, or Peronista periods.

Several factors might underlie these variations in the frequency of roll calls during the different periods since 1900. Although any attempt at "explanation" must be very tentative until much more study is devoted to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, probable factors would seem to include (1) the level of conflict, (2) the nature of the alignments within the chamber, (3) the level of party or bloc discipline, and (4) the self-perceived roles of the deputies. An impressionistic assessment of the different periods on these four dimensions will attempt to relate them to the frequency of roll calls.

Until the arrival of the Radicals to power in 1916, the Chamber of Deputies--like the political system as a whole--was what might in general terms be called a case of the politics of notables.<sup>21</sup> There were differences over issues, but seldom over values, and compared to later periods it would have to be called an era of low conflict. The parties were largely provincial and often ad hoc, resulting in a chamber of both loose alignments and little "discipline." As to role, it would seem reasonable to expect the self-image to be almost exclusively that of "trustee."<sup>22</sup> Under such circumstances it would be unlikely that roll calls would be viewed by the deputies as being necessary to keep their constituencies informed or to prevent deviation in voting, while forcing a vote to be on the record might be embarrassing to some colleagues and thus ungentlemanly.

The 1916-1930 Radical period and the 1932-1943 era of Concordancia administration were similar enough in these four respects to be discussed together. The level of conflict within the chamber was rather

high, and the alignments were more formal than in the earlier period. Nonetheless, the existence of provincial parties under both the Radical and conservative banners maintained a measure of flexibility in bloc formation and tended to reduce conformity in voting within the blocs. The role concept was probably still largely that of "trustee," but there may now also have been cases of "políticos" and perhaps a few "delegates." In contrast to the 1900-1916 era, therefore, the higher frequency of roll calls during the 1916-1942 period could probably be explained at least in part by (1) more and deeper controversies, (2) an increased need to see who is "voting right," and (3) a desire by at least some of the deputies to be on the record for the eyes of their constituency.

The Perón era was marked by a high level of conflict, a rather rigid division of the chamber into Peronista and Opposition blocs, and the entry of labor representatives into legislative politics. Despite the division of the chamber, however, there was at times a rather low level of cohesion within the Peronista bloc in the 1946-1948 period. This diversity within the "government" bloc seemed to be the combined result of the heterogeneous composition of the bloc--it was formed of the Partido Laborista, the Junta Renovadora of the Radicals, and various provincial groups--and of a growing resentment on the part of some supporters of Perón's efforts to be the jefe único of the movement.<sup>23</sup> The technique of calling for a rectificación nominal to bring straying bloc members into line was not invented by the Peronistas, but they used it more frequently--and with more striking results--than had previously been the case.<sup>24</sup> Thus a considerable number of "Peronista" deputies

during the first two-year session would secretly vote against the administration bloc but were hesitant to do so on the record. Because of this, calling for roll calls was an important tool in maintaining bloc discipline. And, as was seen in Chapter V, there were a number of times when even a roll call was unable to maintain cohesion among Peronista deputies of differing persuasions.<sup>25</sup> As to roll concept, it seems likely that the Peronista deputies--especially those from working class origins--would have had more of a "delegate" orientation than had been common in the chamber in earlier periods. If this and the original assumption regarding role concepts are valid, these deputies should have been somewhat more concerned to demonstrate what they were doing for their constituency than would the conservatives and Radicals of earlier years.

Divisions in the chamber since 1958 have continued to be deep, with fewer cases of the "brokers" found populating the central positions on scales of pre-1946 sessions. But unlike the 1946-1948 session, the later periods seemed to present little problem of bloc discipline. Thus it was seen that during the 1960-1962 session when the chamber was divided solidly between the UCRP and the UCRI blocs there was a consistently high level of party unity with relatively few roll calls. While roll calls seemed somewhat less important as a means of maintaining discipline, the party and class background of the deputies during this post-Perón period may have shifted the typical role concept somewhat back toward that of "trustee" and thus further lowered the importance of recorded voting.



Another factor which must be considered in attempting to account for changing frequencies of roll calls is the ease with which they can be carried out. When it takes a half hour or more for the clerk to poll the deputies by name, a member could be expected to be more reluctant to ask for a roll call than when it could be handled mechanically in a couple of minutes.<sup>26</sup> There was a higher number of roll calls (seventy-seven) during the 1938-1940 session--the first one using the new voting machine--than in any previous two-year period, but during the next two years the figure dropped to fifty, slightly lower than any two-year session during the decade of the 1920's. The 275 roll calls of the 1946-1948 session would have been extremely time-consuming if they had been taken in the old manner, but the availability of mechanical roll call voting did not prevent the 1958-1960 session from holding only eighteen roll calls.

In summary, then, it would appear that ease of voting may be a contributing factor toward increasing the frequency of roll calls--and in case of large numbers of such votes it may be considered a necessary condition--but it is far from a sufficient cause. More important, it would seem, are the levels of conflict within the chamber, the nature and depth of party divisions, the extent of party cohesion or discipline, and perhaps the image the deputy has of his role.

#### Scaling Techniques and Problems

To those accustomed to working with roll calls in the United States Congress, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies presents several new problems. The major sources of these problems are (1) a less

consistent use of roll calls, (2) a rather high rate of absenteeism, and (3) the voting rules in regard to abstentions. Each of these points will be considered briefly.

Whether because they consider themselves trustees or--as delegates--feel more accountable to the party than to the constituency, the low level of interest deputies often show in building individual voting records at times allows major bills to go through the chamber without a single roll call. Because of the use of roll calls for party discipline or, at times, as stalling tactics, there are other cases where there will be a roll call on one or two facets of an issue--perhaps individual articles of a long bill--but only a sign vote on final passage. Thus in many sessions, particularly those with relatively few roll calls, analysis of all such votes may still fail to give a complete picture of the issue dimensions. The vital question then becomes whether the partial set of issues on which roll calls are held is a random abstraction of all issues or is biased--and if biased, how it is biased.

During the pre-1916 period, as suggested above, it is possible that deputies would have consciously avoided putting their colleagues across the aisle in an embarrassing position by requesting roll calls on touchy questions.<sup>27</sup> Thus if there was any bias in the choice of issues on which roll calls were taken, it might have tended to be in the direction of avoiding them on questions which were the most controversial. The danger of this type of bias would seem to have been lessened considerably with the arrival around 1916 of the Radicals and Socialists, however, and to have been even further reduced with the appearance of Peronistas in 1946. Along with the shift in language and

debate style which was so deplored by conservatives who had served during the earlier period,<sup>28</sup> these new groups brought varied class perspectives and intensified conflict to the chamber and no doubt reduced the concern over embarrassing one's opponents. Thus while there may have been an occasional exception, it seems reasonable to expect that since 1916 any conscious bias in the selection of issue areas on which to hold roll calls would have been in the direction of such voting on the most important and/or controversial questions. If this assumption is valid, the use of roll call analysis to probe the major dimensions of conflict--if not to map all issue areas--would seem to be defensible.

Of more immediate methodological concern is the combined problem of absenteeism and non-voting. As discussed above, the voting rules have traditionally required that a deputy vote if he is in the chamber --allowing abstention only upon the approval of the house--but specifically provided that if for some reason he prefers not to be recorded on the issue he can step out of the chamber. From the record, therefore, there is no way of knowing whether a deputy was absent at the time of the roll call or whether he had chosen to "abstain" by leaving the chamber temporarily. The combined result of a generally high rate of absenteeism and this method of abstention is a pattern where the majority of roll calls record the position of only between about 50 and 70 per cent of the members, leaving the rest in the undifferentiated category of "non-response."<sup>29</sup> When such roll calls are combined into Guttman scales, the high rate of non-response results in many cases where deputies have to be eliminated from the scale because of excessive ambiguity as to their scale type. This can be

seen most clearly, of course, in the occasional scale composed of only two roll calls; a deputy cannot be included in such a scale unless he voted on both questions.

All contested roll calls--defined as those in which at least 5 per cent of the members voting took the minority position--in each of the six two-year sessions were considered for analysis. The Guttman scaling technique chosen as the primary form of analysis offers a means of (1) determining whether different roll calls reflect the same underlying issue dimension, (2) arranging in rank-order the roll calls which are found to lie along the same dimension, and (3) ranking each deputy on that issue dimension.<sup>30</sup> Very briefly, the scaling technique involves first the determination whether on each roll call a "positive" vote<sup>31</sup> is an aye or a nay and the subsequent ordering of the roll calls in ascending or descending frequency of positive votes. The individuals composing the scale are then rearranged in rank-order from those with the most positive responses to those with the least positive responses. Ideally, each individual should have no positive responses to the negative side of his first negative response nor any negative responses to the positive side of his last positive response. Such a perfect scale pattern is shown in figure B-1. Although the figure shows only one hypothetical legislator in each voting position or "scale type," there will usually be a number of deputies with identical voting patterns who will fall into each scale type.

Seldom, however, is a scale found to consist only of perfect scale types such as those of Figure B-1. There is always the problem of non-response--a rather serious problem in the Argentine case--as

Legislator	Roll Call						Scale Type
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
A	X	X	X	X	X	X	6
B	X	X	X	X	X	-	5
C	X	X	X	X	-	-	4
D	X	X	X	-	-	-	3
E	X	X	-	-	-	-	2
F	X	-	-	-	-	-	1
G	-	-	-	-	-	-	0

Figure B-1

X = "positive" vote; - = "negative" vote

well as varying amounts of "error" in the voting patterns of some members. In the language of scaling, an "error" or non-scale response is a positive vote which on the basis of the scale type should be negative, or vice versa. The term "error" of course does not imply that the legislator intended to vote other than in the way he did; it means simply that for whatever reason his response is not what it "should be" according to the rationale of the scale. Figure B-2 shows some typical patterns of voting errors and ambiguities due to non-response. After criteria used in handling these two types of problems are specified, it will be seen why the legislators in Figure B-2 are assigned to their particular scale types.<sup>32</sup>

The following criteria were applied in the case of voting errors:

1. A deputy casting more than one non-scale vote was not ranked on the scale. (As legislator F in Figure B-2.)
2. Error was assigned to the vote which would result in a perfect scale type. (In the case of Legislator G in Figure B-2, for example, assigning the error to Roll Call 5 will place him in the Scale Type 1 of Figure B-1; assigning the error to any other roll call in his case would not result in a perfect scale type.)
3. When the error could be corrected in one of two ways to produce a perfect scale type, the deputy was assigned to the mean scale score between the two types. (Legislator C of Figure B-2 would fall into Scale Type 4 or 6 depending on whether the error was assigned to roll call 5 or 6; according to this criterion, he would instead be assigned to Scale Type 5.)

Legislator	1	2	Roll 3	Call 4	5	6	Assigned Scale Type
A	X	-	X	X	0	X	6
B	X	X	X	X	0	-	4
C	X	X	X	X	-	X	5
D	X	X	0	0	-	-	NA
E	0	X	-	-	0	-	2
F	X	-	X	-	X	0	NA
G	X	-	-	-	X	-	1

Figure B-2

X = "positive" vote; - = "negative" vote; 0 = non-response

In the case of non-response, the following criteria were applied:

1. A deputy who failed to respond on more than one-half of the roll calls composing a scale was not ranked on the scale.
2. When a non-response occurs between two similar responses (both positive or both negative), it was assigned that response. (Thus it is assumed that Legislator A would have cast a positive vote on roll call 5 had he responded and, in an extension of this criterion, that legislator E would have done likewise on roll call 1.)
3. When a non-response occurs at a point where a deputy could be placed in either of two scale types (as with legislator B in Figure B-2), he was placed in the one closest to the median of the scale.
4. Where two or more non-responses occur at an ambiguous point on the scale (as with legislator D), the deputy was not ranked on the scale.

Just as a deputy was excluded from a scale if he had more than one non-scale response, a roll call was removed if its errors exceeded 5 per cent of the total responses on that item. For the finished scale a coefficient of reproducibility is normally established by dividing the total number of correct responses by the total number of all responses, with .90 or .95 considered the minimum level of reproducibility for a valid scale. Such coefficients were deemed unnecessary in this study of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, however, since the rather rigid criteria of scalability kept the number of non-scale responses quite low. Also, the scales--complete with errors and non-responses--are reproduced in this appendix for the reader's evaluation.



The method used to initially determine which roll calls would combine into a scale was cross-tabulation. Roll calls with related content were first checked against one another and those which qualified according to the criteria given below were used to construct preliminary scales in each issue area. Remaining roll calls were then cross-tabulated with at least one from each scale to detect any that might fit a scale even though there was no apparent similarity in content. When such a roll call was found to scale with one already in a scale, it was then checked against the other roll calls in that scale. If it scaled with all roll calls already included--and "made sense" conceptually--<sup>33</sup>it was added to the scale.

The criteria for scalability used in evaluating the four-fold tables and constructing the scales were the following:

1. If the combined total of the cases in the zero cell and its diagonal cell was less than 5 per cent of the total in all four cells, the roll calls were collapsed into a contrived item.

2. The "error cell" in the table must contain no more than 5 per cent of the total number of cases in all four cells, and must contain no more than half the number of cases found in any other cell.

3. If the ambiguous cases at any one step on the scale exceeded 5 per cent of the members ranked on the scale, those cases were considered as a separate scale type. If less than 5 per cent, they were classified in the adjacent scale type toward the median of the scale.

4. Deputies who showed a non-response on more than half of the final items in the scale--contrived items and/or individual roll calls--

were excluded even though they may have qualified on the basis of response on half or more of the original roll calls.

There are cases where one or more of these criteria have been altered in an effort to draw a little more information from a scale--especially in sessions which had few roll calls and only one or two scales. Each such variation from these basic criteria is explained in the discussion of the particular scale. There are also cases where scalable but error-ridden roll calls are dropped if there are scalable votes on "purer" versions of the same question. An example of this is the petroleum scale of 1926-1928, where the scale was improved--without any significant alteration of the item or the ranking of the deputies--by eliminating various procedural and tangential questions and basing the scale on the "purest" roll calls at each position of the controversy. Because of the folkways of roll call voting in the Argentine chamber which were discussed above, it is often impossible to avoid using votes which deal with one article of a complex bill, motions to take up or to table the issue in question, motions to adjourn, or other types of votes which in addition to the basic question are likely to reflect other dimensions and/or personal vagaries. But when available, votes dealing directly and exclusively with the question at issue are of course to be preferred.

The basic aims of the roll call analysis in this study are to identify the major dimensions of conflict, determine the intensity of conflict along these dimensions, and locate the deputies--in terms both of party and region--on each of these dimensions. The rather rigid criteria for scaling were deemed necessary to avoid pitfalls resulting

in large part from the high frequency of non-response; flexibility to vary from the criteria seemed advisable when it would further one or more of the three aims without substantially increasing the probability of spurious results. Finally, these three goals depend more upon the comprehensiveness and validity of the scales than upon what proportion of the session's roll calls are used in the scales.

#### Scales and Roll Calls, 1916-1966

This section of the appendix reproduces each of the Guttman scales discussed in the preceding chapters and lists a brief description, date, and source of roll calls composing each scale. Scales are presented in the order in which they are discussed in the text, each followed by a list of its roll calls. The volume and page citations at the end of the roll call description refer to the location in the appropriate year's Diario de Sesiones,<sup>34</sup> where the results of the roll call are printed. The vote figure to the right of the description in all cases lists the aye vote total first; the side which is underlined indicates the "positive" vote on that particular roll call.

Most party and bloc abbreviations vary from session to session and are given in the notes to the individual scales. Consistent throughout all time periods, however, is the meaning of UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) and, at the beginning of a party name, P. (Partido), U. (Unión), and C. (Concentración).

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1916-1918

Scale\*\*\*

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 1234
Gallo, V. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX 4
Goyeneche, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Lagos, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Melo, C. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Molina, V. M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Saguier, F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Veyga, T. de	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Demarchi, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Oyhanarte, H. B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Pereyra I., L.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Valle, D. del	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Anquín, I. de	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Carranza, W.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Vaca N., J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Acosta, J. P.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Atencio, J. V.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Marcó, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Morán, G. E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Paiz, J. C.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Aguirre, D.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Lencinas, J. N.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Araya, P.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Cordero, O.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Corvalán, S. E.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Jerez, E.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Cornet, P. L.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Le Breton, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX- 3
Pradere, C. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Zalazar, J. M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Mihura, E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Reibel, M.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Barrera, R.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	XXX-
Aldao, R.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Hernández, D.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XXX-
Iriondo, N. de	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XXX-
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XXX-

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Vergara, T. A.	Catamarca	P. Oficialista	C	XX--	2
Barco, J. del	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX--	
Contte, A.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	XX--	
Redoni, A.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX--	
Iturbe, M.	Jujuy	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX--	
Saravia, D.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XX--	
Uriburu, F. M.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XX--	
Camaño, M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	OX--	
Nougués, A. A.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XX--	
Bravo, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	1
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Cúneo, F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Justo, J. B.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	O---	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Zaccagnini, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X---	
Galíndez, F. R.	Catamarca	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X---	
Pérez V., E.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X---	
Sosa, L.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	X---	
Marchini, E.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	X---	
Aguirre, R. M.	Mendoza	P. Popular	C	X---	
Vidart, R.	San Juan	P. Conservador	C	X---	
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	Liga del Sur	C	O---	
Giménez B., D.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	X---	
Salvatierra, N.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	X---	
Agote, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	0
Arce, J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Avellaneda, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Avellaneda, N. A.	Buenos Aires,	P. Conservador	C	----	
Barceló, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Costa, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Echague, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Escobar, A. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
López B., J. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Massa, A. H.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Moreno, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type	1234
Moreno, R. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---0	0
Pagés, P. T.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Pinedo, F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---0	
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Varela, H. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Vedia, M. de	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Maidana, J.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	----	
Bonastre, M.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	----	
Rojas, G.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	----	
Colina, F. M. de	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	----	
Jaramillo, J. M.	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	----	
Videla, H.	San Juan	P. Conservador	C	----	
Padilla, M. M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	----	

\* Party abbreviations include: P. Demócrata Prog. (Partido Demócrata Progresista), and Liberal-Autonomista (a coalition slate of the Partido Liberal and the Partido Autonomista of Corrientes).

\*\* Bloc abbreviations are: C = Conservative; R = Radical; S = Socialist.

\*\*\* Composition of the scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Approval of the credentials of a Conservative candidate who died between election and inauguration, thus declaring the seat vacant. (Opponents wanted the election to go to the next highest vote getter, who was of the same party and received 6,107 votes to the deceased winner's 6,140; the next candidate had received only 2,986 votes). September 19, 1916, Vol. III, p. 2214.	50-30
1	Mild Senate substitution of a stronger Deputies bill criticizing the intervention of Buenos Aires province. Motion to approve Art. 1, containing the substance of the bill. August 8, 1917. Vol. III, p. 287.	48-18

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
2	Reapportionment. Motion to postpone consideration of the formula for reapportioning the chamber. September 26, 1916, Vol. III, pp. 2408-2409.	<u>49-41</u>
2	Buenos Aires Intervention. Motion to have clerk read some documents allegedly relating to the intervention discussion. June 8, 1917, Vol. I, pp. 774-775.	<u>33-45</u>
2	Budget increase by the Senate of 1,000,000 pesos to create an airborne police force for the southern national territories. Motion to approve. March 13, 1918, Vol. VIII, pp. 652-653.	<u>33-29</u>
3	Motion to approve the election of a Conservative deputy from Jujuy. May 20, 1916, Vol. I, p. 87.	<u>60-46</u>
3	Increase in the tax and control of the sale of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. January 18, 1916, Vol. V, p. 4339.	<u>43-35</u>
3	Buenos Aires intervention. Motion to recess during a filibuster. June 8, 1917, Vol. I, pp. 766-767.	<u>29-52</u>
3	Buenos Aires intervention. Motion to disapprove the executive's intervention of the province. June 8, 1917, Vol. I, p. 854.	<u>53-36</u>
3	Congressional immunity. Motion to consider the arrest of a conservative deputy in Tucumán. January 8, 1918, Vol. VII, p. 746.	<u>38-22</u>
4	Approval of the election of deputies in Buenos Aires province, where conservatives won the majority. May 19, 1916, Vol. I, p. 62.	<u>57-37</u>
4	Motion to break diplomatic relations with Germany. September 24, 1917, Vol. VI, p. 153.	<u>53-18</u>

## FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE, 1916-1918

Scale\*\*\*

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Agote, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	3
Arce, J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Avellaneda, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Avellaneda, N. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Costa, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Echague, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Escobar, A. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
López B., J. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Massa, A. H.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Moreno, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Moreno, R. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Pagés, P. T.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Pinedo, F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Verela, H. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Vedia, M. de	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Galíndez, F. R.	Catamarca	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Vergara, T. A.	Catamarca	P. Oficialista	C	XX	
Barco, J. del	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Maidana, J.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Contte, A.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Solari, B. T.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Sosa, L.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Rojas, G.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XX	
Marchini, E.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX	
Redoní, A.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX	
Colina, F. M. de	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	XX	
Jaramillo, J. M.	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	XX	
Aguirre, R. M.	Mendoza	P. Popular	C	XX	
Vidart, R.	San Juan	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Videla, H.	San Juan	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	Liga del Sur	C	XX	
Hernández, D.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XX	
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XX	
Salvatierra, N.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	XX	
Nougués, A. A.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XX	
Paz, E.	Tucumán	Independent	C	XX	
Bravo, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X0	2
Cúneo, F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X0	



## FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12	Type
Pradere, C. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X0	2
Solanet, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X0	
Barceló, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X0	
Pérez V., E.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X0	
Mihura, E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	X0	
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	1
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Justo, J. B.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Zaccagnini, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Zalazar, J. M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Castellanos, J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	0
Gallo, V. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Lagos, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Melo, C. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Molina, V. M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Saguier, F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Demarchi, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Oyhanarte, H. B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Valle, D. del	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Vaca N., J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Marcó, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	-0	
Morán, G. E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Barrera, R.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	--	
Araya, P.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Cordero, O.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Corvalán, S. E.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Camacho, M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	--	
Cornet, P. L.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	

## FOREIGN RELATIONS SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to take up day's agenda, thereby postponing discussion of a proposed diplomatic break with Germany. September 22, 1917, Vol. VI, p. 27.	23- <u>57</u>
1	Motion to break diplomatic relations with Germany. September 24, 1917, Vol. VI, p. 153.	<u>53</u> -18
2	Motion to postpone until the following day further discussion of the question of diplomatic relations with Germany in order to take up some railroad matters. September 24, 1917, Vol. VI, p. 117.	35- <u>39</u>

## SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE, 1916-1918

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 1234
Pinedo, F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XXXX 4
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XXXX
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X0XX
Vedia, M. de	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X0XX
Solari, B. T.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	XXXX
Iturbe, M.	Jujuy	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XXXX
Jaramillo, J. M.	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	XXXX
Aguirre, R. M.	Mendoza	P. Popular	C	XXXX
Cornejo, J.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XXXX
Saravia, D.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XXXX
Araya, P.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-XX
Correa, F.	Santa Fe	Liga del Sur	C	X0XX
Frugoni Z., D.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Martínez Z., G.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XXXX
Giménez B., D.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	XXXX
Salvatierra, N.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	XXXX
Cameño, M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XXXX
Cornet, P. L.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXXX
Nougués, A.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XXXX
Padilla, M. M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XXXX
Gallo, V. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX- 3
Galíndez, F. R.	Catamarca	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XXX-
Garzón, F. T.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	XXX-
Pérez V., E.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XXX0
Rojas, G.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X0X-
Cordero, O.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX-
Berho, M. S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX0
Demarchi, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-- 2
Pereyra I., L.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Riú, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Solanet, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Valle, D. del	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Varela, H. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-X-
Marcó, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Marchini, E.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX--
Mihura, E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX--
Redoni, A.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX--
Garro A., J. E.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX-0

## SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Echague, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X---	1
Massa, A. H.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X---	
Moreno, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X---	
Pagés, P. T.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-00	
Bonifacio, B.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	0
Bravo, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Cúneo, F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Goyeneche, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Justo, J. B.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Le Breton, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Melo, C. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Zaccagnini, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	----	
Arce, J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Moreno (h.), R.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	----	
Pradere, C. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Anquín, I. de	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Barco, J. del	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	----	
Carranza, W.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	---0	
Maidana, J.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-0--	
Vaca N., J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Reibel, M.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Barrera, R.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	----	
Gatica, T. I.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	
Montes, J. A.	Santa Fe	Radicales Disident.	R	-0--	
Jerez, E.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	----	

## SUGAR PROTECTION SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Art. 2 of sugar import bill, setting a gradually declining scale of duties on imported sugar. August 2, 1917, Vol. III, p. 142.	27- <u>40</u>
1	Art. 3 of sugar import bill, abrogating earlier laws dealing with duties on imported sugar. August 3, 1917, Vol. III, p. 177.	23- <u>41</u>
2	Alternative proposal (after defeat of Art. 2) providing that the old duties would take effect again seventy days after the price of sugar drops below 40 centavos per kilo. August 3, 1917, Vol. III, p. 165.	<u>37</u> -33
3	Stipulation that consumer price would be the figure determining the question of sugar import duties. August 2, 1917, Vol. III, p. 127.	41- <u>31</u>
4	Vote on the key price--40 centavos per kilo--in the sugar import bill. August 2, 1917, Vol. III, pp. 127-128.	45- <u>22</u>

## RELIGION SCALE, 1916-1918

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12	Type
Gallo, V. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Goyeneche, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Lagos, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Melo, C. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Veyga, T. de	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Demarchi, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Pereyra I, L.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Valle, D. del	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Avellaneda, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Barceló, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Echague, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Carranza, W.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Marchini, E.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	XX	
Saravia, D.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XX	
Barrera, R.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	XX	
Salvatierra, N.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	XX	
Padilla, M. M.	Tucumán	C. Conservadora	C	XX	
Pradere, C. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	1
Agote, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Arce, J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Escobar, A. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Massa, A. H.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Vedia, M. de	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Barco, J. del	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Solari, B. T.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	-X	
Atencio, J. V.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Garro A., J. E.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Bravo, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	0
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Cúneo, F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Zaccagnini, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Moreno (h.), R.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	

## RELIGION SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	0
Sosa, L.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	C	--	
Reibel, M.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Budget item allocating 197,124 pesos a year for scholarships for the training of priests. December 26, 1916, Vol. IV, p. 3079.	<u>41</u> -19
2	Motion to appoint a committee to study a proposed divorce law. June 20, 1917, Vol. II, p. 194.	30- <u>33</u>

## INVESTIGATIONS SCALE, 1916-1918

Scale***					
Deputy	Province	Party*	Block**	Item Type	12
Lagos, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Bravo, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Cúneo, F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Justo, J. B.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Zaccagnini, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Riú, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Moreno (h.), R.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Carranza, W.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Maidana, J.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Reibel, M.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Saravia, D.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XX	
Gatica, T. I.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Caballero, R.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XX	
Hernández, D.	Santa Fe	Radical Disidente	R	XX	
Salvatierra, N.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	XX	
Demarchi, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	1
Barceló, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Costa, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Escobar, A. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Moreno, J. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Pinedo, F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Vaca N., J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Zalazar, J. M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Marcó, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Redoní, A.	Entre Ríos	P. Provincial	C	X-	
Arancibia R., A.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Araya, P.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Jercz, E.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Valle, D. del	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	0
Agote, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Varela, H. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Duffy,	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	



## INVESTIGATIONS SCALE, 1916-1918 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item	Type
				12	
Barco, J. del	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	--	0
Jaramillo, J. M.	La Rioja	U. Conservadora	C	--	
Cordero, O.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	
Giménez B., D.	S. del Estero	U. Democrática	C	--	
Cornet, P. L.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	--	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 444.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Request that executive provide information on loans by government banks to national or provincial officerholders since 1890. August 6, 1917, Vol. III, p. 249.	<u>49-16</u>
2	Motion to appoint a committee to investigate alleged irregularities in government retirement and pension fund. September 7, 1917, Vol. IV, pp. 519-520.	<u>27-39</u>

## PETROLEUM SCALE, 1926-1928

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 123	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	4
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bidegain, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Poggi, J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Zurueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Alvarado, M. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Barbich, M. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Beguiristain, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Emparanza, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Garralda, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Goñi, B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Grau, J. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Lillia, F. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Miñones, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Oyhanarte, R. F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Pechano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XOX	
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Subiza, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Vásquez, J. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	OXX	
Artusi, A. A.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	

## PETROLEUM SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				123	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	4
Corominas, R. P.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	OXX	
Peyrotti, J. B.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	R	OXX	
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Ingaramo, V.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Costa, I. J.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
Gatti, J. A.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
Gómez, V. M.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
Echegaray F., A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	3
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX0	
Núñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX0	
Amadeo y V., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	OX-	
Guerci, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-X	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX-	
Hernández, B.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	X0-	
Greca, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX0	
Newell, C. L.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	X0-	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	2
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	

## PETROLEUM SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 123	Type
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	2
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X--	
Dávila, M. V.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-0	
De Miguel, B.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Gnecco, M. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Solíz, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Cafferata, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X--	
Romero, L.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X--	
Calle, J.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	X--	
Herráiz, P.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Mendieta, C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	0--	1
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	0--	
Figueroa, A. F.	Catamarca	U. Cívica Radical	A	0--	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	0--	
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	0--	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	0--	
Torrent, J. F.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	0--	
Jaureguiberry, L.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	0--	
Usandivaras, A.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	0--	
Albarracín, B.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	0--	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	0--	
Aguirre, J. U.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	0--	
Ferri, J.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	0--	
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	0--	
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	0--	
Juárez C., M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	0
Ceballos, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	---	
Calvento, M. G.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	
Martínez, F. V.	Entre Ríos	C. Popular	C	--X	
Calvetti, F. A.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	-0-	

## PETROLEUM SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party**	Bloc***	Item Type 123
Claros, E.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	--- 0
Videla R., A. S.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	---
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---
Sánchez Loria, H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	---
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	---
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	---

\* Abbreviations: Unif. = Unificada; Prog. = Progresista; Antipersonal. = Antipersonalista.

\*\* Blocs: R = Radical; A = Antipersonalista; C = Conservative; S = Socialist.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Petroleum law. Article 1 declaring national ownership of all hydrocarbons. September 1, 1927, Vol. IV, pp. 362-363.	<u>88</u> -17
2	Proposal that exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons be a national monopoly in all parts of the nation. September 7, 1927, Vol. IV, p. 478.	<u>65</u> -55
3	Motion to close debate on the proposed national monopoly of petroleum exploitation. September 7, 1927, Vol. IV, p. 431.	<u>55</u> -65

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE, 1926-1928

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	2
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Empanaza, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Garraida, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Grau, J. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Subiza, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XX	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Calvento, M. G.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX	
Jaureguiberry, L.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX	
Marcó, C. F.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX	

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX 2
Raffo de la Reta, J.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	XX
Corominas, R. P.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX
Alvarado, M. R.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	XX
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX
Cáceres, E. J.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	A	XX
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X- 1
Dávila, M. V.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-
Juárez C., M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-
Figueroa, A. F.	Catamarca	U. Cívica Radical	A	X-
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-
Martínez, J. H.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	X-
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X-
Contte, J. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X-
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	X-
Claros, E.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	X-
Herráiz, P.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	X-
Usandivaras, A.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X-
Landaburu, L.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	X-
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	X-
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-
Lagos, J.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-
Molinas, L. F.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X-
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X-
Ferreya, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	-- 0
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
Zurrueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
Alvarado, M. Rómulo	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	--
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--
López, A. S.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Clause in women's rights law giving a woman the right to administer her own property and that which she receives in the lawful separation of a household. August 25, 1926, Vol. IV, p. 429.	<u>72</u> -12
2	Clause in women's rights law allowing a woman to dispose of her own property and that which she receives as a result of a lawful separation of household goods. August 25, 1926, Vol. IV, pp. 429-430.	50- <u>34</u>



## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1926-1928

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Zurueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Barbich, M. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Núñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Vásquez, J. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Híquez, E. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Solís, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XX	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XX	
Artusi, A. A.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Newell, C. L.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	XX	
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez L., H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	XX	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX	

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12	Type
Juárez C., M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	1
Viñas, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	-X	
Cafferata, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-X	
Díaz de V., J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	X-	
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X-	
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	X-	
Calvetti, F. A.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	X-	
Herráiz, P.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	-X	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	-X	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	C	X-	
Araya, A.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X-	
Greca, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	X-	
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X-	
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X-	
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	-X	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	0
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	
Landaburu, L.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	C	--	

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to take up day's agenda, thereby avoiding a debate on the elevation of Argentina's representation to Italy to the rank of embassy. August 6, 1926, Vol. III, p. 542.	25- <u>77</u>
2	Elevation of Argentina's representation to the Vatican to the rank of embassy. Motion to approve. September 29, 1927, Vol. VI, p. 517.	<u>65</u> -37

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1926-1928

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 123
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX 5
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XOX
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Pérez, L. F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XXX
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	XXX
Cafferata, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XXX
Herráiz, P.	Méndoza	P. Liberal	C	XXX
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	XXX
Landaburu, L.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	C	XXX
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XXX
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXO 4
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	XXO
Goñi, B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXO
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX- 3
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
Cuillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	OX-
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
Aldazóbal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
Barbich, M. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-
Miñones, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				123	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	3
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	
Brizuela y D., R.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	
Newell, C. L.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	XX-	
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX-	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX-	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX-	
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX-	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X0-	2
Juárez C., M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X0-	
Solís, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X0-	
Gil, M.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	X0-	
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonom.	C	X0-	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	X--	1
Bidegáin, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	-X0	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	-X-	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	-X-	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X--	
Núñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X--	
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	X--	
Hernández, B.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	0--	
Usandivaras, A.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X--	
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	X--	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	-0-	0
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	---	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	---	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	-0-	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	-0-	
Conteno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-0-	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-0-	
Martínez, J. H.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	---	
Peña, M.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Díaz de V., J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	---	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	---	

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 123	Type
Jaureguiberry, L.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	0
Marcó, C. F.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	
Quirós, H. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--0	
Calvetti, F. A.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	---	
Claros, E.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	---	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	---	
Lazo, P.C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	---	
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---	
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---	
Echegaray F., A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	-0-	
Sánchez L., H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	---	
Camaño, M.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	-0-	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	---	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Law setting 8 p.m. as the required closing time for business firms. Motion to override presidential veto. August 6, 1926, Vol. III, p. 567.	<u>60-31</u>
2	Senate modification of a bill outlawing work in bakeries between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. making it apply only to federal capital and national territories rather than to entire nation as before. Motion to accept. August 6, 1926, Vol. III, p. 572.	<u>27-50</u>
3	Motion to take up day's agenda containing some items on labor legislation. August 6, 1926, Vol. III, p. 542.	<u>25-77</u>

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Bidegain, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Guifra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Zurueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Alvarado, M. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Beguiristain, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Empananza, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Garralda, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Goñi, B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Lillia, F. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Miñones, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Núñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Subiza, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Vásquez, J. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Brizuela y Doria, R.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Greca, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Ingarano, V.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Gatti, J. A.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XX	
Gómez, V. M.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XX	
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XX	
Echegaray Frías, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	1
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	X-	
Calle, J.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	X-	
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Amadeo y V., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	0
Gnecco, M. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Miguez, E. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	--	
Ceballos, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	--	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	--	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	--	
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	--	



## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12	Type
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	--	0
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	--	
Calvento, M. G.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Hernández, B.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Jaureguiberry, L.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Marcó, C. F.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Quirós, H. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	--	
Martínez, F. V.	Entre Ríos	C. Popular	C	--	
Calvetti, F. A.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	--	
Herráiz, P.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	--	
Raffo de la R., J. C.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	--	
Alvarado, M. R.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	--	
Unsaindivaras, A.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	--	
Albarracín, B.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	--	
Videla R., A. S.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	--	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	--	
Aguirre, J. U.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Araya, A.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Lazo, P. C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Mendieta, C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Cáceres, E. J.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	A	--	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Chissone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	--	
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	--	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	--	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	--	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Elections of deputies in Buenos Aires province. Motion to postpone consideration. June 14, 1926, Vol. I, p. 446.	53-82
1	Election of deputies in Buenos Aires province. Motion to approve. June 14, 1926, Vol. I, p. 447.	68-44
1	Motion to consider a proposed declaration reaffirming the Chamber's sole authority in the matter of initiating the budget. August 3, 1926, Vol. III, p. 304.	53-34
1	National budget. Motion to begin consideration. August 3, 1926, Vol. III, p. 313.	53-34
2	Vote on whether newly elected deputies from Córdoba can participate in preliminary sessions since their credentials had not arrived. April 6, 1926, Vol. I, p. 11.	68-53
2	UCR proposal to constitute the Chamber with just the incorporation of the newly elected deputies from the capital and Buenos Aires province, with deputies-elect from the other provinces to be considered during the regular sessions. June 16, 1926, Vol. I, p. 466.	56-80
2	Motion to adjourn, thus postponing consideration of the credentials from Córdoba. June 21, 1926, Vol. I, p. 596.	45-88
2	Approval of the election of Antipersonalist Deputies Froilán A. Calvetti and Ernesto Claros in Jujuy. June 23, 1926, Vol. I, p. 839.	80-46
2	Approval of election in San Juan in which two Antipersonalistas and a Conservative were elected to the Chamber. June 24, 1926, Vol. II, p. 28.	79-47

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
2	Specific approval of the election of the two Antipersonalist candidates (Belisario Albarracín and Abraham S. Videla Rojas) in the San Juan election. June 24, 1926, Vol. II, pp. 28-29.	79- <del>43</del>
2	Proposal to set up a committee reflecting the composition of the Chamber to oversee a general reregistration of voters and to study any needed revisions in the electoral laws. July 14, 1926, Vol. II, p. 367.	<del>40</del> -59
2	Request that the president not name government employees as non-government (labor or management) delegates to an International Labor Conference. Motion to consider. June 8, 1927, Vol. I, p. 541.	<del>42</del> -44
2	Proposal to extend the period for voter reregistration. Motion to consider. June 22, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 749-750.	<del>46</del> -66
2	Request that the president withdraw a recent decree modifying the national anthem. July 22, 1927, Vol. III, p. 20.	<del>36</del> -60
2	Proposal to create a special committee to investigate alleged mismanagement in the Navy's armament program. Motion to consider. July 29, 1926, Vol. III, pp. 152-1953.	65- <del>35</del>
2	Request for an investigation of alleged purchasing irregularities in the national railroads. Motion to consider. July 30, 1926, Vol. III, p. 194.	51- <del>35</del>
2	Proposal to liberalize the pending bill setting out a woman's rights in civil and business affairs. August 24, 1926, Vol. IV, p. 383.	<del>33</del> -50
2	Motion to refer all minimum wage matters to standing committee on labor legislation. January 18, 1927, Vol. VIII, pp. 456-457.	62- <del>47</del>
2	Vote on whether proposed pay raises for the military is a reconsideration (requiring a two-thirds vote) or a new item (requiring majority support). January 18, 1927, Vol. VIII, pp. 498-499.	57- <del>49</del>

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
2	Motion to refer to committee proposed wage increases for government employees and teachers. January 18, 1927, Vol. VIII, pp. 514-515.	61- <u>48</u>
2	Motion to take up proposal for mixed (public and private) exploitation of petroleum, July 28, 1927, Vol. III, p. 208.	66- <u>50</u>
2	Motion to close debate on proposed national monopoly of petroleum exploitation. September 7, 1927, Vol. IV, p. 431.	55-65

## PENSIONS SCALE, 1926-1928

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	2
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Guifra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Garralda, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Múñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Ahumada, R. C.	Catamarca	U. Cívica Radical	A	XX	
Artusi, A. A.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Brizuela y D., R.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Peyrotti, J. B.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Gatti, J. A.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XX	
Gómez, V. M.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XX	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	XX	
Lazo, P. C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	XX	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XX	
Sánchez L., H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	XX	
Camaño, M.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XX	
Amadeo y V., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	1
De Miguel, B.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Gnecco, M. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	

## PENSIONS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12	Type
Miguez, E. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	1
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Viñas, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-	
Ceballos, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	X-	
Martínez, J. H.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	X-	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X-	
Martínez, F. V.	Entre Ríos	C. Popular	C	X-	
Alvarado, M. R.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X-	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	X-	
Landaburu, L.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	C	X-	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X-	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X-	
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	0
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Pérez, L. F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	--	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	--	

## PENSIONS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to consider requests for pensions by the daughter of a former general and the family of a deceased deputy. September 9, 1926, Vol. V, p. 302.	<u>61</u> -21
2	Motion to approve the Senate's increase from 400 to 1,500 pesos per month the proposed pension for the sister of former Radical leader Leandro N. Alem. September 30, 1926, Vol. VI, pp. 662-663.	<u>65</u> -47

## CREDENTIALS SCALE, 1926-1928

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 123	
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	6
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bidegain, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Poggi, J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Sullivan, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Zurueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Alvarado, M. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Barbich, M. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Berguiristain, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Emparanza, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Garralda, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Goñi, B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Grau, J. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Lillia, F. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Miñones, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Múñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Repallini, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Santa María, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Subiza, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Vasquez, J. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	



## CREDENTIALS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 123	
Artusi, A. A.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	0XX	6
Brizuela y D., R.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XOX	
Corominas, R. P.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Calle, J.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	XXX	
Lencinas, J. H.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	XOX	
Lencinas, R. N.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	0XX	
Moyano, J. A.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	0XX	
Peyrotti, J. B.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Costa, I. J.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
Gómez, V. M.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Greca, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Ingaramo, V.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Echegaray F., A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XOX	
Cáceres, E. J.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	A	XOX	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	5
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	
Quirós, H. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XXO	
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	
Newell, C. L.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	XXO	
Sánchez L., H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	XXO	
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	U. Cívica Radical	A	XX-	4
Calvento, M. G.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX-	
Hernández, B.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX-	
Jaureguiberry, L.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XX-	
Araya, A.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	OX-	
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX-	
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XO-	3
Figueroa, A. F.	Catamarca	U. Cívica Radical	A	XO-	
Peña, M.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XO-	
Romero, L.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XO-	
Torrent, J. F.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XO-	
Parodi, M. J.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	XO-	
Calvetti, F. A.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	XO-	

## CREDENTIALS SCALE, 1926-1923 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 123	Type
Alvarado, M. R.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X0-	3
Videla R., A. S.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	X0-	
Aguirre, J. U.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X0-	
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X0-	
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X0-	
Amadeo y V., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	2
Arce, J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Dávila, M. V.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Juárez C., M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Viñas, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	
Gigena, A. M.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	X--	
Contte, J. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X--	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X--	
Claros, E.	Jujuy	U. Cívica Radical	A	X--	
Herráiz, P.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Raffo de la R., J.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Usandivaras, A.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X--	
Albarracín, B.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	A	X-0	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	X--	
Ferri, J.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	A	X--	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
López, A. S.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Mendietta, C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X--	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	X--	
De Miguel, B.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	0--	1
Solís, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	0--	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	0--	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	0--	
Rueda, P.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	0--	
Gil, M.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata	C	0--	
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	0--	
Martínez, F. V.	Entre Ríos	C. Popular	C	0--	
Lazo, P. C.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	0--	

## CREDENTIALS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 123	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	0
Bunge, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Dickmann, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
González I., H.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Spinetto, A. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	---	
Miguez, E. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Ceballos, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Belisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	---	
Remodi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	---	
Tolosa, E. S.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	---	
Marcó, C. F.	Entre Ríos	UCR Antipersonal.	A	---	
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Molinas, L. F.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-0-	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	---	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to postpone consideration of the credentials of Antipersonalista deputies-elect Rafael M. Lencinas and Juan A. Moyano of Mendoza. June 24, 1926, Vol. 11, p. 17.	29-27

## CREDENTIALS SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
2 Motion to postpone consideration of credentials and resignation of UCR deputy-elect Romeo D. Saccone of the capital. June 9, 1926, Vol. I, p. 294.		<u>65</u> -58
3 Motion to postpone consideration of the credentials of UCR deputy-elect José María Martínez of Córdoba. June 21, 1926, Vol. I, p. 666.		80- <u>58</u>

## BUDGET CONTROL SCALE, 1926-1928

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item Type	123
Alvarez, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	6
Bard, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bergalli, H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Bidegain, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Ferreyra, A. (h.)	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Fonrouge, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Giufra, E. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Hiriart, J. C.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Mohando, A. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Molinari, D. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Podestá, P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Zurrueta, T.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Aldazábal, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Barbich, M. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Beguiristain, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Empanaza, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
García T., E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Garralda, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
González, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Goñi, B.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Grau, J. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Lagomarsino, A. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Liceaga, F. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Miñones, A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Núñez, P. R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
O'Farrell, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Pachano, F. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Pérez, I. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Prat, J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Sánchez, C. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Siri, E. P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Subiza, P.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Vásquez, J. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Rodríguez, C. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Artusi, A. A.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Corominas, R. P.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Adaro, E. P.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Costa, I. J.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	

## BUDGET CONTROL SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				123	
Gómez, V. M.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXX	6
Rodríguez, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XOX	
Greca, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Alcorta, V.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	OXX	
Echegaray F., A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Antoni, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXX	
Sánchez L., H.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	A	XOX	
Errea, F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	5
Lillia, F. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	
Brizuela y D., R.	La Rioja	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	
Gatti, J. A.	Santa Fe	P. Radical Unif.	R	XXO	
González Z., A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	R	XXO	
Aguirre, J. U.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	XXO	
Fiorillo, J. F.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	XXO	
Bermúdez, M. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	XX-	4
Contte, J. A.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	OX-	
Calle, J.	Mendoza	UCR Lencinista	A	XX-	
Raffo de la R., J.	Mendoza	P. Liberal	C	XX-	
Alvarado, M. R.	Salta	U. Provincial	C	X-X	
Abalos, J. G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	XX-	
Solís, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	XO-	3
Ahumada, R. C.	Catamarca	U. Cívica Radical	A	XO-	
Centeno, D. R.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	XO-	
Araya, A.	Santa Fe	UCR Unificada	A	XO-	
Padilla, E. E.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	XO-	
Moreno, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X--	2
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-0	
Viñas, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	X-0	
Meabe, R. R.	Corrientes	Liberal-Autonomista	C	X-0	
Landaburu, L.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	X-0	
Cáceres, E. J.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	A	X--	
Castro, J. B.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	X--	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	1
Carballo, R.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Castellanos, J. D.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	

## BUDGET CONTROL SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				123	
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	1
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Muzio, A. S.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Oddone, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Pena, J. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Revol, P.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Tomaso, A. de	Capital	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Ceballos, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	0--	
De Miguel, B.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	0--	
Bellisle, R.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Remedi, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	S	0--	
Chiossone, G.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	A	0--	
Díaz, M. P.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	0--	
Dávila, M. V.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	-0-	0
Gnecco, M. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Míguez, E. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Pintos, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	---	
Santamarina, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Conservador	C	-0-	
Iturraspe C., F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	-0-	
Gutiérrez, C. C.	San Juan	C. Cívica	C	-0-	
Correa, F. E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	C	---	
Taboada, G.	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	-0-	
Vega, A. de la	Tucumán	P. Liberal	C	-0-	

\* See party abbreviation, p. 459.

\*\* See bloc abbreviation, p. 459.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Proposal to allow the Senate to spend 300,000 pesos of its budget surplus on building repairs and other items. September 30, 1926, Vol. VI, pp. 682-683.	11-66

## BUDGET CONTROL SCALE, 1926-1928 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
2 Motion to remain in permanent session with quorum until the budget is approved. January 18, 1927, Vol. VIII, p. 390.		<u>52</u> -45
3 Vote on a committee report requiring that 65 per cent of the surplus profits from the state oil operation be reinvested in that operation and that the remaining 35 per cent be spent on specified items. September 28, 1927, Vol. V, p. 629.		50- <u>52</u>



## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12345	
Benegas, T.	Capital	Concordancia	C	OXXXX	7
Espil, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Guglielmelli, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXXXX	
Kaiser, J. G.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXXXX	
Rodríguez, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Solá, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Uriburu, F. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Zarazaga, M. J.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Alvarez C., C.	Corrientes	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
González, B. S.	Corrientes	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Solari, F. C.	Corrientes	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	6
Morrogh B., J. F.	Entre Ríos	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Radío, P.	Entre Ríos	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXX	
Arrieta, H.	Jujuy	P. Popular	C	OXXXX	
Amadeo y V., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Barceló, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Carreras, E. L.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Castro, F.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Escobar, A. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Loncán, E.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Vignart, U. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	5
Escalera, F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Candia, C.	Corrientes	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Vallejo, L. A.	La Rioja	UCR (Antipers.)	C	OXXXO	
Gómez R., A.	Salta	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Degano, A. P.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	C	OXXXO	
Aráoz, J. I.	Tucumán	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXXO	
Andreis, F. de	Capital	Concordancia	C	OXXX-	
Iriondo, U. de	Capital	Concordancia	C	OXXX-	
Padilla, T.	Capital	Concordancia	C	OXXX-	
Allperín, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	5
Carús, A. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Miguel, B. de	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXXX-	
Grisolía, L.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Guiraldes, C. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Ortiz B., S.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Osorio, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXXX-	
Salcedo, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12345	Type
Schoo L., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	5
Solís, R. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Tapia, N.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Videla D., D.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Ahumada, L. A.	Catamarca	Concordancia	C	OXX-X	
Agulla, J. C.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Cafferata, J. F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Courei, C. D.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Fernández, D.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Soto, P. N.	Corrientes	UCR Antipers.	C	OXXX-	
Labayén, J.	Entre Ríos	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Quintana, F.	Jujuy	P. Popular	C	OXXX-	
Corominas S., R.	Mendoza	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Godoy, R.	Mendoza	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXXX-	
Vicchi, A. A.	Mendoza	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Aráoz, E. J.	Salta	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Basualdo, H.	San Juan	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Graffigna, S.	San Juan	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	OXXX-	
Cordero, O.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	C	OXXX-	
Fazio R., L.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	C	OXXX-	
Ferreira, A. R.	S. del Estero	UCR Unificada	C	OXXX-	
Simón P., J.	Tucumán	Concordancia	C	OXXX-	
Jardel, E. C.	Mendoza	P. Demócrata Nac'l.	C	XXX--	4
Biancofiore, R.	Santa Fe	UCR de Santa Fe	C	OXX0-	
Bonazzola, C. F.	Santa Fe	UCR de Santa Fe	C	XXX--	
López, H. S.	Santa Fe	UCR de Santa Fe	C	XXX0-	
Muniagurria, J. W.	Santa Fe	UCR de Santa Fe	C	XXX--	
Pita, C. A.	Santa Fe	UCR de Santa Fe	C	OXX--	
Lencinas, R. N.	Mendoza	UCR Federalista	C	OX--0	3
Critto, M.	Tucumán	UCR de Tucumán	U	XX--0	
López G., F.	Tucumán	UCR de Tucumán	U	OX---	
Martínez, M.	Tucumán	UCR de Tucumán	U	XX-0-	
Buira, D.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	2
Buyán, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Castiñeiras, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Dickmann, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12345	Type
Ghioldi, A.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	2
Giménez, A. M.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Lamesa, J. B.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Mouchet, E.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Palacín, M.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Pérez L., F.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Pfleger, J. E.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Repetto, N.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Ruggieri, S. L.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Solari, J. A.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Arnoldi, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Besasso, M. V.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Della L., J.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Korn, G.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Ramírez, M. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X----	
Rozas, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	X---0	
Magris, A.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	0	X----	1
Movsichoff, B.	Córdoba	P. Socialista	0	X---0	
Mattos, L. M.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	X--00	
Jiménez, M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Ameri, R. L.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista	0	0----	
Illanes, E. J.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Martínez, G. N.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Soria, B.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	0---0	
Mihura, E. F.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	0---0	
Busaniche, J. A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Grassi, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Bertotto, J. G.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	0----	
Godfrid, J.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	0----	
Repetto, A.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	0---0	
Araujo, E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	0
Arbeletche, A. P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Cantilo, J. L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0---	
Guillot, V. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0---	
Sáenz, M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Siri, O. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Tamborini, J. P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 12345	Type
Coca, J.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	-----	0
Ramiconi, L.	Capital	P. Socialista	0	-----	
Alsina, J. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Boatti, E. C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Castex, I. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Cisneros, C. E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Eyto, F. F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
López M., I.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Solana, J. F.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Aguilera, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Peña, E. S.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Pizarro, N. A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Martínez, F. B.	Corrientes	P. Liberal	U	---0-	
Aguirrezabala, M.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Astesiano, C. I.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Horne, B. C.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Marcó, C. F.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Sammartino, E. E.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Saá, A.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Saravia, J. M.	Salta	UCR Traditional	0	---0-	
Ruiz, O.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	U	-----	
Vilchez, M.	San Luis	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Boero, A.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Hernández, C.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	---0-	
Piedrabuena, C. P.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Susán, J. C.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Noble, J. A.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	-----	
Sellarés, A.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	---0-	
Wade, E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	0	---0-	
Barriouuevo, G.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	
Aráoz, E. D.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	-----	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938 (Continued)

\* Party abbreviations are as follows:

P. Demócrata Nac'l - Partido Demócrata Nacional.  
 P. Popular - Partido Popular.  
 UCR Antipers. - Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista.  
 P. Demócrata Prog. - Partido Demócrata Progresista.

\*\* C = Concordancia; O = Opposition; U = Uncommitted.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion that Chamber president take whatever measures necessary to maintain a quorum. August 4, 1937, Vol. I, p. 1113.	39-34
2	Declaration favoring increased efforts by the executive to preserve public education from Communist propaganda and other activities contrary to public order. Motion to consider. December 9, 1936, Vol. IV, p. 922.	49-55
2	Budget item providing for two new positions in the federal appellate court in La Plata. December 18, 1936, Vol. V, p. 442.	71-70
2	Proposal to exempt from taxation up to four automobile tires when they come with the vehicle. December 29, 1936, Vol. VI, p. 106.	38-53
3	Motion to postpone consideration of a challenge to the election of Deputy Emilio J. Hardoy of Buenos Aires. April 25, 1936, Vol. I, p. 7.	79-70
3	Motion to approve the election for national deputies in Buenos Aires province. June 17, 1936, Vol. I, p. 840.	68-80
3	Motion to continue debate on the intervention of Santa Fe province. October 30, 1936, Vol. IV, p. 410.	60-59
4	Request that executive provide details on persons expelled from Argentina since February 20, 1932. November 4, 1936, Vol. IV, p. 488.	54-61

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1936-1938 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
4	Declaration urging executive to abide by minimum wage law for government employees and to make it retroactive to January 1. Motion to consider. June 11, 1937, Vol. I, p. 623.	57- <u>36</u>
4	Proposal to increase the minimum wage of government workers. January 21, 1938, Vol. II, p. 686.	50- <u>43</u>
5	Vote to override a presidential veto on an amendment to the labor code which would remove private chauffeurs from the category of domestic servants and thereby guarantee them a weekly day off. December 15, 1936, Vol. V, pp. 168-169.	101- <u>15</u>

## LABOR SCALE #1, 1946-1948

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 123	Type
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	4
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Rojas, N.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Sammartino, E. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Balbín, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Rouggier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX	
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XXX	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Uranga, R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX0	
Zara, E. L.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	0XX	
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	0	XXX	
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX0	
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Orozoco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX0	
Alvarez V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Malecek, J. E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Ayala, L. T., F.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Velloso C., M. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX0	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX0	
Valdés, C.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX0	

## LABOR SCALE #1, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 123	Type
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-	2
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-	
Lasciar, G. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX-	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX-	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-	
Pasquini, J. P. D.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	XX-	
García Q., A.	San Luis	UCR-JR	P	XX-	
Cámara, G. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-	
Pirani, A. S.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX-	
Sarraute, J. R.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX-	
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--	1
Martínez L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0	
Mendiondo, F. D.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
Garay, M. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0	
Osinalde, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0	
San Millán, R. A.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	X--	
Arias, J.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
Díaz, M. M.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--	
Rodríguez, N. M.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X--	
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X--	
Alvarez P., M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---	0
Argaña, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---	
Benítez, A. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---	
Boullosa, E. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---	
Decker, R. A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---	
Cámpora, H. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--0	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	---	
Casas Nobleza, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	---	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	--0	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	--0	
Albrieu, O. E.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	--0	
Villafañe, J. M.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	--0	
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	---	



## LABOR SCALE #1, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0	0
Corvalán, L. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0	
Degreef, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0	
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	---	

\* Party abbreviations are as follows:

- P. Laborista-RJR - Combined slate of the Partido Laborista and the Unión Cívica Radical, Junta Renovadora.  
 UCR, JR - Unión Cívica Radical, Junta Renovadora.  
 UCRY-PL - Combined slate of the Unión Cívica Radical Yrigoyenista and the Partido Laborista.  
 PDN & UCR Antiper. - Combined slate of the Partido Demócrata Nacional and the Unión Cívica Radical Antipersonalista.  
 P. Demo. Nacional - Partido Demócrata Nacional.  
 P. Demo. Prog. - Partido Demócrata Progresista.

\*\* P = Peronista; 0 = Opposition.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion that salary supplement law be amended to include domestic servants. November 20, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 353.	<u>63</u> -18
2	Motion to extend salary supplement law to include all government employees earning less than 800 pesos per month. November 20, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 352.	<u>51</u> -33
3	Meat workers law. Provision requiring all employers guilty of "lock outs" to pay employees their regular pay for the time they were kept away from the job. November 7, 1946, Vol. VI, p. 673.	<u>43</u> -48

## LABOR SCALE #2, 1946-1948

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item Type	12
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	2
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Ottonello, B. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Rodríguez, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Tommasi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Graña E., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Jofré, H. R.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Saravia, T. S.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XX	
Villafañe, J. M.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	XX	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	XX	
Díaz, M. M.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Andreotti, A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	1
Argaña, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Orozco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	-X	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Rojas, N.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Ferrando, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Fregossi, L. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Ricagno, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Rougier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Cufré, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	

## LABOR SCALE #2, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	X- 1
Solanet, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-X
Osinalde, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-X
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	X-
San Millán, R. A.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	X-
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
García Q., A.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	X-
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	0	-X
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-
Brugnerotto, J. N. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	X-
Rodríguez, N. M.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	-X
Sarraute, J. R.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X-
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X-
Liceaga, F. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-- 0
Alvarez P., V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--
González F., T.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Mántaras, M. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	--
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	--

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

## LABOR SCALE #2, 1946-1948 (Continued)

## \*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Labor law governing private chauffeurs. Clause setting 90 days of employment as the minimum to qualify for benefits. September 27, 1946, Vol. V, p. 744.	28- <u>76</u>
2	Retirement and social security law. Amendment making it applicable to government employees over eighteen years old. August 21, 1947, Vol. III, p. 518.	55- <u>36</u>

## UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type	1234
Candioti, A. M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	4
Dellepiane, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	X00X	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Rojas, N.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Reyes, C.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX0X	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	X00X	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
González F., T.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Zara, E. L.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Mántaras, M. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Peña Guzmán, S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Hujica, R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	3
Orozco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Liceaga, F. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX0	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX0	
Sustaita S., H.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX0	
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX0	
Cufré, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX0	
Maineri, D. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXX0	

## UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Scale***				
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 1234
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXXO 3
Polizzi, J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	O	XXXO
Uranga, R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	O	0XX-
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXXO
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	O	XXXO
Antille, D. C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXXO
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXXO
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXXO
Alvarez P., M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXO- 2
Andreotti, A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-O
Boullosa, E. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXO-
García, M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXO-
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--
Ayala L. T., F.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXO-
Dri, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XO--
Pirani, A. S.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-O
Repetto, A.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	OX--
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	O--- 1
Ferrando, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---
Alvarez V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--O
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00
Osinalde, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	O--O
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	O---
García Q., A.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	-X--
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--O
Velloso C., M. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	O---
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	O---
Benítez, A. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---- 0
Colom, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----
Guardo, R. C.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----

## UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Messina, H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	0
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---0	
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Alvarez P., V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Ayerbe, L. B.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Bagnasco, V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	---0	
Fregossi, L. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Ottonello, B. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	-00-	
Raña, E. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	-0--	
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	----	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	----	
Graña E., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Martínez L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Obeid, L.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--X-	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Braga, J. C.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Garay, M. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Saravia, T. S.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	----	
Albrieu, O. E.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	----	
Villafañe, J. M.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	--0-	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Tejada, R. W.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	----	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	----	
Degreef, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---0	
Ponce, A. L.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	----	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	----	
Toro, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	----	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	----	
Rodríguez, N. M.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	-00-	
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	-00-	

## UNIVERSITY LAW SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	New University law. Senate amendment prohibiting faculty members from simultaneously holding other public positions. September 26, 1947, Vol. V, p. 356.	<u>73</u> -47
2	New University law. Senate amendment requiring that all persons joining the faculty have degrees. September 25, 1947, Vol. V, p. 292.	<u>58</u> -46
3	Proposal that deputies who are also university professors either resign from the universities or refrain from voting on the new university law, which includes pay raises. September 25, 1947, Vol. V, p. 287.	<u>48</u> -52
4	New University law. Approval "in general" prior to various amendments. July 23, 1947, Vol. II, p. 778.	75- <u>32</u>



## EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Block**	Item Type 1234	
Candioti, A. H.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	5
Dellepiane, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Sammartino, E. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Reyes, C.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	00XX	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Cufré, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Errecart, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Solanet, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	4
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XXXX	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XXXX	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Peña Guzmán, S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	XXXX	
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	4
Garaguso, B. H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Mujica, R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	

## EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item Type	1234
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	4
Raña, E. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX0	
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXX0	
Alvarez V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Jofré, H. R.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Polizzi, J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	0XX0	
Villafañe, J. M.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	-XX0	
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-XX0	
González F., T.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	O	XXX0	
Degreef, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Mosset I., M.	Santa Fe	P. Demo. Prog.	O	XXX0	
García, M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0-	3
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0X-	
Rougier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Sorgentini, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX-	
Tommasi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Malecek, J. E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Giménez V., F.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-XX-	
Arias, J.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Toro, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Andreotti, A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	2
Cleve, E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX-0	
Klix López, G.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX-0	
Pontieri, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX-0	
Casal, R. M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX-0	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-X0	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	X0--	
Brugnerotto, J. N. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
Díaz, M. M.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
Rodríguez, N. M.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX--	
Valdez, C.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX-0	
Alvarez P., M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0-	1
Argaño, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	

## EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				1234	
Beretta, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	1
Boullosa, E. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Decker, R. A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Messina, H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Palacio, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Ayerbe, L. B.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--0	
Ferrando, M. P.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Fregossi, L. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Iturraspe, C. A. de	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-0-	
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Lasciar, G. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--0	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--0	
Ottonello, B. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--0	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Casa Nobleaga, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Graña E., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Martínez L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0-	
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--0	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Dri, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0-	
Garay, M. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
Saravia, T. S.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	X---	
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	X--0	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Pasquini, J. P. D.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	X--0	
Camus, E. P.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	P	-X0-	
Corvalán, L. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Cuminetti C., A. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Pirani, A. S.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	-X-0	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Sarraute, J. R.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X-0-	
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X-00	

## EXPORT INVESTIGATION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 1234	
Colom, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-0--	0
Rodríguez, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	---0	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	----	
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0	
Repetto, A.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--0*	
Velloso C., M. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	---0	
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	----	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to refer to committee a request for creation of a special committee to investigate alleged irregularities in wheat exports to Uruguay. October 1, 1946, Vol. VI, p. 65.	13-109
2	Request that committee investigating wheat exports to Uruguay be given the authority to check into all matters dealing with export licenses. October 1, 1946, Vol. VI, pp. 66-67.	75-45
3	Proposal that wheat export investigating committee be given full use of the facilities of the Chamber of Deputies in its work. October 1, 1946, Vol. VI, p. 70.	59-45
4	Authorization for export license investigation to check back to June 4, 1943, rather than just back to June 4, 1946. October 31, 1946, Vol. VI, p. 530.	45-55

## RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 1234	
Orozco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	6
Candiotti, A. M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Dellepiane, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Liceaga, F. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Rojas, N.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Sammartino, E. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Cleve, E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Calzagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Cufré, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Del Mazo, C.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Errecart, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Malneri, D. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Solanet, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	-XXX	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XXXX	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Uranga, R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
González F., T.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Zara, E. L.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Aróoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	

## RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	0	-XXX	6
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Mántaras, M. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	00XX	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	00XX	
Peña Guzmán, S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	OXXX	
Boullosa, E. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0X-	5
Gericke, C. G.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X0X-	
Casal, R. M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0X-	
Ayala L. T., F.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0XX-	
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	00X-	
García Q., A.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	0XX-	
Guillot, C. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0X--	4
Mujica, R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XX--	
Alvarez V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-X-	
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XX--	
Antille, D. C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0X--	
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
García, M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	3
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	
Pontieri, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X0--	
Bustos F., R. C.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0-0	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	
Rossi, J.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X0--	
San Millán, R. A.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	X0--	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	X0--	
Toro, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	X0--	
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X0--	

## RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE, 1946-1943 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party**	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	2
Argaña, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Colom, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
Messina, H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Alvarez P., V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Ayerbe, L. B.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Bagnasco, V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Cámpora, H. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Fregossi, L. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Klix López, G.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X--0	
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Lasciar, G. F.	Buenos Aires	P. laborista	P	X---	
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Ottonello, B. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	-X--	
Petruzzi, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Raña, E. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Rouggier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Malecek, J. E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Obeid, L.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Dri, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Fernández, B. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0-	
Osinalde, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X---	
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
Pasquini, J. P. D.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	X---	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	X---	
Corvalán, L. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Benítez, A. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	1
Decker, R. A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	
Garaguso, B. H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	
Tommasi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	0---	
Martínez L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	
Braga, J. C.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	

## RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
Tejada, R. W.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	0---	1
Brugnerotto, J. N. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	0---	
Alvarez P., M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	-0---	0
Cooke, J. W.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Ricagno, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	-0--	
Rodríguez, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	-0--	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	----	
Graña E., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Garay, M. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Albrieu, O. E.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	----	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	-0--	
Arias, J.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Cuminetti C., A. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	----	
Ponce, A. L.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--00	
Mosset I., M.	Santa Fe	P. Demo. Prog.	O	-0-X	
Valdez, C.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	-0--	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Motion to take roll and send the list to business office so pay will be withheld for those deputies who are absent without permission. August 16, 1946, Vol. III, p. 63.	20- <u>61</u>
2	Motion to consider changes in Chamber rules which would make the dismissal of Chamber employees less of a discretionary matter in the hands of the Chamber president. June 12, 1947, Vol. I, p. 611.	55-50
3	Motivation to set up a special committee to investigate the assassination attempt that morning against Deputy Cipriano Reyes. July 4, 1947, Vol. II, pp. 392-393.	<u>60</u> -81



## RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
4	Proposal to expand the investigation of the Reyes assassination attempt to include a general investigation of recent attacks on public liberties. July 4, 1947, Vol. II, p. 394.	51-89

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party**	Bloc**	Item Type 1234	
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	5
Argaña, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Beretta, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Colom, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Decker, R. A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Garaguso, B. H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Palacio, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Lasciar, G. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-XX	
Petruzzi, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Pontieri, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXOX	
Raña, E. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXOX	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Casal, R. M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Malecek, J. E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Obeid, L.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Polizzi, J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Rossi, J.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Braga, J. C.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Garay, M. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Saravia, T. S.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XXXX	4
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XXOX	
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXXX	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	XXXX	
Pirani, A. S.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Ponce, A. L.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XXOX	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Sarraute, J. R.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XXXX	
Benítez, A. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Orozco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXOX	
Cámpora, H. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXOX	
Sustaita S., H.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXOX	

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item Type	1234
Tommasi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX0	4
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XXX0	
Bustos F., R. C.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Graña E., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Brugnerotto, J. M. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Cuminetti C., A. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Degroef, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Díaz, M. M.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX0	
Messina, H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	3
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Ayerbe, L. B.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX-	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XXX-	
Rouggier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Sorgentini, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X0X-	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0-	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	O	XX-X	
Osinalde, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Villafañe, J. M.	La Rioja	P. Laborista	P	XX0-	
Moreno, J. L.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XXX-	
Cámara, G. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX0-	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XXX-	
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	2
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	O	XX--	
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
Pasquini, J. P. D.	Salta	UCRY-PL	P	XX--	
García Q., A.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	XX-0	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	O	XX--	
Antille, D. C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX--	
García, M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	1
Cooke, J. W.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X--0	
Gericke, C. G.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X---	
Alvarez V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-0-	
Díaz de Vivar, J.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-00	

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item 1234	Type
Candioti, A. M.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	0
Dellepiane, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Liceaga, F. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Sanmartino, E. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	-00-	
Reyes, C.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--0-	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Cufre, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Errecart, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-00-	
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
González F., T.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	
Mántaras, M. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0--	
Peña Guzmán, S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	0	-0-0	

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	United Nations Charter and Act of Chapultepec. Motion to consider. August 29, 1946, Vol. III, p. 571.	<u>106</u> -46
1	United Nations Charter. Approval. August 29, 1946, Vol. III, p. 695.	95- <u>39</u>
1	Act of Chapultepec. Minority report recommending approval with several reservations as to national determination. August 29, 1946, Vol. III, p. 690.	31- <u>100</u>
2	Act of Chapultepec. Approval of decree by which Argentina adhered to the Act. August 29, 1946, Vol. III, pp. 692-693.	<u>87</u> -8
3	Declaration of solidarity with the national congress of Guatemala in its claim of national rights over Belize. September 25, 1946, Vol. V, pp. 334-335.	47- <u>47</u>
4	Declaration urging Bolivia to cease political executions. September 29, 1946, Vol. V, p. 892.	<u>39</u> -50

## ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	2
Alvarez P., M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Andreotti, A.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Benítez, A. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Beretta, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Boullosa, E. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
García, M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Mujica, R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Orozco, M. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Dellepiane, L.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Rodríguez de la T., R.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Alvarez P., V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Bagnasco, V.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Fregossi, L. J.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Kees, C.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Lareo, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Lasciar, G. F.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Letamendi, B. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Petruzzi, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Pontieri, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Raña, E. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Ricagno, R.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Rodríguez, M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Sorgentini, M. A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Sustaita S., H.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Tommasi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Balbin, R.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Calcagno, A. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Córdova, J. S.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Errecart, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Galvagni, S. M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Maineri, D. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Pérez de la T., H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	

## ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Scale***	
				Item	Type
				12	
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XX	2
Vergara, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Alvarez, V., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Bustos F., R. C.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Curchod, A. J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Graña, P., M.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Malecek, J. E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Martínez, L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Obeid, L.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Polizzi, J.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Bertini, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Ayala, L. T., F.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Mediondo, F. D.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Rossi, J.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	O	XX	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	O	XX	
Braga, J. C.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Dri, R.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Fernández, B. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Garay, N. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Mariategui, A. S.	Entre Ríos	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
MacKay, L. R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Saravia, T. S.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XX	
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	XX	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Dufau, J. A.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Giménez V., F.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Aráoz, R. E.	Salta	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Camus, E. P.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	P	XX	
Tejada, R. W.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	XX	
García, Q., A.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	XX	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	O	XX	
Antille, D. C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Arias, J.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Barreiro, C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Brugnerotto, J. M. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Cámara, G. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	

## ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Corvalán, L. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	2
Cuminetti, C., A. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Degreef, J. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Ponce, A. L.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Repetto, A.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Bonazzola, R. E.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Mántaras, M. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Noriega, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Montes de Oca, C.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Perea, P. J.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Alvarez, J. D.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Sarraute, J. R.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Valdéz, C.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Fajre, J. B.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Peña Guzmán, S.	Tucumán	U. Cívica Radical	O	XX	
Messina, H.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	1
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Ravignani, E. J. P.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Rojas, N.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Sammartino, E. E.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Ianspolsky, A.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Cufre, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Zinny, M.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	-X	
Díaz, M. M.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Rubino, S. N.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Zanoni, P. P.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	O	X-	
Vischi, A.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	--	0
Liceaga, F. J.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	O	--	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	--	
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	O	--	
Uranga, R.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	O	--	



## ABORIGINAL PROTECTION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

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\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Resolution regarding protection of aboriginal peoples. Motion to consider. August 22, 1946, Vol. III, p. 245.	<u>115</u> -7
2	Proposed allocation of 30,000 pesos to the Committee on National Territories for use on study trips. Motion to consider. August 22, 1946, Vol. III, p. 246.	<u>100</u> -20

## SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE, 1946-1948

					Scale***
Deputy	Province	Party**	Bloc***	Item Type 12	
Colom, E.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	2
Dellepiane	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Frondizi, A.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
López Serrot, O.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Pomar, G.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Ravignani, E. J. F.	Capital	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Rouggier, V. S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Cufré, O. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Del Carril, E. D.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Del Mazo, G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Errecart, J. A.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Ferrer, M.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Maineri, D. J.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Martínez G., G.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Pueyrredón, H. H.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Solanet, E.	Buenos Aires	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Baulina, A. V.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Lencinas, J. R.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Sobral, A.	Córdoba	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Díaz Colodrero, J.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XX	
Vanasco, J. A.	Corrientes	PDN & UCR Antiper.	0	XX	
Santander, S.	Entre Ríos	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Zara, E. L.	Mendoza	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Arévalo C., J.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Pastor, R. A.	San Luis	P. Demo. Nacional	0	XX	
Antille, D. C.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Cámara, G. F.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Pirani, A. S.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Ponce, A. L.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	XX	
Busaniche, J. J.	Santa Fe	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Rojas, A.	S. del Estero	U. Cívica Radical	0	XX	
Rodríguez, N. M.	Tucumán	P. Laborista	P	XX	
Alvarez, N.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	1
Argaña, J. M.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Guillot, C. J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Marotta, J.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Reynés, L. R.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	

## SAN JUAN RECONSTRUCTION SCALE, 1946-1948 (Continued)

				Scale***	
Deputy	Province	Party*	Bloc**	Item Type 12	
Rumbo, E. I.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	1
Tesorieri, J. V.	Capital	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Letamendi, J. V. (h.)	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Visca, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Casas Noblega, A.	Catamarca	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Martínez L., E.	Córdoba	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Urdapilleta, O. C.	Corrientes	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Sarmiento, M.	Jujuy	UCR Yrigoyenista	P	X-	
De la Torre, J.	Mendoza	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Camus, E. P.	San Juan	UCR Bloquista	P	X-	
Tejada, R. W.	San Juan	P. Laborista	P	X-	
Corvalán, L. R.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Cuminetti C., A. D.	Santa Fe	P. Laborista-RJR	P	X-	
Montiel, A. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--	0
Pontieri, S.	Buenos Aires	P. Laborista	P	--	
Fernández, H. S.	San Luis	UCR, JR	P	--	
Allub, R.	S. del Estero	P. Laborista	P	--	

\* See party abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\* See bloc abbreviations, p. 495.

\*\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1 Proposal to add a representative of the property-owners to the special committee which will administer some 300 million pesos in national funds allocated for reconstruction in the province of San Juan following an earthquake. September 24, 1946, Vol. V, p. 294.		<u>72-16</u>
2 Motion to set a date for consideration of needed reconstruction in San Juan after an earthquake, with or without a committee report. September 4, 1946, Vol. III, p. 844.		<u>56-37</u>

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	Type
			Item 1234	
Belnicoff, M.	Capital	UCRP	X0XX	5
D'Angelo, E. A.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Elena, R.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Garófalo, R. A.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Jaroslavsky, M.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Minsk, H. E.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Musitani, H. F.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Rosito, M. C.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Stainch, A.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Zadoff, A.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Zarriello, R. J.	Capital	UCRP	XXXX	
Del Pero, M. P.	Capital	Independent	XX0X	
Alfonsín, R. R.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Cerdeiro, A. M.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Cortelezzi, O.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Lavalle, M.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Massolo, E. A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Mastolorenzo, V.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Ortúzar, J. C. F. de	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Oxenford, R. K.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Picado, E.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Prat, L. C.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Puricelli, A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Schapira, D.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Tróccoli, A. A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Vázquez Pol, J.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXX	
Pernasetti, H.	Catamarca	UCRP	XXXX	
Vaca Lobo, J. M.	Catamarca	UCRP	X0XX	
Fernández, R.	Córdoba	UCRP	XXXX	
Fernández, N., I.	Córdoba	UCRP	XXXX	
García, H.	Córdoba	UCRP	XXXX	
Ortiz H., A. H.	Córdoba	UCRP	X0XX	
Ratti, L. C.	Córdoba	UCRP	0XXX	
Spertino, N. A.	Córdoba	UCRP	XXXX	
Barbí, U. G.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	XXXX	
Garay, F. J.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	XXXX	
Solari, E. A.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	XXXX	
Cáceres, R. M.	La Rioja	UCRP	X0XX	
Llaver, S. S.	Mendoza	UCRP	XXXX	
Videla, R.	Mendoza	UCRP	XXXX	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 1234	Type
Villamayor, R. A.	San Juan	UCRP	XXXX	5
Damiani, S.	Santa Fe	UCRP	XXXX	
Del Matti, J. J.	Santa Fe	UCRP	XXXX	
Rouzaud, A. R.	Santa Fe	UCRP	XXXX	
Sañudo, F., C. R.	Santa Fe	UCRP	XXXX	
Barrionuevo, G. E.	S. del Estero	UCRP	XXXX	
Méndez D., A. V.	S. del Estero	UCRP	XXOX	
Mercado, J. I.	S. del Estero	UCRP	XXXX	
Zanoni, J. C.	S. del Estero	UCRP	XOXX	
Arroyo, R. F.	Tucumán	UCRP	XXXX	4
Amura, L.	Capital	Independent	XXXO	
Pena, R. H.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XOXO	
Urteaga, B. F.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	XXXO	
Roberto, M.	Córdoba	UCRP	XOXO	
Rodríguez V., E.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	XXXO	
Arrascaeta, F. de	La Rioja	UCRP	XXXO	
Baffico, A. O.	Capital	UCRP	XXX-	3
Domínguez, L. C.	Buenos Aires	FNPC- U. Conserv.	XXX-	
González, B. P.	Buenos Aires	FNPC- U. Conserv.	XXX-	
Hardoy, E. J.	Buenos Aires	FNPC- U. Conserv.	XXX-	
Fiol, J. A.	Córdoba	UCRP	XXX-	
Harvey, R. J. G.	Corrientes	Autonomista	XXX-	
Bilbao, S.	Entre Ríos	FNPC- P. Dem. U.	XXX-	2
Bravo, H. F.	Capital	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Patlis, L.	Capital	P. Demócrata Prog.	OX--	
Thedy, H. R.	Capital	P. Demócrata Prog.	XO--	
Ghioldi, A.	Capital	P. Socialista Dem.	OX--	
Gutiérrez, E. O.	Capital	UDELP	XX--	
De Cara, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Fabrizio, L. N.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Dem.	XX--	
Abalo, R.	Buenos Aires	UDELP	XX--	
Balestra, J.	Corrientes	FNPC- P. Liberal	XXO-	
Aletta de S., A. R.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Berrini, E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Martínez, R., R. J.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Molinas, R. F.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	
Muniagurria, C.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	XX--	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 1234	Type
Calviño, H. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	0---	1
Muñiz, R. A.	Capital	P. Socialista Arg.	0-0-	
Caggiano, A. R.	Capital	UCRI	X---	
Simini, J. A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	0---	
Coral, J. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Arg.	0---	
Musacchio, V. M.	Buenos Aires	UCRI	X---	
Pérez A., A.	Buenos Aires	UCRI	X---	
Bazan R., S. A.	San Juan	CPP - UCR Bloquista	X-0-	
Gallo, C. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	----	0
Niembro, P.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Rodríguez V., F. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Sa, E.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Sarmiento, N. M.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Tecera del F., R. I.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	--0-	
Vázquez, A.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	--0-	
Busacca, S. F.	Capital	P. Demócrata Crist.	----	
Alegre, C. D.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Armesto, A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Bianchi, M. L.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Castellanos, A. I.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Castillo, M.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Insúa, C. R.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Isla, R.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Izetta, G. M.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Montani, J. J. M.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Natiello, R. O. A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Riande, T. N.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Rodríguez, E.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Schiaffino, N. H.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Pérez, R.	Buenos Aires	MID	----	
Tortonese, D. O.	Buenos Aires	MID	--0-	
Vedia, E. de	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Crist.	----	
Antón, J.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Cottonaro, C. A. C.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	-0--	
Roca, L. R.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Pizarro, T. F.	Córdoba	P. Demócrata Crist.	----	
Arballo, E. J.	Corrientes	MID	-0--	

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 1234	Type
Espinoza, S. R.	Corrientes	MID	----	0
Maya, H. D.	Entre Ríos	Just. - Tres Banderas	--0-	
Ferreira, J. W.	Entre Ríos	MID	----	
Uranga, R. L.	Entre Ríos	MID	----	
Calvó, C. A.	Jujuy	Just. - P. Blanco	----	
Catalán, G.	Mendoza	Just. - P. Blanco	-0--	
Fluixá, E. W.	Mendoza	Just. - M. Pop. Mend.	----	
Serú García, A.	Mendoza	Just. - Tres Banderas	----	
Caro, J. A.	Salta	Just. - P. Labor. Nac.	---0	
González, J.	Santa Fe	Just. - U. Popular	----	
Vinti, G.	Santa Fe	Just. - U. Popular	---0	
García Solá, H. J.	Santa Fe	MID	----	
Gómez Machado, H.	Santa Fe	MID	----	
Abdulajad, A.	S. del Estero	Just. - U. Popular	-0--	
Juárez, C. A.	S. del Estero	Just. - Tres Banderas	----	
Riera, F. P.	Tucumán	Just. - Acción Prov.	----	
Romano, B. V.	Tucumán	Just. - Acción Prov.	----	
Salado, F. A.	Tucumán	P. Demócrata Crist.	--0-	
Ocampo, C. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Arg.	----	
Risso, C. S. E.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	----	

\* Party and bloc abbreviations are as follows:

UCRP - Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo.  
 UCRI - Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente.  
 FNPC - Federación Nacional de Partidos del Centro.  
 UDELPA - Unión del Pueblo Argentino.  
 CPP - Confederación de Partidos Provinciales.  
 MID - Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo.  
 U. Conserv. - Unión Conservadora.  
 P. Dem. U. - Partido Demócrata Unido.  
 P. Demócrata Prog. - Partido Demócrata Progresista.  
 P. Socialista Dem. - Partido Socialista Democrático.  
 P. Liberal - Partido Liberal.  
 Just. - Justicialista.  
 U. Popular - Unión Popular.  
 P. Socialista Arg. - Partido Socialista Argentino.

## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

P. Demócrata Crist. - Partido Demócrata Cristiano.  
 P. Labor Nac. - Partido Laborista Nacional.  
 Acción Prov. - Acción Provincial.  
 P. Blanco - Partido Blanco de los Trabajadores.  
 M. Pop. Mend. - Movimiento Popular Mendocino.  
 P. Labor. Nac. - Partido Laborista Nacional.

\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Buenos Aires street development; motion by proponents to insert material in the record assuring care of displaced residents. July 6, 1965, pp. 1055-1056.	<u>74-30</u>
1	Rent control law; committee report recommending a 10 per cent annual increase in rents. September 30, 1965, p. 3954.	<u>69-77</u>
2	Resolution condemning U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and censuring the Argentine executive for supporting the OAS stand on the intervention; motion to consider. May 14, 1965, p. 308.	<u>64-76</u>
2	Resolution asking foreign minister to seek a change of location of upcoming OAS foreign ministers conference in Rio de Janeiro due to alleged anti-democratic conditions in Brazil. October 28, 1965, p. 4960.	<u>53-55</u>
2	Homage to Eva Perón; motion to hear all proposed homages, including this one. July 28, 1965, pp. 1574-1575.	<u>60-57</u>
3	Resolution condemning U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic; motion to consider immediately. May 7, 1965, p. 265.	<u>69-62</u>



## PARTISAN ISSUES SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

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Item	Roll Call	Vote
3	Request that minister of interior come to chamber immediately to "explain" the alleged violent suppression of a worker demonstration that day in which two allegedly died; motion to consider. October 21, 1965, p. 4675.	66- <u>62</u>
3	Declaration that the chamber would be "pleased" if the executive would pay the nation's teachers for the time they were on strike; motion to consider. March 23, 1966, p. 7009.	60- <u>48</u>
3	Request that appropriate government ministers be called to discuss problems of telephone service; motion to consider. April 1, 1966, p. 7408.	48- <u>57</u>
3	Motion that minister of interior be called in to clarify restrictions on the Peronistas in the statute governing political parties. June 16, 1966, p. 1185.	53- <u>62</u>
3	Law of amnesty for Peronista labor unrest; motion to set date for consideration. August 11, 1965, p. 1991.	64- <u>52</u>
3	New tax law; vote on majority report. May 5, 1966, p. 260.	<u>72</u> -78
3	Rent control law; clause excluding government operations from provisions of the law. September 29, 1965, p. 3921.	63- <u>49</u>
4	Request that ministers of education and economy come explain why teachers' pay was behind schedule, particularly in the interior. June 30, 1965, p. 832.	92- <u>49</u>
4	Tax relief for growers in drought-plagued Entre Ríos and southern Corrientes; motion to set on agenda. June 16, 1965, p. 648.	63- <u>40</u>

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1965-1966

				Scale**
Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Item 12	Type
Calviño, N. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	XX	3
Gallo, C. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Niembro, P.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Rodríguez, V., F. R.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Sarmiento, N. M.	Capital	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Busacca, S. F.	Capital	P. Demócrata Crist.	XX	
Selser, J. J.	Capital	P. Socialista Arg.	XX	
Caggiano, A. R.	Capital	UCRI	XX	
Garibaldi, A.	Capital	UCRI	XX	
Musitani, H. F.	Capital	UCRP	XX	
Amura, Luis	Capital	Independent	XX	
Alegre, C. D.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Armesto, A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Bianchi, M. L.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Castellanos, A. I.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Castillo, M.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Isla, R.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Izetta, G. M.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Natiello, R. O. A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Riande, T. N.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Rodríguez, E.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Simini, J. A.	Buenos Aires	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Mársico, A. O.	Buenos Aires	MID	XX	
Pérez, R.	Buenos Aires	MID	OX	
Tortonese, D. C.	Buenos Aires	MID	OX	
Vedia, E. de	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Crist.	OX	
Coral, J. C.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Arg.	XX	
Ocampo, C. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Arg.	XX	
Fabrizio, L. N.	Buenos Aires	P. Socialista Dem.	XX	
Arana, T. P.	Buenos Aires	UCRI	XX	
Musacchi, V. M.	Buenos Aires	UCRI	XX	
Pérez Aznar, A.	Buenos Aires	UCRI	XX	
Antún, J.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Cottonaro, C. A. C.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Risgo, C. S. E.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Simó, A. J.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Monte, R. A.	Córdoba	UCRI	XX	
Arballo, E. J.	Corrientes	MID	XX	
Espinoza, S. R.	Corrientes	MID	XX	

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 12	Type
Maya, H. D.	Entre Ríos	Just. - Tres Banderas	XX	3
Tachella, E. S. J.	Entre Ríos	Just. - Tres Banderas	XX	
Calvó, C. A.	Jujuy	Just. - P. Blanco	OX	
Catalán, G.	Mendoza	Just. - P. Blanco	XX	
Fluixá, E. W.	Mendoza	Just. - M. Pop. Mend.	XX	
Serú García, A.	Mendoza	Just. - Tres Banderas	XX	
Caro, J. A.	Salta	Just. - P. Labor. Nac.	XX	
Cornejo, L., J. C.	Salta	Just. - P. Labor. Nac.	XX	
González, J.	Santa Fe	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Vinti, G.	Santa Fe	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Gómez Machado, H.	Santa Fe	MID	XX	
Migno, M.	Santa Fe	MID	XX	
Viñals, F. J.	Santa Fe	MID	XX	
Abdulajad, A.	S. del Estero	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Juárez, C. A.	S. del Estero	Just. - Tres Banderas	XX	
Riera, F. P.	Tucumán	Just. - Acción Prov.	XX	
Romano, B. V.	Tucumán	Just. - Acción Prov.	XX	
Salado, F. A.	Tucumán	P. Demócrata Crist.	XX	
Roca, L. R.	Córdoba	Just. - U. Popular	XX	
Bravo, H. F.	Capital	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	2
Thedy, H. R.	Capital	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Belnicoff, M.	Capital	UCRP	XO	
D'Angelo, E. A.	Capital	UCRP	X-	
Zarriello, R. J.	Capital	UCRP	X-	
De Cara, J. E.	Buenos Aires	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Alfonsín, R. R.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Cerdeiro, A. M.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Corteletzi, O.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Lavalle, M.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Massolo, E. A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Pena, R. M.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Picado, E.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Prat, L. O.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Schapira, D.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Tróccoli, A. A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Urteaga, B. F.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	
Vázquez Pol, J.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	X-	

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 12	Type
Pernasetti, H.	Catamarca	UCRP	X-	2
Fernández, R.	Córdoba	UCRP	X0	
Fernández, N., I.	Córdoba	UCRP	X-	
Rasines, O. G.	Córdoba	UCRP	X-	
Ratti, L. C.	Córdoba	UCRP	X-	
Roberto, M.	Córdoba	UCRP	X-	
Spertino, N. A.	Córdoba	UCRP	X-	
Balbi, I. G.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	X-	
Villamayor, R. A.	San Juan	UCRP	X-	
Aletta de S., A. R.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Berrini, E.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Martínez R., R. J.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Molinas, R. F.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Muniagurria, C.	Santa Fe	P. Demócrata Prog.	X-	
Damiani, S.	Santa Fe	UCRP	X-	
Del Matti, J. J.	Santa Fe	UCRP	X-	
Rouzaut, A. R.	Santa Fe	UCRP	X-	
Mercado, J. I.	S. del Estero	UCRP	X-	1
Zanoni, J. C.	S. del Estero	UCRP	X-	
Arroyo, R. F.	Tucumán	UCRP	X-	
Zadoff, A.	Capital	UCRP	0-	
Oxenford, R. K.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	0-	
Puricelli, A.	Buenos Aires	UCRP	0-	
Garay, F. J.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	0-	
Rodríguez V., E.	Entre Ríos	UCRP	0-	
Cáceres, R. M.	La Rioja	UCRP	0-	
Saúdo F., C. R.	Santa Fe	UCRP	0-	
Baffico, A. O.	Capital	UCRP	--	0
Garófalo, R. A.	Capital	UCRP	--	
Riva, R. E.	Capital	UCRP	--	
Gutiérrez, E. O.	Capital	UDELPA	--	
Del Pero, M. P.	Capital	Independent	--	
Domínguez, L. C.	Buenos Aires	FNPC - U. Conserv.	--	
González B., P.	Buenos Aires	FNPC - U. Conserv.	--	
Hardoy, E. J.	Buenos Aires	FNPC - U. Conserv.	--	
Vaca Lobo, J. M.	Catamarca	UCRP	--	
Bilbao, S.	Entre Ríos	FNPC - P. Dem. U.	--	

## LABOR LEGISLATION SCALE, 1965-1966 (Continued)

Deputy	Province	Party Bloc*	Scale**	
			Item 12	Type
Aguinaga, C. E.	Mendoza	FNPC - P. Demócrata	--	0
Llaver, S. F.	Mendoza	UCRP	--	
Barrionuevo, G. E.	S. del Estero	UCRP		

\* See party and bloc abbreviations, pp. 525-526.

\*\* Composition of scale:

Item	Roll Call	Vote
1	Labor law changes, motion to consider. April 28, 1966, p. 7968.	<u>80</u> -10
1	Labor law changes, motion to consider. April 29, 1966, pp. 8011-8012.	<u>84</u> -14
2	Labor law amendment giving tenure to employees with ten years seniority. Motion to consider. October 10, 1965, p. 4839.	55- <u>63</u>
2	Coverage of maritime workers in labor law. Motion to override Senate amendment which would exclude maritime workers. April 29, 1966, p. 8039.	55- <u>54</u>

Notes.

<sup>1</sup>The literature on roll call analysis in the United States is much too vast to attempt to summarize here, but useful discussions and bibliographic starting points include Lee F. Anderson et al, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 414-452.

<sup>2</sup>Among studies of foreign legislatures which have utilized Guttman scaling in the analysis of roll calls are Duncan MacRae Jr., Parliament, Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); MacRae, "Intra-Party Division and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," Comparative Studies in Society and History, V (January, 1963), 164-211; David M. Wood, "Issue Dimensions in a Multi-Party System: The French National Assembly and European Unification," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VIII (August, 1964), 255-276; and William O. Aydelotte, "Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840's," Comparative Studies in Society and History, V (January, 1963), 134-163.

<sup>3</sup>Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," in Social Science Research on Latin America, Charles Wagley (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 189. For another critique reaching a somewhat similar conclusion, see John D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics, XXVIII (February, 1966), 57-80.

<sup>4</sup>Roll calls printed in the Diario de Sesiones, the record of debates of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, are neither indexed nor numbered. Thus, they can only be located through a page-by-page examination of the publication.

<sup>5</sup>Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Reglamento de debates y policía de la Cámara de Diputados de la Confederación (Paraná: Imprenta del Estado, 1856).

<sup>6</sup>Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Diario de Sesiones, 1878, I, 298-299.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., I, 354.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., I, 653. Many of the roll calls held by the Argentine Chamber of Deputies come as rectificaciones nominales requested by members dissatisfied with the outcome of the original vote.

<sup>9</sup>Diario de Sesiones, 1879, p. 560.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Diario de Sesiones, 1880, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup>Not all editions of the chamber rules could be located for examination, but the continuity among those that were available would suggest that the same general procedures were followed over long periods of time.

<sup>13</sup>Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, El parlamento argentino (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 279.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 279-280.

<sup>15</sup>Diario de Sesiones, 1938, III, 445ff.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 795.

<sup>17</sup>Austin F. Macdonald, Government of the Argentine Republic (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942), p. 263.

<sup>18</sup>Information on the breakdown of the machine and the inability to get it repaired due to the unique design was provided by an employee of the chamber who was in charge of maintaining the equipment in 1967.

<sup>19</sup>On similar grounds, some researchers have considered as a single "court" the period of time between changes in the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court.

<sup>20</sup>Indicative of the imbalance in the chamber during the latter part of the Perón era is the fact that it was divided between 135 Peronistas and 14 Radicals in 1952, 141-14 in 1953, and 140-12 in 1955. See Darío Cantón, Materiales para el estudio de la sociología política en la Argentina (2 vols.; Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1966), I, 69-71.

<sup>21</sup>For an analysis of "old names" in the chamber during several different periods, see Darío Cantón, El parlamento argentino en épocas de cambio: 1890, 1916 y 1946 (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1966).

<sup>22</sup>The terms "trustee," "delegate," and "politico" are used here in the sense they are employed by Heinz Eulau et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American Political Science Review, LIII (September, 1959), 742-756.

<sup>23</sup>Several assassination attempts against Deputy Cipriano Reyes, leader of the Partido Laborista who tried to maintain a measure of independence from Perón, are generally considered to be a product of this internal conflict. See Robert J. Alexander, The Perón Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 58.

<sup>24</sup> Among many examples of such changes in the 1946-1948 session was a roll call recording 115-7 approval of a measure which had failed twice in anonymous voting and a 50-41 vote which reversed to 29-62 when a roll call was requested. Diario de Sesiones, 1946, III, 245, and 1947, V, 347.

<sup>25</sup> Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to analyze the voting deviance of Peronista deputies in terms of voting returns in their areas of residence.

<sup>26</sup> In the sessions both before the installation of the voting machine and after it ceased to function for roll calls, numerous instances can be found of deputies accusing their opponents of requesting roll calls merely as a stalling device.

<sup>27</sup> Considerations such as this, for example, may have motivated one deputy when asking for a roll call to point out that the question was "clearly of an administrative character, having nothing to do with politics." Diario de Sesiones, 1901, II, 481.

<sup>28</sup> For a colorfully written and illustrated description of style in the chamber--from a conservative point of view--see Ramón Columba, El Congreso que yo he visto (3 vols.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Ramón Columba, 1948-1951).

<sup>29</sup> There are three types of recorded absence in the chamber: absent with permission, absent with notice, and absent without notice. These distinctions are not relevant in the current analysis, however, and all three types of absence--along with deputies who were present at the opening of the session but were not recorded on the particular roll call--are grouped into the general category of "non-response."

<sup>30</sup> See Louis Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Measurement and Prediction, Samuel A. Stouffer et al. (eds.) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1950), pp. 60-90.

<sup>31</sup> The term "positive" carries no value connotations; it is an arbitrary decision which end of any issue dimension is designated as the positive end. The need to convert the votes to positive or negative responses arises from the fact that an aye on one roll call may represent the same position on an issue as does a nay on another roll call.

<sup>32</sup> The major source of these criteria is Anderson et al., pp. 107-110.

<sup>33</sup> This subjective check on "scalability" seemed advisable due to the probability of random matches, especially in a chamber that tends to vote by party bloc.



<sup>34</sup>The year of the Diario de Sesiones refers to the year in which the annual session begins, usually around May 1. Therefore, the first few months of a calendar year will be recorded in the Diario of the previous year.

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Visión.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lee Cameron Fennell was born February 5, 1934, in Miami, Florida. He lived in the Miami area until early 1942, spent the following year in Puerto Rico, and from 1943 until late 1948 he lived in Costa Rica. Following his return to Florida, he lived in Leesburg and graduated from Leesburg High School in 1952. From 1953 until 1955 he served in the U.S. Army, spending most of the time in Korea. Following his separation from military service, Mr. Fennell entered the University of Florida and in June, 1959, received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Journalism. As an undergraduate he served as managing editor and editor-in-chief of the Florida Alligator. He was a member of Florida Blue Key and Sigma Delta Chi.

Mr. Fennell spent the next five years working as a newspaper reporter, first for the Clearwater (Fla.) Sun and later for the Tampa (Fla.) Tribune. He pursued graduate studies on a part-time basis from 1962 until 1964 while working for the Tribune, and in September, 1964, he began full-time graduate work in the Department of Political Science. He held a graduate fellowship from the College of Arts and Sciences for the 1964-1965 academic year and a National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship for the years 1965-1968. The 1967 calendar year was spent in Argentina on dissertation field research.

Since September, 1968, Mr. Fennell has held the position of assistant professor of political science at the University of the Pacific in Stockton, California, where his areas of specialization include


Latin American politics, political development, and research methodology. He is a member of various professional organizations, including the American Political Science Association, the Latin American Studies Association, the International Studies Association, the Western Political Science Association, the Southern Political Science Association, the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, and the Northern California Political Science Association, on whose council he currently serves.

Mr. Fennell is married to the former Elizabeth Loraine and is the father of three children.



This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


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Dean, College of Arts and Sciences


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